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Abstract
From the beginning of the 17th century to the middle 
of the 19th century the Christian Empire of Ethiopia was in 
decline; the power andprestige of the Emperor were at a 
low ebb and the provincial governors; vied with one another 
for a dominant position in the Empire. This decline was the 
combined effect upon the Empire of past wars with her Muslim 
neighbours, religious civil war and the Galla invasions.
At the provincial level the p eriod was marked by terri­
torial expansion, centralization and consolidation of provin­
cial autonomy. This development achieved varying degrees of 
success in the different provinces. Probably the highest 
degree of success was achieved in the Galla-dominated province 
of Shoa, where a line of Amhara rulers fees** the district of 
Manz succeeded in establishing a stable dynasty. Through 
military prowess and administrative ability the dynasty gradu­
ally conquered the surrounding Galla, and by the IB40s had created 
a, powerful kingdom independent of the Emperor. The success of 
Shoa’d development was due partly to the ability of its rulers, 
partly to the absence of interference from other princes in the 
Empire, and parffcr to the political and military weakness of the 
Galla tribes.
In 1855-6 Emperor Theodros, having revived the imperial 
authority, conquered Shoa but nine years later Shoa regained 
her independence, From 1865 to 1889 the relations between Shoa 
end the revitalised Imperial power became a crucial domestic 
issue in the Empire. The period also saw Shoa conquer more 
Galla provinces.
As a result of her expensionjthere evolved in Shoa a strong 
centralised administration, and a commercial and military 
activity, the relative efficiency of which enabled the kingdom 
to withstand efforts by the Imperial power to conquer it.
In 1889 the King of Shoa became Emperor and thereby 
re-united the Empire under the Shoan dynasty.
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Preface
Hy original idea was to write a historyjrf the Galla 
in Ethiopia; X was not clear in my own mind whether i t was 
to be the Galla of the centra!.;, plateau or those in the south. 
Nevertheless, I began to go through the literature on the G?lla. 
After Ihad seen a fair amount of the literature I decided to 
write on the rise of Shoa. 1 was led to this decision by one 
simple factor. All the general histories on Ethiopia devote 
considerable space to the reign of Emperor Menelik XI and rightly 
emphasize his contribution to the building of present day 
33thiopia. However, very little indeed is said of Menelik before 
he became Emperor. Invariably he is mentioned .as having aspired 
to the imperial throne, as having been thwarted for some time by 
the superior strength of Yohannes IV, and as having been a friend 
of the Italians from whom he obtained firearms. Menelik as King 
of Shoa is dismissed In a cou2>le of lines. A few periodical 
articles give some sidelights on the Kingdom of Shoa, but this 
is always incidental to the main theme of the articles and con­
sequently is useful only as an indication of what might be found. 
With the exception of two recent studies the general histories 
on Ethiopia do not say anything about the kingdom over which 
Menelik ruled, Its administration, commercial and military organ!-
sation. Yet these are the things one would like to know in 
order to appreciate more fully the role played by Menelik, 
not only as Emperor but even more so as ICihg of Shoa, since 
the few references to him as King of Shoa tend to suggest 
that even then Menelik was an important figure In the politics 
of the Empire,
Of the two studies which give some account of Shoa, 
q
Levine’s work, published towards the end of 1965, Is a 
sociological rather than a historical study of Ethiopia.
His account of Shoa covers eight to nine pages of a chapter 
which deals primarily with the relative legacies of Gondar 
and Mans to the present day Empire of Ethiopia. In order to 
be able to assess the legacy of Manz, -^ evine found himself 
sketching the outlines of the history of Shoa. All that he 
could do in that limited space was'to trace the rise of the 
Shoan dynasty. Even so the crucial period from about 1848 to 
1889 deserved more than the fourteen lines which the author 
gives to it.
The only study which deals at some length with the King-
2
dom of Shoe, is Dr. Abir’s thesis which is not yet published.
Levine, D.IT: T/ax and Gold_,_ Chicago and London 1965*
Abir, K.s Trade and Politics in the Ethiopian Region 1830-55*
London Ph.D. 1964*
In a chapter of some sixty pages the author has written a 
political and commercial history of modern Shoa up to about 
1855, Indeed his thesis is the only existing study which gives 
a coherent account of some of the provinces which now con­
stitute the Empire during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The major limitations of the work are pointed out 
in the preface by the author himself. In connection with 
Shoa, however (and probably with the ether chapters too) it 
should be noted that, being a pioneer In the field, Dr. Abir has 
tended, not unnaturally, to accept some facts which seem to me 
to be questionable* Moreover, interesting as the study Is, 
it really ends with the death of Sahla Selassie in 1847, for 
the reign of Haile Malakot, the successor of Sahla Selassie,
:is dismissed in a couple of lines.
The present study, which attempts to give a coherent and 
detailed history of Shoa up to 1889, has been undertaken with 
a view to providing that background which seems to me to be 
indispesnable to a proper understanding of the succession of 
Menelik to the imperial throne In 1889, and cf the a?ten em­
phasised role which he, as Enperor, played in the Empire.
The sources which I have used for this study can be grouped 
into two broad categories; first, traditional Ethiopian and,
secondly, official archival as well as published material,
British, French and Italian. For convenience in discussing 
the second graup of sources we shall sub-divide them into the 
different nationalities and consider them under those headings.
The traditional Ethiopian sources consist of chronicles 
of the reigns of the Emperors Theodros and Menelik. Of these 
the chronicle of theieigiof The o dr os which is believed to have 
been written by Alaka Zanab Is incomplete and goes only as far 
as about 1860. Although it contains an outline of the history 
of the Empire from about 1800 and- is fairly detailed on Theo- 
dros's early life and rise to power, jfc is sketchy, even for a 
chronicle, on events in Shoa. On the other hand, the chronicle of 
the same Emperor written by a Shoan cleric, Alaka halda Maryam , 
is complete and more detailed. This chroniclejis the only source 
I could find which treates the period 1855 to 1865 hi any detail. 
Thus my account of that period has tended to be heavily dependent 
on this chronicle. The author, being a Shoan eye-witness of the 
events recorded, one would suspect that the narrative is somewhat 
biased against Theodros. This suspicion becomes greater when 3fc 
is remembered that the chronicle was written thirteen years after 
the deathjrf Theodros, at a time when a Shoan was likely to extol 
and arer-emphasise the role played by kShoans" during the period
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covered by the chrofticle. For example, Yfaiaa Maryam writes 
with emotions about executions inflicted by Theodros on his 
soldiers who attempted to revolt while they were in Shoa, 
as if execution for a similar offence was completely unknown 
in the history of Shoa. On the whole, however, Vial da Maryam 
is fair to Theodros. He records in some detail b^oth the 
wicked and. commendable actions of the Emperor and the 
occasional eulogies so characteristic of Ethiopian royal 
chmicles are not wanting.
The third chronicle consulted for this study is that 
of the reign of Menelik written by Guebre sellasie. The author 
was the Emperor's Minister of the Pen andtherefore the chronicle 
may be regarded as the official account of the reign, ill though 
sketchy, as is to be expected, on the early rulers of Shoa, 
it is extremely detailed for the reign of Menelik both as King 
of Shoa and as Emperor. It is to the credit of the author 
that much of his account, especially from 1376 onwards, is 
confirmed not only in the essentials but sometimes also in the 
minor details in the despatches sent to Europe by the Europeans
who were then in the country.
Of the European archival material the British had a limited 
value for fiyiy purposes. This is because British source material
on Shoa is limited to the period 1839-43? with a few odd 
despatches referring to the years lg48-50, and 1868-71 * The 
voluminous reports on the Afar and Somali coasts in the 1880s 
are of only peripheral importance for the purpose of this 
study. The material which deals with the period 1839-43 is 
made up of reports, partly by the protestant missionary Krapf, 
and partly by the Harris Mission, which arrived in Shoa in July 
1841 and left in February 1843* ICrapf came to Shoa after he 
and his companion Isenberg* had been expelled from Ttfgre by Ubie the 
ruler of that province. Their reasons for coming* to Shoa may have 
been purely evangelical, but KrapPs letters from that Kingdom 
reflect a conviction, probably as a result of his experience 
in Tigre, that his missionary activities would be doomed to 
failure unless it was linked up with British commercial, and colon­
ial enterprise. For this reason he was anxious to lead the British 
government on to acquire an influence in Shoa, Krapffs information 
about the strength and resources of Shoa, therefore, are not always 
accurate. His anxiety to interest the British in Shoa led him to 
exaggerate the danger offered by the French, One tends to suspect
that the ambitious project which Krapf attributes to the Frenchman
•1
Eochet d'Hericourt, who was then in Shoa, was designed to achieve
^Unreservedly accepted as a fact by Ullendorff and Beckingham 
in their article “The first Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty", Journal 
of Semitic Studies, Vol. IX, Ho, 1 Spring 1964.
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liis object of persuading the British government to send a 
permanent mission to Shoa. One’s suspicion is strengthened by the 
awareness that Rochet himself does not speak of his projects in 
Shoa in such grandiose terms. Yet one would have erpected him 
to speak in high terms about his plans in the letters and re­
ports which he sent to the French government ministries if only 
to win official backing. One does not get the full weight of 
Krapfs ideas from his published works; his most telling re­
ports are in the archives.
The official reports, articles and books written by 
Harris and members of his mission provide much of what we know 
of Shoa during the reign of Sahla Selassie. The bulk of the 
official reports was written by Harris in his caimcity as the 
leader,of the missi^pn, yet for the most port, Harris lived in 
Ankober and could hardly have acquired all the information him­
self. One concludes therefore that Harris obtained his information 
partly from other members of his mission, partly from the English 
traveller Dr. Beke who was ad.so in Shoa at this time and partly
from- ICrapf. A careful comparison of the ’’medical report” by
1 2 Kirk,* of the report on Aliu Amba by Barker, of the reptort on
3LG205 No. 1453.
2LG 185 No. 1440.
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agriculture by Graham5 and of Beke's letters with the 
reports of Harris makes this clear. It is a pity that 
Harris does not acknowledge openly the part played by 
others in providing information for his reports. Although 
in general the men who furnished the material for Harris 
were careful and reliable observers Harris himself had 
an inordinate tendency to exaggeration. There is little 
doubt that the nature of his mission influenced the contents 
of his reports. Nevertheless, when all reservations are 
made, one has to admit that the information furnished by 
Krap>f and members of the Harris Mission constitute a very 
valuable source material for our knowledge about Shoa in 
the B4-0s.
The French archival sources span a longer period than 
the British sources. Besides the material on the 1840s, there 
is also material which begins from about 1874 and which con­
tinues to flow, though not without some interruption',, through­
out the period covered in this study. The French material 
which I found useful is to be found partly in the Bibliotheque 
Hationale but mainly in the Ministere des Affaires Ftrangeres, 
There are also a few letters in the Archives Hationales.
The material in the Bibliotheque Nationale is made up entirely
i
of the ”d’Abbadie Papers”. I should explain what is con­
tained in these papers. The d'Abbadie Papers consist of 
about twenty-seven volumes, most of which deal with Ethiopia 
but some contain private papers of the d’Abbadie family.
Of those dealing with Ethiopia the bulk is made up of notes, 
personal observations and oral information collected by 
Antoine d1Abbadie during* his travels in Ethiopia. The rest 
consists of correspondence between Antoine d’Abbadie and 
various people such as the Prefects of Propaganda Fide and 
the Oatholic missionaries, Mas sal a, Taurin Gaiiagne and others; 
all this correspondence deals with Ethiopia. It was these 
letters which were useful to me; the oral information and 
personal observations written down by d’Abbadie himself during 
his Ethiopian travels were hai'dly of interest to this study.
In this connection it should be remembered that, although they 
travelled widely in Ethiopia, neither of the d’Abbadie brothers 
visited Shoa, so that all that they were able to write about 
Shoa was derived from Muslim merchants whom they met in other 
parts of Ethiopia. In many cases I found this type of in­
formation inaccurate. As regards the Missionaries in Shoa and 
the G-alla country who were in regular touch with d’Abbadie, 
it should be noted that they were in general men of limited 
intelligence whose attitude and reports were often influenced
by religious sentimentalism.
At the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres I would like 
to draw attention particularly to the series Memoirgset 
Documents. Other series like 1 Consulaii£ et Commercial' 
and 1 Correspondence politique des Consuls', the section 
for Massawa, which is catalogued under Egypt, contain inter­
esting information on Ethiopia generally but these were not 
of much direct help to me. In the M. & D. series we may 
note first a memorandum by Rochet d'Hericourt on the politics 
and commerceof Shoa. Rochet is often referred to by writers 
on Ethiopia as a French agent; no doubt this reflects the
tone of Krapf. Rochet was in early 1840s no more a French
a British agent 
agent than Henry Salt was/ He need to distinguish between
the Rochet who in the fir&t half of the 1840s was an adventurer, 
a commercial speculator, and the Rochet who In 1846 was sent 
on a mission by the French government to northern Ethiopia 
and later was appointed French Consul at Jedda. Rochet’s later 
career depended on his knowledge of the area and not on the 
fact that In the early 1840s he was an agent for the French 
government. That Rochet had no contact in French official 
circles during his visits to Shoa, is indicated by his in­
ability to secure even an official encouragement for the trade 
he planned to follow in Shoa. The second thing we may note in
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the M. & D. series is the extracts from the journal lcept 
by Arnoux while he was in Shoa, and the letters he wrote 
in an effort to win official support for his commercial 
enterprise. It is regrettable that the full journal is 
not available, for although one detects a certain overlay 
in Arnoux's letters, the entries in the journal regarding 
events which he witnessed in Shoa bear the stamp<f authenticity.
we may now mention the journals of Soleillet and Borelli 
detailing their travels in Shoa, and the articles written by 
Aubry and Audon and other French travellers who visited Shoa 
during the period covered by this study. Borelli is probably 
the most reliable of our French sources. Practically all the 
Frenchmen who visited Shoa during the reign of Menelik were in 
one way or another interested in opening up commercial links 
between Shoa and the French port of Obock on the Somali coast, 
Borelli unlike all the others was purely an explorer seeking 
geographical information. Thus he had no particular reason 
not to record the non-geographical information which came his 
way as faithfully as he could, and one would like to think that 
this is what Borelli did.
The fourth category of sources which I have made use of 
for this study is the Italian archival and printed primary 
material. We need to distinguish three sex>arate archives here.
First, the archives of Propaganda Fide where are to "be 
found, at least up to 1892, the letters and reports written 
by members of the Catholic mission to the Galla* The 
material covering the period after 1892 has been transferred 
to the Vatican archives. Secondly, there are the historical 
archives of the Italian Geographical Society. It is here 
that are kept the original despatches from the members of 
the geographical expedition led by Marquis Antinori, which 
intended to go to the equatorial lakes but which came
ti
to be based in Shoa. Some of these despatches were published
either partly or wholly in the bulletins of the geographical
society but others have remained unpublished. Thirdly, the
archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
material which I found useful here are those which originally
belonged to the now dissolved Italian Ministry for Africa
and which are kept as part of the MAS1V archives. This
]
material is labelled ASMAI" in the archives. Some .of this 
material was published in the Italian government Green Books. 
It should be noted, however, that in a number of cases only 
extracts from the original despatches were published in the
1See Abbreviations.
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Green Books, and sometimes the omissions are hy np means the 
least important. The safest way to use the Green Books there­
fore is to cross-check their contents with the original 
despatches in the archives.
The quality and reliability of the material in the Propa­
ganda Archives have been indirectly commented upon in con­
nection with the "d’Abbadie papers”. Here it is only neces­
sary to emphasize that the writings of Massaia are in many 
ways a disappcaating source. Massaia, it will be recalled, 
was the head of the mission to the Galla from its inception 
in 1847 until 1879, when he was expelled from Ethiopia by 
Emperor Yohannes. For the last eleven years of his evangelical 
life in Ethiopia, Massaia lived continuously in Shoa. Here 
was a man who could have furnished us with invaluable in­
formation on the first fourteen years or so of Menelik*s reign 
as King of Shoa. True enough, he wrote fairly regularly to the 
Propaganda but his letters, and also his published twelve volume- 
work detailing his missionary activities, are concerned more 
with his evangelical work than with politics and other aspects
1Massaia, G.: 1. Miei Trentacinque anni di missione nell1 alta
Etiopia, Milano 1885-95.
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of life in the areas where he worked. That portion of his 
writings which is of interest hi) us tends to be sketchy and 
sometimes confused, and often he saw things only through the 
eyes of his religion.
In the Geographical Society archives attention should 
be drawn to the reports sent by Antinori, Ragassi and fraversi. 
Although right from the beginning Antinori’s mission had com­
mercial as well as political undertones, he remained at heart 
an explorer whose /previous experiences as such and whose 
scientific mind taught him to report honestly and accurately 
the information he obtained. As regards Ragazzi and fraversi, 
it should be remembered that by their time Italy’s colonial 
aspirations had taken a definite turn towards territorial ac­
quisition. Despite the fact that both Ragazzi and leavers! 
were intelligent, well educated and scientifically trained men 
they could hardly have written reports as dispassionate as one 
would hove expected of them. Fortunately, however, they both 
travelled widely in the kingdom and knew at first hand much of 
the events and facts about which they wrote.
The material in the archives of the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was furnished by various officials not only in 
Shoa but also in other parts of Ethiopia, and an the Red Sea as
well as the Somali Coast ports. Antonelli stands out prominently 
among all those officials. From 1882 to 1889 Antonelli was the 
accredited representative of the Italian Government in Shoa.
As such, Antnnelli was under instructions from Italy and in 
most cases his actions in Shoa were carefully guided to suit 
the policy of his government. An interesting example of this is 
found in the way Antonelli dealt with Menelik*s searching questions 
about the Italian occupation of Massawa in 1885. Naturally 
therefore one needs to scrutinize Antonelli’s reports. The need 
for caution becomes greater if those reports are used as source 
material for diplomatic history. Nevertheless, in a sense, the 
fact that Antonelli was an official government representative is 
a great help to us, for he was thus obliged to collected as 
accui'ate and as detailed information as could be obtained on all 
aspects of Shoan life on which the Italian Government could base 
its policy. In an effort to do this Antonelli travelled exten­
sively in the Kingdom, accompanied Menelik to a few meetings 
with the Emperor Yohannes and foil owed::, the King on a number of 
campaigns. In this way Antonelli acquired a great deal of in­
formation about Shoa which he reported, one would like to believe, 
as accurately as he could. Antonelli himself was a very intelligent 
and well educated man, a shrewd observer, who seems to me to have
understood clearly Henelik's position in Shoa, especially with 
regard to the Emperor. X find his analysis of the political 
pattern in Shoa and his comments on events in general both meti­
culous and pert'unent •
Finally I would like to refer to articles written by 
Italian travellers and also to C‘ecchifs invaluable three volume 
work on his travels in Shoa and in the Galla country. Cecchi, 
like Borelli, was primarily an explorer interested in scientific 
and geographical information, and whatever other information he 
recorded was incidental to his main interest.
Although in this study I have tried to give as coherent 
and comprehensive account of the Kingdom of Shoa as I could, 
much more remains to be done before the picture will be complete. 
The source material I have used is not nearly exhausted. The 
important question of land tenure, linked as it was with the 
expansion of Shoa, has only been touched upon. The church and 
its response to the activities of foreign evangelical missions 
in Shoa and hi the conquered Galla. country has not been touched 
at all and will no doubt serve as an interesting subject for 
research. Bor have I discussed the histories of the individual 
Galla Kingdoms or of Harar from the point where Dr. Abir left 
off. These have not been touched, not because they are uninterestin
xxi .
izi themselves, hut because to discuss them as part of this
study would have encumbered our main theme with many digressions.
Nevertheless, the background to Menelik1s imperial reign is,
to my surprise, hardly known even to students of Ethiopian hi story.
It is my hope that this study has brought that background to
light and thereby has contributed to a better understanding of
one of the most fascinating periods in the history of Ethiopia.
This research was made possible by a post-graduate scholar™ 
ship granted to me by the University of Ghana, for which I am 
deeply grateful. My thanks also go to Professor Joseph Tubiana 
who helped me a great deal in Paris and was so kind as to visit 
me in hospital when I underwent an operation there. Einally, I 
would like to record my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, 
professor Roland Oliver, for the encouragement and advice he 
was always ready to give me.
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Chapter 1 
THE RISE Off THE DYNASTY
The 16th century marked a turning point in the history 
of the Empire of Ethiopia. On the one hand, it saw the 
climax of the medieval empire, extensive, powerful and fairly 
prosperous. On the other hand, it witnessed a series of 
events whose culminative effect was to reduce the size of 
the empire and weaken the Imperial authority to the point of 
near collapse. These were the war against the Muslims of the 
lowland regions, the invasion of the Galla, and religious 
disputes.
Lebna Dengel (1508-40) inherited an empire which ex­
tended from the river Baraka and Massawa in the north down to 
Laka Abaya (Margherita) in the south, and from Zeila on the 
coast to the Blue Bile in the West. The population of this 
empire was considerable and included Christians, Pagans and 
Muslims; despite the religious diversity of its population, 
the central authority as well as its local institutions was 
strong and respected. But already, even before 1520, the 
Empire was threatened with what turned out to be the first 
of a series of wars and invasions from whose disastrous
effects it could never completely extricate itself until 
the second half of the 19th century. This was the fifteen 
years of continuous warfare with the Muslims of Adal led by 
Ahmad Gran.
First established at Massawa about the 8 th century the 
Muslims gradually expanded towards the Ethiopian plateau and 
by 1300 the majority of the people inhabiting the lowlands
1
between the sea and the eastern Ethiopian plateau were Muslims,
and the Muslim state of Ifat had been established high up the
Hawash valley on the eastern frontier of the province of Shoa.
By about 1400 a number of Muslim states - Hadya, Fatajar, Ifat,
Dawaro and Bali had been established to the east and south of
2 -the Ethiopian Massif. In the 1320s the Christian empire and 
the Muslims came to open hostility; this turned out to be the 
beginning of a long conflict which continued Into the 16th 
century. The struggle which broke out in the reign of Lebna 
Dengel must, therefore, be regarded as a continuation of this 
conflict. In 1516 Lebna Dengel defeated and killed the Emir
1J. S. Trimingham: Islam in Ethiopia, (Oxford, 1962), p. 46.
o
Trimingham: op.cit., pp. 62-3-
of Harar when the latter attacked Eatajar, which was one 
of the Muslim dependants of the Christian Empire. The 
Muslims, however, re-organised and led by Ahmad Gran, re­
opened the struggle in 1527. Hitherto the Christians had been 
generally victorious but now the tide turned against them.
This was due largely to the improved fire-power of the Mus­
lims. Their proximity to the sea and their religious lihk 
with the Islamic world enabled the Muslims to Import fire­
arms from Arabia where firearms had been introduced about 
1515 as a result of the expansion of the Turks. In the en­
suing struggle the Muslims swept all before them and the 
Christian Empire was saved from a possible total extinction, 
by the arrival on the scene of some four hundred and fifty 
well armed Portuguese soldiers. The Portuguese had been 
sent from Portuguese India in response to an appeal for 
help which the Emperor Lebna Dengal had made to the King of 
Portugal. The effect of one and a half decades of continued 
defeat on the Christian Empire can hardly be over-emphasised. 
Among other things defeat weakened the power and prestige
of the Imperial authority.
Lebna Dengel died in 1540, two years before the wars 
came to an end; although his immediate successor, Oalawdewos
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(1540-1559) and Sartsa Dengel (1565-97) did much to repair 
the material and moral damage caused by the wars, the Empire 
was now on the decline. The period 1605-1652 was marked by 
religious feuds resulting in civil wars which weakened still 
further the Imperial authority.
The participation of the Portuguese soldiers in the wars 
with the Muslims drew the attention of the Society of the 
Jesuits to Ethiopia, and Jesuit missionaries were sent into 
the country to win it to the Roman Catholic fold. Ethiopia 
which had b een converted to Christianity in the 4th century 
had adopted the Monophysite doctrine very early in its re­
ligious history. The favours shown by the Emperor Za Dengal 
(1603-04) to the Jesuit missionary Pero Pais who reached 
Ethiopia in 1605 led to rebellions in which the Emperor was 
killed and which brought Susneyos to the throne (1607). 
However, Pais soon succeeded in converting Susneyos also to 
the Roman Catholic faith. The Emperor urged on, no doubt, 
by Affonso Mendes, the successor of Pais, issued a number 
of edicts prohibiting the age-old practices of the Ethiopian 
Church. These prohibitions drove the people to arms 111 de­
fence of the religion of their fathers aid the reign of Sus­
neyos (1607-52) was thus consumed by religious civil wars.
Although the prohibited practices of the Ethiopian Church 
were restored in 1652 and the Jesuits subsequently expelled 
from the country by the successor of Susneyos, the civil 
wars of the period 1605-52 contributed to the weakness of 
the central authority and made its hold on the provinces 
tenuous.
The Empire was now in no position to offer effective 
resistance to any serious attack from outside; yet it was 
during the xDeriod from the 1550s onwards that whatever unity 
the Empire possessed was threatened with dissolution by 
migrations of the Galla. A detailed study of the role of 
the Galla in the domestic politics of the Empire of Ethiopia 
is yet to appear; what seems certain, however, is that the 
Galla migrations lad far-reaching consequences on the Christian 
Empire. The Galla took possession of all the southern provinces 
of the medieval empire and the Wallo, Raya and Yajju tribes 
pushed on to settle on the central plateau. The effect of 
these migrations was two-fold. Eirst, the Galla robbed the 
Empire of its southern provinces; secondly, the entry of the 
Galla tribes of the central plateau into the Imperial court 
at Gondar and into the politics of the empire in the 17tli and 
18th centuries accentuated the weakened position of the Imperial
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power. Thus it was made even more difficult for the Im­
perial authority to conquer the invaders and re-establish 
its control over the Galla conquered southern provinces.
The task of re-conquering the southern provinces therefore 
fell on a line of rulers which established itself in one 
of the mountain strongholds of Manz in the southern province 
of Shoa.
When the wars with the Muslims broke out the Galla appear 
to have been a loosely knit confederation of tribes occupy­
ing the valleys of the Webi and Juba rivers and extending 
westwards beyond Lake Abaya (Margherita) in the south of 
present day Ethiopia. About 1500 the expansion of the Isaq 
and Darod tribes of the Somali is thought to have driven them 
to advance northwards into Ethiopia"** where effective resist­
ance was offered by neither the Muslims nor the Christians 
both of whom had been weakened by the wars of Gran. The ad­
vance of the Galla was therefore rapid. After defeating the 
Emperor's army the invaders occupied Bali, Dawaro (1545-47) 
and Fatajar. For reasons already given,the strong initial 
resistance offered by the Emperor Galawdewos in 1554-5 could
1 — Trimingham: op.cit., p,93•
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not be followed up in the succeeding reigns, and the Galla 
swept forward over the Sidama states into Shoa and pushed 
on to the central plateau. By 1563 a third of the Empire 
had teen overrun and by the opening of the 17th century, 
in spite of the military campaigns condicted by the Emperor 
Sartsa Bengal (1563-98) the effective frontiers of the 
Empire were limited to the Abay river with Galla groups 
established on the eastern spurs of the plateau.
The first time the Galla played any role in the politics 
of the court was in the first decade of the 17th century 
when Susneyos, who had lived for sometime among the Bor ana 
Galla, recruited an army of the Galla to fight his way to 
the Imperial throne. In the religious civil wars which 
distracted his reign he relied, no doubt, on his Galla army 
to maintain his position. It was, however, not until the 
second half of the 18th century that the Galla played a vital, 
and as it turned out for the Empex*ors, a disastrous role in 
the domestic politics of the Empire.
As a result of the Gran wars of the 16th century and the 
religious struggle of the 17th century the tendency towards
^Trimingham: op.cit., p.94.
regional separatism and provincial independence had been 
sharpened. The assassination of the Emperor Iyasu I (l682- 
1706) ushered in a long series of royal murders and palace 
revolts whose effects could only be ruinous to what unity 
and strength now oemained to the Empire. Upon the advice 
of his mother, the Empress Mentuab, the Emperor Iyasu II 
(1730-50) married the daughter of a Wallo Galla chief, 
probably in the hope of gaining, in the Wallo, allies against 
the separatist tendencies of the traditional chiefs. That 
this step was miscalculated was proved by subsequent events. 
On the death of Iyasu II in 1750 hems succeeded byi lyoas, 
his half-Galla son, a minor, whose Galla mother acted as 
the regent. Asms to be ecpected, the regent depended on her 
Galla relatives for her government appointing Gallas to posts 
not only in the provinces but also at the court, and the 
"emperor became little more than a Galla puppet". The Galla 
ascendency alienated the traditional Amhara ruling classes; 
and this accentuated the hostility of the Amhara nobles to­
wards the Imperial court and hardened regional autonomy.
The next one hundred years were consumed in bitter and bloody 
civil wars in which the Imperial authority sank to its nadir.
In the foregoing pages the main factors which affected 
the course <£ Ethiopian history between tie 15th century and
the middle of the 19th century have been outlined briefly.
This story is given a fuller treatment in most general 
historical works on the Empire of Ethiopia. However, hardly 
any attention has been paid to its constitutional undertones. 
Yet, the history of the period from about 1750 to the 
accession of Menelik II to the Imperial throne in 1889 
makes it clear that the events outlined above had a con­
stitutional significance. Since the present study is not 
directly concerned with the events just sketched a detailed 
treatment of the constitutional aspect cannot be attempted. 
Nevertheless, a few of the relevant points will be indi­
cated in order to place the subject of this thesis in a 
proper perspective.
Viewed from the constitutional standpoint the history 
of Ethiopia from the 16th century to the accession of Mene­
lik II presents a picture of a struggle for power between the 
central Imperial authority on the one hand, and the traditional 
nobility on the other hand. A closer examination of the facts 
reveals changes in the pattern of alliances. During the wars 
between the Christian Empire and the Muslims of Adal the Im­
perial authority found aLlies in most of the traditional nobles 
who saw their Christian heritage threatened. During the re­
ligious civil wars, however, the Imperial power, inclined to 
support the cause of a "foreign brand" of Christianity, 
found itself opposed by the traditional leaders of the people 
who had been its pillar of strength in the conflict with the 
Muslims. Weakened by the wars against the Muslims, exhausted 
by the resistance to the Galla penetration and now the ranks 
of its traditional supporters thinned by religious disputes, 
the central authority fell on the newer elements in the 
society, the Galla, for support. This action Introduced a 
more delicate issue into the struggle for it raised, more 
pointedly than before, the question of the traditional role 
and privileges of the Amhara princes in the government of the 
Empire. At this point the constitutional undertones of the 
previous struggles assume a clearer shape. And the history of 
the period from the reign of Iyasu II (1738-50) to the accession 
of Menelik II is first and foremost a constitutional history.
For the most jart the nobles appear to have had the upper 
hand and provincialism got the better of Imperial centraliza­
tion, but it is clear from Bruce’s account that the Imperial 
authority did not concede defeat and struggled 011 to reassert 
its power and prestige. It was not until the middle cf the 19th 
century, however, that the accession of a mancf unusual military 
talents to the Imperial throne brought some success to the
central authority in its struggle against the provinces. 
Whatever may be said of his origins and claims to the 
Imperial throne, Theodros II brought vitality to the central 
authority after a century of decadence. His campaigns 
against the provincial nobility - his defeat of Birru and his 
son Birru Gbshu of Godjam, of Ras Ali the ruler of Gondar 
and Amhara, of Ras Ubie of Tigre, and M s  conquest of Shoa - 
must all be seen as a continuation of the constitutional 
struggle, with the balance now in favour of the central 
authority. The upward trend of the fortunes of the Imperial 
power continued during the reign of Yohannes lV, and with 
the accession of Menelik II to the Imperial throne in 1889 
the seal could be said to have been put on the victory of 
Imperial centralization over provincial Independence.
The struggle between the central authority and the pro­
vincial rulers which dominated the national history of the 
Ethiopian Empire from about 1750 onwards, may be said to 
have been a magnification of the struggle which went 011 at 
the provincial level. In the provinces, an almost incessant 
contest was being fought between the provincial chiefs on 
the one hand, and the petty chieftains of the various dis­
tricts or units which constituted the individual provinces. 
And in the provinces as at the national level, the issue was
one of centralization by the provincial chiefs as against 
the tendencies of the districts to be independent. This 
is not surprising for a provincial chief needed to have 
the whole of his province united behind him before he could 
confidently enter the constitutional struggle against the 
Imperial authority and hold his own against other provinces.
In the provinces, however, unlike at the national level, 
it was the central provincial authority which, in general, 
won the struggle. Within the provinces, therefore, the 
period of the masafent (of Imperial weakness and provincial 
autonomy), as the period 1750-1850 has been described, was 
marked by territorial expansion and centralization by the 
provincial rulers. This explains the frequency of the inter­
district and the inter-provincial wars and the changing 
frontiers which were so conspicuous a feature of the period.
The process of provincial expansion and centralisation achieved 
varying degrees of success in the different provinces. Per­
haps the highest degree of success was achieved in the former 
Imperial province of Shoa which by 1750 had been almost com­
pletely occupied by the Galla. It seems clear, in view of 
what has been said above, that an appreciation of the develop­
ments which took place at the provincial level is neccessary 
for an understanding of the history of Ethiopia as a whole.
from about 1750 to the accession of Menelik II, This is the 
best justification for researching into the history of Shoa, 
especially since in 1889 Shoa became the centre of a revivified 
imperial authority.
Until about the end of the 16th century Shoa had played 
an important role in the politics cf the Empire of Ethiopia.
At the time of the Zagwe usurpation (l0th-13th century) Shoa 
is said to have served as a place of refuge for the sole sur­
vivor of the Solomonic dynasty and his descendants; and it 
was from Shoa that Yelcuno Amlak came to be restored to the 
Imperial throne in 1269. The Shoan towns of Tegulet and Debra 
Berhan served as centres of government for a number of the Em­
perors of the restored dynasty, and Debra Libanos was an im­
portant religious centre. By the middle of the 17th century? 
however, together with other southern provinces of the Empirq 
Shoa was overrun by the Galla invaders. The Imperial court 
which had previously been peripatetic within the southern half 
of the Empire was transferred to the neighbourhood of Lake 
Tana by Sartsa Dengel about 1571; and the few Amharan families 
of Shoa who survived the Galla onslaught took refuge in a 
mountain stronghold in the district of Manz.~ The Jesuit Manoel
^Guebre Sellassie: Chronique du regne de Menelik II Roi des 
Rois d’Ethiopie. Edt. Maurice de Coppet..(Paris 1930-32)7 
Vol. I, pp. 62-3- See p. below.
de Almeida who was in Ethiopia from 1624 to I6p2, writing 
about 1628-29 says "... today the Gallas possess the greater 
part of Xaoa; some villages of Abyssinians still exist on 
a few ambas”.^  It was from one of these arnbas in the district 
of Manz that the process of development and reconquest of Shoa 
began.
Among the factors which contributed to the successful
development of this process is the geographical position of
the district of Manz. Manz lieson a broad plateau about
10,000 feet above sea level and is bounded on all sides by
2steep mountains. It was surrounded on all sides by various 
Galla tribes. In the north Manz was separated from other 
Christian provinces of the Empire by the Wallo Galla, a brave 
and fierce tribe who took possession of central Ethiopia at 
the time of the Galla invasions. The Wallo were divided into 
a number of independent groups mutually hostile. In the 18th 
century some of the Wallo groups became involved in the politic
1
Manuele de Almeida: "History of Ethiopia" in Some Records
of Ethiopia, trans.: Beckingham and Huntingford. Hakluyt 
Society~1954* Book I, Chapter 5, p.19.
D. M. Levine: "On the History and Culture of Manz" in 
Journal of Semitic Studies, Yol. IX, Ho. 1. Spring 1964. p. 
204, n.l.
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of the court at Gondar and as a result nearly all the Galla 
tribes on the central plateau were drawn into the long 
series of civil wars which ensued in the northern Christian 
provinces. Manz was therefore cut off from the northern 
theatre of war, and in this isolation the Manzian rulers 
embarked on a policy of southward expansion which led to 
the reconquest of the former imperial provinces of Shoa from 
Galla occupation.
The student who seeks to reconstruct the history of Shoa 
before the reign of Sahla Selassie comes up against the 
problemcf sources. It may be argued that as far as the 
possession of a written indigenous language is concerned, 
Ethiopia has had an advantage over almost all the African 
states. This is true, and over the centuries there has been 
an impressive output ofjliterary works in the main Ethiopian 
languages. Nevertheless, the bulk of this literature is 
religious in content. Even this may not be as useless to 
the student of history as is sometimes thought, for non- 
historical literature has often been found to be an invalu­
able source material for historical writing. The difficulty 
here Is that of accessibility. So far no systematic effort 
has been made to catalogue the mass of written material which
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exists in the various monasteries so that we do not know 
just how much of it will or will not he useful to the 
historian who is not interested in religious or monastic 
history. There are, of course, chronicles, but for Shoa in 
the 18th' century the chronicles are of very limited useful­
ness. There is no chronicle of Shoa known to the present writer 
which was written in the 18th century. Of the two chronicles 
consulted extensively for this study, Walda Maryam’s history 
of the reign of the Emperor Theodros was written in 1881 
while G-uebre Sellassie’s chronicle of the reign of Menelik 
II is of a later date still. Both chronicles are very in­
formative on their respective periods but regrettably 
lacking in detail on the events of the earlier reigns. This, 
of course, is the general problem of traditional historical 
material, especially if it is oral or if it is not recorded 
contemporaneous with the events it describes; the further 
back in time it gets the less detailed it becomes. In this 
respect the traditions told by the "Shoans” to the European 
travellers who visited the kingdom during our period have some 
slight advantage. Krapf, Rochet d’Hericourt and Harris all 
visited Shoa between 1839 and3S44 and Massaia, Cecchi and 
Soleillet between 1868 and 1884. Their accounts, especially 
those of the earlier travellers, may be said to have been com­
paratively nearer in time to the 18th century events than 
the chronicles. "When It comes to the events witnessed sim­
ultaneous^ by both the Europeans and the Chroniclers, the 
foreigners may again be said to have written from a more de­
tached, even if not altogether unaffected, position than the 
Chroniclers.
The first; ruler and the founder of what was later to
become the dynasty of Shoa was Hagassi ICristos Harada Qal
1 2 commonly known as Magassi. Born to a wealthy proprietor
of Agantcha, one of the districts of Manz, Nagassi’s valour
and skill at arms soon won him many followers and after a
series of battles with the neighbouring Amhara families he
emerged as the principal chieftain in Manz. Among the chieftains
against whom Hagassi fought appear to have been Mama, Lalo and
Gera, three renowned warriors whose names are still remembered
in Manzian traditions. These three chieftains are represented
"4). M. Levine: Art, cit., p.208.
2
A. Cecchi: Da Zeila alle frontiere de Caffa. Roma Tomo I,
p. 237. The ancestry of Magassi is traced by his descendants 
to the Solomonic dynasty through Yaq. ob, the 4th son of the 
Emperor Lebna Dengel (1508-40) who is said to have taken re­
fuge in Mans during the Gran wars. One is not sure, however, 
of the names of the generations which link Hagassi to Yaq’ob.
It appears from the accounts given by Harris (ill, 7) Rochet 
(Second Voyage, 24l), Itrapf (j of I & K, 312) and Cecchi (1,237) 
that the male ancestors of Hagassi were of Galla stock and that 
this Solomonic connection is through his female ancestors.
L^. Krapf; Journal of Isenberg andKrapf... (Lond. 1843), p.299. 
cf. also Levine, Art. cit., p.208 n.l.
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as having "been appointed by one cf the Emperors at Gondar, 
probably Iyasu I (1682-1706), as governors of different parts 
of Manz. By his battles Hagassi annexed the sub-divisions of
i
Ajabar and Tarmabar to M s  native district of Agancha. Ihe 
paucity of the information available makes it difficult to 
analyse the purpose behind Nagassi’s wars with any degree of 
confidence. Seen in the context of the contemporary situation 
in the northern Christian provinces, however, Nagassi's wars 
would appear to be a struggle for power and prestige in Manz 
alone; and like his contemporaries in the Christian provinces 
north of the Wallo Galla, Hagassi took advantage of the weakened 
position of the Imperial authority. With the successors of 
Nagassi, however, other factors entered the situation giving 
to their wars of conquest and expansion a new and nobler pur­
pose. When ^ 'agassi died about 1703 disputes arose as to 
which of his sons was to succeed to the position of political 
power which he had built for himself.' in Manz. In these disputes 
the Amhara nobles of Manz appear to have taken sides and to 
have deposed Akawa and installed Dana in his place. Sebastiye 
entered the contest and succeeded in defeating his brother Dana
^ICrapf: op.cit., p.312.
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and his supporters. Sebastiye's victory over Dana meant more 
than a mere overthrow of one claimant hy another. More im­
portant , it meant the rejection of the claims of the Amhara 
nobles of Hans to interfere and settle the succession in their 
own way. This claim has been implicitjln their support for Dana 
against first Akawa and second Sebastiye. As it turned out the 
victory of Sebastiye was of far-reaching constitutional im­
portance for the budding principality. On the one hand, it 
established the supremacy of the descendants of Nagassi over 
the other Amhara families in Manz. On the other hand, it made 
it possible for the inheritance to pass on from father to the 
srni without much succession dispute. One would suspect that this 
latter result was made possible by the introduction into Manz 
of the age-old practice of incarcerating the male kinsmen of 
a reigning prince as a precaution against rebellions and suc­
cession disputes. This would remove from the scene all the 
hostile brothers and uncles of Sebastiye thereby eliminating 
the possible legitimate opposition not only to himself but 
also to the accession of his son. Information collected by 
travellers in the 19th century Indicates that a prince on suc­
ceeding to the "throne” immediately imprisoned all his brothers, 
this weapon of "preventive detention" as an instrument of power In 
It was the Introduction of/the budding principality which en­
sured that the succession passed from father to son. Indeed'
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by the opening of our period in 1813 the succession was not 
merely patrilineal but also a primogeniture.
Sebastiye not only maintained but strengthened the position 
which he inherited from his father. He married fagunstyan, 
the daughter of Mama and thereby strengthened his hold over 
1hat part of Ma.nz over which Mama had been the overlord. When 
he died about 1720 his son Abiye was acknowledged by the Manzian 
Amhara as the ruler of the whole of Manz. A hereditary dynasty 
was thus gradually emerging which owed its position largely 
to the valour and military skill of its members.
Abiye inherited both the policy and valour of his pre- 
decessors. He completed the conquest of Manz by reducing to 
complete submission Gole, the grandson of Gera, who had revived 
his claims to the lands over which his grandfather had exer­
cised power. Abiye*s position in Manz was thus stronger than 
that of his predecessors. By sheer military skill Hagassi and 
Sebastiye had acquired subjects, built up a considerable reputation 
and raised their familjT- to a position of great prestige in Manz. 
Abiye succeeded to this enviable position and he must have felt 
himself in honoiir bound not merely to maintain but to extend the 
area over which his overlordship was accepted and to increase 
the number of his subjects. In pursuance of this aim, after con-
solidating his position in Manz, Abiye took the title of 
Haredazmatch^ and directed his attention against the Galla 
tribes who had taken possession of the districts surrounding 
Manz. In his move against the Galla the political weakness 
and mutual hostility that were so marked a feature of the 
various Galla groups was doubtless an inducement.
At the time of their migrations the Galla were united 
by ties of blood and developed principles of political and 
social life. This sense of unity explains, in part at least, 
the success with which they overran the southern half of 
the Empirecf Ethiopia. By 1720 the momentum cf the migrations 
had practically come to an end; they had overrun almost half 
of the medieval empire and were already settling down in 
their newly-found home. At this point, however, the Galla 
began to lose the unity which they had so far possessed.
The growth of their population and the need to adapt them­
selves to highland conditions brought their conflicting sectional 
interests to a head. The Galla, therefore, disintegrated into 
a number of petty groups, mutually hostile; this mutual 
hostility between the various Galla groups was a great ad-
Basically a military title; literally it means ,lcommander 
who inspires awe”, in practice a commander of reserves and 
might be equated to a colonel.
vantage to the rising Amhara principality of Mans.
Moving eastward towards the medieval province of Ifat,
Abiye, with a force of Manzian subjects, conquered the
district of Iiarr-Amba and established a military colony 
1there. He died about 1745 fighting the Iiaraye Galla. In 
the twenty five years during which he exercised power Abiye 
consolidated his hold over the whole of ^anz and, by 
leading the Amhara against the Galla, gave the Manzians 
an increased sense of unity. Abiye had also initiated the 
policy of forward advance against the Galla; the stage was 
thus set for the enormous expansion which Manz was to wit­
ness in the years which followed.
On the death of Abiye his son Amha Iyasus succeeded as 
the Maredazmatch of Manz; the Hagassi dynasty ms by now 
so firmly established that the inheritance passed in unbroken 
succession from father to son for several generations to come. 
It has been said that the re-unification of Shoa started in
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the period of Amlia lyasus.^ This is overlooking some of 
the facts. It is true that Amha Iyasus was the first
since the time of Nagassi to re-conquer a considerable
number of districts which had been occupied by the Galla; 
by so doing he greatly extended the frontiers of his in­
heritance and went a long way towards the re-unification 
of Shoa; but the actual origins of the frontal attack against
the Galla which finally resulted in the re-unification of
Shoa must bee seen in Abiye’s struggle with the ICaraye. It 
was this struggle which led to the reconquest of Harr-amba 
from the Galla. The forward advance against the Galla was 
given impetus during the period of Amha Iyasus. The new 
maredazmatch imported a number of matchlocks from Gondar 
which improved his fighting power.
Contact between the rising southern province of Shoa and 
the Christian provinces north of the hallo does not appear 
to have been completely cut off inspite of the confused poli-
M^. Abir: ’’Trade and Politics in the Ethiopian Regions”.
London Ph. L. Thesis 1964, p. 356. So far this is the only 
study on Ethiopia which deals with some of the ’’lost” pro­
vinces of the Empire in the first half of the 19th century.
Of the "Amhara" provinces it deals with only Shoa; but it 
is particularly useful for the five Maca Galla kingdoms which 
developed in the Gibe-Ona-Didessa region.
tical situation in the northern provinces. Magassi, the 
founder of the Shoan dynasty,is said to have gone to the 
Emperor’s court at Gondar, presumably to pay his tribute 
to the Emperor and to receive at his hands the investiture 
acknowledging him as the principal chieftain in Mans, and 
according to tradition he died on his way back from Gondar.
Arnha Iyasus on coming to power in Mans paid a visit to 
Gondar, where he was met by the Scottish traveller, James 
Bruce, in 1771. Bruce referred to Arnha Iyasus as the ’’son 
of the governor of Shoa” and explained that the Shoan 
prince "had a commission from his father, governor of Shoa, 
to detach Gusho, if possible, from his alliance with Powussen". 
Whatever may have been the purpose cf the visit, it is a 
mistake to describe Arnha Iyasus in 1771 as the "son of the 
governor of Shoa". All the sources are agreed on the fact 
that Abiye, ‘he father of Arnha Iyasus, ruled as "governor of 
Shoa" for twenty five years from about 1720 and died about 
1745. Thus in 1771 when Arnha Iyasus visited Gondar he was 
not an emissary of his father the governor, but was in fact 
himself the governor. Bruce describes the audience which the
1
Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. I, p. 238. D. N. Levine: art. cit.,
p.208.
Manzian maredazmatch had with both the Emperor Tekla 
Haymanot XI and Has Mikael Sehul, governor of Tigre and 
the dominant personality in the north at the time, and 
remarks that the Shoan ruler was treated more like an in­
dependent and ally sovereign than a vassal. The Scottish 
traveller thought that Amha lyasus "brought, in imitation 
of old. times, a tribute to the King (Emperor), as a testi­
mony of the loyalty of the faithful province cf Shoa" and 
r,a present in gold" to Ras Michael. He goes 011 to say that 
"110 words cone erning the government of Shoa passed, nor any 
proclamation relative to the state of the province; and this 
silence was equal to declaring it independent, as .....
1indeed it had been considered as such a long time before", 
ft is possible, however, that what .Bruce considered as 
1 tribute" and the "present in gold" were meant to induce both 
the Emperor and the Ras to furnish Amha lyasus with matchlocks.
The state of armament ± l the Christian provinces north of 
the ¥allo G-alla was far better than was the case in the rising
^James Bruce: Travels to discover the source of the Rile, 
1790 Edition, Voir Til, pp. 25T-6.“"
province of Shoa, Indeed, but for the weakness of the 
Imperial authority, their pre-occupation with civil wars 
and the geographical position of the Hallo Gal la, the Emperor 
or someotherof the Christian princes could successfully have 
interfered with and upset the development which was talcing 
place in Shoa, Until the 16th century lances and shields, 
bows and arrows were the weapons used bjrythe Ethiopian army.
In the 16th century the wars against the Muslims and the 
Turkish occupation of Massawa (1557) brought about a revolution 
in armament in Ethiopia. The Muslims, because of their proxi­
mity to the sea and their religious links with the Muslim world 
were able to import firearms from Arabia, where as a result 
of Turkish expansion firearms had been introduced about 1515.
In the first campaign the Muslims are said to have counted
among their forces two hundred cavalry men armed with match- 
q
locks. The increasing firepower of the Muslims is reflected 
in the crushing defeats which they inflicted on the numerically 
superior forces of the Emperor. The Portuguese soldiers who 
came to succour the Christians against the Muslims brought,
^Arah“Eaqih quoted in Pankhurst: An Introduction to the 
Economic History of Ethiopia (Lond. 196± J, p.161.
according to Castanhoso, over six hundred matchlocks as well
as eight field pieces and one hundred swivel guns. Some or
possibly all of these firearms must have been left behind in
the country on the termination of the war. Also jb was to be
expected that 011 the final defeat of the Muslims some of
their firearms would fall into the hands <f the Christians
as booty. In this way firearms were introduced into Ethiopia.
The Turkish occupation of Massawa made possible the importation
of firearms from that port; but in the course of time the
•Turks instituted a, blockade aimed against the importation of
2arms into Ethiopia. Despite this blockade increasing quan­
tities of firearms continued to reach Ethiopia from the Massawa 
region "partly as gifts to the Emperor and his governors, 
partly as contraband and partly as booty captured in encounters 
with the Turkish raiding parties, no fewer than two hundred 
muskets being 011 one occasion acquired in this way,''* The ac­
quisition of firearms in this way appears to have continued
1Castanhoso quoted in Fankhurst: op.cit., pp. 162-3.
p
Beccari quoted in Fankhurst: op.cit., p.163.
^Pankhurst: op . cit., p.165. Also see Fankhurst: "Fire-arms
in Ethiopian History (1800-1935)” in. Ethiopian Observer, 
Vol. VI, Ho. 2, 1962. ....
into the 19th century. In the second quarter of the 17th 
century Almeida estimated that the Emperor and his governors 
had more than one thousand five hundred muskets, adding 
however, that fewer than sis hundred musketeers were found 
011 expeditions and that most of these musketeers were not
1 T.skilled. By 1771 Bruce estimated that Tigre, the province 
nearest to Massawa, could muster not less than six thousand 
matchlocks and that the Emperor’s household troops at G-ondar 
counted some two thousand matchlocks among its number. In 
June 1809 Nathaniel Pearce described, the state of armament 
in the provinces north of the Wallo Galla: Ras Walda Selassi
the then ruler of Tigre, had some five thousand five hundred 
matchlocks and his chiefs a further three thousand four hun­
dred; the ruler of Godjam had about five hundred guns;
Gugsa of Gondar about four hundred and fifty; Ras Aylo of 
Lasta about one hundred, and Ras Gabriel of Samien only ”a 
few”.5
1Almeida,: ’’History of Ethiopia” in Beckingham and Huntingford 
op.cit., Bk. I, Gh. 18, p.77•
2Bruce: op.cit. (Lond. 1790), Vol. Ill, p.308.
N^. Pearce: quoted by Pankliurst in Ethiopian Observer,
Vol. VI, No. 2, 1962, p.135*
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In Shoa, on the other hand, firearms were very scarce 
in the I8th century and despite the increasing quantities 
which Sahla Selassie (1813-47) acquired over the years, fire­
arms continued to be relatively scarce until the time of 
Menelik II (1865-89). Bruce who saw the contingent of Shoan 
troops which followed Amha lyasus to Gondar in 1771 described 
their weapons as consisting of a lance ten feet long and. two 
light javelins.*^ ¥ith the matchlocks imported from Gondar, 
however, Amha lyasus gained an advantage over his Galla enemies 
whose weapons are described as consisting of lances or poles 
sharpened at the end and hardened in the fire, and shields 
made of bulls1 hides which because they lere fashioned from
a singlefold were liable to warp in the heat or become pliable 
2in wet weather. In his wars against the Galla, therefore, 
Amha lyasus had greater successes than his father.
Amha lyasus struck first against the Karaye Galla, at 
whose hands his father had met his death, and quickly subju-
^Bruce: op_.cat., Vol. IV, p. 18.
2
Ibid., Vol. II, p.220. Also Krapf: Travels Researches and
Missionary Labours during Eighteen Years’ Residence in East 
Africa ■ (bond. 1860J, p.74.
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gated them. He carried his wars of conquest over the whole 
of what had been the eastern part of the Imperial province 
of Shoa as far as the left bank of the river Hat-rash con­
quering among others the province ox Ankober. Following 
his father’s example, Amha lyasus established, military out­
posts in the provinces which he re-conquered from the Galla 
to serve as bases for operations further afield. Thus he 
founded Astit and Ankober in the province of that name and 
built churches in bothpLaoes. On founding the outpost which
developed into the town of Ankober, Amha lyasus made it his 
while his family continued to Jive at his private residence 
official residence/at Harr-amba. The conquest of the pro­
vince of Ankober marked an important stage in the rise of 
Shoa; it brought the ^anaian rulers to the centre of the 
ShoanpLateau thus opening the way to the conquest of the pro­
vinces to the west and south of the plateau. Having strength­
ened his hold on the newly acquired provinces, Amha lyasus 
turned west and carried war into the plains between Ankober 
and Debra Eerhan, pushing on to establish an outpost in the 
province of Teguelet. He aren made incursions into the province
"Guebre Sellassie: Chronique, Vol. X, pp. 58-9. Ceccli: Ha
Zell a , Vol. X, p. 240. 'Harris: The Highlands, Vol. Ill, p. 8.
Ankober continued to be the capital of Shoa until Menelik 
founded Antoto (Addis Ababa) as a new capital in the 1880s.
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of Horabiete but the final conquest of this province was the 
work of his son and successor Asfa:'¥assan.
Amha lyasus died about 1775 having been maredazmatch 
of Mans for over thirty years; during this period he success­
fully continued the advance against the Galla which his father 
had started and greatly extended the frontiers of Hans.
The rise of Shoa was fast becoming an accomplished fact.
'When Amha lyasus died, his son Asfa Wassan succeeded him 
as the maredasmatch of the rising province of Shoa. The new 
ruler was a true scion of the Wagassi line; he is described 
in the sources as a warrior of unparalleled skill."** His period 
of rule was marked not only by rapid expansion of Shoa but also 
by administrative organisation. His predecessors had subju­
gated all the provinces east and south-east of Hans as far as 
Ankober. Asfa Wassail’s conquests were made, in the north, north­
west and west of Hans. In the north, a little to the east,
Asfa Wassan annexed Efrata, the southern part of the stretch 
of territory which lies between the province of Gqddem and the
■^ Harris: op.cit., III, p.9- Guebre Sellassie: op.cit., I,
p.62. Rochet d’Hericourt: Second Voyage sur les Deux Rives 
de la Her Rouge... et le royaume de Ghoa. "(Paris 18if"$y p.243*
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Berkona river. In the north-west the southern district of 
the province of Geshe was subjugated; the northern district 
of this province appears to have remained in the possession 
of the Borana or Tuloma Galla until the 1830s when it was 
annexed, after a number of campaigns by the then governor of 
the southern district.^ * It is in the west, however, that the 
greatest addition was made by Asfa Wassan. After strengthening 
his hold over the Galla who occupied the plain between Ankober 
and Debra Berhan, and who had been conquered by his father,
Asfa Wassan, carried war into the province of Morabiete.
Decheh, the ruler of the province, was defeated and Morabiete 
was annexed as part of Shoa. According to Krapf, Dechen was a 
descendant of Demetrios, the person who appears in the Chronicle
of Iyasu I (1682-1706) as the governor of Morabiete, and prOb-
r^ 2 3abl3r a contemporary of Hagassi. The defeat of: Tzedoo ' the
hereditary ruler of Morat, and the subsequent annexation of
^Krapf: Journal of Isenberg and Krapf (Bond. 1843)? pp. 31
320. Cecchif op_.joit., Vol. I, pp. 240, 242.
2 -
Krapf; Journal cit., p.300. See also Paul Soleillet:
Voyages en Ethiop1e (Rouen 1886), p.280. 1 Guidi: "Annales
Iyasu I" In Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Roma,
^Krapf; Journal cit., p.300. This name,.: appears in Harris 
(ill, 36) as Zeddoo and in Cecchi (l, 24l) as Todu. For the 
revolt see below.
his province appear to have followed a rebellion which broke
out against Asfa Wassan in his conquered territory and to
which Tsedoo gave his support. By these conquests the frontiers
of Shoa were greatly extended. In the north-west the frontier
touched the south bank of the Adabay river; in the south, by
conquering Morat and its southern district, the frontier was
brought to the territory of the Awberi Galla within a few miles
q
of the point where Angolala was later to be founded.
By the time of Asfa Wassan the founding of towns and
building of churches in the districts which were re-conquered
from the Galla had beoome an established policy. Thus Asfa
Wassan founded Zella Dengai and built a church which he dedi-
2
cated to the Virgin Mary. The churches which were built in 
the newly-conquered districts were meant to serve a diial pur­
pose; first, to provide for the religious needs of the Christian 
Anhara who settled in those provinces as troops and colonists; 
second^, to facilitate the conversion of the Galla to Christian­
ity. Although there does rot seem to have been a s5^ stematic policy 
of converting the Galla to the Ethiopian Church, examples are
1Soleillet: op.cit., pp. 270-1. Cecchi; op.cit., Vol. I,
pp. 240”!.
Guebre Sellassie; Chronique, Vol. I, pp. 65-6. Gecchi; 
Da Zeila, Vol. I, p.242.
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not found wanting of instances where influential Galla and 
evan a whole group of Galla were converted to Christianity.1
The rise of Mans and its gradual expansion had reached 
a stage where its rudimentary administrative system no 
longer sufficed. Hitherto the administrative burden had been 
light; it consisted mainly in the stain trance of order and 
peace in the expanding province, a duty which, because of 
the limited extent of the province, the maredasmatch could 
personally perform with the help of his army, With the con­
quests of Amha lyasus and Asfa Wassan, however, the sized 
the province was more than doubled, its population increased, 
and the number of people who could be recruited into the 
fighting force of the maredzmatch had correspondingly increased. 
The maredazmatch could no longer lead the army alone a? dis­
charge the semi-civil duty of maintaining' law and order in his 
province single handed. Asfa Wassan clearly understood the 
situation and accordingly established a more elaborate ad­
ministrative machinery; it was this which formed the basis 
for the well-defined adnrixlistrative set up which was described
^Krapf: Journal cit., p.300. Haris: op.cit., Vol. Ill, p o 7 •
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by European travellers who visited Shoa in the reign of Sahla 
Selassie (1813-47)• The "country" was divided into four main 
provinces, probably Ifat, Ankober, Mans and Morabiete. Each 
of the provinces was subdivided into a number of districts; 
for example, the province of If at comprised If at proper, Geddem 
and Efrata; Manz maintained its former divisions into Lalo- 
meder, Mamameder and Gerameder; aid the province of Morabiete 
must have included Geshe to its north and Morat to the south.
A governor was appointed to rule each of these districts in 
the name and on behalf of the maredazmatch. It was the duty 
of the governors to raise a local army and follow the mare­
dazmatch in his wars of conquest; the governors had also a 
duty to maintain order in their varinus districts with the 
help of the army under their control. No information is offered 
In the sources as to who were appointed governors and only three 
of them are mentioned by name, Wassan Sagad, the heir apparent, 
Marie and Negdi. All three appear to have engaged in rebellions 
against the maredazmatch which is probably the reason why they 
were the only ones to be remembered by name. As part of the
*"|
Soleillet: Voyages, pp. 270-1. J. L. Morie: Histoire de
I’Ethiopie (Subie et Abyssinie) depuis les temps les plus 
reclues .jusqu'a nos jours. (Paris 1904*), Vol. II, pp. 411-2.
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administrative organization, Asfa Wassan issued laws to 
regulate the relationship between the ruler and his subjects. 
One of these laws, which appears to have been unpopular, for­
bade the subjects to manufacture or drink hydromel (a kind of 
mead), reserving this only to the maredazmatch and at his 
option to the favourite governors.^ *
Hitherto the rise of Shoa had been on the whole smooth 
and devoid of serious reverses. Abiye indeed fell while fight­
ing the Galla, and it is conceivable that the newly con­
quered and outlying G-alla districts may have revolted from 
time to time only to be suppressed. In the reign of Asfa 
Wassan, however, the sources record revolts which are said 
to have threatened the security of the maredazmatch and the 
very development which his predecessors had done so much to 
bring about. Two of the district governors rebelled and 
assembling the soldiers under their immediate command advanced 
against the maredazmatch. The cause of the rebellion is not 
known for certain; probably the; rebel governors resented 
the'despotic laws" which Asfa Wassan had been issuing. Whatever 
their reasons the rebels must have been urged on by a sense
1
Harris: Ojq^ cit., Vol. Ill, p.9. Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. I, 
p.24-0. Rochet d'Hericourt; Second Voyage, p. 243•
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of power and independence which their position as governors 
gave them, and also by the confidence and the support which 
they enjoyed of the inhabitants of the districts under their 
rule. In what is described as a fierce and bloody battle 
the rebels were defeated and one of the two leaders was killed. 
The other appears to have escaped to Morat, then independent, 
where having allied with Tsedoo, the hereditary ruler of that 
province, he collected fresh forces and resumed the struggTe. 
Again the rebel army was defeated and its leader captured and 
executed.1 It was probably at this time that Morai was con­
quered and annexed to Shoa.
Asfa Wassan was to face another revolt which is said to 
have been led by his own son and heir apparent, Wassan Saggad.
It is not clear from the sources what the object of this revolt 
was or what must have led the heir apparent to take part in a 
revolt against his father. Perhaps this revolt, like the first 
one, was an expression of the resentment of the people, or at 
least, of the rebels at the stringent laws which Asfa Wassan 
continued to pass. This revolt was also suppressed and Wassan 
Saggad was- captured and imprisoned. The failure of these re-
" I  y,
Harris; op.cit., Vol. Ill, p.9. Rochet d'Hericourt: op.cit., 
p.243- Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 241-2. Cecchi gives the
names of the rebel governors as Marie and Wegdi.
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volts left Asfa V/assan more secure and more powerful than 
before in his provinces; when he died towards the end of 
1808, he left to his successor a "country" of considerable 
extent whose ruler was almost absolute.
On the death of Asfa Wassan his son Wassan Saggad, 
the one-time rebel, succeeded as the maredasmatch of Shoa.
He enjoyed a brief but exceedingly active reign of four and 
a half years during which he extended the frontiers of his 
inheritance far beyond the limits bequeathed to him by his 
father and greatly added to the absolutism of the ruler by 
enacting laws as despotic as those of his father. Becoming 
rich and powerful, Wassan Saggad adopted the title of Has2.
His marriage with Zenama Warp, the granddaughter of Goli and 
a descendant of Gera, cemented the bond of unity which linked 
the dynasty to the Amhara descendants of Gera, the first
A
governor of the Manzian district of Gerameder. Already during
*1
Harris: op.cit., Vol. Ill, p.11.
2 !Also basically a military title, Basis the third highest
title in Ethiopia after Hegusa Hagast (Emperor) and Hegus (king).
^Dynastic marriages were an important weapon in the rise of 
the Nagassi family to power. Sebastiye, the successor of 
Magassi, by his marriage to fagunstyan, the daughter of Hama, 
linked the Amhara descendants of Mama, the first governor of
(cont.)
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his father’s reign Wassan Saggad had shownlhis valour andlI
military skill, and had played an outstanding part in the 
conquest of the province of Morahiete. As governor of the 
border district of Geddenn he continuously fought his Yejju 
Galla neighbours and the result of these campaigns was the 
annexation of the district of Efrata. In one of these cam­
paigns Wassan Saggad was taken prisoner by the Yejju but was 
later .ransomed.'*"
After his accession Wassan Saggad continued his war of 
conquest, and was to enhance greatly the reputation of the
(cont.) the Manzian district of Mamameder and a contemporary 
of Nagassi, to the interests of his family. Asfa Wassan 
married Waizero Attemoch Houno, a lady represented in the 
sources as a Solomonic princess, but morel likely a Manzian 
Amhara, and thereby won the loyal support of her family for 
the Wagassi dynasty. Sahla Selassie, the successor of Wassan 
Saggad, beside his Amhara wife, had a number of Galla con­
cubines by whom he had numerous illegitimate daughters. It 
became part of his policy sometimes to win, at other times to 
maintain, the loyalty or friendship of a powerful and influential 
luijxbcvvf' by the hand of a princess. With his own subject, 
the offer of the hand of an illegitimate princess was an expression 
of great honour and highest favour in his royal heart. Ihe 
marriage of Menelik’s daughter Waizero Zauditu to Ras Areya 
Selassie, the only legitimate son of the Emperor Yohannes, 
in 1882 and Menelik’s own marriage to Taitu, the daughter of 
a Yejjii Galla chief in 1883 are both examples of the stabil­
izing role played by marriage,- alliances in regulating Shoa’s 
relations with her neighbours. (See Ch. Ill)
Sellasse: Chronique, Yol. I, pp. 64, 66. Cecchi: ha Zeila,
Yol. I, p.241.
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army acid of the country which he inherited. His conquests 
were made mainly to the southwest of the frontier bequeathed 
to him by his father. There he conquered the Woberi (Awberi), 
the Gilale and part of the Abitchu Galla tribes , thus ex­
tending the frontier nearly to the Chiachia river.1 In the 
north-west he pacified the district around Debra Libanos and 
advanced northwards to campaign against the Wallo tribes which 
bordered on his norhtern frontier. Wassan Saggad1s northern 
campaigns have been represented in the sources as part of a
grand scheme which he conceived for the conquest of the whole
2
of northern Ethiopia and unite it with his province of Shoa. 
Wassan Saggad was the strongest ruler of Shoa until his time, 
and from the point of view of the loyalty of the subjects 
and unity of the country, probably the most powerful in Ethiopia 
as a whole. He commanded the confidence and loyalty of all 
sections of the society under his control which now comprised 
Christians, Muslims and pagans. In the grand scheme of con-
1
Harris: op.cit., Vol. Ill, p.37. Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. I,
p.243.
2 ^
Sellassie: Chronique, Vol. I., p.69. Harris: op.cit.,
Vol. Ill, p.11. Cecchi, op.cit.Tomo I, p. 243-
conquest he may have been inspired by the glorious past of
the medieval empire tf Abyssinia, an inspiration which must
have come to him through the traditions of the Church; thus
he determined to restore the empire to its past glories.1
In this ambition he was undoubtedly influenced by the extremely
weakened position of the Emperor at Gondar and the confused
political conditions in all the provinces from Wallo through
2Gondar and Begamder as far as Tigre. It was probably under 
the influence of this inspiration and determination that 
Wassan Saggad i*efounded in Shoa a number of toms as well as 
churches which had been destroyed during either the Gran wars 
or the Galla invasions. Eor example, he rebuilt Debra Berhan 
and erected a church there which he dedicated to the Trinity, 
and at Debra Libanos he restored the church of the Virgin Mary; 
he also built new churches at Sella Dengai and at Kondi, a 
town which he founded.J The execution of the grand scheme, 
however, was brought to an abrupt end by his sudden death.
1~in this connection it may be noted that the man who was the 
father confessor to both Asfa Wassan and Wassan Saggad was 
a priest from Gondar where the old traditions were better 
known. The glories of the medieval empire became a greater 
influence on the policy of Sahla Selassie and of Menelik.
See below, and Chapter III.
2
See above, pp. 1 -l£
3 *^Sellassie: Chronique, Vol. 1., pp. 67-8. Cecchi; op.cit., 
Tomo I,.p. 243•
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In the sphere of administration, Ras Wassan Saggad 
built on the foundations laid by his father. Realising 
that the strength of his position as well as the security 
of his country depended on tie unity and loyalty of his sub­
jects, Wassan Saggad followed a policy of religious toleration 
and of social equality. Thus he appointed as governors of 
the districts and to positions of trust at his court those 
who proved loyal to him, Amhara Christian, pagan Galla or
Muslim Afar, regardless of the religion or tribal background
1of the people so appointed. Eor example, all the eastern 
districts of Shoa which were inhabited mainly by Muslims, were 
given to Muslim governors.. Among these was Walasma Mohammed, 
the functionary who, under Sahla Selassie, became the "Governor 
General of the Eastern Provinces". Ear from compromising the 
position of Wassan Saggad,~t!ris was a display of political in­
genuity which, for as long’ as the governors were loyal, greatly 
strengthened his control over the Muslim element in the society. 
By his polic^ r of social equality Wassan Saggad built up, from 
among the different social groups a body of servants united by 
bonds of loyalty and devotion to both the person and the ideals
1 'Rochet d'Hericourt: Second Voyage, p. 243.
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of the Ras and depending on him for their position and
wealth. Depending 011 the loyalty of this group of servants
Wassan Saggad passed a number of laws which exalted the
position and power of the Ras and thus greatly added to the
1absolutism of the ruler.
The policy of social equality followed by Wassan Saggad 
was, however, resented by the Amhara, who wished to revenge 
themselves on the Galla and the Afar by treating them as 
social inferiors;; again his policy of religious toleration 
was disliked by the clergy. The disgruntled Amhara made common 
cause with the clergy and, finding excuse in the despotic 
laws which continued to be issued, fomented a conspiracy and 
secured the assassination of the Ras towards the end of 1812. 
Nevertheless, the loyalty of the great majority of his subjects 
outlived him and was to be the greatest weapon of his successor 
in the disturbances which followed his death. Ruling for Iwss 
than five years Wassan Saggad, by his personal valour and the 
strength of his army, raised Shoa to a position of great re­
spect among the neighbouring Galla tribes. The wealth and power 
of both the ruler and the state were known in tie distant pro-
^Harris: op.cit., Vol. Ill, p.11. Rochet d'Hericourt:
Second Voyage, p. 244.
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vinces of Gondar and Tigre. So secure and powerful was the
central authority in Shoa that Henry Salt, writing from Tigre,
referred to the province as "the kingdom of Shoa" and described
it as being "... entirely independent of the kingdom of Abyssinia 
1proper". The rise of Shoa may noWbe said to have become an 
accomplished fact.
Wien the news of the death of the Has reached the out­
lying districts, the G-alla rose in rebellion. Throughout the 
development of Shoa the death of a ruler was an occasion for 
revolt in one Galla province or another. While the Shoan Amhara 
as a group were loyal not merely to the person of the ruler but 
also to the ideas for which the dynasty stood, the Galla were 
attached more to the person of the ruler than to any ideals for 
which the dynasty stood. The attitude of the Galla was due partly 
to the fact that, living as they did in mutual hostility with 
their fellow Galla, those who ■©re subject to Shoa found, in 
their connection with the Shoan rulers, an opportunity to attack 
their hostile neighbours. Thus "while there is no king there is 
no law" appears tojbave been the maxim of the Shoan Galla. It 
was, therefore, a first necessity for each new ruler to suppress
3^?10. l/l: Henry Salt to P.O. 22.8.1811.
the rebellious districts and let his power be felt by the 
Galla before embarking on any definite policy, and this is 
what Sahla Selassie also had to do. Many of the outlying 
districts took advantage of the death of the Ras to re­
assert their independence and the Abitchu Galla even marched 
on ^ebra Berhan. The young Ras (he was aged eighteen years) 
displayed great tact in those difficult days and succeeded 
in winning over some of the Galla chiefs by diplomacy; with 
their help and with the help of the loyal subjects of his 
father, Sahla Selassie suppressed the revolts and re­
established the power of the central authority over all the 
di stricts.
Cecchi claims that Sahla Selassie came to power by
usurping the rights of his elder brother called Bacurrege
and explains how this came about as follows. Wien Wassan
Saggad was assassinated, Bacurrege, who was then a governor,
in one of the provinces, was kept busy suppressing the Galla
insurrections which his father’s death occasioned and was
therefore unable to reach the capital in time. Meanwhile,
the younger brother, Sahla Selassie, then studying at Sella
Dengai, presented himself before the elders and leaders of
1the country and was proclaimed Ras of the country. This poin 
*1
Cecchi: Da Zeila, Tomo I, p.244. This point of view was
accepted by M. Abir in his Ph. D. Thesis cited in an earlier 
reference.
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of view is not corroborated in any of our sources; moreover 
it fails to take into account the principles which governed 
succession in the Shoan dynasty. In theory as well as in 
practice succession in the Wagassi dynasty had, since the time 
of Sebastiye, become strict primogeniture; that is, the in­
heritance descended on the eldest son by the woman who was
-y
the lawful wife according to the sights of the Ethiopian Church. 
The claim that "the crown is not hereditary, but the king 
nominates his successor"'1' is simply not correct. The require­
ments emphasised the legality of the marriage because in 
general the rulers had, besides the legal wife, secondary 
wives and sometimes several concubines as well. The children 
of a secondary wife had claims on the succession nnly when 
the lawful wife had no children, while the childrenof an 
ordinary concubine had no claims on the throne at all. It 
Is clear from these principles that the son of a legitimate 
wife who might be younger had better claims on the succession 
than his half-brother, the son of an "illegitimate" wife, who 
might be the elder. We know that WaiLzero Zenama Warq. was the 
legitimate wife of Wassan Saggadim and that Sahla Selassie was
1
Charles Johnston: Travels in Southern Abyssinia through the
country of Adal to the kingdom of Shoa (bond. 1844)? "Vol. II, 
p. 295- Harris: op.cit., Vol. Ill, pp. Ip, 15-
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a son by this marriage. What we do not know - and Cecchi 
himself gives On indication 00 this - is whether Zenama 
Warq had an elder son called Bacurrege, although, according 
to Harris, Sahla Selassie had brothers.^ Moreover, it 
could hardly be expected that the Malafia Agafari whose duty 
it was to crown the king, together with the other Amhara 
nobles, all of whom were conversant with the principles 
governing succession, would have consented to crown the 
younger son over and above the head of a legitimate elder 
son simply because the elder son was away from the capital.
It is likely that Bacurrege, if there was any child of Wassan 
Saggad’£ known by that name, was the son of an “illegitimate” 
wife or even of a concubine. In the light of these arguments 
and in the absence cf further information, the claim that 
Sahla Selassie usurped the rights (f his elder brother must 
be rejected as unreliable.
The thirty-four years during which Sahla Selassie ruled, 
first as the Ras, and then as the Negus (king) of Shoa marked 
the climax of the development which had started with Nagassi.
^IOL: B.S.P. LG. 204 No. 1172. Hartii?, 31.10.1842.
His reign was remarkable first, for the coming of Europeans 
into Shoa and secondly, for the extensive territorial annexa­
tions which were made as a result of Sahla Selassie’s campaigns 
of conquest and expansion.
During the reign of Sahla Selassie, for the first time 
in our period, Shoa was visited by Europeans, These were of 
two types s the missionary whose avowed interest was evangelical, 
and the ordinary traveller whose interest layin adventure, in 
exploring the hitherto un-explored regions and opening up un­
known sources of knowledge to the scientific world, and in 
exploring the commercial potential of the regions through which 
he travelled. Two missionaries and quite a few of the ordinary 
travellers visited Shoa at this time. However,fham the point 
of view of Sahla Selassie and his country, the most important 
of these travellers were the Protestant missionary Krapf, the 
Drench adventurer Rochet d’Hericourt and the mission which was 
led by the Englishman Captain VT. C. Harris,
While in Tigre, the Protestant m:‘s sionaries Krapf and 
Isenberg had received an invitation from Sahla Selassie to 
visit Shoo.. When early in 18p8 they were expelled by Ubie, 
the ruler of Tigre, they decided to go to Shoa where they
49.
arrived, by way of Zeila and Tadjura, in June 1839. No 
doubt Krapf and his friend considered the invitation as a 
favourable opportunity for their evangelical work, but Sahla, 
Selassie had different motives. Sahla Selassie had come to 
contemplate plans for making Shoa a powerful nation; to be 
able to execute his plans successfully he felt he needed the 
help of civilized Europe. He had come to believe that Europe 
could help him in the execution of his plans as a result of 
his awareness of the part that was being played by Europeans 
in Tigre. The.rulers of Tigre Walad Selassie and Sabagadis had, 
as a result of visiis paid to their country by Englishmen, 
entered into contact with the British Government and had re­
ceived some matchlocks. Ubie was also in touch with England 
as well as France.^ Sahla Selassie did not want to be left 
behind in the race to make their provinces powerful. That 
this was so is reflected in the use to which he put Krapf - 
as an adviser and a channel though whom he could enter into 
relations with Britain. In this latter objective Sahla Selassie 
was not disappointed, for upon Krapf1 s advice he wrote to the
1]?.0. l/l: l/2; 1 /3  passim.
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1British Resident in Aden asking for friendship. The British 
Government anxious to ”establish commercial intercourse with 
the different chieftains of Abyssinia” welcomed the opportunity 
to enterVhto relations with the ruler of Shoa. Under the 
authorityof the Bombay Government a mission led by Captain 
Harris was sent to Shoa in 1841.
The object of the mission was first and foremost com- 
to enter into a convention with the king of Shoa for securing a free and 
mercial. It was ”to endeavour/unrestricted commercial inter­
course with the territories described to be under his authority; 
to endeavour to form similar conventions of commerce and friend­
ship with the chiefs of the country on the road from
Tadjurajbo to Shoa and also with the rulers of the countries
2adjacent to and beyond Shoa". Of the nine objectives set 
forth in the instruction given to Captain Harris, six are 
directly commercial, one Delates to scientific nesearches and 
one to ttje abolition of the slave trade; the one objective 
which does not M l  clearly into any category enjoins on the 
mission "to report the probable advantages which the British
^F.O. l/3 Krapf to Campbell dated Ankober in Shoa 3*7-1840.
I.O.L; B.S.P. LG 159 ho. 1486° Sahela Selassie to Resident 
at Aden.
2I0L: B.S.P. LG 159 No. 1479s Willoughby’s Instructions to
Harris, dated 24*4*1841» para. 12.
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Government is likely to derive from the continued cultivation 
of friendly relations with Shoa and the neighbouring countries”. 
It hardly needs to be said that those aspects of the mission's 
objective which may be regarded as scientific and philan­
thropic also had commercial undertones. Indeed Willoughby 
set the seal on the commercial nature of the mission when he 
added that "the Governor In Council has been led to suppose 
that ultimately an extensive field for commercial enterprise
may be opened to the British merchant in this portion of 
1
Africa".
Once In Shoa, Captain Harris and his men set to work to 
achieve the purpose for which they were sent. A treaty of 
commerce and friendship was signed between Harris and Sahla 
Selassie in November 1841. The treaty, however, remained a 
dead letter because Shoa's lack of a seaport and the diffi­
culties involved in carrying goods from Shoa to the coast
at Zeila or Tadjura and vie# versa were considered too great
2to make such commerce profitable. As It was later to be
1IOL: B.S.P. LG 159 Ho. 1479s Willoughby*s Instructions to
Harris, dated 24.4.1841, par^ 14. Por the background to the 
Mission and the terms of the Treaty see Ullendorff and 
Beckenham "The first Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty" in Journal of 
S^itic_^udies^ Vol. 9 Ho. 1, Spring 1964, pp. 187-i99.
2IGLs B.S.P. LG 184 Ho. 1456 Haddock (Sec. to Govt, of India) 
to Willoughby (Sec. to Bombay Govt.) Ip.12.1841. LG 191 
Ho. 2665-k: same to same 13*7• 1842. Krapf: Travels, p.31*
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demonstrated, these difficulties could have been at least 
mitigated by entering into treaties of friendship with the 
chiefs of the Afar tribes through whose country the routes 
from Shoa to the coast lay. This, in any case, was part of 
the instructions given to Harris before the mission left India.
As it turned out, the mission was not allowed to stay long 
aiough to do this because it was considered by the "Governor- 
General in Council of India’* that there were no "...grounds 
for supposing that the mission to ghoa /would/ ever lead 
to the acquisition of advantages commensurate with the expense
it /occasioned/". Although a considerable body of scientific
the trade in*-slaves beyond collecting information 
and geographical informationwas gathered, nothing was done about/
about it. In fact the slave trade and slavery were not even
mentioned in the treaty of commerce and friendship which was
signed by Harris, on behalf of the Indian Government or the
British Government, and the ruler of Shoa. This aspect of
Harris's instruction was left out of the treaty because, as
Harris explained, "it was neither politic nor practicable at
this stage of proceedings to make the smallest allusion to
the suppression of slavery towards the attainment of which....
1LG 191 Ho. 2663A. Haddock to Willoughby 13.7.1842. Para. 2.
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object some higher boon must be extended than the prospective
advantages of a commercial intercourse with Great Britain....
From the point of view of the Government of India, therefore, 
the mission may be said to have been 8, failure. When it with­
drew from Shoa early in February 1843? relations between Shoa 
and Britain were, for all practical purposes, closed for the 
rest of our period.
For Sahla Selassie, however, the Harris mission was not 
without its usefulness. Although his hope of seeing the Arts 
and Science introduced into his country remained unfulfilled, 
he obtained a considerable stock of firearms from the mission. 
VJhatever may be naid of the ability of the '’Shoan'* soldier to 
use these firearms in war, the fact still remains that the 
possession of firearms increased the prestige of Sahla Selassie 
in the eyes not only of his subjects but also of his Galla 
enemy.
The same desire for European help which had induced Sahla 
Selassie to seek the friendship of the British Government led 
him to take into confidence a French adventurer, Rochet 
D'Hericourt who first arrived in Shoa in October 1839. Sahla
"LG 189 ho. 2060^. Harris, 5.1.1842. paraj.2.
Selassie hoped, that through Rohhet he would make contact
with France^ and he charged the Frenchman with a mission
to propose to the French President friendship between
France and Shoa. It appears that Rochet d'Hericourt had
elaborate plans for establishing not just a French colony
of traders in Shoa but in fact a French protectorate over 
1
Shoa. Rochet's plans met with no encouragement from the
French Government, and a commercial treaty which Rochet
made with Sahla Selassie, like the one negotiated by Harris,
2was never put into effect. Except some firearms and other 
presents sent to him by the French Government to reciprocate 
those which he had sent to the French President, nothing 
came out of Sahla Selassie's expectations from France. Thus 
despite his efforts, when Sahla Selassie died he left behind 
him hardly any signs of European civilisation in Shoa.
Besides the visit of Europeans, the reign of Sahla 
Selassie was remarkable for the territorial acquisitions 
which Shoa made at the expense of her Galla neighbours. By
^F.O. l/3s ICrapf to Campbell, dated Ankober 3-7.1840.
For the treaty see Rochet d'Hericourt; Second Voyage, 
pp. 37 5-8 ^
the time of Sahla Selassie, the campaigns of conquest which 
his ancestors had initiated had become an established policy 
of the dynasty and were conducted two or three times annually. 
It was by these regular campaigns that Sahla Selassie ex­
tended his frontiers. The remarkable successes which attended 
his campaigns were due to two main factors; the first of which
was the numerical superiority of the "Shoan” army over the
rulers
Galla enemy. The conquests of the earlier^had reached a stage 
where Shoa could put a considerable force to ttje battlefield.
In the early 1840s it was estimated that Sahla Selassie could 
muster an army of thirty to fifty thousand men.”*" The mutual 
hostility of the various Galla tribes meant that any group 
which found itself attacked by Shoa could not seek help from 
its neighbours. Indeed some of the .tribes allied with Shoa 
against their fellow Galla. Thus Shoa could always put into 
the field a force numerically superior to any that her Galh 
enemy could muster. This superiority was a great advantage to 
Shoa at a time when the shield and the lance tere a common 
factor to both the invader and the invaded. The second factor
1Krapf: Travels, p. 35. Rochet d’Hericourt: Voyage sur la 
C6te Orientale de la Men Rouge  (Paris (l84l) p.233-
56.
which made for the success of Shoa1 s campaigns of conquest
was her possession of firearms. It has already* been mentioned
that the state of armament in the northern provinces of the
Empire was far superior to that of Shoa and that it was from
the north that Shoa obtained its matchlocks. This situation
remained unchanged throughout the reign of Sahla Selassie.
The norhjbern princes continued to increase their stock of
firearms and Sahla Selassie continued toimport matchlocks
1from Gondar and Tigre. Sahla Selassie was on friendly terms 
both with Sabagadis who governed Tigre from about 1823 until 
he was overthrown by Ilbie in 1831? and with Ras Ali, the
p
ruler of Gondar from about 1834 to 1854; he could therefore 
import increasing quantities of firearms from his friends in 
the north, Ivhen, after 1835? European travellers began to 
visit Shoa by way of Tadjura and the Afar country, another 
avenue for acquisition of firearms was opened to Sahla Selassie. 
Between 1839 and 11844 his stock of firearms was increased by the 
presents of pistols offered him by the European travellers, and
^Harris: The Highlands? Vol. Ill, p.37.
2IOL: B.S.P. LG 189 No. 2060K , Harris, 28,2.1842, para. 7.
Rochet d’Hericourt: Voyage sur la Cdte Orientale de la Mer 
Rouge, p. 184? under the date 6.10.1839.
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especially by the large consignments of matchlocks, muskets 
and detonating pistols together with their accessories which 
were offered him by ^arris in the name of the Bombay Government, 
It must be emphasized, however, that this supply of European 
firearms though increasing over the years, was still limited 
and, in any case, only a few of the rulerlfe subjects knew how 
to use them; thus the firearms could not have contributed 
appreciably to the fighting strength of his army. Nevertheless, 
the mere possession of these improved firearms and the fear 
that they might be made use of at any time greatly strengthened 
the hand of Sahla Selassie against his G-alla enemies who had 
no firearms at all.
As has already been hinted at, the success of Sahla 
Selassie’s campaigns was also affected by the disunity which 
marked the various Galla tribes bordering on Shoa. It was 
mentioned earlier on that the difficult mountainous terrain 
and the river valleys coupled with growth in population soon 
led to the disintegration of the Galla, hitherto loosely 
united, into small independent tribal groups hostile to one 
another. The disunity between the different Galla tribes was 
greatly exploited by Sahla Selassie who used not only methods 
of war but also diplomacy to win toohis side many Galla chiefs
with whose help he advanced his conquest further afield.
LG IBS No. 2.06.0 IC, Harris, 28.2.1842, para. 5.
There are many examples in the sources of instances where
diplomacy was used instead of war to annex a new district.
Sahla Selassie summed up his diplomatic methods in a speech
he was reported to have made to Harris when he heard that
ICrapf had been robbed by Adara Bille, a powerful Wallo Galla
chief, with whose territories Shoa shared a northern frontier.
"... I have no power over Adara Bille.
I give him cloths every year, and have asked 
his daughter in marriage because I wish to 
secure his friendship n^-
Like his father before him, the major conquests of Sahla
Selassie were made in the south and south-west. But the
few conquests which he made in the north-west andnorth-east
were by no means insignificant. In the north-east, continuing
his father’s campaigns in Efrata, Sahla Selassie advanced his
effective frontier to the natural boundary of the Berkona river,
thus incorporating in his dominion the southern provinee of 
2 -Argoba. in the north-west Sahla Selassie completed the conquest 
of the province of Geshe, the southern part of which had been
r i
conquered by Asfa Wassan, by defeating the Debfa and Tuloma
"^.S.P. LG 193 No. 2918A, Harris, 8.5.1842, para. 19- 
^Harris; The Highlands, Vol. II, p. 343.
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Galla inhabitants and annexing the northern district of 
Mesaraser.^ By these conquests the northern frontier of 
Shoa was brought to the upper reaches of the Wonshit (Wancit) 
river and directly into contact with the Wallo Galla with whom 
Sahla Selassie was to maintain uneasy relationship throughout 
his reign. The outstanding partpLayed by A to Sarnmu Hegus, the 
governor of southern Geshe in the conquest of Mesaraser, and 
by the governors of Geddem and Efrata in the conquest of 
Argoba, and subsequently in maintaining these conquests, may 
be said to typify the devoted services rendered to Sahla 
Selassie by his officials.
Shoan frontiers in the west, north and east had been 
brought more or less to well-marked boundaries and Sahla Sel­
assie’s attention ms directed to the south and south-west.
A number of factors attracted him to this direction; the 
disunity ±1 this area and the military weakness of its Galla 
inhabitants were the least important of these factors. More 
important was the commercial reward which the area promised. 
The area south of Godjam stretching from the south bank of
I^frapfs p.320. I0L: B.S.P,
LG 189 Ho. 206CP, Harris, 27.11.1841* para. 41.
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the Abay river as far as ICaffa, inhabited mainly by Maca 
Galla, and the Sidama area south of the Hawash river between 
the Oielo river in the west and the headwaters of the Webi 
Shabella in the east, were the richest in the whole of 
Ethiopia. It was from these regions that the gold, ivory, 
civet, gum, coffee and other products which constituted the 
main articles of export came.^ By about the 1830s the 
revival of trade in the Red Sea in the early decades of the 
19th century had begun to have repercussions in Ethiopia, and 
in response to the growing demand for "Abyssinian products", 
Ethiopian merchants, mostly Muslims, were organizing regular 
caravans to the rich south and south-western provinces. 
Hitherto the most frequented route by which the products 
from these regions reached the coast was that which led from 
Massawa through Tigre and Gondar to Godjam and across the 
southern bend of theAbay river to the Maca country. Sahla 
Selassie, the most enlightened Shoan ruler till his time, 
could not be an idle onlooker and let all this trade fall to
1.0. 1/4: Plowden, 20.8.1847. B.N. (Paris) N.A.P. 21302, 
pp. 316-7, d’Abbadie; N.A.E. 21303, p.383, d’Abbadie.
For a detailed discussion on the trade of this area and of 
Shoa in this period see Chapter V.
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the advantage of the northern princes. He determined therefore
to push his conquests further and further towards thewe rich
provinces in order to divert, at least, part of the trade througi
Shoa to the seaports of Tad jura and Zeila, and to profit by
taxes on the goods passing through his dominion.1 In the 1840s,
therefore, as a result of Sahla Selassie’s conquests in the
south and the south-west, and the friendly relations which he
kept with the Afar princes, the route from Tadjura and Zeila
through Shoa to the Gibe region or the Maca country became open
and was growingjin commercial importance. The Shoan mler amassed
considerable wealth from the transit trade of his country by
imposing an Import duty of ten per cent in kind on every caravan
of merchandise aid an import and export duty of four amole upon
2every slave that passed through his country. Sahla Selassie
followed a policy of monopoly in such lucrative items <f trade
as gold and ivory and piled up for himself huge stocks of both,
which he used as occasional presents to his favourite subjects
and as ’'medals" in recognition of faithful service rendered
■5
by his subjects.
1I0L: B.S.P.: LG 189 Ho. 2060G, Harris, 5.1.1842.
2Ihid. An ample was a piece of block salt used as currency; 
its value was equivalent to 2l/2d.
 ^LG 189 Ho. 2060G, Harris, 5.1.1842, paras. 21 & 22.
62.
Another important factor which attracted Sahla Selassie 
to the south and south-west was the noble desire to re-unite, 
under the rule of Shoa, the scattered Christian populations 
which markedthe limit of the medieval empire of his ancestors.
This was the same policy as his father’s grand scheme but 
executed in a different direction. Before the Galla invasion 
the region described above as the richest part of Ethiopia 
was inhabited by people cf Kushitic origin called Sidama.1 and 
formed part cf the Empire of Ethiopia. Various Emperors under­
took missionary activities in this area and in the reign of 
the Emperor Sarsa Dengel (1563-97) nearly the whole area was 
converted to Christianity. Vith the occupation of these provinces 
by the pagan G-alla Christianity in the area fell into abeyance 
and Christian churches were 'turned into pagan temples. Never - 
theless, Christianpractices appear to have been kept up through­
out the centuries in a few families scattered over the whole 
region and Krapf speaks of Christians and ’’priests” coming from 
among other places, Gurage and Enarya to ask for priests and 
religious books in Shoa. The tradition that the treasures and
U EWofjct. j «.vC& j t  Some ftptprAs c^ . 11
^Journal of Xsenberg and Krapf, pp. 178-181. See also d’Abbadie 
in AnnaleV’de la Pop. de la Poi. xvii, p.279 quoted in Trim- 
ingham, op.cit., p. 109 n.3» The present writer found the 
original of~d'Abbadie’ s letter in the Archives of the Propaganda 
Pide in Home, in the series: Scritture Riferite nei Congress!
Vol. 4, pp. 439-440. To appreciate the significance of the de­
tails given one has to remember that d’Abbadie was at this time
(cont.)
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valuable manuscripts gl the ancient Abyssinian Emperors were 
deposited on an island in lake Zuai during the Muslim in­
vasions of the 16th century was very popular in Shoa at this 
time; the rescuing ox these treasures as well as the re- 
imiting of the pockets of Christians living in the predominantly 
pagan occupied provinces were said to lave been Sahla Sellasie's 
greatest ambitions.'**
Inspired by the glories cf the medieval empire and urged 
on by the political disunity of the area, as well as by the 
prospects of rich gains, Sahla Selassie conducted campaigns 
towards the south and the south-west. In hie south the "Shoan1 
army conquered the southern Karaye, the Galan- and the Combitchu 
Galla and thus brought Shoan frontiers to the Hawash river*.
In the south-west Sahla Selassie's armies overran’the Abitchu 
country where a frontier post was erected. This outpost, which 
was erected early in the 1830s, developed into the town of
Angolala, which was described in the 1840s as the second capital
2
of the county and the ruler's favourite winter residence.
(cont.) (1840s) advocating the establishment of a Cathblic 
mission among the Galla, and he used as one of his arguments 
the survival of Christianity in the Galla country.
■^ Harris; The Highlands, vol. Ill, p.37. Krapf: Journal of 
Isenberg and Krapf, pp. 179-80.
2
LG 189 Mo. 2060, Harris 14.10.1842, parag. 19.
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By the 1840s the effective western frontier of Shoa had 
reached the headwaters of the Hawash river; beyond the river 
in the same direction the Liban tribes and the Nonno were 
tributary to Shoa. South of the Hawash the effective frontier 
might even be said to have included the Soddo Galla, in 
whose country Sahla Selassie built an outpost at Gholie and 
beyond whom his influence reached as far as Aimelele in the 
norhtern district of Gurage." By these conquests Sahla 
Selassie more than doubled the area of the country bequeathed 
to him by his father. In the 1840s the area of the Shoa was 
estimated at one hundred and fifty miles in length by ninety 
miles in breadth and its total population at two and a half 
millions of which one million were Amhara Christians and the 
rest pagan and Muslim Galla and a few Muslim Afar. Firmly 
secure in the government cf Shoa, enriched by the flourishing 
transit trade of his country and made powerful by the possess!®!, 
of a large and devoted army and as well as by the loyalty of 
his subjects, Sahla Selassie, about 1899, adopted the extremely
1LG 189, No. 20601, Harris 91.1.1842, para. 21. LG 189, 
l\To. 2060K, Harris 28.2.1842.
2LGo 204, No. 1216 Graham. Harris; The Highlands, Vol. Ill,
p . 28.
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enviable title of Negus (king) of Shoa without bothering
1
to secure the approval of the puppet Emperor at Gondar.'' 
Neither the Emperor nor any of the governors of the northern 
provinces had either the free hand or the military strength 
to compel Sahla Selassie to relinquish this important and 
meaningful title; and from that time all bonds of allegiance 
which subordinated Shoa to the Emperor at Gondar may be said 
to have been broken. Sahla Selassie was now in theory as 
well as in practice the king of an independent kingdom of 
Shoa.
The reign of Sahla Selassie saw one serious crisis 
about 1898. It was a rebellion by Ato Medako (Metako) a 
man described as "one of Sahla Selassie's most favourite 
generals'.' Medako had risen to this position of favour 
by sheer "military talents combined with undaunted personal 
intrepidity in the presence of the enemy1'. However, his 
aspirations to the hand of a royal princess led to his being 
deprived of the governorship which he held. Angry at this 
deprivation Medako fled to the "subjugated though disaffected 
Galla" from whom he raised a large force and marched against
^MAE (Paris): M & I) (Afrique) Vol. 19? p.9. Antoine d'Abbadie 
to M. le Directeur de la Division Commerciale au MAE. 14*7.1899. 
Here he wrote: lfLe Marodazm&tch Sahla Selassie est se fait 
le maitre independant du Chawa. II a pris le titre du roi 
qui n'est pas reconnue par le clerge et les nobles de Gondar..."
2
Harris writing in 1842 said the rebellion occured "About 
four years ago".
Angola!a. Medako was however defeated, captured and im­
prisoned at Guncho from where he managed to escape and 
for the second time raised the standard of rebellion. In 
the encounter which followed Medako was again defeated, 
captured and executed for high treason." That Sahla Selassie 
was able to weather this storm which had threatened to 
upset his otherwise peaceful reign was due to the devotion 
of his subjects, especially the Manzians, who at this critical 
moment, rallied to the x-escue of the ruler.
The administration of the kingdom of Shoa in the 184-Os 
was elaborate and may be considered as the culmination of 
the adminastrative experiments which wex^ e made by the pre­
decessors of Sahla Selassie. In the reign of Sahla Selassie 
the great expansion of Shoa resulted in increasein the number
i
of provinces. The eastern block extending from the eastern 
slope of the mountain range on which Anlcober stands to the 
Hawash river, and stretching from Argoba and Errata in the 
north to Bulga in the south, was inhabited mainly by Muslims. 
The central block of provinces including Manz, Tegulet and 
Ankobar was occupied by Amhara Christians, and the western 
and southern provinces were wholly occupied by the Galla sub-
^LG 189 Ho. 2060 Harris, 14.10.1842, paras. 31-34. 'As a 
result of Metako's escape from prison "Hallasma Mohamed the 
state gaolex1 lost the whole of his px^ opaty and was suspended 
from office for two years". Para 33* Journal of Xsenberg 
and ICrapf, pp. 301-2. Harris: The Highlands, Vol. II, pp. 132'
jects of Shoa. Each province was divided into a number of 
districts and the districts were subdivided into smaller 
units whose heads were known as shurns. In 1842 it was 
estimated that there were fifty one districts and about 
four hundred ”shumates"Each of these districts was ruled 
by a sub-governor immediately subject to the governor of 
the province in which the district was situated, but 
directly responsible to the king. The duties of the officials 
were both civil and military. The whole set up was an ab­
solutism controlled from the centre by the king who personally 
appointed all the important officials and watched over their
p
actions by an intricate spy system. An official continued 
in office as long as the king had confidence in him. It 
would seem that tenure in office was very precarious; in 
practice, however, the king was such mi absolute master of 
the country that he could afford to be lenient without having 
to fear for his position. All that was good in Sahla Selassie’s 
character was given due emphasis by the Europeans who visited
1
ICrapf; Journal, p.90.
p
Krapf; Travels, p.91- See Chapter IV for a detailed discussia 
of the governmental machinery of Shoa.
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Shoa in his time.'*' While he overlooked many minor failings 
in his officials hut punished serious offences heavily 
with deprivation, confiscation and chains, he rewarded 
lavishly loyalty and devoted service with positions of 
power, lands, servants and occasionally the hand of a princess, 
lie was sympathetic and genuinely concerned with the welfare 
of his subjects. Each subject, rich or poor, slave or free­
man, had equal and easy access to the king, who listened 
to their complaints with sympathy. His concern for the wel­
fare of his subjects is reflected in the alms which he fre­
quently gave to the poor, in the number of people who were 
fed from the royal kitchen and in the distributinn of food
from the royal granaries to all his subje cts in time of crop 
2
failure. ¥hen he wrote in his letter of July 1840 to 
Captain Haines^ that ”... God has given me a good and large 
kingdom but Arts and Sciences are not yet come into my country 
as they are in yours..." he summed up his desire to improve
1See for example: LG 206, No. 1600 Graham, para. 12.
Charles Johnston: Travels, II, p. 142.^  MAE (Paris): M & D 
(Afrique) Vol. 13,~p. 279 Rochet d’Hericourt.
2
LG 206 No.1600 Graham, paras. 13-15* Johnston: op.cit.,
Vol. II, p.160.
3 CLG 159 No, I486 : Haines to Secretary to the Bombay Govern­
ment 25.9.1840 (enclosing Sahla Selassie to Haines dated 
July 184°).
the lot of his subjects and make them a happy and prosperous 
people. Sahla Sela ssie's judicious and humane character 
won for the Crown the loyalty and confidence of all his sub­
jects, Christian, pagan and Muslim alike. The loyal support 
which the subjects gave to Sahla Selassie was undoubtedly 
a potent factor in the development of the "Rasship" which 
he inherited into an absolute monarchy. Although the king 
wielded absolute power ,!a stranger... soon perceives Sahla
Selassie to be superior to the temptation of abusing that
1power which he possesses" and his despotism was indeed 
benevolent.
The reign of Sahla Selassie marked the culmination 
of the development which originated with Nagassi. This 
development passed through many difficult moments when', it 
seemed as if it would break down. Through the valour and 
military skill of the family as .a whole, the weakness of the 
Galla tribes, the loyalty of their Amhara subj ects and the 
administrative skill of the last few rulers as well as the 
judicious character of Sahla Selassie a powerful monarchical 
state was built up in Shoa which was undoubtedly the most 
stable in the whole of the Ethiopian region. In contrast
1Charles Johnston: op.cit., Vol. II, p.189.
to Sahla Selassie's period cthe twenty years which followed 
his death were a period of decline. Nevertheless, it is 
the measure of the success of his reign that during these 
years of decline, tie sense of unity and loyalty which 
marked his reign survived the difficult times and preserved 
the essential features of the state intact to form a founda­
tion for the great developments which Shoa was to witness 
under Menelik II.
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THE PERIOD OF DECLINE
The reign of Sahla Selassie was a golden age for Shoa;
the monarchy was more firmly established than ever before,
and though he exercised absolute authority, the king enjoyed
the confidence and respect of all his subjects, Sahla Selassie
himself was a benevolent monarch who laboured unceasingly
to improve the lot of his subjects. The administrative
machinery of the kingdom was probably the most efficient in
the whole of the Ethiopian region; 'justice, law and order
were its distinguishing features. Under thig reign the
"Shoans” pursued their various occupations in peace, and both
agriculture and commerce grew and prospered.
Sahla Selassie died in 1847^ a*1*! was succeeded by his
eldest legitimate son, Haile Malakot, then aged about twenty
two years. The young king was represented to be ”a man of
2talent and great firmness”. The death of Sahla Selassie was
^Propaganda Archives? Scritture Riferite nei Congress! Vol. 5 
(Africa Centrale, Etiopia Arabia) p.8. Padre Guglielmo al 
Procurators Generale die Cappuccini, dated Aden 28.3*1848.
A.' Cecchi (Da Zeila, I, 248) says October 1847*
^IOL; Aden Secret Letters Received (Various) Vol. 30, pp. 
143-4 . Lieut. Cruttenden to Captain Haines, 4*4*1848. 
Cruttenden, the Assistant Resident at Aden, went on one of 
his periodic visits to the ports in the Red Sea and Somali 
coasts, and derived the information at Berbera from an Afar 
chief called Mohamed Ali who was a regular trader to Shoa
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followed "by disturbances in some parts of the kingdom. The 
Galla tribes living outside the frontiers of the country, no 
longer deterred by the fear of the old king and talcing 
advantage of the youth and inexperience of his successor 
attacked the inhabitants of the peripheral districts of Shoa. 
Also the Galla inhabitants of some of the outlying districts 
rose in rebellion. With the help of his father's faithful 
soldiers, Haile Malakot suppressed the revolts and re­
established law and order throughout the kingdom. The 
thoroughness with which these revolts were put down was a 
warning to the Galla that Haile Malakot was determined "to 
tread the footsteps of his great father Sahla Selassie".
He showed this determination in both his domestic and foreign 
policies. Externally, he sought to re-open relations with 
the British in Aden. In 1849 Haile Malakot sent a letter and 
gifts to the British Resident in Aden for the Queen of England
p
and requested artisans and firearms. ‘ Although nothing sub-
■^ IOL: Aden Secret Letters Received (Various) Vol. 30.
Ibid. Same to same.
E.O. l/5: Murray to Palmerston, 21.5.1849* Enclosure Palmerston 
to the King of Shoa, 4.7*1849*
P.O. l/6: Political Agent at Aden to Secretary to the Bombay
Government, 10.9.1850.
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stantial came out of this effort, Haile Malakot1s approach 
to the British indicated an attempt to continue his father's 
enlightened policy. At home, the king strenuously fought 
and successfully held down the Galla tribes who menaced 
the province of Angolala.^ His reign was, however, destined 
to he short;; he died early in December 1855? and with his 
death the kingdom of Shoa entered on a period of inter-regnum 
and of decline.
Compared with the reign of Sahla Selassie before it 
and that of Menelik after it, the period from the accession 
of Haile Malakot to the accession of Menelik in 1865 is one 
about which not much is known. Ho Europeans visited Shoa 
during this period, and although Europeans were in other 
parts of the Empire they did not appear to have known much 
about events in Shoa. Eor the reconstruction of the history 
of Shoa during this period, therefore, one has to rely on 
local sources of which there are not many.f and to cross-check 
them partly with what information came through to the Euro­
peans then in other parts of the Empire, and partly with '
1E.0.1/6; Political Agent at Aden to Secretary to the Bombay 
Government 10.9.1850.°’ A.S.S.C.I.; Cartoni VIC. chiarini:
"Memoria.... sulla storia recente dello Scioa dalla morte 
di Sable Salassie sino ad oggi" dated 23-11.1877t
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the accounts collected in Shoa by Cocclii and other Europeans
who visited the kingdom in the 1870s. Guebre Sellasie’s
Chronicle of Menelik's reign which was mentioned in the last
chapter * Alaka ¥alda Maryam’s chronicle of the reign of the
Emperor Thedros II, and the chronicle of the same Emperor’s
reign believed to have been written by a dabtara (scribe)
called Zanab (Zeneb) - these three chronicles constitute
our main sources for this period* Walda Maryam’s chronicle
was edited and translated into French by C. Mindon-Vidailhet 
1
in 1904-5- The Amharic test of dabtara Zanab’s chronicle
was edited in 1902 by Enno Liftman from a manuscript which
2has come to be known as the Berlin Manuscript* Littmann’s 
test was in turn translated into Italian by M. M. Moreno 
in 1042.^
1Ik Weld Blundell appears to have had another copy of the manu­
script of this chronicles a partial translation of which he 
published in the Journal of the African Society, VI, 1906-7.
p
The manuscript was brought from Ethiopia to Germany by the 
missionary Martin Flad. This appears to be the only copy yet 
known.
'K. M* Moreno: "La Gronaca di Re Teodoro attribuita al dabtara 
’Zaneb'M in Rassegna dl Studi Etiopici, Vol. II, 1942, pp. 143-80.
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All that is lmom of Alaka Walda Maryam is what he 
himself tells us in his chronicle. He was a monk from 
Shoa, and appears to have been one of the men imprisoned 
at Magdala by Theodros. He mentions that he was with 
the Abuna and was much loved by him. This would suggest 
that Walda Maryam was one of the Shoan clergy who believed
in the doctrine of two births which was favoured by the
1
Abuna. Of course, it is possible that Walda Maryam was 
one of the Shoan chiefs taken captive to Magdala on the conquest 
of Shoa by Thedros, although it is not known for certain if 
religious leaders were among those taken captives. Walda 
Maryam was thus an eyewitness of the events he describes and 
may well have taken an active part in some of them. His ac- 
count of the Emperor’s life before about 38 50 is extremely 
sketchy. From about 1850 onwards, however, the account be­
comes more detailed, although not nearly as detailed as it 
could have been. For example, he does not give us any idea 
as to the value of the tribute which Shoa or any other con­
quered province paid to the Emperor. And his account of the
"Ksee below.
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struggle between Kassa (as Theodore then was) and Birru 
Goshu of Godjam is rather simplified. On the whole Walda 
Maryam is less detailed about events in other parts of the 
Empire than about those in Shoa. Nevertheless, when all 
allowances are made, this chronicle, which was written in 
1881, remains one of the best contemporary accounts of the 
reign of the Emperor Theodros.
According to Flad who brought the manuscript to Europe, 
dabtara Zanab who wrote the other chronicle knew the Emperor 
intimately. This chronicle was written during Thppdros’s 
reign, but it is not known if it was intended to be an 
official chronicle. Although it only goes up to about 1860 
it has this value that it supplies Walda Maryam's omission 
in the early part of Theodros1s life. The chronicle has a 
simplified account of the history of the northern provinces 
of the Empire from 1800 to thp 1840s. His account of Kassa1s 
early life is fairly detailed and agrees in many respects 
with those of Henry Hufton and other European travellers.
Could he have been an informant for some of the travellers?
On events in Shoa however, this chronicle tends to be very 
sketchy compared to Walda Maryam. Taken together however the 
chronicle of Walda Maryam and that of dabtara Zanab provide a 
useful indigenous source material for the history of the reign
of Emperor Theodros. Their usefulness is enhanced by the 
fact that the authors saw, at first hand, the events which 
they wrote about, and wrote at a time when they could still 
remember the details.
The inter-regnum and its consequent decline were the 
direct result of the political changes which had been talcing 
place in the northern provinces of the Empire of Ethiopia 
during the previous three or four years. In the last chapter 
it was mentioned that the Empire entered on a period of 
decline in the 18th century, and that the provncial governors 
vied with one another to increase their territory and power.
This process continued into the 19th century and throughout 
the first half of the century the northeriiprovinces were a 
theatre of internecine war whose vicissitudes reflected both 
the political and territorial strength of the contending parties. 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to trace in detail the 
numerous battles, treaties, alliances and treacheries by which 
changes were brought about. Suffice it to say that by 184-1 
four large provinces had emerged out of the struggle2 in the 
north was Tigre under the rule of Dedjazmatch Ubie (wube); 
in the centre was the province of Amhara under Ras Ali; south 
of Amhara was the province of Godjam and Damot ruled over by
Dod,jazmatch Goshu; to the east of Amhara and directly
north of the Wallo Galla was the province of Lasta ruled
by a nominee of Bas Alt. The ¥allo Galla, to the south of
Lasta, were virtually independent. All these provinces were
1dependent on the Ras who ruled from Gondar in the name of 
the titular Emperor? but this dependence on the Ras was 
more nominal than real, and a desultory war continued to be 
carried 011 between the Ras and his nominal vassals. Such 
was the state of affairs when about 1852 a revolt by Kassa, 
one of the petty vassals of the Ras, brought about changes 
of far-reaching consequence in the decadent Empire.
The story of Kassa’s rise to power as Emperor Theodros 
II, of his reforms, his later excesses and his tragic death 
is too well known to be repeated in this thesis. Attention 
must, however, be drawn to the fact that Kassa's early strugg 
in his native district of Kwara (Quara) against the Muslim 
soldiers of Egypt who menaced the north-western frontier of 
the Empire sharpened both his religious aid nationalist senti­
ments. It was his experiences in these campaigns which made
1Ras is the third highest title in Ethiopia, both civil and 
military, after negus (king) and negusa nagast (emperor).
him determine to re-unite and strengthen the divided Empire 
and to lead his Christian soldiers in a crusade to drive 
the Turks away from the Holy Land. Kassa's military offensive 
against the various provincial governors of the Empire in the 
first half of the 1850s was the first step towards achieving 
his objective. In February 1855 when he was crowned Emperor 
as Thedros II be brought vitality and dignity to the Imperial 
power, and for the first time in over one hundred years policy 
and guidance came from the central authority.
As- Emperor, Thedros's authority was limited, in May 
1855? to the northern provinces of the Empire. The central 
Ethiopian plateau was occupied by the hallo. Galla, Muslims by 
religion, nominally dependent on the authority at Gondar but, 
as has been said above, virtually independent. South of the 
hallo lay the Independent kingdom of Shoa, paying no allegiance 
whatsoever to the political authorities at Gondar. Both hallo 
and Shoa lay within the boundaries of the former Empire of 
Abyssinia; and if Thedros was to restore the unity of the 
Empire and make the authority of his government felt throughout 
It, the conquest of the hallo and of Shoa was imperative.
The struggle against the hallo Galla began in June 1855. 
In this campaign, as in those conducted earlier in the northern
provinces, Theodros defeated his opponents and captured a 
number of the leading men including one of the ruling princes, 
Amedie Ali Liken, the son of Queen Warquitu (larquet). How­
ever, a series of revolts was to break out later and twice 
during his reign Theodros made unsuccessful attempts to pacify 
the hallo country.
With the defeat of the hallo, the Emperor continued
his march southwards to Shoa. The king of Shoa, Haile Malakot,
made every preparation to defend his kingdom. He must have
anticipated the designs of the Emperor who, in 1854? was said
to have sent a message to the Shoan king ordering him to come
to Gondar to do him homage.^ * Thus when Theodros crossed the
Wallo-Shoan frontier into the province of Geshe the "Shoans”
were ready to oppose him. The first battle (f Th©Odros Shoan
war, which lasted nearly five months, was fought early in 
2
October 1855. The "Shoan” forces consisted partly of the 
local Geshe troops commanded by the governor of the province,
^Correspondence Respecting Abyssinia, p. 94? Ho. 177? Plowden 
to the Earl of Clarendon, 10.7.1854.
2 -• laida Maryam; Chronique de Theodoros II, Roi des Rois d’Bthiople
Edt. & trans. C. Mondon-Vidailhet, Paris 1905. p. 10.
Habta Maryam, and partly of soldiers from the neighbouring
province of Geddem under the command of Ato Sammou-Negous,
the governor of Geddem. A fierce battle ensued which lasted
a whole day and appears to have continued throughout the night
into the next day when Habta Maryam was captured; Ato Sammou-
1Megous either escaped or was killed* Theodros indeed won 
the victory, but it was by no means an easy victory.
The news of the defeat of Habta Maryam caused panic in 
the governing circles of Shoa* Thidpanic was heightened by the 
additional news fiat the forces of the Emperor were vastly 
superior to those of the kingdom. The danger which faced Shoa 
could not be under-estimated and Haile Malakot is said to 
have convened a council of his generals and chief men to 
decide the best course of action to follow. Some of the 
"counsellors”, led by Ato Beddelu, governor of Efrata, ad­
vised submission without further resistance, but the Assembly 
appears to have been swayed by a group led by the king's younger
1 " \ 'Walda Maryam: op*Git., ibid. Guebre Sellassie: Chronique
du regne de Menelik II, Rol des Hois d'Ethiopie. Edt. & 
trans. M. de Coppet. Paris 1930-2. Vol. i,pp. 82-3.
brother, Prince Seifou Selassie, then governor of Morabiete, 
who favoured vigorous and sustained resistance.^
It has been estimated that the "Shoan" army during this 
war "... consisted of upwards <£ fifty thousand brave and valiant 
troops", and that this was numerically "superior to that of 
the king" (Theodros). In JuneI855 Plowden estimated that 
on assembling "all the forces of Christian Abyssinia, Teegray 
included... /Theodros/may have from fifty to sixty thousand 
men of all arms". Earlier he lad reported that the Emperor 
"has fifty thousand men and has ordered apart of them to march 
against the Mohamed.au Gall as who had assembled in great force 
in the province of Worra-Haimano in defence of their faith".^ 
Considering the number left to garrison Magdala on the conquest 
of Worra-Haimano, and those who died In the war against the 
Wallo as well as on the march from Gondar to Shoa, the Emperor’s 
army could not have numbered more than forty thousand soldiers.
A^. Cecchi; D^^eila,, Vol. I, p.251.
A* Stem: Wanderings among the Ealashas in Abyssinia 
LoncL. 1862. p.76. Rev. Stern, it mil be remembered, was one 
of the European missionaries who worked in the Empire during 
this period. He was also among the Europeans detained by 
Theodros at Magdala; his books are among the best contemporary 
accounts of the reign of Theodros.
^E.O. l/9: Plowden to the Earl of Clarendon, 25.6.1855. Enclosure 
same to same, 7.4*1855-
The superiority of the Imperial forces, could, not have
lain in their numbers; it lay in their discipline, endur­
ance, experience and armament. Of the Imperial forces there 
must have "been a well-trained and highly experienced core of 
at least a thousand soldiers who had fought with the Emperor 
from the early years of his military career. The rest, con­
sisting of soldiers from the various northern provinces, had 
gained their militarjr training in the incessant inter­
provincial wars which had, for so long, ravaged the northern 
provinces. As regards armament, as was pointed out in the 
last chapter, the north was much better supplied with match­
locks and other firearms than Shoa was, and on the defeat 
of Dedjazmatch Oubie of Tigre, as many as seven thousand 
muskets and two cannon fell to the lot of Theodros.^
The "Shoans”, on the other hand, possessed a limited 
supply of matchlocks and only a handful of rifles, to the use 
of which they were ill-accustomed. Although these were enough 
to send their Galla neighbours reeling, they were insignificant 
against an army as well equipped as that which followed Theo­
dros. Nor could the "Shoans” rely much on their numerical
H/alda Maryam: op.cit., p-8. E.0.l/9: Plowden to Earl of
Clarendon 25.6.1855. Enclosure. Eaneb; Moreno’s Translation 
in Rassegna di Studi Etiopici, Vol. II, 1942, p.160.
.superiority, military discipline, valour and endurance, 
since their wars of conquest against the neighbouring Galla, 
which were all the military experience they had bad, were 
more of surprise raids than of serious and sustained en­
counters.
After his victory at Geshe, Theodros continued his march 
to Mans where the governors of that province, Geddem axd 
Efrata submitted without striking a blow. It will be wrong 
to regard the submission of these governors simply as an act 
of treachery. One might argue that they were rather hasty 
in talcing that action, nevertheless, submission ms the 
only reasonable course of action open to a people who, though 
proud of their independence, were militarily weak and found 
themselves matched against a vastly superior enemy which was 
led by an Emperor whose valour and military skill they had 
just cause to dread. The submission of these provinces, 
however, had effects upon both the invader and the invaded.
Those who submitted either joined forces with, the invaders 
against their king and fellow" Shoans, or, at best, remained 
neutral in the contest; In either case, their action considerat 
facilitated the task of the invader. Eor Iiaile Malakot and his 
generals, on the other hand, the effect of thesctinn of the 
northern governors was to deprive them of a gtieable portion of
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the total armed men they could muster against the invader.
Further, it could hardly have failed to weaken their morale.
The rest <f the kingdom rallied round the king to offer
a strong and determined resistance to the Emperor. In the
encounter which followed the Shoans fought bravely but the
superior discipline and armament of the Imperial forces won
them the day. Hail© Malakot and a number of his officials
withdrew to Ankober; two days later, upon the advice of his
officials the king set fire to that part of the city where
1
the royal granary was situated. It is not clear what this
was intended to achieve. Perhaps.', it was meant to deprive
the invading army of provisions when they entered the city.
If this was so, the king was ill-advised; for the invading
*
army could easily pillage individual homes for food. Shortly
after this incident Haile Malakot fell ill and died at the
2
beginning of December 1855* li is difficult not to think 
that desperation, exhaustion and the humiliating realization 
that the Independent kingdom which seven generations of his 
ancestors had laboured to build should fall during his reign,
■Hfalda Maryam: o;p.cit_., p. 15. A. Cecchi (op.cit., I, 255) 
mistakenly says that it was Debra Bejrhan and not Ankober which 
was burnt.
o
‘“Walda Maryam: op.cit. ibid. The chronicler is very specific 
on the date: 50 Hedar, Friday night, in the 8th year of his 
reign.
contributed to the illness from which Haile Malakot was 
unable to recover.
The Shoan chiefs and their soldiers were undoubtedly 
demoralised by the sudden death of their king at this 
critical moment. Yet, it was in these difficult circumstances 
that the achievements of Sahla Selassie and his predecessors 
made themselves felt. The benevolent rule of Sahla Selassie 
had, in general, united the Crown and the people in the 
knowledge that the independence of the kingdom meant for them 
a prosperous and peaceful life. How they stood to lose this 
independence at the hands of the invader and it was for them, 
although without a king, to fight in defence of the inde­
pendence of their kingdom. Their difficulty was complicated 
by the fact that the heir to the Shoan throne, Prince Menelik, 
was only about eleven j^ ears old and incapable of giving the 
kingdom the leadership it needed. His safety was the most 
immediate problem for the leaders of the kingdom. The Emperor 
also realised what the freedom and safety of the prince meant 
for the success of his campaign, and he devoted his tactics 
to capturing Menelik. The next phase of the struggle, there­
fore, ms one in which the 1 Shoan” chiefs sought to prevent 
the Emperor from capturing Menelik.
On the death of Haile Malakot, his half brother, Ato
Dargue and Ato Andargatchaw took upon, themselves the task 
of leading the country in the war against the invaders.
Their first plan was to take Prince Menelik to a safe hiding 
place in the distant province of Bulga. After three brief 
stops they climbed the Chaka mountain chain through a gorge 
and descended at the eastern end into the plain which stretches 
to the province of Mindjar. The Emperor on the other hand 
followed a route which passes southwest of Ankober, and leaving 
the city to his left pursued the Shoans to Bulga; he camped 
his troops 011 the river Kassam which forms the boundary be­
tween the province dT Bulga and that of Mindjar. His plan 
appears to have been to catch up with the Shoan forces, to 
follow up his early successes with a crushing defeat and cap­
ture the heir to the Shoan throne. Having sent one of his 
generals, Ras Engheda with an army by a north-eastern route 
to intercept the Shoans and prevent them from reaching Anko­
ber by an eastern route Theodros hmself pursued the enemy by
1
a south-eastern route.
Ras Engheda and Ixls men Chaka range and
"I
Walda Maryam: op.cit., pp. 13-14* Cecchi: op.cit., I, p.255* 
Guebre Sellassie; Chronique, I, p.86.
descended eastwards to the plains of Barakat where they
encountered the Shoan forces. It was about the middle
of November that the opposing forces joined battle. The
Imperial forces withdrew from the first encounter with
heavy losses; in the second encounter, however, Ras Engheda
succeeded in forcing the Shoans to withdraw with considerable
losses.^ * The Shoans were now in a precarious situation;
their way to the north was barred by Ras Engheda; at the
same time Theodros and the men under his command were pursuing
them from the south-east. They soon realised the hopelessness
of their situation and sued for peace, handing over Prince
Menelik as a hostage to the Emperor. Theodros received the
prince with manifest satisfaction for his surrender meant the
end of the resistance which had taken a heavy toll of the
Imperial forces.
.ifter the surrender of Menelik and his chiefs, the
Imperial forces had to hasten back to Angolala province where
2the G-alla were sfcill in arms against the Emperor. Erom here
Hlalda Maryams op.cit.,p.14- Geechi; ibid.
2
G.R.A. p.269* No. 469* Plowden to Earl of Clarendon 
22.12.1855. The Galla, he reports, suffered "1000 of their 
number dead on the field, besides wounded and prisoners", 
and adds that "the king (Theodros) has sent messengers to all 
parts of Abyssinia to announce his complete success In Shoa".
the Emperor went to ihikober to receive homage from the clergy. 
With the submission of toth the army and the clergy, the inde­
pendence of Shoa became a thing of the past, and the Emperor’s 
last act was the settlement of the administrative question.
This he did towards the end of February 1856.
Until the time of Wassail Saggad, the sixth ruler of 
Shoa, who adopted the title of Ras and thereby accelerated 
the process of Shoal independence, Shoa was considered as an 
integral part of the Empire, and its ruler was regarded as a 
vassal of the Emperor at Gondar. The title of the ruler of 
Shoa was then Haredazmatch. Now that the kingdom of Shoa 
had been conquered and the heir to the Shoan throne was a 
prisoner in the hands of ‘the Emperor, Theodros re-introduced 
the old title. Haile Mikael, one of the illegitimate sons of
Sahla Selassie, was appointed governor over the whole of Shoa 
In appointing a Shoa "prince" to govern the conquered kingdom 
with the title of Maredazmatch. / Theodros made one of the
mistakes which were to render his hold over Shoa so tenuous.
In his conquest of the northernprovinces, Theodros replaced 
the old and established ruling families with his own tmsbed 
men as governors. The method by which he re-organized the ad­
ministration of the northern provinces was nicely summed up by 
Plowden thus:
"...He placed the soldiers of the different 
provinces under the command of his own trusty 
followers to whom he gave high titles "but 110 
power to judge or punish, thus infact, creating 
generals in place of feudal chieftains, more 
proud of their birth than of their monarch, 
and organizing a new nobility, a legion of 
honour, dependent on him and chosen specially 
for their daring and. fidelity." 1
This method was designed to win the support of the conquered 
people away fromtheir traditional rulers for the Imperial 
government. To what extent it succeeded in its aim Is an 
open question, but there is little doubt that it contributed 
a great deal to malting the first half of Theodros's reign 
the success which it was. By not following a similar policy 
In Shoa Theodros failed to win the sympathies of the "Shoans" 
away from their attachment to their "provincial" independence.
The significance of this will become clearer when we come to 
consider the anti-imperial feelings which gave rise to revolts 
against the raw regime. In addition to the Maredazmatch,
Theodros appointed Ato Andargatchaw an Abogaz or frontier governor. 
It was his duty, as an Abogaz, to see to it that the Shoan sub­
jects who inhabited the frontier provinces lived In peace with 
those living beyond the frontiers. The duties of an Abogaz were
by 110 means easy; it was for this reason that Haile Malakot and
2his predecessors had appointed at least four Abogazoch, one 
FO 1 /9  Plowden to Earl of Clarendon, 25•6.1855? Enclosure.
2
■'Amharic plural for JLbogaz.
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responsible for each of the four jrontiers of Shoa. Here 
again the innovation could not have contributed to 
strengthening the Emperor's hold over the conquered king­
dom. One frontier governor could not successfully see to 
the maintenance of law and order at the four frontiers, 
especially since he did not have a large army and also 
communications were so poor at the time. Further, Ato Andar- 
gatchaw who was'appointed to this post had been a devoted 
official of the Shoan dynasty and had fought courageously 
against the imperial forces. It is possible that the courage 
of Andargatchaw and the popularity which he eifpyed in the 
country influenced the Emperor in appointing him to the post 
in the hope of making advantageous use of his qualities and 
popularitsr. Much as he could have been a useful agent for 
the Emperor, the indications are that Andargatchaw was more 
of a liability than an asset to the imperial administration 
in Shoa.
Our sources do not tell us what happened to the numer­
ous officials of the former administration, the shums, the 
district and provincial governors, the court officials, all 
of whom had useful parts to play. It is not unreasonable,
^See Chapter IV.
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however, to assume that the lower grades of the former 
hierarchy were left undisturbed by the conqueror, and 
that it was only the most important top grades which were 
re-organised.*** This was another of the Emperor fs mistakes 
in connection with the re-organisation of the administration 
of Shoa, for these lower officials had been the backbone of 
the former regime and no conquest of Shoa could last long 
unless the lower ranks of the monarchical administration 
were re-organised. The assumption that the lower grades were 
left untouched is strengthened by the fact that we are told 
in the sources that Theodros issued a proclamation to confirm 
the laws which existed during the previous administration. 
There appears to have been one exception, and this referred to 
the murder law passed by Sahla Selassie. According to this law 
murder was punishable by the death of the culprit as well as 
his whole family, and the confiscation of their property by 
the State.^ This was undoubtedly a harsh law.but its purpose
*|
The assumption becomes more valid when one considers the 
factors which facilitated Menelik’s re-conquest. See below.
alda Maryam; op.cit., pp. 17-18.
^Ibid.
s~
was clea? and simple. Sahla Selassie wanted to make Shoa a safe 
and peaceful place to live(j and his murder law together with 
his property and theft laws, were designed to achieve this 
purpose.1 The severity of the law against murder could not 
escape Theodroswho had already shown himself, among other 
things, a social reformer. He therefore humanised this law 
by stipulating that only the person convicted of murder should 
be executed and that any members of his family would be exe­
cuted only if they were proved to have been accomplices or
found at the place of murder at the time when the cffence was 
2committed.
Having thus settled the administration of Shoa,
Theodros left Ankober for Gondar by way of Godjam and Beghe-
nader.^taking with him, as prisoners of war, Prince Menelik,
the son of Haile Malakot, his mother, and a number d? the
chief men of Shoa:'including Ato Hadaw, Ato Dargue and Walda 
4*Tsadek.
1 See Chapter IV.
2
Walda Maryam: op.cit.,p.18.
:)He arrived back in Gondar in June 1856.
^ASSGI: Cartoni VIc. Chiarim: "Memoria... sulla storia
recent© dello Scioa... " 23*11*1877.
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It was thus that the independent kingdom of Shoa was 
conquered by the Emperor Theodros. It was not without a 
desperate struggle that the inhabitants of Shoa yielded to 
the conqueror, and their capitulation was hastened by the 
sudden illness and. subsequent death of their sovereign at 
the time when the struggle was at its climax. For the next 
nine years the ''Shoans” lived under the "Maredazmatchship” 
established by the conqueror; but throughout that period 
they strove unceasingly to regain their independence; the 
history of Shoa in those years is, therefore, the story of 
revolts against the Imperial administration.
In view of the criticisms which have been made against 
the methods by ihich the Emperor hoped to win the support of 
the conquered kingdom of Shoa, it is remarkable that the con- 
quest lasted as long as it did. One is tempted to think that 
there must have been a considerable body of men in the king­
dom who supported the nationalism for which the Emperor stood, 
and that it was these people who constituted the prop on which 
the Imperial administration rested. It is difficult however 
to point at any individuals or group of men. Nevertheless, 
there must have been such men among the clergy. This suggestion 
gains weight when it is remembered that for some time the clergy 
in Shoa, like those in Godjam, Gondar and Tigre, had been
divided 011 a number of theological questions, Theological 
discussions and disputes had for some centuries been a
1 r>feature of the Church in Ethiopia as a whole. by the first 
half of the 19th century two sects had developed in the 
Ethiopian church on the question of the naturdof the birth 
of Jesus Christ, There were those who believed in what came 
to be termed the three births of Christ: "Christ proceeding
from the Father, from all eternity /was/ styled the Eternal 
'birth*, his incarnation as being born of the Holy Virgin, 
termed his second or temporal birth and his reception of the 
Holy Ghost in the Womb, denominated the third birth". Opposed 
to the doctrine of three births were those who denied the 
third birth and preached two births. Both "sects" or doctrines 
had a large following ii the leading monasteries In the various 
'"provinces" of the Empire, but the doctrine of the two births 
was particularly strong in Tigre. Both the Emperor Theodros 
and the Abuna Salama upheld the two births and prohibited the 
three births throughout the Empire 011 pain of the offenders
See I. Guidi: nLa Chiesa Abissina" inQriente M°derno.
Anno II 1922-3PP- 123-8, 186-90, 252-6.
2I0L: LG 189 Ho. 2060®, Harris, 27.11.1841, para 18.
For detailed account of these disputes see Cobat: Journal
of a Three. Tears Residence in Abyssinia in Furtherance of 
the_ objegts of the C.M._S._ (Bond. 1834) and Journals__ ofj.,.,.. 
Tjqenberg and Krapf... . Lond. 1843 -
having their hands cut off.***
In Shoa the dispute between the adherents of the two
doctrines reached dangerous heights in the 1830s when the
king, Sahla Selassie, intervened to uphold the three births
and "issued a proclamation*1 ttaa t "any subj ect denying the
three births of Christ should forfeit his property and be
banished the aealm". In consequence of this proclamation a
number of leading Churchmen known to have believed in two
2births were deprived of their posts. A tense situation 
was thus developed which, the European travellers then in 
Shoa feared, might lead to a religious civil war. It must 
be emphasised that the question of the two or three births was 
only one of the many issues over which the clergy was divided.
Both chroniclers emphasise that the anxiety to settle 
the doctrinal disputes among the clergy in Shoa was one of 
the factors which led the Emperor to conquer Shoa, and that on 
conquest the doctrine of two births was established in the 
kingdom."* It is conceivable therefore that the Emperor found
G^-uidi: Art. cited in Qriente M°derno II, p. 190. Abuna is 
the title given to the metropolitan of the Ethiopian Church.
^LG 189 No. 2060^, Harris, 27.11.1841? para. 20. CMSA; 
CM/044? 21: Itrapf to Coates, 14.12.1841.
■'Valda Maryam: op.cit., pp. 7-10. Alaka Zaneb: op.cit. in 
USE, Vol. II 1942, p.150.
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support in Shoa among those who had adhered to the doctrine 
of two births and had, under the old regime, been intimidated 
and victimized as a result. Considering the influence which 
the clergy exercised over the minds of the people, it is lilcely 
that the adherents of the two births doctrine made quite a 
following among the inhabitants of the kingdom to espouse 
the Imperial cause in Shoa, It may also be added that it is 
quite possible that the governors of the northern provinces 
of Shoa who submitted after ineffective initial resistance, 
oi" without any resistance at all, were believers in two births.
One must, however, not emphasize too strongly the 
religious issue as a f actor which made for what success at­
tended Theodros*s conquest of Shoa. Religious sympathies of 
the kind indicated do not necessarily lead to political alli­
ances; and there is no evidence in the sources of the exist- 
m o e  in Shoa of any sizeable body of people who believed in 
centralism (represented by Theodros) as opposed to provincialism. 
Indeed, the revolts which broke out against the Imperial ad­
ministration not only in Shoa but also in other parts of the 
Empire suggest that, in general, the inhabitants of the Empire 
were still opposed to Imperial ddomination. The initial suc­
cess of the Emperor’s conquest of Shoa must therefore be sought 
in factors other than the support of those who were in agreement
with the Emperor about certain theological issues.
It would seem that those who submitted initially to 
the Emperor did so more out of fear than out of disloyalty to 
the Shoan monarchy or sympathy with the aspirations of the in­
vader. This fear must have been due to exaggerated reports 
about the Emperor’s military prowess and resources. As lias 
been remarked already, the submission of the northern provincial 
governors weakened both the total numerical strength and the 
morale of the nShoaas” who could be put to the field against 
the Emperor. The situation was complicated for the Shoans by 
the untimely death of their king. Thepsychological effect of 
the king’s death at that difficult moment upon a priest-ridden 
and superstitious society should not be under-estimated. These 
factors, more than the religious sympathies, -mas-t must have led 
to the collapse of Shoan resistance in 1856. Later when the 
Shoans had recovered from the shock of the events they success­
fully resisted all efforts by the Imperial administration to 
pacyfy the kingdom.
The resistance of the ’’Shoans” against the Imperial govern­
ment found leadership in the Prince Seifou Selassie, the younger 
brother of the deceased Haile Malakot. Seifou appears to have 
been one of the few chief men of Shoa who managed to escape
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capture by Theodros. The first series of revolts was protracted 
and was brought to an end only by the death of the Prince in 
I860. The rebels defeated the imperial administrators in a 
series of battles fought between 1896 and 1859. In 1859 the 
Maredazmatch Haile Mikael was summoned to Magdala, the Emperor's
headquarters, deprived of his post and put in chains.^ We are
not told what happened to Ato Andargatchaw, the Abogazf but
from 1859 he fades out of the picture, and one suspects that
he was either killed in the revolts or imprisoned with the 
Maredazmatch.
The explanation for the imprisonment of the ^aredazmatch 
(and possibly of the Abogaz Andargatchaw) was that he had not 
proved equal to the task of governing Shoa and had been unable 
to quell revolts in that part cf the Empire. In his place Ato 
Abo3?'e (Ahboye) was appdnted as governor and Ato Bezabu as Abogaz. 
The new administrators had no better luck than their prede­
cessors had had against the rebels who had by now occupied the 
capital, Ankober. It would have been remarkable if they had 
had successes for, as we have seen, their administration does
^Alaka Zaneb: op.pit., in 0.H. II, p. 174. Cl. Sellasies op.clt.
I, pp. 93-4. Cecchis Da Zeila, I, p.256.
not appear to have had much support in the kingdom. After 
suffering repeated defeats, the governors .sent a messenger 
to Theodros undoubtedly to ask for reinforcements. This 
brought the Emperor to Shoa for the second time. Plowden. 
who was then in Gondar, places the Emperor's second visit 
to Shoa at the beginning of October, 1859* The rebels 
successfully repulsed every assault on the city, inflicting 
severe losses on their opponents.' Unable to make any 
headway against the rebels, Theodros decided to abandon the 
struggle and gave orders to his men to withdraw.
In this unsuccessful attempt by the Emperor to cap­
ture the rebel stronghold Ankober, we have evidence of the 
exaggerated reports about the invincibility of the Imperial 
army. Admittedly the need to put down revolts in some parts 
of the northern half of the Empire had considerably reduced 
hie numerical strength of the invading army, but a reduced, 
fighting strength was no less true of the Shoan rebels. On 
this occasion as on^ the first, it may be said that events 
played into the Emperor's hands, for just at the point when 
the Imperial forces withdrew from the attack, Prince Seifou 
made an error of judgment which robbed him of the fruits of
^E.O.l/lls Plowden to H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, 2.2.1860.
2
Walda Maryam: op.cit., p.25. Sellassie: op.cit., 1, p.96.
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day's hard fighting. He decided to abandon Ankober and
pursue the enemy into the plains below. His decision appears
to have been unpopular with a section of his army; they
rightly suspected that Hie enemy's action might be a trap
to entice them on to the plain, and thereby deprive Seifou
of the advantage of fighting from a mountain top. Accordingly,
this section of Seifou's soldiers, numbering some five hundred
men, refused to follow their leader into the plains and re-
mained behind to guard the city.
When Theodros saw that Seifou had abandoned the city
and was pursuing the Imperial forces, he turned round, gave
him a battle and succeeded in scattering Seifou's soldiers;
then he made an assault on Ankober which, after strong initial
resistance by the five hundred soldiers still there, fell to
the Imperial soldiers. The fall of Ankober was followed by
pillage and massacre of not only soldiers but also the clergy,
2
and much church property was either destroyed or captured.
1I have followed Cecchi for this part of the story. The three 
chronicles (¥alda Maryam, 25, Alaka Saneb in RSE 11,180, 
Sellassie, I, 96) say that the discovery that Theodros was 
personally leading the attack unnerved Seifou who, thereupon, 
fled In fear leaving Ankober to its fate. Cecchi:, op.cit.,
I, p.257.
Wal&a Maryam, op.crtp.25™2b. Sellassie. op...ext. , 1, p.96. 
Cecchi; Ha Zeila, I, p.257. Cecchi adds,that Theodros set the 
city on fire; and Walda Maryam estimates that the Emperor 
lost 1600 men in the battle.
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That the Church should have been a target for attack from
the Emperor's soldiers suggests that the clergy played a
part in the resistance to the Imperial government. It is
likely that the "defeated" adherents of the doctrine of three
births, who appear to have been in the majority in the Church
in Shoa, stirred up anti-imperial feelings in 'the ordinary
people. The Emperor does not appear to have learnt any
lesson from the revolts, for he left the administration and
the obfence systems of Shoa the same as they had been under
Maredazmatch Haile Mikael, and returned to Magdala leaving
Aboye and Bezabu in control at Ankober. On his way to the
north the Emperor devastated the Shoan province of Morabiete
over which Prince Seifou had been the governor and brought
panic and disorder into that province. It was in his attempt
1to restore order there that Seifou was killed In June I860.
The death of Prince Seifou Selassie brought the first 
wave of revolts in Shoa to an end, but for the next three 
years the "Shoans" lived in an uneasy peace. Although the Sei­
fou revolt failed, its lesson ought to have been clear to 
Theodros and his representatives in Shoa. The enthusiasm with
■^ Cecchi; op.clt., I, 258-9.
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which the Shoans responded, to Seifou1 s call to arms and 
the daring with which they prosecuted their designs ought 
to have warned the Emperor that the Shoans would spare 
no effort to win back their independence. What is surprising 
was that Theodros should have failed to garrison Akober with 
troops from the north under one of his own faithful captains? 
but should have depended? as he appears to have done? 011 
his religious sympathisers in Shoa for the peace and security 
of his southern conquest. One is led to believe that he 
failed to understand the attitude of the "Shoans" towards his 
conquest of their kingdom? and under-estimated their loyalty
to the independent Shoa which they had helped to build..
1
In late I863 or early in 1864 the second series of 
revolts broke out in Shoa. This time they were led Abogag 
Besabu, one of the two officials appointed by Theodros to 
govern Shoa. The fact that a representative of the Imperial 
regime did turn against the Emperor indicates that Theodros's 
conquest of Shoa was not as popular as the Emperor appears to 
have believed. About this time Ato Aboye took the annual
Sellassie; op.oit.? 1? 97? n.10. The Editor depends here on 
Stern's The Captive Missionary pp. 214-6 where Theodros' 
attempt to put down revolts in Wallo and Shoa are described.
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1
tribute, to the north to the Emperor and left Bezabu behind
to maintain peace in Shoa. 'faking advantage cf the absence
of his superior, Bezabu proclaimed himself negous (king)
2of Shoa. In taking this action Bezabu certainly reckoned 
on the absence of popular support for the Emperor’s rule 
in Shoa. The "Shoans" had not as yet come to accept Theodros's 
conquest as a falt acoomp1i. Their loyalty to the old order 
was deep-seated, and all that they needed to rebel ms a 1 eader 
who would restore the old order. Nobody knew this better than 
a man who for four years had represented the interests of 
Theodros in Shoa. In his campaign, therefore, Bezabu un­
doubtedly represented himself as a man pledged to restore the 
old order, the champion of the conquered people against the 
conqueror.^ Further, Bezabu must have counted on the fact 
that the military reputation of Theodros which had driven the 
Manzians to submit without resistance was exaggerated. He 
must have realized during the last campaign that, but for 
the tactical mistake of Prince Seifou, Theodros could hardly
^Alaka Zaneb (RSE II, p.174) estimates the annual tribute paid, 
by Shoa at 100 horses, 788 mules, 10,000 thalers,several oxen, 
100^ sciamma (a kind of shirt) and other unspecified articles.
2 ^
Walda Maryam: op.cit., p.54. Sellassie: op.cit., I, 97-
Cecchi: op.cit., I, 26o.
-^ Sellassie: idem, s The chronicler attributes the following
speech to Bezabu: "If Menelik, the son of my /former/ master
returns, I shall hand ever the reins of government to him, but 
if anybody else comes claiming to be master of Shoa 1 shall 
not abandon it (Shoa)1' i.e. I shall oppose any such pretender.
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have taken Ankober, All these thoughts must have weighed 
heavily in the mind of Bezabu when he rebelled against the 
Emperor Theodros*
It is interesting to note that some time earlier,
1Bezabu had sent messengers to Tadjura to purchase firearms.'
This is significant for it indicates to what extent the rebels 
in Shoa, like those in Tigre, were determined to fight for 
the overthrow of the Imperial regime. In seeking to re­
open contact between Shoa and the coast, which must have 
been closed as a result of Theodros1s conquest and the consequent 
insecurity in the kingdom, Bezabu also demonstrated to the 
people his determination, even if only apparent, to restore 
the old order.
With rebellions in Wallo and other parts of the Empire, 
Theodros was in a difficult situation, but for the third time 
he marched southwards to Shoa to suppress the rebel Abogaz.
His plan appears to have been first to put down the rebellion 
in the Wallo country under the leadership of Waizero Warqit, 
and after that to continue to Shoa. Mot much success attended
& D (Afriquej Yol. 63, pp. 276-8: Betsabe to a certain
Ghebra /Seubra/ Hajwat, 2.4.1863.
the Emperor's campaign in either the hallo region or Shoa.
The hallo Galla, without hazarding a battle ^ withdrew to some
distant and inaccessible ambas from where they "began a
destructive guerilla war" against-the Emperor. "Numerous
bands... hovered around the ^mperor
1
or assailed its rear when it moved". The effect of the Wallo 
activity on the Imperial army was that the soldiers were ex­
hausted and dispirited by the time they arrived in Shoa; 
consequently their fighting strength was weakened. In the 
circumstance it is not surprising that the Imperial army could 
not dislodge the rebels from the naturally impregnable fortress 
of the Afgara in Mans from where the latter attacked the invaders 
Unable to make any headway against the rebels, his army already 
weakened by the campaign in the Wallo country, and pressed by 
the need to attend to other rebellions in the northern party of 
his Empire,Theodros withdrew from the attack. All that he could 
do was to plunder the nearby provinces; he returned to Magdala 
and left Shoa ii the hands of the rebel leader. As it turned 
out, Theodros was never again to set foot in Shoa, and by the
's7 camp when it rested,
*^Rev. H. A. Stem: The Captive Missionary (bond. 1868), p.215.
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time he died in April 1868, the kingdom which he had sought 
to annex to his Empire had re-established its independence 
under the Prince who, for nearly ten years, was his prisoner 
at Magdala.
Menelik's escape from Magdala and his reconquest of 
Shoa constitute a fascinating episode in the history of the 
kingdom. Born in August 1844 Menelik's mother was a lady of 
humble birth who, for some time, was employed as children's 
nurse in the royal household.^ Menelik was only about eleven 
years old when Shoa was conquered by Theodros and he, together 
with other chief men of the kingdom, was taken prisoner to 
Magdala. It was here therefore that Menelik spent most 
of his adolescent and formative years. The influence which 
this period had on the shaping of both his character and future 
policy will make an interesting study. Here we cannot do more 
than to point out that the policy which Menelik was later to 
follow as king of Shoa, especially the use which he made of 
Europeans, appears to have had roots in this period. While he 
was at Magdala Menelik was well treated and had for a playmate
■^ Sellassie: op.cit. 9 I, pp. 73? 74^5* In note 3 on p.73 the 
Editor dates Menelik1s birth to 17th August 1844*
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1the Emperor's son, 11,j;) Mashasha. Both hoys appear to have
been directly under the care of Dedjatch Cilbie, the former
2
ruler of Tigre, at this time also a prisoner at Magdala.
Menelik was loved not only by the soldiers and his f ellow
prisoners but also by the Emperor who later gave his daughter
in marriage to the Shoan prince. Well treated though he
was, Menelik was burning with the desire to ascend the throne
of his ancestors and to restore Shoa to the peace and prosperity
to which the kingdom had been used. And be began to contemplate
plans to escape.
While the desire to ascend the Shoan throne may have
been inherent in his princely birth, and was merely sharpened
by circumstances in which he found himself, the thought of
escape seems to have come to Menelik from two possible sources.
The first source would be Magdala itself and could have includedI
not only the Shoan chiefs imprisoned there with Menelik but 
also Dedjatch TJbie and even the Abuna and the clergy all of 
whom had lately encountered the hostility of the Emperor. All
^Literally meaning boy;it is generally attached to the names of 
the sons of the Imperial family as a form of title.
p
Walda Maryam; op.cit., p.40.
V^/alda Maryam: ibid. Stern: The Captive Missionary, p.219. 
Sellassie; op.cit., I, 94. In note 5 the Editor names her as 
Zauditu.
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these leaders must have believed, that of all the "princes" 
detailed at Magdala only Menelik had any chances of escaping 
because of the freedom of movement which he was allowed by 
the Emperor. Further it was only Menelik who, once he had 
escaped, could win back the support of his country to resist 
successfully the power of the Emperor whojhad of late degener­
ated into a blood-thirsty tyrant, fhe second source from which 
the thought of escape could have come to Menelik was Shoa, 
where resistance to the Imperial conquest had not wavered 
since 1856. One would like to think that Menelik was the 
cause of the troubles that the Imperial administration faced
In Shoa, as is indeed suggested by the speech attributed to 
1Bezabu. Menelik must in fact have been the centre of an 
elaborate intrigue in Shoa to oust the Imperial government and 
to restore the Shoan dynasty. Although there is no evidence 
in the sources to indicate that Menelik was in touch with 
events in Shoa, this may well have been the case; and contact 
between him and the rebel leaders in Shoa could not have been 
as difficult as one might think. Letters could have been ex­
changed between the leaders In Shoa and Menelik at Magdala without
1
See p.\olv. n. 2>
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the Emperor finding out. That this was possible was proved 
by the fact that the Abuna who was still a prisoner at 
Magdala was able to communicate with Menelik after the 
latter had escaped to Shoa.'1' Thus Menelikfs desire to return 
to Shoa was sharpened by the encouraging support which he 
must have obtained both within certain circles at Magdala 
and in Shoa itself.
The escape from Magdala was effected on the night
of June 30, 1865; Menelik was accompanied by his mother and
only a few of the Shoan chief men imprisoned with him. The
route of escape lay south-eastwards through the district
of Warra Haimauou, across the Maskal mountain, and southwards
to Boroumeda where Menelik was given an enthusiastic welcome
by the Wallo Galla Queen Warqit. The Galla Queen even gave
Menelik an escort consisting of three detachments of Wallo
2troops to take to Shoa.
On the face of it Warqit1s reception of Menelik appears 
unusual. She is represented as a fanatical Muslim who had the
1
Walda‘Maryam; on.pit., p.51.
2_
Letters from-the Captive Missionaries in Abyssinia (Lond.1868), 
p.2. Stern to Charlotte /stexnf/' dated Amba Magdala, 15.7.1865.
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1habit of burning down Christian churches. And the political
relations between the Wallo and the Sfooan frontier governors
2
were, on the whole, anything but friendly. Thus either re­
ligiously or politically the Wallo Galla had virtually nothirg 
in common with Shoa which could understandably explain War­
qit *s behaviour. Further, Warqit* s own son. Imam Amedi Ali 
Liben, the hereditary Prince of the Wallo Galla, was at this 
time a x>risoner in Magdala, and Warqit could hardly have 
failed to realise that her son might lave to suffer for it if 
she connived at Menelik1 s escape, as indeed l-b' happened. ^ 
However, Warqit may have reconciled herself to the painful 
fact that her son might never come bade alive from Magdala, 
and she was, therefore, prepared to take whatever measures 
she could to revenge herself on Theodros. Ironically, Warqit 
had something in common with Menelik and the Shoans. Both 
the Wallo Galla and the "Shoans** were rebels against Theodros
1
Walda Maryam; op. ci
^Crapf: in Journal of Xsenberg and ICrapf, p.314? 316.
IOL: LG 189 Wo. 2031? Harris 10.11.1841. paras. 29-30.
Walda Maryam: op.cit., p.9?
^When Oli eo dr os heard of the escape and of the receipt ion of Menelik 
- by the Wallo Queen Warqit, he ordered the Immediate execution of 
the Wallo Prince together with 24 of the Wallo prisoners. See 
Walda Maryam, p.40; also F.0.401/2, Rassam to Lieut.-CHonel 
Merewether, 15.8.1863; Stern, letter cited. It is remarkable 
that the Shoan chief men who remained behind at Magdala should 
have remained unmolested while the Wallo prisoners were executed.
and fin helping the success of Menelik*s escape and with it 
the success of the Shoan revolt, Warqit believed that she 
was inflicting a humiliating rev;enge on Theodros.
The escort of three detachments of Wallo soldiers
which Menelik had, could hardly have been a match if the
"Shoans*1 had offered a serious opposition to the entry of
Menelik into Shoa. As it happened the governor of the frontier
province of Geshe, Dedjatch Waldie and the governor of the
district of Antokia (Antsokia) in the province of Efrata sub™
mitted without any resistance and, together with their men,
1joined the ranks of the Prince,
As a result of his revolt against Theodros, and in order 
to prevent any sudden attack on Ankober by the Emperor,
Wesabu had stationed soldiers to guard the various defiles
which led from the frontier provinces into the centra,!
province of Shoa. One such guard was posted at the river
Katchenee defile in the district of ©air, the southern district of
Geshe. "The defile is the principal pass and entrance into the centre
of Shoa, The banks of this defile are so steep and high that
the natives would be able, by throwing stones.- upon the invader,
Sellassie: op.cit., X, p.103
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to check a whole army,1,1 Both the guard and the governor of 
Bair submitted to Menelik without resistance. The abandonment 
of this strategic defile by the soldiers of Bezabu and their 
defection greatly facilitated the ascent of Menelik and his 
party and their advance into the centre of Shoa. So fax*
Menelik's advance had been devoid of any military encounter; 
the inhabitants of these provinces who had been shaken with 
fear and had submitted to the Emperor were now proving that 
they were not disloyal to the Hagassi dynasty. But the easy 
advance of the Prince was not to continue as far as Ankober^ 
for Bezabu, the rebel governor who now controlled Shoa, was 
not without his devoted followers. Among them was the pro­
vincial governor of Efrata, Ato Habta Yassus, who opposed 
Menelik's advance. In Efrata, therefore, Menelik's party had 
to fight the first battle of the reconquest. The royalists won 
the battle, and captured in addition to Habta Xassus and some 
of his soldiers, eighty rifles, horses and mules;'1 all of which
2
went to strengthen the fighting power of Menelik and his party.
1I-Crapf: Journal, p.314. "Prom Mans," Kkapf writes on the same 
page, "one descends some 3?000 ft, through this defile at the 
foot of which flows the river Katchenee which separates the 
province' of Manz from that of Greshe,"
%ellassie; op.cit., I, p.103.
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With the submission of Greshe and the conquest of 
Efrata Menelik won the northern provinces to his side.
This gave him sufficient soldiers to be able to fight his 
way to the throne if this became necessary. It also 
strengthened the morale not only of himself but also of 
his Wallo 63001*1; Menelik was therefore able to proclaim 
himself ICing of Shoa when he arrived at Ghedeip (G-eddem) .
When the news of Menelik's advance reached Bezabu he 
assembled the men who had helped him to rebel against Theo­
dros and led them in person against the advancing Prince.
Bezabu had tasted power and as a rebel ruler of Shoa was 
probably beginning to enjoy the loyalty and confidence of 
the inhabitants who, as has been suggested, looked upon him 
as champion of the old order; he was therefore, understandably 
reluctant to relinguish the position: of power which he had 
seised. It js even possible that, in order to wingj the 
support of his soldiers against Menelik, Bezabu represented 
the advance of the Prince as another of the Emperor’s attempts 
at subjugating the revolted, province of Shoa. This suggestion
1 *■Sellassie: op.cit«, I, p.103.
becomes more plausibe when we consider how Menelik won the 
battle against Bezabu which took place on the plain of 
Gadilo in the province of Geddem. The encounter could hardly 
be called a battle, for the sources agree on the fact that 
when Bezabu*s soldiers realized that the “invader" was 
Menelik and not Theodros^the majority refused to fight 
against the prince on whose behalf they had for so long re­
sisted the Imperial government in the kingdom. Bezabu thus 
found to his dismay that he had not sufficient followers to 
fight the battle; and it was with difficulty that he escaped 
capture and fled to seek safety'on the fortress of Afqara.
Menelik entered Ankober in triumph about the end of 
August 1865. His first act as King of Shoa. was to abolish 
whatever changes were in troduced during the Imperial admini­
stration and to reinstate the officials who had served under 
his father and grandfather, This re-organization was parti­
cularly needed in the Church where the official establishment 
of the doctrine of two births by the Emperor had caused much 
confusion. The doctrinecf three births was re-established in
Hfalda Maryam; op, cit., pp. 54-5. Cecchi; Da Zeila, Vol. I, 
p.262. G. Sellassie; Chronique, Vol. I, p.104. Sellasie 
dates the "battle of Gadilo" to Monday, 16th of Mahassie, 
about 2prd August 1865.
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Shoa and the clergy who had been dismissed by the Emperor were
re-instated. It must be pointed out however that the doctrine
of three births was again to be abolished and replaced by that
of two births by the Emperor Yohannes IV in 1878 after he had
1come to an agreement with Menelik in that year. After a short 
stay In Ankober, Menelik was said to have gone on a country­
wide tour of his kingdom, no doubt £o proclaim the end cf the
inter-regnum and the dawn of a new and hopeful era for the
2
inhabitants of Shoa. As for Bezabu, he was graciously par­
doned and made governor of the district of Abba Moti in the 
province of Tegulet; however, when later he was found to 
be stirring up Insurrections in his district, hems captured, 
tried publicly for treason and executed. The execution of 
Bezabu removed the only possible immediate threat to the se­
curity of the new regime, and central Shoa became tranquil. 
Menelik then turned his attention to the frontier Galla who were
■^1. Guidis ftLa Chiesa Abssina" in Oriente MQderno, Anno II 
1922-3, p. 190. See also Chapter III,
‘"'Walda Maryam; op.cit., p. 55. G. Sellasie: op. cit. » Vol. I, 
pp. 104-5.
^Walda Maryam: op.cit., loc.cit. G. Sellasie; op.cit.» I, 
pp. 105-6. Cecchi: op.cit., 1, pp. 263-4..
prone to be rebellious, and by 1868 lie had pacified the 
frontier districts of his kingdom.
The British Expedition to Magdala and the death of 
Thebdxos in April 18^8 led to the return, to their dative 
country, of those Shoan chief men who still remained prisoners 
at Magdala after the escape of Menelik; among these were Ato 
Dargue, Ato Wadaw and Walda Tsadek. The returnof these men 
to Shoa removed the last stain of Theodros1 conquest of the 
kingdom and the restoration mayy be said to have become complete.
As has been seen Theodros* conquest of Shoa failed 
for two related reasons. First, the Emperor failed to effect 
a thorough re-organization of the administration of the con­
quered kingdom, as he tended to do in the northern provinces.
It may be argued that he did not have nearly enough soldiers 
to have been able to spare some to garrison the distant pro­
vince of Shoa. Whatever his reason might have been, the failure 
to Introduce into Shoa the policy which he had found useful 
in the north played into the hands of the opponents of the 
conquest. These opponents of the imperial regime were able to 
organize effective resistance against the government and this 
made the Emperor's control over the conquered kingdom tenuous. 
The second fector which contributed to the f ailu¥?e of the Em­
peror’ s conquest was the loyalty of the inhabitants <f Shoa to
the dynasty tinder which the country had grown to become peace­
ful and prosperous* It Is true that some of the inhabitants 
wavered under the shock of an invasion by the Emperor; this 
shock was heightened by the untimely death of their king at 
the critical moment, an incident which must have had a great 
psychological effect on the invaded country. Nevertheless, 
the majority of the inhabitants d Shoa remained loyal to the 
heir to the throne despite the fact that the Prince was for 
nearly ten years a prisoner at the Emperor's headquarters.
Their loyalty expressed Itself in the series of revolts which 
broke out against the representatives of the Emperor in the 
kingdom. It was these same factors which made the restoration 
of the old dynasty probable, and when it came it was rapid 
and almost bloodless.'. The restored king embarked upon a policy 
of aggrandizement which not only made the name of Shoa feared 
and respected in all Abyssinia, but eventually made the kingdom 
of Shoa the centre of a regenerated Empire.
The reigi of Mian el ik effected the regeneration of Shoa 
after the decline which followed the conquest of the Kingdom 
by the Emperor Theodros. The reign was marked by developments 
which can be grouped under three main heads: Firstly, the
influx of European nationals into Shoa and the development 
of a more sustained relating with Europeans than had hitherto 
been the case with the rulers of Shoa. Secondly, greater 
involvement with the provinces north of Shoa end with the 
politics of the Empire as a whole. Thirdly, the expansion of 
the Kingdom to Incorporate the vast Galla populations in­
habiting the regions to the south, south-west and south-east 
of Shoa. This grouping is completely arbitrary and is made 
only for the convenience in treating the reign. All the de­
velopments were closely interwoven and each had marked effects 
upon the others. For example, the Influx of Europeans closely 
affected. Shoa's relations with the northern princes, as well 
as her expansion. Besides these "major" events, there took 
olace, in a more domestic sense, developments whose contribu­
tion to the "major" events were no less important. Among these
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were the growth of a regular army and the development of an 
administrative machinery which catered for the needs of the 
expanding Kingdom and became, after 1889? the basis for the 
administration of the United Empire.'*'
The influx of various European nationals Into Shoa 
during MenelikTs reign had important effects on the final 
stages of the rise of the Kingdom. During the reign of 
Sahela Selassie, for the first tine in our period, Sho0 was 
visited, by Europeans. Through these Europeans Sahela Selassie 
made contacts with Britain and France, but nothing positive 
came out of these contacts, and after about 1844 no more 
Europeans came to Shoa until the reign of Menelik."' In 
1848-9 Haile Malakot, said again in 186j>, Bezabu, one of the 
Shoans appointed by Emperor Theodros to governor Shoa, tried 
without success to re-open contact with Europe.^
On returning to Shoa after his escape from Magdala in 
1365? one of the first acts of Menelik was to re-open contact 
with the British and French agents in Aden. In his letter to
1 See Chapters IV and VI. 
^See Chapter I.
'See Olianter Jk
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the French consul Menelik made a direct request for cannon and 
muskets. Very early in his reign Menelik realized the immense 
value which European firearms would be to him. He needed im­
proved European weapons not because he wanted to ant against 
Theodros as the European agents claimed'*' but to be better able 
to defend Shoa should Theodros re-Invade the Kingdom. Moreover, 
he needed firearms to pacify his rebellious Galla countries to 
the south and south-west of Shoa. Menelik was, however, frustrated 
by the British, who fearing that arming Menelik would complicate
their involvement with Theodros, made representations to the
2
French officials both In Paris and at Aden. As a result, Mene­
lik ’ s military strength was for the next decade very weak.
In the letter^ which Menelik sent to the English Agent in 
1867 he made no formal request for firearms, but proposed the re­
newal of the friendly relations which the British had entertained 
with Shoa during the reign of Sahela Selassie. In expressing
the hope that ".... my country will not again be lost", Menelik
expressed in a. nutshell the objective which log’ behind his approaches
^F.O. 40l/2 p.644. Morewether to Lord Stanley, 11.7.1867- This 
'Despatch is printed in Correspondence Respecting Abyssinia, p.410.
See also ibid. p. 681. Footnote.
2_
ibid., Merewether's Despatch quoted.
^Ibid., p.641. Same to Same, 20.7 * 1067.
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to tlie Europeans. In his dealing with the Europeans Menelih1 s 
foremost interest was to safeguard the independence of the 
Kingdom over which he ruled, is he saw it the only way by 
which he could achieve this was to build up Shoa * s military 
strength to a position strong enough to resist successfully, 
and if possible, conquer, his neighbours, including the north­
ern provinces of the Empire. The first thing that he wanted 
from th oEurop cans therefore was an unlimited supply of fire­
arms .
Besides firearms, lien el il: would employ ear.7 European
willing to work for him on any aspect of development which
contributed to the security cf Shoa. Thus in 1877 a Frenchman
named Pottier was employed in training a group cf Shoan youths
1in European military techniques. Another Frenchman, Pino,
was a regular officer in the Army which was commanded by Sas
Gobana. Swiss engineers, Alfred IIg and Z^ nwaernann were employed
on, among other things, building bridges across the Eawash and
2other rivers to facilitate movement within the Kingdom. The 
Italian physicians, Dr. Alfieri and Dr. fraversi, were made use
~G. Massaias I ISiei Trentacinque Ann! di Hissioiie nell1Alta 
Etiopia, tfltiHPlO ISgjgV^ Yoi. X p. 193- Pettier was killed in the
same year while' fighting the rebellion of Auril-Kay, 1877.
o _ . -
hJ. F. Auden; "Voyage au Choa” in Le Tour du Konde 2e Sernestre 
1889, also Traversi, l,Viaggio nei Guraghe1 in B.S_.G.I. 1887. 
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of by the IChqg as his regular personal doctors, and. from time
to time were allowed to attend important dignitaries. Gradually
Menelik had come to appreciate the advantage of having a
medical officer with him on his campaigns, and took to the
practice so seriously that he found it necessary to delay
Traversi's visit to the south-western Galla provinces in
18S7 because, as Traversi explained, he would not like to go
1on a campaign "sensa medico*'. And quite a few of the Europeans 
who went to Shoa were, on a number of occasions, consulted by 
Menelik on important issues. For example, Massaia played a 
considerable role in bringing about reconciliation between 
Menelik and his cousin Machacha Self oil, after the latter's re-
p
bellion in 1877. The first mission which Menelik sent to 
Europe inl872 under Abba Micael owed not a little to Massaia, 
and the second mission which was confided to a Frenchman,
A
Pierre Arnoux owes its initiative wholly to the Frenchman.
1Traversi: "Excursions nel Gimma" in B.S.G.I. serie III,
Mol. I, 1888. p.901.
2
A. Cecchi; Da Zeila alle Frontiere del Oaf fa, Roma 3.886.
Vol. 1, p.271. Massaia: op.cit., Mol. X, pp. 202-D*
■^L. L. Lande: "Un Moyageur Frangais dans 1'Ethiopie Meridionale" 
in Revue des Deux Mondes, Mol. DO, 15th December, 1878. p.
887“8, and Passim; also 2nd Article in R. des Deux Mondes,
Mol. pi? p.390 and Passim.
In the use which Menelik made of Europeans, as in many 
other aspects of his policy, he took his example from the 
Emperor Theodros at whose court he had spent the formative 
period of his life. Theodros had made use of missionaries 
who lived in Gaffat for the manufacture of gunpowder and had 
had. an Englishman John Bell as a regular soldier in his army. 
Accredited to his court, though resident at Massowah, was a 
British consul, Plowden, and. after Plowden's death in 1360, 
Cameron. Menelik, however, made a more extensive use of Euro­
peans than Theodros ever did. In the course of this essay, 
an attempt will be mad_e to show that Menlik had much of his 
later policy roughly formulated in his mind before he reached 
Shoa after his escape in 1865.
Early in March 1868 the Catholic missionary, Mgr. Massaia, 
the first European to arrive in Menelik’s Shoa, reached, the 
Kingdom. Prom Zeila the missionary had written to ask, and 
ostensibly obtained^the permission of Menelik to pass through 
Shoo, to the south-westerly Gall a region where he had established 
a mission between 1852 and 1864-1 On reaching Shoa, however,
X
The material on the ’’Mission to the Call a” is in the Archives 
of the Collegio della Sacra Congregasione di Propaganda Elde 
in Rome, the series Scritture Rlferite nei Congress!. The 
Mission was instituted in 1846 as a resuit of representations 
made to the Roman ^atholic Authorities in Rome by the celebrated 
French traveller Antoine d’Abbadie, who had visited part of the 
Galla region in 1859-43. Massaia first entered the legion in 
1852 by way of the Sudan, Abajr and God jam.
Massaia was persuaded by Mene 1 ik to stay in Shoa and from 
1868 until 1879 Massaia lived in Shoa. He was later joined in 
Shoa by the other missionaries who had been with him in the 
south-west; Leon des Avanchers, however, remained on in G-hera 
where he was met by Cecchi and Chiarini in 1879-80.
Massaia1s request to enter Shoa came at a time when 
Menelik was still fighting to establish himself in power after 
his escape from Magdala and seeking to make friendly relations 
with the European powers on the Red Sea coast. He therefore 
saw the presence of a European in his country as a favourable 
opportunity for his contact with Europe. This was probably 
the reason why he persuaded Massaia to ^ay in Shoa. Menelik 
hoped that with the help of Massaia he might be able to secure 
the help which he needed from the European powers. As it turned 
out this was not an idle hope for, upon the advice of Massaia, 
Menelik sent a mission under an Abyssinian, Abba Michael to
i
Europe in 1872. Hie object of the mission was to establish 
friendly relations with the governments of England, -^ rance, 
Italy and the Papacy, Abba Michael visited only Italy, and
Massaia: I. Miei.... Vol. X pp. 12-21. Libro Verde Ho.
XV (Document!)' Etiopia. Doc. II, p.25 Massaia to S.M. Vittorio 
Emanuele, dated Gnlogov (Scioa) 25.6.1872.
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although received in audience by the King of Italy his mission 
failed to achieve its declared objective. Tet, it would be wrong 
to consider Abba Michael’s mission as a hopeless failure, for 
It contributed to bring* Shoa, to, the attention of the Italian 
authorities; this fact, no doubt, resulted in the selection 
of Shoa as a route and a base for tie scientific mission which 
the Italian geographical society was to send in 1876 to explore 
the lake regions of Equatorial Africa. Seen from the long­
term point of view, Abba Michael’s mission was not without 
its achievement.
The arrival in Shoa in September 1874 of the French 
merchant Pierre Arnoux marked a stage further in Menelik’s 
involvement with Europeans.
Eor many centuries the Red Sea coe„sts had attracted visitors 
from various nations. The importance of the Red Sea area derives 
from the channel which it provided between Africa, the Medi­
terranean World, and Arabia. In the early decades of the 19th 
century the revival of trade in Arabia soon had its repercussions 
in the Red Sea, and led to a similar trade revival in this part 
of the world. The ports of the Red Sea were at this time con­
trolled by the Ottoman Empire, but this did not deter France and
“Infra, pp. \ 3^— 9
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Britain from trying to get a footing on the Red Sea coast. 
Indeed, until about 1849 Britain did not officially recognise 
Turkish control over the Red Sea ports.
The French Ministry of Marine sent a number of expeditions 
to the Red Sea with a view to developing trade with the ports 
of the area. One way by which this was to be done was to 
establish trading posts on the African side of the coast and 
to enter into friendly relations with the rulers of the hinter­
land. In the 1830s two of these missions, that of Lefebvre 
and that of Combes and Tamisier penetrated into Ethiopia.
Combes and his friend bought from Ded.jatch Ubie, the then
ruler of the Province of TIgre the port of Ait near Massawah/ J-
with the intention of developing it as a base for Franco- 
Ethiopian commercial dealings. In 1859? the Bay of Adulis
i
was acquired by France from Negussie, then ruler of Tigre 
for the same purpose. By a treaty of 11th March 186&, signed 
with the local ruler,the French Government acquired possession 
of Obock, situated in the northern part dT the bay of Tadjoura. 
Obock was to be developed to serve the dual purpose of a depot
“M.A.E. (Paris) M. & D. (Afriqua) Vol. 68, pp. 408-24.
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for the refuelling of French ships to and from the East, 
and of attracting the trade of Ethiopia, The French were 
determined to win exposition in the East strong enough to 
rival that which the British had built in India. Throughout 
the 19th century the French policy in the Red Sea had for 
its purpose the destruction of British commercial preponderance.
The British, on the other hand, were determined to safe­
guard their interest in the East. One of the methods by which 
they intended to do this was to secure a dominant position in 
the Red Sea. Already the British had an agent at the port of 
(Mocha) Mokha on the Arabian side cf the Red Sea. To strengthen 
their position the British occupied Aden between 1839 and 1840.
British commercial interests were not limited, to the Arabian 
side of the Red Sea; they were also interested in the African 
side of It, It was part of the instructions from the Bombay 
Government to their agent in Mokha to "(pen) communications
and (eskhllsh) a commercial Intercourse with the different
2chieftains in Abyssinia”. In 1810 one such attempt was mad.e 
with Henry Salt’s mission to Ras Walda Selassie, then ruler of
1Of. for example instructions given to M. Lemay who was sent 
on a mission to Emperor Xohannes In 1884. M. & D. (Afrique)
Vol. 105, p.52. '’Mission confiee a Mr, Lemay aupres du Roi 
d’Abyssinie. Instructions donnees a cet Agent en Nov. 1884.”
‘"F.O. l/l p. 169. Henry Rudland to General Hewitt, dated Mocha, 30-9.1809 
For correspondence on the missions of Henry Salt and William Coffin 
cf. F.O. l/l, F.0.1/2, F.0.l/3. For Harris’ mission see Chapter I.
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Tigre; another was made in the 1820s with ¥. Coffin's mission 
to Sabagadis, the successor of Walda Selassie. A third attempt 
was made with Captain Harris' mission to Sahela Selassie, the 
King of Shoa in 1841-3- The establishment cf a British con­
sulate for Abyssinia (Ethiopia) at Massawah in 1847 was the 
climax of British activities on the African coast cf the Red 
Sea at this period.
The opening of the Sues Canal in 1869, which directly 
linked the Mediterranean sea to the Red Sea, intensified com­
mercial activities In the area and brought a wave of adventurers 
anxious to explore and exploit the commercial potential of the 
African hinterland. By this time, however, Britain's direct 
interest In Ethiopia had waned, for the basis of her Red Sea 
policy had altered. The.French continued to be interested in 
the area. Their interest was largely sustained by individual 
Frenchmen; from time to time rather short-lived, commercial 
companies were floated In France to develop trade with Ethiopia 
through the port of Obock. Italy was late in coming to the Red 
Sea, but after 1879 she began to play an increasingly important 
role both on the Red Sea and the Somali coasts.
Arnoux^who arrived in Shoa In September 1874 was one such 
individual; he had conceived plans for developing close re­
lations between France and Shoa. France would help Shoa to de~
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velop in such a nay that she -would spearhead the regeneration 
of the Empire of Ethiopia; a regular commercial route would 
be open between Shoa and Obock; a colony of French artisans 
would be established in Shoa to instruct the inhabitants in 
improved agricultural and industrial activities; the intro- 
dilation of European medicine into Shoa; training of Shoan 
army on European lines; introduction of order and efficiency 
into the Shoan governmental system; in short all the essential 
elements of European civilisation would be introduced into 
Shoa,’*'
Arnoux1s project had. advantages for both France and 
Shoa, It would, ensure for France a foothold in the hinter­
land of north-east African coast, with all its commercial 
and political advantages, For Shoa it would give an Euro­
pean ally from, whom Menelik could expect all the material 
and cultural help he needed, for the development of Shoa.
In a number of meetings with Menelik and. his chiefs, 
Arnoux impressed on the King the advantages -with which Shoa
p
stood, to gain from his project. Menelik showed great in-
M.A.E. (Paris); M. & D. (Afrique) Vol. 62, pp. 334-6, 
Arnoux*s Report on his project. Ibid., pp. 355-73? Arnoux: 
"Extraits du journal de voyage".
2M,A.E. (Paris): Ibid., p.356.
terest in the project; he appears to have, without any hesi­
tation, taken the frenchman into confidence, and in 1876, sent 
him on a mission to Europe -with, the authority to est ablish 
friendly relations with the governments of France, England, 
Italy, the Papacy as well as Egypt. Menelik also fitted out 
a caravan of Shoan products for Arnoux to take to Europe to 
demonstrate Shoa's commercial potential.
One must not fall into the teptation of attributing 
undue influence to Arnoux over the shaping of Menelik's ideas 
as to how best Shoa could be developed. As far as the ideas 
themselves are concerned there was little in the Frenchman's 
proposals that was new to the King. Menelik had all his ideas 
formed in a nutshell and had already started to put them into 
execution before Arnoux arrived in Shoa. Between 1865 and 
1867 Menelik had sent letters to the French and English offi­
cials in Aden soliciting friendship with their respective 
governments. With the same purpose in view, he lad sent a 
mission, albeit unsuccessful, to -taLy in 1872, Realising 
the Importance of commercial contact with the coast, Menelik 
had appointed in 1871 a certain Cesar Tian as his agent in 
Aden whose duty it was to endeavour to develop commercial 
relations between Aden and Shoa,1 This agent appears to have
iOL; Abyssinia Original Correspondance, Vol. 5. Menelik 
to (British) Resident at Aden, dated 29 Ma? a sia 1865 (about 
5th May 1871). 'Ibid., Resident at Aden to Menelik, 50.9.1871 
Cesar lian was connected with a French firm of coffee-iraporter 
35&lIc1i was established at Aden.
achieved, some success for when Arnoux arrived in Aden in 
February 1874 on his way to Shoa he met two AbyssinIans ,
Abba Mikael and Ato hankie, sent there by Menelik to bring 
merchandise to Shoa. It was in the company of these
X
Abyssinians that Arnoux travelled from Aden to Shoa. ITor
did the need to introduce European technology or to establish
peace and unity among’ the various Ethiopian princes escape
Menelik5 since he referred to these in his letter to the
p
British sovereign in 1869.
The ready response which Menelik g'ave to Arnoux1 s 
proposals is, therefore, not to be seen as a fascination for 
the grand new ideas of the Frenchman. It is rather to be seen:' 
as an Indication of the closeness of Arnoux’s ideas to his own. 
Perhaps what Arnoux succeeded in doing was to give Menelik 
some education in the techniques of European diplomacy; the 
importance In stressing in Menelik’s letters to the European 
powers such Issues as were likely to interest them, for example,
1L.Jj.Lan.de: "Un Voyageur frangais.....” in ’’Revue des Deux
Hondes, Vol. 30, 15.12.1878, p.880.
p
I0L: Abyssinia Original Corresp., Vol. 3? pp. 759-61: Menelik
to Queen Victoria 27 Sanne 1861 (about 4th July 1869).
Massaia’s influence may have been at work here. In a personal 
note to Capt, Goodfellow, the British Resident at Aden,accompany­
ing this letter Massaia claimed that ”1 am the one who exhorted 
the King to despatch” the letter to the Queen.
the abolition of the slave trade and the encouragement cf 
legitimate trade. This new idea is discernible in the 
letters Menelik prepared for Arnoux1s mission to Europe in
~i
1876 and in his subsequent letters to the European powers." 
Henceforth Menelik would stress the cultural guidance which 
Europeans could bring to Shoa, Acting on this new emphasis, 
Menelik welcomed Europeans of all descriptions, arms merchants, 
missionaries, both Protestants and Catholic, travellers and 
explorers including a scientific mission sent by the Italian 
Geographical Society. The 1880s brought into Shoa a number 
of Erenchmen many of whom were actively engaged in trading 
arms to Menelik. Notable among these arms merchants were 
Paul Soleillet, Leon Chefneux, Jules Bremond and Labatut.
The overall advantages derived by Menelik and his kingdom, 
though limited, must not be underestimated* Indeed the civilisin
1
"Cf. for example, Menelik1s letters to the European Powers 
and the British Anti-Slavery Society in 1878 in F.0.407/11.
Also see M. & D. (Afrique), Vol. 62, p. 286, Menelik to 
President MacMahon of Prance, 19.12.1875. Ibid., Menelik 
to La. Societe de geographie de Paris Ankober, 5.2.1879*
L.V. No. XV; Doc. 57? pp. 58-60, Menelik to S, M. Umberto I, 
28.11.1878,  ^B.S.Ct.I. , Serie II, Vol. XI, p.515. Menelik 
to La Societa geografica Italiana, dated 5 Eamile 1877 
(about 15th July 1884/5)•
light of Europe began to shine in Shoa, Quite a feu individual
inhabitants of the Kingdom became acquainted with European
languages and served as interpreters for the King and the
1
important dignitaries. Bridges were built by qualified European 
engineers5 scientific medicine was introduced. Upon the re™ 
quest of Dr. Travers! in 1886 the Italian Geographical Society 
agreed to and took steps toward the construction of a hospital
p
in Antotto. More important , from Menelik’s point of view, 
the Shoan army was ssrstematically equipped with contemporary 
European firearms. MenelikTs encouragement of the arms traders, 
and his tolerance for the missionaries angered the Emperor 
Yohannes, and increased the Emperor’s suspicion as to the in­
tentions of Menelik. Thus one of the effects of the presenee 
of Europeans, especially of the Italian agents in Shoa, at a 
time when the Italians had occupied Massawah and, were pushing
"The famous Joseph Uegussie was Menelik’s interpreter and 
"secretary". Has Gobana had an interpreter; and in 1888 
a certain Michael, "son-in-law of Asage Walde Tzadek", who 
spoke "French, German, English and A abic" appears to have 
been Makonen’s interpreter in Harrar. Cf. Armando Rondani’s 
letter dated Harrar 1,3.1888, printed in B.S.G.I. serie III - 
Yol. 1 , 1888, pp. 580-1 .
2Communications between Travers! and the S.G.I. on this subject 
are to be found in B.S.G.I. Dec. 1886, p.923; B.S.G.I., 1887? 
p. 497- See also Supra, p.i22-2.
In 1886 the Italian Geographical Society probably upon the
request of the doctors, "sent 14cases of drugs, surgical in­
struments, medical books etc, to Assab to be forwarded to Dr.
Kagazzi and Dr. Ti^ aversi In Shoa." ASMA1, 36/4-37. M.A.E. 
to General Gene, 5.1-1886.
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towards Tigre, was to complicate the relations between 
Menelik and Yohannes.
The development of Italo-Shoan relations is an important 
aspect of Menelik’s dealing with Europeans. Apart from its 
effect on Menelik’s rule in Shoa,, it was to have a profound 
long term effect on the history of the Ethiopian Empire as 
a whole.
When in 1872 Abba Mikael, the first Shoan envoy to 
Europe arrived in Italy, besides the King, he had discussions 
with Qrazio Antinori, a naturalist and an (fficial of the 
Italian Geographical Society, and impressed on him the 
willingness of Menelik to receive European travellers. Around 
this time the Societ,y was thinking of organising a scientific 
expedition to explore the lake regions of Equatorial Africa 
and when all the necessary preparations were finished Shoa 
was chosen as a base for the exploration. The Expedition led 
by Orasio Antinori arrived in Shoa in September 1876. Its 
object was twofold; firstly, It was to undertake the 
scientific exploration of the Galla regions south of Shoa 
as far as the lake regions of Equatorial Africa - mountains, 
geology, course of rivers etc; secondly, it was to examine 
the prospect of opening up commercial relations between Italy
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and the countries through which the expedition passed.
This second objective was clearly explained in the letter
of introduction which the Expedition carried from the
1Italian Foreign Minister to Menelik.
It would appear that behind these declared objectives
was another which was not openly expressed. Italy, which
had only recently achieved national unity, was looking for
some positive achievement to cement its unity. The Geo-
graphical Society thought that the exploration of the hitherto
unknown parts of Africa In which other European nations were
engaged would be an ideal object to tackle. Success in this
enterprise would not only give a new life to united Italy, it
2woilild also enhance her position and prestige in Europe.
In welcoming the Expedition Menelik was induced by the 
same motive which had led him to welcome Massaia and Arnoux; 
that is, to make use of the expedition as a channel through 
which Italian arms and artisans would percolate to Shoa.
And this is what happened, for, although the expedition re­
mained, more or less, scientific in nature and objective, it
L.V. Mo. XT, hoc. 17- Annesso. Visconti Venosta to Menelik, 1.3.1876. 
Sources for the Scientific Expedition are mainly A.S.S.G.I. and 
the Bulletin of the S.G.I. for period in question.
n
M *A.E.I.t .AjS.M.A.I., 36/1-4* Memorandum by the S.G.I. 
to the President of the Council of Minister dated 8.4.1878.
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paved the way for the development of commercial and political 
relations.between Shoa and Italy. In 1877 Menelik offered 
the expedition a tract of land (Let Marefia) two hours north 
of Ankober on which to make is headquarters. The station 
established here became the centre of Italian activity in 
Shoa. With the establishment of the Geographical station 
the Italian authorities entered into a more frequent communi­
cation with Menelik, exhorting him to treat the Italians in 
Shoa well mid offer them freedom of movement to pursue their 
scientific researches. Mrom time to time gifts of arms and 
ammunition were offered through the Expedition to Menelik, 
partly as a way of rewarding,and partly as a way of encourag­
ing his friendly attitude to the expedition. Menelik, on 
his part, did not hesitate to take advantage of the presence 
of the Expedition to ingratiate himself with the Italian 
authorities, and to pursue his policy of hunting for firearms.
q
' Dissatisfied with the arms offered by the expedition on the 
arrival of Martini-Bernardi in 1877, Menelik caused Martini 
to be sent back to Italy In quest for more arms. Martini 
returned to oho a in November 1879 with only a few hundred 
rifles and their accessories.
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I-Ie treated the expedition well” and offered them the oppor­
tunity to travel through the kingdom; sometimes he took 
individual members of the expedition with him on his campaigns 
of conquest in various directions. From time to time he sent 
gifts to the King of Italy and these were reciprocated with 
arms and. ammunition- Menelik represented himself to the 
Italian authorities as being devoted to the suppression 
of the slave trade and to the pacification of the provinces to
the south of Shoa in order to facilitate the travelling and.
2
researches of the Expedition, These id.eals coupled with his 
friendty attitude towards the Italian Expedition in Shoa won 
him the respect and confidence of not only the Italian Geo­
graphical Society but also the Italian Foreign Ministry.
Thus when in 1881 Menelik suggested that Antinori be accredited 
to his Court as a representative of the Italian Government'5
1Antinori in his letters frequently remarked that”(noi) siamo in 
benissimi rapporti con Re”, (he are In excellent relations 
with the King). See among others; B.S.G.I. serie II, Vol. II 
1877* pp. 297-8, Antinori to Bienenfeld,Licce 6.12.1876.
Serie II, Vol. V 1880, p.120 Antinori to Martlni-Bernardi, 
Let.-Marefia 4.9.1879.
p
See Supra Mote 1 on p.V!>3>
■^ L.V. XV. Doc. 45* p.73. Menelik to S.M. Umberto I, Debra Brahan 
11.10.1881.
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the suggestion was welcomed by the Italian authorities, 
and Antinori was so appointed; on the death of Antinori 
in August 1882 Antonelli was appointed to the post.
It is not clear whose Influence might have been at 
work in the initiation of such a diplomatic manoeuvre.
It is possible that Menelik derived a precedent from Theo- 
duos's example with Plowden and Cameron; but one wonders 
If Menelik appreciated the difference between Antinorifs 
position as head of the scientific Expedition and as the 
Italian Government's representative to Shoa. One would 
like to believe that the suggestion owed its origin to 
one or the other of the Italians then in Shoa, possibly 
Antinori but more likely Antonelli. The indications are 
that between November 1879? when Antonelli arrived In Shoa, 
and October 1881 he (Antonelli) had several discussions 
with Antinori ai, amongst other things, the possibility cf 
talcing advantage of the Expedition's presence in Shoa to 
develop commercial and political relations between Italy 
and Shoa.^ The subsequent development of Italo-Shoan 
relations owed not a little to Antonelli and to the favour­
able impression he made on Menelik during this period. What
1Carlo Giglio: L'Italia in Africa, Roma, 1958. Vol. I, pp. 
148-9* An extremely useful work on Italian activities in 
the Red Sea and Somali coasts and in Ethiopia in the 19th 
century.
is clear is that as a result of AntonelliTs visit (lTov.
1879-Nov.l88l) the semi-official rather detached, relations
which had existed between Italy and Shoa took a definite
turn towards official commercial and political relations.
Pietro Antonelli first arrived in Shoa in November
1879 as a private traveller in the company of Martini-
Bernard! a member of the scientific Expedition. He travelled.
extensively in the kingdom and gradually came to a realisation
of the possibility of developing commerce between Shoa and
Italy by way of Assab, In several interviews with Menelik
in October 1880 Antonelli and Antinori discussed with the
ICing, among other subjects, the opening of a route between
1Assab on the coast and Shoa for commercial purposes. Antonelli
had come to believe that Italy could maintain her friendly
position In Shoa only If Menelik1s desire for firearms was 
2satisfied..' He therefore decided to enter Into a private 
arrangement with Menelik to supply him with two thousand 
Remington rifles in order to pave the way for the development
h.S.G.I., Serie II - Vol. VI, Harch 1881, pp. 157-166,
Antonelli to the President of the S.G.I. Let-Marefia 28.10.1880
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of Italo-Shoan commerce by way of Assab.1 Precisely when
this project was discussed with Menelik is not known; it
is likely that this was done between February 6 and February
19? 1881 when both Antonelli and Oecchi travelled with
Menelik to Rorra Xlu from Samera (near Debra Tabor) where
all three had taken part in the coronation of Ras Adal as 
2
King of Godjam. The contract was signed on March 27? 1881 
at Debra Berhaai*5 and in November Antonelli left for Italy 
to look for two thousand rifles to fulfil his part of the 
contract.
While in Italy Antonelli set to work to win support 
for his project and found a favourable response from the 
Foreign Ministry; this was a stroke of luck for Antonelli 
since the time was favourable to him. The official Italian 
attitude of absolute disinterestedness in colonial matters 
underwent a transformation betweenl879 and 1882 and there­
after became one of territorial acquisition.
1Carlo Zaghis nPietro Antonelli esploratore" in Rivista 
delie Coloniale Italiane. Sept.* 1932, pp. 707-716.
*03 ee Infra, pp.i(?9>~t70 Also A. Oecchi:, Da Zeila Alle 
frontiere del Gaffa, Roma 1886, Vol. “II, pp. 582-89.
^A.S.S.G.I. Carton! YI^. Antinori alia Commissions 
Esecutiva della Spedizione$> Geografica Italians a Rome, 
dated let-Marefia 6,4.1881. Antinori gives the terms 
of the contract. See also Zaghi: Article cited.
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Bet we on February and. March 1879 the then Italian
Foreign Minister, Depretis, under the influence of Raffaele
Rubattino and other industrial-commercial interests, had
been converted to the need to develop Assab as a lase for
trade with Ethiopia and to open a regular route from Assab
through Aussa to Shoa: to divert the trade of Shoa and other
1southern G-alia provinces from Zeila to Tadjura. Depretis's 
policy was adopted by his successor. In March 1879 Depretis 
prex>ared a draft treaty of commerce and sent it to Shoa for 
Mgr. Massaia to negotiate on behalf of altaly with Menelik^ 
and later enjoined Antinori to discuss with Menelik the 
opening up of a route from Assab to Shoa. In furtherance 
of this project Assab was re-occupied and a Civil Commissioner's 
office established there between 1879 and December 1880.^ 
bt is clear then that Antonelli's project was substantially 
the same as the official government policy which had been
1For this development see C. Oiglio: op.clt., 1, pp. 149-154. 
Also Ibid., 1-36 for official Italian attitude to colonial 
acquisition before 1884-
%.A.S.I. (Rome) ASHAI 36/1-8. M.A.E. (Bepretis) to Padre 
Mgr. Massaia, 1.3.1879. The letter and treaty were taken 
to Shoa by Martini-Bernardi but by the time he arrived in 
Shoa (Nov. 1879) Massad a had left the Kingdom, expelled 
by the Emperor Yohannes.
^Assab had been acquired in.November 1869 by Sapeto on behali 
of the Italian Government but was transferred to the Rubat kno 
Company In February , 1870. see Giglio, opnail..., pp. lOp—o 
and Note 14 on p. 126.
initiated between February and March 1879. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that Antonelli found a favourable ibspouse from 
the Foreign Ministry.
In June 1882 Mancini, the Foreign Minister charged 
Antonelli with an official mission to take letters and present 
from the King and the Government of Italy to Menelik to re­
ciprocate those which had been received from the Shoan King.~ 
Added to these was a draft treaty of commerce and friendship 
which Antonelli was to negotiate with Menelik.
llhen Antonelli arrived at Assab on his way to Shoa 
he completed a treaty with Mohamed Hanfari, the sultan at 
Aussa in order to make possible the opening of a route from 
Assab through the Sultan1s territory to Shoa;^ to show the 
practicability of such a route Antonelli followed a route 
hitherto imattempted from Assab through Aussa and Gafat to 
Shoa. This was the route which was intended to divert Shoa!s 
trade from Zeila and Tadjura*^
1ASIA4,I 36/2-11. Mancini (M.A.E.) to .Antonelli 1.6.1882.
^L.V. XV. Etiopia p.127. hoc. 60 (Annesso).
^B.S.G.I., Dec. 1883, pp. 857-880. Antonelli ”11 mio viaggio 
da Assab alio Scioa”.
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bhen Antonelli arrived in Ankober in April (29) 1883 , 
lie presented the letter and gifts of which he was in charge 
as well as the rifles which he had in 1881 contracted to 
supply to Menelik. This increased Menelik*s confidence in 
Antonelli and must have made the task of negotiating the 
treaty considerably easier for Antonelli. The treaty was 
concluded in Ankober on May 21, 1883.^ The"nineteen articles 
of the treaty stipulated:
a) Establishment of diplomatic relations and the 
exchange of consular representatives between Italy and Shoa 
(Art. 2.).
b) Full freedom of movement for both men and goods 
from the one country in the other (Art, p).
c) Religious liberty for the citizens of Italy in 
Shoa and‘vice versa (Art. 5).
d) A single, unified duty of 5°/o ad valorem was to
2
be imposed on trade goods brought into Shoa by Italians; 
while goods brought by the subjects of Menelik - export or
~ASMAI, 36/2-12. Original draft pi*inted in LV. Mo. XV. Etiopia 
Doc. 61 ^ Annesso)pp1* 128-131.
hloods entering Shoa paid duty up to 20°/o. See Chapter V.
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import - would be tax-free in the Italian possession of 
Assab (Art. 8).
e) Menelik would do all he could to secure the commercial 
avenues from the interior to Shoa and from Shoa through the 
Danakil country to Assab, while Italy would see to the security 
of the coast and its immediate hinterland (Art. 7, 9? 10).
f) Italians in Shoa would be judged according to Italian 
laws in any offences they might commit in Shoa, and the Shoan 
authorities should give every possible assistance to the Italian 
Consul in Shoa in the discharge of his judicial duties (Art, 13).
g) In disputes between two Italians in Shoa, or between 
an Italian and a non-Abyssinian, the Italian Consul in Shoa was 
to arbitrate; in a dispute between an Italian and a subject
of the King of Shoa, arbitration was to be done by the Italian 
Consul assisted by a local ji%e (Art. 12).
h) Subjects of the King of Shoa when on the coast or 
outside the reach of Menelik*s influence could avail themselves 
of. the protection of the Italian authorities there (A^ t. 14*).
i) Reciprocal most-favoured nation treatment (Art, 15).
j) A neutral power was to arbitrate in disputes between
the Government of Italy and that of Shoa (Art. 16).
k) The treaty was to last for ten years in the first
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instance from the day of its ratification, after which 
its renewal was at the discretionjof the contracting powers 
(Aat. 18).
The conclusion of this treaty marked an important stage 
in the development of It alo-Shoan relations. Up to this 
time the relations between the two countries had been semi­
official through the scientific Expedition led by Antinori. 
With the conclusion of the treaty the Italian Government 
officially entered into relations with Shoa, and was to build 
on it to gain an influence in Ethiopia as a whole. In 1885 
(Feb.) Italy occupied Massawah and began to push inland 
towards the frontier of Tigre, This brought her into hostility 
with the Emperor Yohannes# In this conflict Italy counted 
on, if int the support, at least the neutrality of her friend, 
the King of Shoa.“ Yet Menelik’s friendship with the Italians 
complicated his relations with the Emperor Johannes, end the
There are several indications in the Italian archives to 
this effect. See, for example, ASEAI 8/l~2: M.A.E. to Generale 
Saletta, Comandante Superiore, Massaua, dated Roma 11.4.1887 
where he writes "... Nell occasione del’invio di ^uesti doni 
... il Cavaliere Bienenfeld avrebe voluto iniziar pratiche 
per Indurre il Re Menelik, per mezzo del governatore dell* 
Harar, a muover guerra al Re d'Abissinia."
LV, XV Etiopia. Doc. 119 Annesso I, p.261; 0. Robilant 
(the M.A.E.) to Antonelli, Roma 11.3.1885 where he mentions 
that in the military- operations towrads the interior "an 
important factor to take into account would be the attitude 
of Menelik" ("...Important© elemento di giudizio sara per 
noi 11 atteggianiento di Re Menelik") and he continued by 
asking Antonelli to find out if Menelik would co-operate with
(cont.)
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the Italian occupation of Massawah. greatly embarrassed
Menelik. To extricate himself from this ugly situation
without antagonising either of the contestants, Menelik
tactfully proposed to mediate between the Emperor and the 
1Italians.
From 1883 to 1891 -Antonelli served as the official 
representative of the Italian Government In Shoa. He spent 
this period between Italy and Shoa as the intermediary between 
the two Governments. During this time he spared no effort to 
satisfy Menelik’s desire for firearms and to build up the 
King's confidence in the Italian friendship.
In 1884-5 Antonelli was charged with another mission 
to Shoa which was the direct result of the successful com­
pletion of the firfet mission. On this occasion he was to 
carry letters and gifts to not only Menelik but also three 
of the principal chiefs of the Kingdom - Has Dargue, Has 
Gobana, and As age kalde Tsadek. More important, he was to
(cont.) Italy against the Emperor Yohannes. See also 
ASMAI 36/4-42. Crispi (M.A.S.)’s telegram to the R° Console
d1Italia In Aden, dated 27-11.1887. Antonelli to M.A.E., 
Addis Abeba 16.11,1887. Same to Same Addis Abeba 23.11.1887.
1 ASMAI, 36/4-42, Antonelli to M.A.E., Addis Abeba 29.10.1887.
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persuade Menelik to send a delegation to Italy to ratify 
the treaty of 1883? and was himself to conduct this delegation 
to Italy. He was also charged by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Oommerce to conduct some agricultural, researches in Shoa.^
Antonelli appears to have achieved initial success on 
the important task of persuading Menelik to send a delegation 
to Italy. By February 1885 Menelik had decided to send the 
mission, but before preparations could be made for its de­
parture, the news of the Italian occupation of Massawah reached 
Shoa. Menelik became uneasy as to the real intentions of Italy 
and Italo-Shoan relations became strained. It needed all the 
tact of Antonelli to ease the King's mind and restore a semblance 
of normal relations.
The occupation of Massawah by Italy and her advance 
towards Tigre convinced Menelik that the Italians were de­
termined, despite their protestations to the contrary, to 
acquire a colony at the expense of the Empire of Ethiopia;
1ASMAI 36/2-22. II Ministro di Agricultural e commercio al 
Sig. Pietro .Antonelli, Roma 5-1-1884.
Antonelli concluded another "private" treaty with Menelik 
, in Nov. 1884 to supply the latter 50,000 Remington Rifles 
with 200 cartridges for each over a period of 10 years.
A^SMAI 36/3-28. Antonelli to R. Comm. In Assab. dated 
Hori (Efrata) 19-1-1886, ASMAI 36/-2B. Antonelli to M.A.E, 11.5.1886,
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and he determined to prevent this happening1. The treaty 
which he signed with the Italians on May 2, 1889 (Uccialli) 
when lie became Emperor was for him only a temporary measure 
designed to gain time. In the circumstances an open conflict 
between Menelik and his erstwhile friends, the Salians, seemed 
unavoidable; hence the series of battles which culminated 
in the humiliating defeat of the Italians at Adowa in March 
1896.
The second major development of the reign was Shoa's 
relations with the rest of the Empire. The death of the Emperor 
Theodros in 1868 and the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary 
Forces whose campaign against Theodros brought about his death, 
had left a power vacuum in Northern Ethiopia. The struggle 
to fill this vacuum was contested between Wagshum Eobazi of 
Amhara and has Godja-Kassa of Tigre. Menelik does not appear 
to have contemplated seriously joining in this struggle. For 
one thing his authority in Shoa was only now beginning to Mce
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root, and he rightky considered it unwise to direct his 
subjects into the expensive contest for the Imperial crown. 
Moreover, he did not have, in the northern provinces, that 
prestige which could win him the support of those provinces 
in the struggle. Menelik’s chances in the struggle, there­
fore, would depend entirely on his military strength, but 
this was, at the time insignificant when compared with that 
of either Kassa or Gobasie. Instead, Menelik spent the 
period consolidating his position at home and initiating 
campaigns In the Wallo Galla region.
With the final defeat of Gobazii in July 1871, Kassa 
became Emperor as Yohannes IY. The new Emperor then marched 
south to assert his power over the southern provinces. After 
pacifying Godjam in 1875 he turned to continue his march into 
Shoa, From this pezi.od until Yohannes' death in 1889, the re­
lations between Menelik and the Emperor was one of the crucial 
domestic issues within the Empire.
Menelik aspired to the Imperial Grown but through out 
the period his military strength was weaker than that of the 
Emperor. Menelik was fully conscious of his milItany weakness
'Until the Peace settlement of 1878 between the Emperor end 
Menelik the lalter's seal carried the Imperial title of "King 
of Kings".
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and employed various methods to improve his fighting strength. 
He encouraged Individual European arms traders to supply him 
with stocks of firearms and entered into treaties with Anto- 
nelli (and the Italian government) for tie same purpose. He 
also conquered the rich Galla countries to the south and 
south-west of Shoa. These countries were important to Menelik 
for two reasons; the positive reason,fo|? getting merchandise 
to pay for the firearms which he obtained from theEuropeans 
and of increasing his manpower resources; and the negative 
reason of preventing not only the Emperor but any other 
prince of the Empire from the control of the region, for 
the region was important for the commercial life of the whole 
Empire. Moreover, Menelik tried to build up his prestige in 
parts of the northern provinces of the Empire, He saw the 
Hallo and Godjam as important provinces to dominate; their 
possession would not only add to his power and prestige but 
would weaken the Emperor. Between 1868 and 1876 therefore 
Menelik conquered the Hallo Galla and fought Godjam, in 1877 
and again In 1882, taking its ruler prisoner. All these 
various methods of aggrandisement were to prepare himself 
for his eventual bid for the Imperial Crown.
Yohannes, on the other hand, saw the Independence of
Shoa and everything that Menelik stood for as a threat to 
his position and power as Emperor. He was, therefore, de­
termined to re-incorporate Shoa within his Empire and reduce 
Menelik to the position of a vassal. In these circumstances 
armed conflict between Menelik and Yohannes was to be ex­
pected. That such a conflict was avoided in spite of several 
attempts at Invasion of Shoa by Yohannes was due, partly 
to Menelik1s caution andpartly to Yohannes' preoccupation 
with the incursion of the Egyptians, the Dervishes and after 
1885 the Italians on the frontiers of his possession. The 
details of these incursions and of Yohannes* response are 
beyond the scope of this essay. It must be noted, however, 
that throughout his reign Yohannes was menaced by these 
foreign powers and he spent most of his time resisting 
their incursions, so that he never really had a free hand 
to deal more firmly with Menelik. Perhaps it was this more 
than anything else which saved Shoa from conquest at the hands 
of Yohannes.
In 1875 the first of Yohannes* attempts at invasion of 
Shoa took place, but he had to give It up, as he was to do 
many times later, and Instead settled his relations peacefully 
by a treaty. By this treaty Menelik recognised Yohannes'
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suzerainty and agreed to pay tribute.1 In accepting those 
terms Menelik clearly compromised Shoa's independence, yet 
he had no choice, for he was militarily we ale and his position 
in both central Shoa and the newly conquered ¥allo region 
was threatened by revolts. On his part, Yohannes contented 
himself with what he must have seen as a stop-gap settlement, 
because Egyptian forces were then threatening his northern 
frontiers'.
The frontier struggle between Ethiopia and Egypt dated 
back to the second quarter of the 19th century, when Mohamet 
All's territorial ambitions in the Sudan and the Red Sea 
coast had brought Egyptian soldiers to Ethiopia’s western, 
northern, and north-eastern frontiers. But it was not until 
the 1870's that the conflict assumed serious proportions.
The Khedive Ismael inherited the territorial ambitions of 
his predecessors and embarked on a policy of building an 
Egyptian Empire covering the whole of N.E. Africa, in pursuit 
of this policy, the Khedive obtained Massawah from Turkey 
in May 1868 and between 1870 and 1875 occupied the whole of
M.A.E.; Correspondence Politique des Consuls, Egypte. 
Massouah. Vol. 4? p.12, de Sarzec to Decarses, 14.8.1875. 
L.L.Lahde 1st Article in R. des Deux Mpndes, Vol. 30,pp.895-6. 
¥. Mac. E. Dyes Muslim Egypt and Christian Abyssinia, 1880, 
p. 127 -
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of the African coast of the Red Sea, as well as the ports 
of Zeyla, Tael jura mad Berbera on the Somali coast. More­
over, an Egyxbtian force pushed inland across the Somali 
coma try mad conquered the important city-state of Harar 
in February 1875. Having occupied the ports, Egypt instituted 
blockades thereby cutting off not only the Emperor but also 
Kenelik from the coast. Already in May 1872 the Egyptians 
had occupied the Bogos area, the northern-most district of 
Ethiopia and in 1875 the IChedive fitted out two expeditions 
to attack the Empire, one from the Bogos area, and the other 
from the Tadjura and the Danakil country. This last expedition, 
led by Munsinger Pasha, was attacked and destroyed by the 
Danakil before it could reach Ethiopia. In the north, Yohannes 
routed the first expedition led by Arakel Bey and Colonel Arendrup 
in November at Eundet on the banks of the Marob, and again de­
feated another expedition in March 1876 at Gura. From 1875 
until 1884-5} when Egypt evacuated :the Red Sea and Somali
coasts, Yohannes1 attention was largely absorbed by the conflict
1
with the Egyptians.
For Yohannes1 relations with Egypt see ¥. ^ac E, Bye, 
op.clt., pp. 125 onwards, also F.O. Confidential Print 
Ho. 4249, 4082, 5205, 5154* Douin, G*: Histoire du regne 
du Khedive Ismail, Tome III, part 2, Cairo 1958; part 5*
It has been assumed that Menelik co-operated with the 
Egyptians against Yohannes. It is true that Menelik received 
letters and gifts as an offer of friendship from the Khedive 
in 1875 and In January 1876 ; it is also true that Menelik 
too wrote to the Khedive and that Arnoux’s mission to Europe 
also covered Egypt. But nothing more appears to have happened 
between Menelik and the Khedive, The Egyptian blockade at 
the coast hit Menelik hard and in his letter to the Khedive 
In 1876 the Shoan King complains bitterly about this. In 
fact he continued to complain to the European powers about 
this blockade throughout the p eriod cf Egyptian occupation 
of the Somali coast, a fact which indicates that relations 
between Shoa and Egypt never got beyond the mere exchange of 
Mters In 1875 and 1876. Menelik* s encouragement to the French 
and the Italians to open to the Shoa ports free from Egyptian 
control at Obock and Assab may well have had something to do
M.A.S. Parisi H. & D. (Afrique) Vol. 62, Arnoux: ''Extrait 
du Journal" for 13th January 1876, p.376; also, L. .L. Lande;
2nd Article cit. in R. des D eux Mon des, Vol. 31? 15.1.1879? p.380.
^M.A.E.: M. & D.(Afrique), Vol. 62, pp. 210-211, Menelik to 
Ismael Pacha dated Litche 10.6*1876.
AJee for example, F.Q, Confidential Print Ho. 4082. Menelik 
to Queen Victoria, dated 28th Hedar 1871 (6th Dec. 1878).
with the Egjp tian blockade at Zeila and Tadjura, the ports 
hitherto used by Shoa.
While Yohannes iras busy with the Egyptians, Menelik 
pursued his policy of self aggrandizement. By July 1876 he 
had conquered the hallo as far north as, and including, the 
fortress of Magdala; and in February 1877 invaded Godjsm.
He crossed into Godjam by way of Beguemder. It is not clear, 
if Menelik, in talcing this routefintended to attack Gondar 
and, possibly get himself crowned Emperor as has been assumed. 
In any case he did not attempt to enter the city and only 
camped a few miles to the south of it. Menelik!s advance into 
Godjam was easy, for Has Adal, the Godjamese ruler, realising 
that he was overmatched, fled first to a (amba) fortress 
in the south of the province and later to the Emperor, aban-
p
doning the province to the invader.~
Yohannes could not tolerate such an overt demonstration 
of ambition by his vassal. The outbreak of Russo-Turkish war
^Cecchis Da Zeila, Vol. I, p.272.
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in 1876 led to a diversion of Egyptian forces to fight for 
Turkey, and this resulted in a suspension of the Ethio- 
Egyptian war. This respite enabled Yohannes to march south 
to Shoa in 1877 on what was his most serious attempt at
1subjugating Shoa. By July the invader was already en route
and in Shoa panic built up. Between July and December feverish
preparations were made to provision impregnable fortresses
2where women, children and valuables were taken to safety.
By January 1878 the Imperial troops reached Shoa’s northern 
province of Geshe where a futile attempt at resistance was 
made by three neighbouring governors'* and the invader pushed 
on into the province of Mens, Realising the danger in which 
they found themselves, Menelik decided to send envoys to sue 
for peace. Although the Emperor now had Menelik at his mercy, 
he would not risk weakening his forces in a large scale war 
against Shoa when he needed his full strength to defend his
^M.A.E.s Correspondence Politique de Consuls. Egypt, Massouitah, 
Vol. 4, p.74* C & r b o n n e l  to M.A.E. 28.7.1877.
2Cecchis op.cit., 1, pp. 414-20.
^Cecchi: I dem, p.415*
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vulnerable northern frontier. Thus negotiations for peace 
were started and the result was the peace arrangements of 
20th March 1878. The negotiations were hardgoing, for the 
Emperor's demands were stiff and were initially rejected 
by Menelik.-^ -
The terms of the settlement have not been officially 
published and do not appear i© G-uebre Sellassie's chronicle 
of Henelilc's reign. The unofficial versions given by Massaia, 
Cecchi and Waldmeier differ considerably from one another.
Of the three sources, Cecchi and Massaia were in Shoa, at 
the time when the events took place, while Waldmeier was not 
in Shoa and only derived his information from Mayer the German 
Protestant missionary then in Shoa. At the news of the in­
vasion, the missionaries including Mayer end Massaia, upon 
the advice of Menelik, withdrew to the safety of the fortress 
of Eekerie-Ghemt where they remained throughout the critical
period, and Massaia says he derived his information on these
2
events from Ato Mannaje, the governor of the fortress, Cecchi,
P
C&cchl; op.cit., X, pp. 415-21. Waldmeier: i 
of Theopilus Waldmeier,.. p.135.
^Massaia; I. Miei, Vol. XI, p.10,
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on the other hand, was not shut up in the fortress and Indeed 
did not restrict himself to one spot. Cecchi and Chiarini 
thus followed these events more directly than the missionaries. 
This accounts for the interesting details which Cecchi gives 
about the progress of the negotiations. In fact Cecchi followed 
Menelik to the Imperial camp on March 20, the day when agree­
ment was reached, although he was not present in the Emperor's 
tent where the final round of negotiations took place. Indeed, 
only the Emperor and Menelik engaged in these final discussions 
for, as Cecchi explains, everyboc&r else was made to leave the 
Emperor's tent at the crucial moment. In the circumstances, 
therefore, it might be sand that the reliability of one or the 
other of the three versions is as good as the others,
fortunately, however, there is enough similarity in the 
three versions to enable us to form a fairly accurate picture 
of what the terms of the agreement might have been, Menelik 
undertook to renounce the title of "King of King's, which he 
had so far used on his seal, and to assume simply that of "King 
of Shoa"; to pay an annual tribute of unspecified, amouirb; to
^Cecchi: op.cit., I, pp. 44-§2.
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close the route from Shoa to the coast to Europeans within 
two years; to furnish troops to the Emperor wherever the 
need arose; and to support the Imperial army while they re­
mained in Shoa, The Emperor on his part, acknowledged Menelik 
and his descendants as the lawful rulers of Shoa and he 
officially crowned Menelik as King of Shoa; he recognised 
Menelik's control over the ¥&llo, and undertook to offer 
military help to Menelik when necessary. Although there 
was a dogmatic difference within the 6‘iuirch in Shoa as in 
the north, our sources are not agreed whether its settlement 
formed a condition of the agreement. What seems likely is 
that Menelik agreed at the discussions to a settlement of 
the doctrinal difference, and tfc&t after the political 
settlement a special council of the religious dignitaries 
from both Shoa and the north was called to discuss the 
religious issue.
1Massaia: op.cit,, Vol. XI, p.II. Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. i,
pp. 442-p. Waldmeier: op.cit., pp. 133-4 . For the dogmatic 
question see I. Guidi, "La Chiesa Abissina" in Oriente 
Moderno, Anno II 1922-3? pp. 123-8? 186-90, 232-6.
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The peace settlement of 1878 was, as later events were 
to show, the most basic of all the settlements that were 
made between Menelik and Yohannes. While it did not fully 
satisfy the personal aspirations of either of the signatories 
- in the circumstances on<ty a complete victory following a 
full-scale war could do this - it went a considerable way 
to eliminate the element of insecurity and panic which had 
until then dominated the relations between the two princes. 
Nevertheless, it was a compromise which hit Menelik harder 
than Yohannes, and Menelik would respect it only for as long 
as his relative military strength was weak. Menelik's actions 
after 1878 indicate a conviction that Shoa's real security 
depended not so much on peace arrangements as 011 her mili­
tary strength, Without repudiating the settlement, Menelik 
continued, and indeed intensified, his efforts to build up 
his prestige and military strength. He fought Godjam for 
the second time in June 1882 and took her ruler a prisoner; 
the greatest of his Galla conquests were made in the period 
after 1878; and Menelik intensified his efforts to get fire­
arms, encouraging European arms traders to bring them to Shoa 
despite the clause in the agreement which stipulated closing 
the route to Europeans.
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Yohannes on his part does not appear to have put too 
much confidence in Menelik’s respect for the settlement of 1878.
Eor tiis reason, while he did not discontinue his usual but 
1
subtle methods of dealing with Menelik, Yohannes devised 
other means to ensure that Menelik would respect the agree-
2
ment. It was with this intention that inl882 Yohannes initiated 
another agreement which not only confirmed that of 1878 but 
also recognised Menelik's suzerainty over the Galla inhabiting 
the regions to the south and south-west of Shoa. More import­
ant from the Emperor's point of view, the 1882 settlement 
stipulated a marriage between his only legitimate son, Ras 
Areya Sellasie and a daughter of Menelik's, Waizero Zaudltu.
The marriage actually took place in the last week of October 
1882. It also arranged the succession to the Imperial throne 
on the death of Yohannes. Ras Areya Sellassie was to succeed 
his father, and was to be succeeded by his own children by Zauditu.
^See below, pp.j&lf— \W5>
2 t
G. Sejlasie* op.cit., I, p. 185. The 1878 arrangement was 
a better deal for Yohannes than it was for Menelik, and It 
was therefore in the Emperor's interest to safeguard it.
2’ ^  
P. Soleillets Y oyages en Ethiopie, Rouen 1886, pp. 98-106.
Soleillet arrived in Shoa on 2.10.1882 and assisted in the
marriage celebrations.
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In the event of the Ras dying without children Menelik 
was to succeed to the Imperial throne,'*' The Emperor un­
doubtedly designed these stipulations as safeguards to 
protect the 1878 settlement which, for as long as it was 
adhered to, assured him of Menelik*s support, The 1882 
arrangement, unlike those of 1875 and 1878 was, on the 
whole, satisfactory to Menelik. Although he himself might 
not become emperor, the agreement guaranteed that, through 
his daughter, Menelik*s descendants would one day come to 
possess the Imperial throne. When in 1888 Ras Areya 
Sellassie died without children, MeneHk*s chance of succeed­
ing Yohannes as Emperor became great, and, for the first 
time in our period, the Imperial Grown came within the reach 
of the Shoan dynasty.
Taken together the peace arrangements of 1878 and 1882 
went a long way to meet the aspirations of both Menelik and 
Yohannes. The proof of this is found in the fact that after 
1882 co-operation between Menelik and the Emperor became more 
frequent. It is true that after the Italian occupation of
B. Wylde: *85 to *87 in the Soudan (Lond. 1888), Vol. I, 
p. 357. G. Sellasie: Chronigue, Vol. 1, p. 183 n.p.
Mas so wall in February 1885? when Yohannes and the Italians 
came to open conflict, relations between Yohannes and Menelik 
became somewhat uneasy, because of Menelik’s continued friend­
ship with the Italians in Shoa. It Is no less true that 
after 1882 relations between Menelik and Yohannes were more 
friendly than ever before.
Allusion has already been made to subtle methods employed 
by Yohannes in dealing with Menelik. Besides the straight­
forward method of threats of invasion and peace negotiations 
by which Yohannes regulated his relations with Menelik, 
the Emperor employed other-, - subtle, means to deal with Menelik 
and preserve the balance o? strength in his own favour. It 
has been remarked that despite the peace settlements, Mene­
lik intensified his policy of military build-up and terri­
torial aggrandisement. Yohannes, right from his accession 
realized - and how correctly - that the security of his 
Imperial position depended, domestically on preserving his 
military superiority over Menelik. For this reason, while he 
treated openly with Menelik, trying to reduce him to the 
position of a vassal, Yohannes at the same time, employed 
cunning and rather indirect methods to keep Menelik weak.
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These methods were of two kinds. The first was to ally 
either openly or secretly with Menelik*s rebellious subjects. 
The immediate purpose of this method was to magnify Menelik*s 
domestic problems. This method was used with considerable 
success in the hallo provinces which Menelik had conquered, 
but with little success in central Shoa.
During Menelik*s campaigns of conquest in the hallo 
country (1868-76) the Wallo rulep,Abba Hatto, several times 
appealed to Yohannes for help; the invasion which the Em­
peror projected against Shoa in 1875 was in fact in response
1to those appeals. Later when Abba TJatto was imprisoned 
by the Shoan King and the government of the hallo was given q 
to his rival cousin, Mohammed Ali, the new governor was not 
long in rebelling. It is not know if Yohannes in any way 
encouraged this rebellion; what is clear is that, having 
rebelled, Mohammed Ali appealed to and received protection 
from 'the Emperor. In 1878 when Yohannes invaded Shoa, Mohammed 
Ali contributed a contingent to the Imperial army against his
p
former overlord, Menelik. Mohammed Ali became a faithful
^Cecchi: op.cit., I, 269.
2Massaia; op.cit., XI, p. 10. Cecchi; op.cit., i, 4-45°
Cecchi estimates the strength of the contingent furnished by 
Mohammed Ali at 4— 5,000 cavalry.
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vassal of the Emperor's, he was converted to Christianity, 
baptised as Mikael in 1878 and a year later was promoted 
Ras by Yohannes. So consistent was Yohannes' support for 
rebellions hi the Hallo region that by 1878 the Magdala 
district which hah been conquered in July 1876 was virtually 
lost to Menelik. The 1878 peace settlement recognised Menelik’s 
control over the whole of his Hallo conquest, but he was per­
suaded by the Emperor to cede the whole region except the 
Worra-Ilu district as a fief to Ras Areya Sellasie and
p
Waizero Zauditu on the occasion of their marriage.
In central Shoa, a serious but unsuccesful revolt by Waizero 
Bafsna in 1877 appears to have been, at least, known to the 
Emperor. He was believed to be in touch with the rebel leaders, 
and after the pea.ce settlement of 1878 Yohannes was said to 
have repealed some details of the Bafana plot to Menelik.^
By siding directly or otherwise with Menelik’s rebellious sub­
jects, Yohannes sought to weaken Menelik's position in his own 
kingdom arnd thereby reduee the threat which Menelik posed to
"Domenico Brielli: "Ricordi Storici dei Uollo" in Study Etiopicl , 
Edt. C. Conti Rossini, 1945, p. 108. G. Sellasie; Chronique,
I, 157.
p
G-, Sellasie; op. cit. , 1, p. 185.
^Massaia: I. Miei Trentaclnque Annl...... Yol. X, p.201.
also MAE. 10222, pp. 51-2.” Massaia* s letter dated Eeb. 15,
1880.
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him as the Emperor.
The second subtle method by wMch Yohannes sought to keep
Menelik weak was to build up the power of other princes within
or outside Shoa as a counterpoise to Menelik.
In 1879 when Mashasha Seifou, a cousin of Menelik*s rebelled
for the second time he was arrested and imprisoned. It was
upon Yohannes1 intervention in 1882 that Seifou was released,
and for a time he remained with Yohannes. Yohannes* concern
for the personal safety of Mashasha Seifou may be seen as an
attempt to balance Menelik *s power with another force within
Shoa, Though there is no evidence that Yohannes was implicated
in any of the Seifou revolts, the Emperor* s known pro-Seifou
attitude could have had little other motive*
Seifou was the legitimate son of Seifou Selassie, the
younger brother of Menelik*s father, Haile Malakot; Seifou
was thus a cousin germane to Menelik, and was the next in the
line of succession should Menelik die without children Seifou
had a considerable following among the population of Shoa and
was greatly respected by the soldiers and the great men of the 
1kingdom. It was therefore in the Interest of Yohannes to prop 
up Seifou*s position in Shoa. The Emperor realised that the
Chiarini*s Journal, notes dated 20.12*1877 quoted in Cecchi, I, 
285. L.Y. XT', Doc. 97 (p.204), Antonelli to M.A.E. Bntotto 
26.11.1885*
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more Seifou*s influence in Shoa increased the more dangerous 
was he as a potential rival to Menelik; and the more Menelik 
had to fear from Seifou the less would he he able to create 
trouble for Yohannes. Thus, Yohannes* attitude to Seifou did 
not change after the Peace of 1878 when he openly recognised 
Menelik as King of Shoa. Menelik realised clearly that in 
the event of an open conflict between himself and the Emperor, 
the latter might draw on the support of Seifou. The Italian 
representative at Menelik*s court, Antonelli, also appreciated 
the situation; and he mentions this as one of the reasons 
why Menelik would not take advantage of the Emperor* s com­
plications with the Italians in the north-east frontier to 
revolt against Yohannes.*** The Emperor* s attitude to Mashasha 
Seifou, therefore, added to Menelik*s need for caution in 
his dealings with the Emperor; and by acting cautiuusly 
Menelik succeeded in neutralising the dangerous effect which 
the Emperor*s pro-Seifou leanings could have had on his own 
position as King of Shoa. Nevertheless, the l*understandingu 
between Yohannes and Seifou caused Menelik considerable em­
barrassment.
■**L.V. XV, Doc. 97 (p.204). Antonelli to M.A.E. Entotto 26.11.1885*
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It was in Godjam that Yohannes made the greatest effort 
to build up a counterpoise against the growing power of Mene­
lik. It has been seen that one of the ways by which Menelilc 
sought to increase his power was to extend his territorial 
possessinns. In the Wallo region he met with only an in­
direct opposition from the Emperor. In Godjam, however, the 
Emperor1s opposition was overt.
It was particularly important for the Emperor that God­
jam should not become a satellite of the King of Shoa. Apart 
from her importance as a source of food supply to the North, 
the most direct route whih led from the North to the south­
western Galla countries passed through Goddam. This route 
was perhaps the most important commercial route in the whole 
of Ethiopia, and it was on this route that the commercial life 
of the northern provinces depended. The Godjamese district 
of Baso had one of the most important markets in the Empire. 
To let a potentially dangerous rival such as Menelilc control 
God jam was to inflict a mortal blow on what prosperity the 
northern provinces lad; Yohannes could not have this, so he 
consistently supported the ruler of Godjam, Ras Adal, against 
Menelik*s incursions. The Emperor*s object was not just to 
preserve the independence of Godjam and his own control over
that region; he in fact intended to build up the power of
the Godjamese ruler to rival that of Menelilc* It was with
this intention that the Emperor created Ras Adal Negous
(King) of Godjam and the south-western Galla and crowned
him under the throne name of Tecla Haimanot in January 1881.
Cecchi, one of the four Italians who were eye-witnesses of
the coronation, surmised that the Emperor intended the
1occasion for a political purpose. All tie Emperor1s tributary 
chiefs, including Menelilc, were present with troops; this 
display of the Imperial strength may have been designed to 
strike terror into Menelik. But the important point is that, 
by publicly recognising Godjam's conquest in Gudru and Laga- 
mara, the Emperor openly demonstrated his support for Tecla- 
Haimanot in his contest with Menelik for the possession of 
the south-western region.
Godjam's incursions into the Galla provinces to the south 
of the Abay had started in the 1850s.^ By the late 1870s 
Gudru and Lagamara were controlled by Ras Adal and a Godjamese 
governor commanding Godjamese soldiers was resident in these 
provinces.^ The influence of Ras Adal reached into the Galla
1
Cecchi: op.cit.. II, 184; of. also 582-89. The other Italians 
were Antonelli, Gustav Bianchi, and Giacomo Naretti. See also 
Bianchi: Alla Terra, pp. 528-9.
2Massaia: I.Miei Trentacinque Anni... Vol. IV, p.134 and passim.
^Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. II, p.564.
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monarchies in the Gibie-Omo-Didesa region and. played no
1
small part in the 1 Aberration of Cecchi from prison in Ghera. 
Encouraged, thus, by the Emperor, Tecla I-Iaimanot intensified 
his activities in these provinces. This brought M m  into 
hostility with Menelik, who was also actively engaged in 
campaigns in the area. A war ensued between the two princes 
in the Spring of 1882 in which the Shoans defeated the Cod-
p
janiese and took Tecla Haimanot and two of his sons prisoners. 
The Emperor had little choice but to intervene to secure the 
liberation of Tecla Haimanot and make peace between the two 
princes. In the peace settlement which took place between 
Yohannes and Menelik in the Autumn of 1882 the Emperor recog- 
nised Menelik’s control over the region disputed between Shoa 
and Godjam. In this way the ssttlement of 1882 put the seal 
on the failure of the Emperor’s policy of building up the power 
of Godjam as a counterpoise to that of Shoa. There is little 
doubt that the Emperor’srecognition of the failure of this 
policy contributed to his need to initiate the settlement of 
Autumn 1882 to protect the position which the settlement of 
1878 had given him.
It has been mentioned that on the death
^Cecchi: op.cit. ’ Vol. II, pp. 54-3-551.
2ASMI, 36/2-12. Antonelli to M.A.S. Aden 16.9.1882.
Ibid. 36/2-13. Branch! to M.A.E, Debra Tabor 30.6.1883*
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of the Emperor civil war broke out in the northern provinces 
to determine the succession, and that Gobasie and ICassa were 
the leading contenders. These two men woe the only princes in 
the Empire who, in 1868, could have interfered with Menelik*s 
rule in Shoaj> their preoccupation with the contest In the 
north thus left Menelik free to consolidate hisjposition in 
Slioa and take the offensive against the Galla tribes who 
shared frontiers with Shoa.
The first region to claim the ICing*s attention was that of 
the Wallo with whom Shoa shared a northern frontier. Menelik* s 
first campaign in this region is represented as having been 
undertaken to restore to power the Wallo queen called Warquit. 
Warquit had been regent for her son Imam Amedie Ali Liben, 
who was taken prisoner by the Emperor Thedros during the latter*s 
Wallo-Shoa campaign of 1855-6. Eor the welcome which Warquit 
gave to Menelilc on his escape from Magdala (in June 1865)
Theodros executed the Wallo Prince together with the other 
Wallo prisoners who were with him. With the death of her 
son ^Warquit *s regency no longer had any validity and she was 
forced to cede power to a rival named Mesteouat, who played 
regent for her own young son Abba Uatto, and driven to seek
3C h .  I I .  P. ill, rt.3.
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refuge in Shoa. To restore Warqit to power may he a fair 
explanation for Menelik*s first campaign. In so doing 
Menelik would not only show his gratitude to the former 
regent, but also ensure that he had an ally among rival 
¥allo rulers. But it could not have been the whole reason; 
in fact the Warquit incident only offered Menelik an imiediate 
occasion for initiating a conquest which appealed so much 
to him. For nearly ten years (1868-76) Menelik campaigned 
vigorously in the Wallo country and succeeded in bringing 
under his control almost the whole country as far north as,
and including, the fortress of Magdala. Although in later 
years Menelik had to give up the northern part of his Wallo 
conquests as part of peace settlement between the Emperor 
Yohannes and himself, he controlled the southern part more 
or less effectively until 1889 when he became Emperor and 
thereby reunited the whole of Ethiopia.
The real explanation for the Wallo conquest was the 
need to safeguard the northern frontier, at this time the 
most vulnerable of all the Shoan frontiers. The central 
position of the Wallo Galla country - between Shoa in the
"Sellassie: Ghronique.... Vol. X, p.118. A. Markham: A History 
of the Abyssinian Expedition, p.368. For the Wallo domestic 
rivalry see Domenico Brielli: "Ricordi Storici del Uallo*1 in 
Studi Etiopici pp. 78-109-
south and the other Amhara provinces in the north - made the 
attitude of the Wallo a matter of crucial importance to the 
existence of Shoa as an independent Kingdom within the Empire. 
Erom the ¥a3Lo tribes themselves the Shoan rulers had little 
to fear since so great were their sectional interests that 
they could hardly ever take concerted action against Shoa.
What was important to Shoan rulers was the attitude of the 
Wallo tribes to an invasion from the northern provinces.
This fact was brought out during Theodros!s three invasions 
of Shoa between3855 and 1864 when Wallo resistance affected 
the success of the invasions. Even before the time of Theodros, 
Sahela Sellasie had fully recognised this fact, but not being 
strong enough to conquer the Wallo, he sought to win the friend­
ship of the important rulers among them. Sahela Selhssie attached 
great importance to his Wallo alliances and endeavoured, 
throughout his reign, to maintain them by occasional distri­
bution of gifts to his allies and even by|narriage proposals.^
In spite of all the efforts of Sahela Selassie, relations 
between the frontier governors of northern Shoa and their Wallo
p
neighbours remained, at best, uneasy.
1B.S.F. LG. 189 No. 2031 Harris, 10.11.1841. See Ch. X.
2Xhid., Ho. 2060D Para. 41» Harris, 27.11.1841.
Ibid., Ho. 20601 Para. 2 & 3> Harris, 31.1.1842.
Menelik did not appear satisfied with this state of
o
affairs. As he saw it, the security of Shoa*s northern frontier 
depended not on maintaining an uneasy relationship, with the 
various Wallo rulers but on actually dominating them. He would 
then be able to regulate the frontier defences as he thought 
best, largely by fortifying a number of spots. Thus when Mene­
lik conquered the southern-most district of the Wallo Region, 
he erected and fortified the town of Worra-Ilu in 1871-2 to 
serve the dual purpose of a frontier defence as well as a base 
for operations further afield. It was with much the same in­
tention that the conquests were advanced as far as the im­
pregnable Amba Magdala which fell to Menelik in July, 1876.
All this - the conquest and frontier fortifications in the 
Wallo region - was part of the building up of Menelik* s power 
and prestige in preparation for his eventual bid for the Imperial 
Crown.'*'
The first expedition to the Wallo region was .sent in the 
Autumn of 1868 and followed by another a year later in November 
1869* In this second campaign Imam Abba Watto was invited to 
submit, but he refused to do so and prepared for war. In a battle 
which took place during the second week of Hovember the Wallo
^Cf. supra, pp. I5&-3.
176.
were routed and only the Imam and a few of his followers 
succeeded in escaping; after repeated defeats, the Imam sub­
mitted, sought and was granted pardon and given a district to 
1govern. Yet, Abba Uatto kept on rebelling and appears to 
have appealed for help to Yohannes, who had by then become 
emperor, as a result of his victories over Gobazie. Neverthe­
less, because of the Egyptian threat of invasion on the northern 
frontiers of the Empire, Yohannes was unable to give the Imam 
any effective help until the Shoan conquest was already an 
accomplished fact. It was during the next campaign which took 
place at the end of 1871 that Warra-Ilu was built and fortified. 
In building this frontier post Menelik was only following a 
practice which his predecessors had adopted and which he came 
to find so vital to the successoof his conquests. TJntil the 
construction of ¥arra Ilu all the expeditions_ were despatched 
from Litche in the centre of the Kingdom which was then the 
King's usual place of residence. The distance frmm Litche to 
the Uallo country was considerable and the hazards of the 
journey must have reduced the fighting strength of the King's 
soldiers. The construction of Warra Ilu as a frontier base was 
to eliminate this disadvantage. Thus having surrounded the tom
^Sellassies op.cit., Vol. I, p. 119. Cecchi: Da Zeila, Vol. I, p.266.
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with high walls, Menelik stationed an army estimated at 40,000
more or less permanently there while the conquest of the Wallo
1region was not yet completed.
Menelik appears to have had as a target of his Wallo
conquests, the natural fortress of Magdala situated in the
northern province of that region. The conques/b of this fortress
would bring Shoa*s effective northern frontier to a naturally
impregnable post.^ so for the next five years (1872-6) Menelik
gradually extended his conquest towards this target. Amoux,
who accompanied one of these campaigns, described the extent
of the conquest in February 1875 as reachiig the foot of Magdala
2
and covering the Tedju province. Magdala itself fell to 
Menelik in July 1876. The conquest had taken nearly ten years 
to complete. From time to time there were revolts but these 
were put down and Shoan rule re-affirmed*
When a new district was conquered, its ruler, if con­
sidered unreliable, i^ as imprisoned and his district given to 
a governor on whose devotion the King could rely. For example, 
the rebellious Abba Uatto was imprisoned and the governorship
1Arnoux: in Lande ”Un Yoyageur Frangais...n Revue des Deux Monies, 
Yol. 30, Dec. 1878, p.890. Arnoux gives a detailed description 
of the town and its fortifications.
%I. & D. (Afrique) Yol. 62, pp. 350-1, Arnoux*s Journal for 
17.2.1875.
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of M s  district was given to his brother Mohammed Ali. Later,
when Mohammed Ali also proved rebellious, the governorship
was taken from him and given back to a reformed Abba Uatto.
Also one of the King’s generals Ded.iatch Oualie was given
1the governorship of the Yedju province.
That the Wallo campaigns were successful at a time when 
Shoa*s military strength was only a fraction better than that 
of the Wallo was due in part to the disunity among the various 
Wallo tribes. Perhaps more important than this was the 
absence of intex’ference from other Ethiopian princes.
The strategic importance of the Wallo region was recognised 
not only by Menelik but by his contemporary northern princes.
That Menelik was left free to conquer this region to the 
obvious disadvantage of the ether princes, was due to two 
factors both of which have already been alluded to. The first 
was the three to four years of civil war which absorbed the 
attention and energies of the two princes who had the military 
strength to affect Menelik1s campaigns. The second factor was 
thepreoccupation of the victorious Yohannes with external threats
*|
^Sellasie: op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 121, 125. It was this Mohammed 
Ali who. allied with the Emperor Yohannes in 1877-8, was con­
verted to Christianity with the name of Michael (Mikael) and 
later promoted a Ras. See Supra, p.-(-65*— k
of attack s on the frontiers of his Empire. In 1875, for example, 
the Egyptian threat of invasion induced Yohannes to suspend a 
projected attack on Shoa and to conclude an agreement with Menelik. 
On at least three more occasions during his reign Yohannes was 
forced Toy external events to call off a projected invasion of 
Shoa* That Yohannes considered the Wallo region an important 
possession is borne out by the fact that in the settlement which 
he made with Menelik in March 1878 the region was a vital issue 
in the negotiations; and in the 1882 settlement Yohannes per­
suaded Menelik to cede the greater^part of the region to their 
newly marri ed children.'1' Thus the preoccupation of the northern 
princes with other activities in therortk contributed to the 
success of Menelik1 s campaigns in the Wallo region.
After securing the northern frontier, Menelik directed 
his conquests more closed to the Gallq regions to the south, 
south-west, and south-east of Shoa. Before any serious campaigns 
could be undertaken, however, Menelik had to deal with a dangerous 
revolt which originated at his court. This was a chain of re­
volts involving the King's cousin, Mashasha Seifou, and the 
royal concubine Bafana to which we may refer as the "Bafana plot".
Soon after his return to Shoa Menelik got attached to 
Bafana, a woman of low birth, exceptionally pretty but old enough 
to be his mother. She had been married at least twice before 
and had had quite a few children. The relationship was depre­
cated by everybody who had any position of influence in the King­
dom, mainly because of the age-difference, but possibly also 
because of the ambitions of Bafana. Despite the general dis­
approval, Bafana continued to enjoy the King’s Confidence right 
into the early 1880s.
Bafana1 s ambition was that her children, or at least, her
p
descendants, would one day become the rulers of Shoa. She 
planned hard and took definite steps towards achieving this 
ambition. She gave one of her daughters in marriage to the 
King’s cousin Mashasha Seifou. This was an ingenious design^ 
since Mashasha was the next in line of succession should any­
thing happen to Menelik before the latter could have children; 
the marriage was thus a safeguard to ensure that at least 
Bafana’s children's children might one day come to possess the 
crown of Shoa. But Bafana had not the patience to wait on events. 
Indeed, if she were to let events run their own course her ambition
^Massaia: I.Miei, Vol. IX, pp. 42-3*
Slassaia: op.cit., Vol. X, p.190. Cecchi: Da &eila. Vol. I, 
p.270. ASSGI Oartoni VIC: Ghiarini: nMemoria Sulla storia 
recente dello'scioa dalla morte di Sahle-Sallassie sino ad 
oggi’’(Nov. 1877) dated 23*11*1877*
would not be realized. So she schemed to achieve her objective.
As she saw it Menelik and Mashasha Seifou were the principal 
obstacles to the realization of her ambition. Her plan 
appears to have been to get rid of Mashasha first,and then 
the King; yet she wanted to do all this without raising 
suspicion. To get rid of Mashasha, Bafana schemed to set him 
against the King, let him appear a rebel and thereby create a 
justifiable cause for his imprisonment. Without first dis­
solving the marriage, Bafana gave Siefou's wife in marriage 
to another person. We do not know what Menelik*s attitude 
to Bafana*s perfidy was; what is clear is that Mashasha saw 
the action as an insulljknflicted with at least the King’s 
knowledge. He thereupon left the Court in anger and went to 
stay at the home of Dedjatch Gobana, one of the army leaders.
The departure of the prince from the Palace gave rise to specu­
lations and threatened a divisinn among the soldiers, for Mashasha 
was respected by the soldiers; a situation for a revolt had 
thus been created, which might well have led to a civil war 
but for the timely intervention of Ras Dargue, a paternal uncle 
of both Menelik and Seifou, who settled their differences and
^ASSGI, Cartoni VIC. Chiarini: "Memoria...." 
Cecchi; Da Zeila, Vol. I, p. 270.
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offered to keep Seifou safe in his own home. The inter­
vention of Has Dargue was a setback for Bafana1 s plans; 
nevertheless she continued to insinuate to the King that 
Seifou was dangerous and succeeded in getting Seifou im- 
prisoned in December 1876. With the imprisonment of 
Mashasha Seifou, Bafana had achieved the first part of 
her project, and she then set to work to eliminate the 
King himself. The tail-end of the next scheme was to betray 
Menelik to the Emperor Yohannes.
It will be remembered that in the first half of 1877 
Menelik invaded God jam; that in the second half of the year 
the Emperor Yohannes projected an invasion of Shoa; and that 
on this invasion the Emperor allied with Mohammed Ali, Mene­
lik fs governor of the Wallo Province, who himself rebelled 
about the middle of the year. All these events appear to have 
been planned in part, and in otherpirt skilfully manipulated 
by Bafana to further her scheme to eliminate Menelik. The 
details of the plot as given by Massaia and substantially 
confirmed by the chronicler, Cecchi and Chiarini were as
^ASSGX, Cartoni VIC. Chiarini; "Memoria....1 Cecchi: op.cit.,
I, p.272. G. Sellassie: op.cit., I, p.126.
follows: While Menelik was away in Godjam, Maredazmatch
1
Haile Mikael was to rebel and declare himself King of Shoa; 
the plot was planned for the rainy season when the Abay (Wile) 
would be flooded and not fordable so that Menelik could not 
cross into Shoa; then word would be sent to the Emperor Yo­
hannes who would march on Menelik in Godjam and take the 
latter a prisoner. This done, Haile Mikael would hand over 
the throne to one of the sons of Bafana in return for a hand­
some compensation. Bafana would accompany Menelik to Godjam 
partly to avoid suspicion, partly to report his movements to
the rebels and possibly the Emperor and partly to divert his
2attention from events in Shoa. Events of the first seven 
months of 1877 support these details. Menelik left Shoa in 
December 1876 and by April was busy overrunning Godjam, having 
left the aged Dedjatch Ghermami and Azage Walde Tzadek as
•j
One of the sons of Sahela Selassie and therefore a paternal 
uncle of Menelik and Seifou. He was the man first appointed 
by Theodros to govern Shoa when the Emperor conquered the 
Kingdom in 1855-6. He was imprisoned in the fortress of 
Tamo by Theodros in 1859 for inability to suppress revolts, 
but was released by Menelik on his return to Shoa. See 
Ch. II.
%assaia: op.cit., X, pp. 190-1. Sellassie; op.cit., Vol. I, 
pp. 152-6. Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. X, pp. 272-9. Chiarini:
uMemoria...u, cit.
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regents in the Kingdom with only a few hundred soldiers to
give respect to the regency. He was accompanied by Bafana.
At the end of April Maredazmatch Haile Mikael, having gathered
men on the pretext of going to release Mashasha Seifou from
prison, in fact rebelled. He defeated the regents in a battle
on May 2, and took possession of Ankober. In a second battle
two days later, however, the rebels were defeated, the Mare-
1dazmatch himself was wounded and takenprisoner.
It was when the news of the revolt reached Menelik in 
Godjam early in May that Bafana excelled herself in cunning.
She successfully persuaded Menelik to send her with part of 
his army to Shoa to quell the rebellion while he remained 
behind to complete the conquest of Godjam. Further she managed 
to get from the King a written document with the royal seal
p
purporting to transfer the regency from Ghermami to Bafana.
Her intention was to reduce the army which the King had with 
him in Godjam and thereby weaken the resistance which he might 
be able to offer to the Emperor when the time came for the 
Emperor to pounce on Menelik in Godjam. At the same time, by 
offering to go and suppress the revolt in Shoa she hoped to
“Hlassaia: op.cit., Vol. X, pp. 194-7* Chiarini: "Memoria” cit.
Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 275-4* Sellassie: op.cit., Vol. I, 
pp. 152-5*
^Unfortunately no trace of this document has been found.
185.
divert Menelik*s attention from events in Shoa. Once in Shoa, 
with the army now in her hands, she would herself take control 
over the situation and direct events as she had already planned. 
All this ties up very well with the details of the plot given 
by Massaia. Indeed she went a long way towards achieving 
success; it was only the development of a situation which she 
undoubtedly had not foreseen which in the end ruined her plans. 
Back in Shoa Bafana, fortified by Menelik* s letter and the 
army which followed her quickly took over the regency, trans­
ferred all the rebel prisoners, including Maredazmatch Haile 
Mikael and Mashasha Seifou, from the fortress of Enoari to 
the more impregnable fortress of Tamo (Tammo). Hext, she saw 
to it that all the military stores inthe Kingdom and large
supply of provisions were brought to Tamo and the fortress
1surrounded by armed soldiers.
It is not known for certain if Bafana sent any word of
these developments to the Emperor Yohannes. According to Cecchi,
the Emperor was marching on Menelik in Godjam when the latter,
having heard of this in time, crossed the Abay at its confluence
2
with the Gemma River into Shoa. According to the chronicler,
^Cecchi (l, 275) dates these events to mid-May 1877. 
^Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 272-5*
Menelik; crossed into Shoa from Godjam on May 25, and that 
he did this partly to avoid defeat in Godjam, and partly
to see to the aes tor at ion of peace in Shoa.’*' It is known that
Ras Adal, the ruler of Godjam, unable to withstand the Shoan 
invaders fled to the Emperor and that he and his soldiers 
formed part of the Emperor’s army which invaded Shoa in 1877-8.
It is further known that by July 1877 the Emperor was already
in the northern province of the Wallo region on his way to
invade Shoa. It is reasonable to suppose that the Emperor 
was in fact marching against Menelik in Godjam when, on hearing 
that the latter had crossed the Abay, he altered his course 
and made direct for Shoa by way of the Wallo country. But it 
is difficult to say if the advance towards Godjam and the sub­
sequent change of direction were the result of Ras Adal’s flight 
to the Emperor or of reports from Bafana. Probably it was the 
result of both. It is quite possible that the Emperor was 
following the development of Bafana*s plot. This suggestion gains 
strength when one remembers withat Massaia says that, after the 
peace agreement made between Menelik and Yohannes in March 1878,
^Sellassie: op.cit., I, p.155.
2M.A.E. (Paris): Gorresp. Politique des Consuls: Egypt©; 
Massouah. Vol. 4, p.74. Carbonnel to M.A.E., 28.7.1977.
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the Emperor revealed details of Bafana's plot to Menelik."**
The return of Menelik to Shoa in the last week of Ma^ r 
clearly unforeseen and unexpected by Bafana, led to the collapse 
of Bafana^ plot, for it brought Menelik into control over the 
situation in Shoa before the plot could mature. The part of 
the plot which was planned to take place in Godjam misfired, 
and that planned to occur in central Shoa did not mature, 
but the invasion of the Emperor was not called off, and caused 
panic in Shoa. MenelikTs difficulty was complicated by a re­
volt about this time (June-Julyl877) in the Wallo region, which 
might possibly have been part cf the general plot. An attempt 
to suppress this revolt failed and the rebels joined ranks 
with the invading army of the Emperor.
The threat of invasion, the rebellion in the Wallo 
region, and the recent plot in central Shoa which had centred, 
in part at least, on Mashasha Seifou, brought hone to Menelik 
the need to close ranks with his cousin. It was for this reason 
that in December 1877 Menelik and Seifou came to a settlement 
of their differences and Seifou was released from prison virtually
1Massaia: op.cit., Vbl X, p.201.
1on his own terms. The reconciliation between Menelik and 
Seifou, coupled with the peace settlement made between Menelik 
and Yohannes in March 1878, put the seal on the failure of 
Bafana* s plot, and with it her ambition to win the Shoan crown 
for hex’ children. Bafana herself was punished with deprivation 
and expulsion from the Palace; although she was later restored 
to favour and to her property, she ceased to be an important 
figure in Shoa in 1883 when Menelik officially and legally 
married Waizero Taitu. In 1879 another attempt at a revolt 
by Mashasha Seifou was nipped in the bud; the Prince was im­
prisoned and only released cn the Emperor's intervention in 
1882. After 1879 Menelik did not face any more rebellions of 
such serious implications from within his possessions although 
the Emperor's pro-Seifou attitude continued to cause him em­
barrassment .
Until 1878 the northern frontiers of Shoa were the main 
theatre of Menelik*s military campaigns. Prom time to time ex­
peditions had indeed been sent to provinces to the south and
1Chiarini*s Journal for 19th December 1877 quoted in Cecchi, 
op.cit., I, p.284.
Massaia: op.cit.t Vol. X, pp. 202-4. Massaia played a part in 
bringing about the reconciliation, aid Chiarini was an eye­
witness of the events he describes.
Mashasha was given control of the army which he had previously 
commanded, raised to the dignity of Dadjazjatch and given governor' 
ship of the Soddo Galla country in the south on both sides of tie 
Hawash.
southwest of Shoa, hut it was not until dTter that year that 
these regions became the main centre cf Menelik*s expansion.
This was because until the peace settlement of 1878 Shoa's 
northern frontier was too unsafe to enable Menelik to con­
centrate on other frontiers. It will be remembered that 
among the gains which Menelik derived from the s ettlement 
was the formal recognition of 'his position as King of Shoa 
and of his conquests in the Wallo region by the Emperor.
These gains gave Menelik a sense of security and enabled him 
to turn his attention more closely to otheijregions.
Sahela Selassie had initiated the expansion of Shoa 
towards the southerly and south-westerly provinces and had 
made considerable conquests in these areas. His motives had 
been imperial, religious and economic. Menelik had all these 
motives, but the imperial and economic ones appear to have 
been dominant. This is not to imply that the religious motive 
faded out of his considerations. On the contrary, efforts were 
made to propagate Ethiopian Christianity in the Muslim and 
Pagan areas which were conquered. Churches were built in each 
new district that was conquered and Amhara priests put in charge 
of them.
Earlier in this chapter it was remarked that Menelik enter-
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tained the ambition to become Emperor of Ethiopia and to 
reunite the northern and southern provinces of the Empire; 
that in prep ar at inn towards this end he strove hard to build 
ip his reputation and military strength; and that one of the 
methods which he employed to do this was to increase his man­
power resources by means of territorial expansion. This, 
indeed, was one of the reasons why the Galla and Sidama regions, 
with their untapped manpower resources attracted Menelik. 
Moreover, by conquering these regions he would thereby extend 
the frontiers of Shoa to incorporate all those provinces which 
had formed part of the Medieval Empire of Ethiopia. This in 
itself would considerably ease his task as the Emperor of a 
united Ethiopia when the time came.
By far the most important consideration, however, was 
the economic gains that those areas promised. It has already 
been remarked that the southerly and south-westerly regions 
were the richest in the whole of the Medieval Empire. Menelik, 
more than any of his predecessors, needed the wealth of those 
areas. His policy of military build-up was pursued not just 
by increasing the number of men under arms but also by improving 
on the quality and quantity of their weapons. Menelik obtained 
these improved weapons from the European arms traders who came
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into Shoa in increasing numbers in the 1880s. He paid for 
these firearms partly in thalers but mainly with local products 
« coffee, ivory, gold, civette gum etc. All these products 
came from the Galla and Sidama countries to the south and 
south-west of Shoa; hence Menelik's anxiety to conquer and 
control as much of this region as possible. There is thus a 
direct connection between the infnx of firearms into Shoa and 
the pace of the conquest. On the one hand, the more firearms 
that were obtained the greater was the need for ivory, gold 
etc. to pay for them, and the greater this need became the more 
the campaigns were intensified and pushed further afield towards 
the very sources of these products. On the other hand, the 
more firearms that the King's soldiers employed the greater were 
their successes'in these campaigns. This last point is brought 
out clearly by the fact that the campaigns which were undertaken 
in those areas after 1880 were more successful than those under­
taken earlier. Part of the explanation, of course, is that before 
1878 attention was concentrated in the north and, therefore, the 
greater part <f the soldiers were employed in thetaorth; but the
i
Henry Audon: "Voyage au Choa" in he Tour du Honda. 2e Semestre 
1889, p.139* para. XI. ASMAI 3673-28 Antonelli to Ho. 
Commissario Civile in Assab, dated Hori (Efrata) 19-1.1886.
J. Borelli; Ethiopie Meridionals, Paris 1890, p.165, Antoto 
10.11.1886.
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main explanation is that after 1880 large stocks of firearms 
began to reach Shoa and as a result Menelik's soldiers became 
better equipped. The success of the campaigns of conquest 
was also affected by the political conditions hi the areas 
under discussion.
The south-westerly region, that is, ro u g h ljr  the area
south of Godjam, stretching from the south bank cf the Abay
River in the n>rth to the Godjeb River in the south, from the
Mugar River and the Upper reaches of the Hawash River in the
east to the Didesa River in tie West was (and still is) occupied
by a large Gall a group called Maca. like all the other major
gimps of the Galla the Maca consisted of several smaller units.
In the southern half of this region, constituted by the valleys
of the Gibe (Gibie) - Upper Didesa-Godjeb rivers, mainly as a
result of conquests initiated by nuclear units, larger units were
built up which as time went on developed into strong unified
kingdoms. By the early 1840s five major kingdoms had emerged,
1
namely Goma, Limmu-Enarea, Guma, Ghera and Jimma Kaka. Through­
out our period these kingdoms continued to vie with each other 
for supremacy in the area. By the early 1840s when we first hear
■^ Jimma Kaka is popularly known as Jimma Abba Gifar after the 
founder of the dynasty.
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of them Limmu-Enarea was the most powerful, but the medio­
crity of her later rulers and the vicissitudes of war led 
to a change in the balance of power and by the 1870s Limmu- 
Enarea had lost its foremost position to Jimma Kaka.
The tribes which inhabited the northern half of the 
region rare not as well organised as those in the southern 
half. Here, each of the numerous units lived an independent 
existence, obeying their own leaders and owing no allegiance 
to anyone outside their own limited frontiers. Nevertheless, 
war was a constant feature of the relations between those 
petty units and one would like to think that, but for the 
Amhara conquest, the eventual outcomejof the struggle might 
have been, as in the southern half, the emergence of larger, 
unified communities. A tendency towards this end was, in 
fact, visible in the Gudru and Lagamara provinces where rich 
and powerful families were gradually gaining influence over 
their poorer and less powerful neighbours. So complete did 
their influence appear In practice that the Catholic Mission­
aries who livedin the area in the 1850s and 1860s described
See M. Abir: "Trade and Politics in the Ethiopian Region”, 
London Ph.D. Thesis 1964, pp. 106-163, also M. Abir; "The 
Emergence and Consolidation of the Monarchies of Enarea and 
Jimma in the first half of the 19th century” in J.A.H,,
Yol. VI, 1965, pp. 205-219.
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these dominant families as chiefs.
*2The struggle which went on everywhere between neigh­
bouring groups made a united resistance to an outside invader 
impossible. Further, it weakened them internally and reduced 
the effectiveness of their individual efforts. Thus when the 
,tAmharau armies invaded the area, the Galla were in no position 
to give any effective resistance, and fell one after the other 
to the invaders.
Naturally, Menelik1 s approach to the Maca group was 
to conquer the less organised northern tribes first before 
reaching out to the more organised Kingdoms on the Gibe-Godjeb- 
Didesa banks. The conquest of the Maca Galla region ms almost 
wholly the work of Dedjatch (later Ras) Gobana, perhaps the 
most able of all Menelilc*s warriors. In a series of campaigns 
conducted between 1868 and 1878 Gobana conquered all the Liban 
tribes inhabiting the area between the Mugar and the head­
waters of the Hawash rivers in the East and the River Guder 
in the west.^ Shoa*s western boundary was thus brought to 
the eastern frontier of Gudru. It was in Gudru and the provinces
1Massaia : I. Hied., Vol. II, pp. 187-9, also Vols. Ill and IV, 
and infra.
^Massaia and the other missionaries give this picture for the 
northern half while Cecchi, Borelli and other travellers give 
a similar picture for the southern half. Solleillet: op.cit.
(cont.)
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beyond that the soldiers from Shoa <nme into conflict with 
those from Godjam. Godjamese advance into this region 
and the purpose behind it have been mentioned earlier in this 
chaptex*. In 1872 Godjam campaigned vigorously in Gudru*1* 
and by 1880 Leqa had become tributary to Godjam . It is 
reasonable to suppose that Lagamara, situated between Gudru 
and Leqs^  was also tributary to Godjam by 1880. Thus by 
this time Godjam* s influence reached up to the northern 
frontier of Limmu-Bnarca.
3
In November 1878 Menelik* s soldiers penetratedinto 
Lagamara which Godjam must have regarded as her sphere of 
influence. Prom 1878 to 1882 the "Shoans’* and the "Godjamese" 
were in open conflict in therorthem half of the Maca region.^ * 
With the defeat and capture of Has Adal, the ruler of Godjam, 
by the soldiers of Menelik in a battle fought %  Gudru in June
(cont.) p.209> mentions a bloody war between Jimma ICaka and 
Gera in 1881. Borelli makes clear a continuous war between 
Jimma Kaka and Zingero throughout the first eighty years of 
the 19th century.
^B.N. (Paris) d’Abbadie Papers: Nouvelles Acquisitions Pranyaises 
No. 10222. Massaia*s letter dated 15.2*1876.
1M.A.P. 10222, Massaia 9.6.1873.
^Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. IX, p.555.
^Propaganda Archives. Series: Scritture Riferite nei Congress!s 
Vol. 8. Taurin Cahagne to Cardinal Simeoni. 4.1.1879.
4Sellassie: op.cit.. Vol. pp. 171, 173, 174,179.
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1882 the ltShoanslf came into possession of the provinces 
conquered by Godjam. As a result of the peace settlement 
made between the Emperor Yohannes and Menelilc in the Autumn 
of 1882 by which Yohannes recognised Shoa's conquests in 
the disputed provinces, Menelilc was given a free hand in 
the Maca region.
Menelik seems to have planned his advance into the 
Gibe-Didesa-Godjeb monarchies from two fronts. tJhile Gobana 
conquered the northern half of the Maca region, other ex­
peditions were organised to approach the southern half from 
the north-eastern frontier of Jimma-Kaka, at this time the 
most powerful of the five monarchies. The route which led 
from south-western Shoa across the Hawash through the Soddo 
province, Cabiena, Botor and Badifolla to the north-eastern 
frontier of Jimma Kaka was one of the main routes which led 
from the Gibe region to the Anihara countries. It was the 
shortest to Shoa and at this time the principal outlet for 
products from Jimma ICaka.^  The control of this route was 
therefore vital to Menelilc. In May-June 1875 an expedition 
led by Menelik which went to northern Guraghe appears to have
^Cecchi; op.cit., Vol. II, p.558. ASSGI, Cartoni VlII^, Traversi 
to the President of the S.G.I. let-Marefia 10*4.1888.
conquered Cabiena, for in the following year the governor of 
this province arrived in Shoa with tribute of civet to 
Menelik.^
By September 1878 the provinces between Cabiena and
Jimma Kaka had been conquered and Jimma herself had become
2
tributary to Shoa. With Jimma Kaka as tributary Menelik had
got a foothold in the heart of the sources of those products
which he needed so much. Prom Jimma Kaka Menelilc sent expedition
to other parts of the legion^ but up to 1880 these do not
appear to have had any successes.^" %  the end of 1882, however,
the monarchies of Limmu-Enarea, Guma, Goma, and Ghera had all
5 -rbecome tributary to Shoa. It appears that ICaffa also became 
tributary in 1882 though probably for only a short period.
i
L. L. Lande: ”Un Voyageur Pranjais... ." in Revue des Deux Mondes, 
Vol. 319 15-1.1879, p-590. Cecchi (ll, 52)" "say^ that the ”
.^ governor Omar Baxa, seeing his province menaced by Shoa's advance, 
'offered to become tributary in order to avoid conquest.
2B* H. (Paris), W.A.P. 10222, Massaiafs letter dated Peb.13,
1879, p.50. ASSGI, Cartoni VII , Antinori to Bienenfeld, 
Let-Marefia 13*9*1878. Antinori reports that in Sept. 1878 
15 men from Jimma Kaka arrived in Shoa carrying tribute from 
the King of that Kingdom.
^ASSGI, Cartoni VII^* Antinori ibid.
^ASSGI, Cartoni VII^. Antinori to the President of S.G.I. Let- 
Marefia 28.10.1880. Cecchi whowas held a prisoner in Ghera 
from Peb. 1879 to Aug. 1880 gives the impression that Shoa's 
influence had by then not reached beyond Jimma Kaka.
(cont.)
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There is no mention in the sources of tribute reaching Shoa 
from KaJTa after 1882. In fact the available dnformation in­
dicates refusal by Kaffa to pay tribute, and twice in 1888 the 
King of ICaffa refused, with impunity, to allow Traversi and 
Borelli to enter his Kingdom, though both travelled as friends 
of Menelik.1 It was not until 1897 that Kaffa was conquered 
and only after a long and arduous campaign. With the conquest 
of Wallaga, which is situated to the x*est of the Didesa river 
in 1886 and the appointment of Menelik* s own subjects as
governors in all the conquered provinces except Jimma Kaka,
■5
the conquest of the Maca region was complete. The stage was 
thus p repared for the conquest of the Sidama provinces lying 
to the south and south-east cf the Maca region. This stage of 
the conquest in the south-west which started about 1888 was 
completed in the 1890s.
^Soleillet: Voyages en Ethiopie, Rouen 1886, pp. 115, 145, 220. 
ASMAI. 36/2-11. Antonelli1s^report dated 22.5*1883. According 
to the Chronicler (Sellassie I, 171, 173) the first expedition 
to Ghera and Guma was sent in 1881.
^Soleillet; op.cit., pp. 115, 145, 185-6. Sellassie; op.cit.,
I, pp. 174-5. ASMAI 36/2-11, Antonelli, Report cit.
J. Borelli; Bthiopie Meridionals, Paris 1890, pp. 298, 367. On 
p. 260 -under the date Antoto 24.10.1887, Borelli reports of 
Menelilc writing to him to say "you can go to any territory under 
my control except Kaffa which has refused to pay me the tribute."
o
Parts of Wallaga were inhabited by Shanlcalla, i.e. negroes.
3Jimma Kaka retained its local ruler throughout this period.
' « * ■  w .
It was not only the south-westerly region which attracted 
Menelik; the Guraghe country situated to the south of the Hawash 
river, the large Arussi grotip of Galla and other Galla groups 
inhabiting the region to the south-east of the river also 
attracted the King. 'The attraction of these areas was much the 
same as that of the south-westerly region. In the conquest of 
Guraghe the memories and the Christian traditions of the Medieval 
Umpire appear to have played a considerable role. In the whole 
of the southerly and south-westerly regions it was, perhaps, 
in Guraghe that the relics and some traditions of the Medieval 
^mpire were best preserved.^" The tradition that the Elands 
situated in Lake Zeway harboured the treasures of the Ethiopian 
church taken there for safety during the Gran wars of the 16th 
century had been popular in Shoa. Like Sahela Selassie before 
him, the desire to recover these treasures was one of the motives 
which induee^d Menelik to the conquest of Guraghe. It was with 
this intention that an expedition ms led by Menelik personally 
in the autumn of 1879 to the lake Zeway district. The district 
all round the lake was ravaged but the islands themselves could 
not be reached. To reach then the soldiers needed boats which
Of. Oh. I,pp.62.-3 of this thesis. Also Traversi "Viaggio nei 
Guraghi" in B.S.G.I. serie II. - Vol. XII 1887, p.279.
they did not have; and for this reason the expedition failed 
to achieve its objective.3*
Previous to 1879, Menelik had personally led two cam­
paigns to Guraghe to pave the way for the conquest of the lake 
and its islands. The first which took place in May-June 1875
conquered the provinces in fhekorth as far south as* but not
 ^ 2
incltxding, the province of Ciaha. The second campaign was 
in October 1876. This does not appear to have made any new 
conquests, though it returned with what was described as a 
rich booty of hundreds of slaves and large numbers of cattle.
To ensure the suceess of his campaigns to the lake district,
Menelik had to have control over thosepprovinces of Guraghe which 
were situated on the approaches to Shoa. This is what the cam­
paigns of 1875 and 1876 were designed to achieve.
There was also an economic factor which increased Mene- 
lik's desire to conquer the whole of Guraghe, a task which was 
completed inihe second half of 1889.^ The products which came
■ T^raversi; nDa Sntotto al Zuquala" in B.S.G.I. Serie II - 
Yol. XII, 1887, p.595, also p.270. Sellassie: Ghronique ,
Vol. I, p. 167. H. Audon, "Yoyage au Choa" in he Tour du 
Monde, 2e Semestre 1889, p. 158, para. XIX.
TT.A.F. 10222, Massaia 23.6.1375. M. & D. (Afuk*^ ©.) 62, 
pp. 359-63. Arnoux: "extraits du Journal" also in R. des deux 
Mondes, Yol. 30, pp. 896, 899-902. The provinces would be those 
of Aimelelle already tributary, Huhur, Abso, Ghedelei, and Esgia.
^ASSGI, Cartoni YI^, Antinori's Journal (in pencil) for October 1876. 
Ibid., Chiarini "Memoria Sulla Storia...11. CecchI (ha Zeila..
I, 27l), says the King lost about one-third of his army and with-
(cont.)
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to Shoa from Guraghe, although insi^gnifleant compared with 
those which came from the Maca region, were nevertheless 
important to the Shoan monarch, These consisted mainly in 
slaves; it is true that Menelik himself and the Christian 
population of Shoa in general, did not tradejm slaves. Yet
i
the taxes paid in Shoa by the Slave merchants on each slave
brought, in transit, to the Kingdom constituted one of the
important sources of revenue for the crown. Slaves from Guraghe
were reputed, at the coast, to be the best and therefore the
most sought after; they were hard working and docile.1 Slaves
and other trade goods from Guraghe did not all reach the coast
by way of Shoa; part of it went eastwards by way of the Arussi
2
country to Harar. It was therefore in the interest of Menelik 
to control the whole of this limited but important trade. It 
is probable that Menelik*s conquest of the Arussi region and 
of Harar itself was dictated by, among other factors, his desire
(cont.) drew to avoid greater losses.
^S.R. nei Congress! Vol. 10. Taurin Cahagne to Cardinal Massaia. 
Harrar 18.7.1889.
^L. Traversi "Viaggi negli Arussi11 in B.S.G.I., Serie II,
Vol. XII, 1887 p.268.
o
fraverift, Ibid. , p.284. Cecchi: op.cit., Vol. II, p.102.
Iaurin affirms the existence of a frequented route from Harar 
to Arussi; he describes it as passing through the Gara 
mountaings, across the Majo River, the plains of Wareris and
the marketscf Gulufa and Oesara. HAff. 10222, Taurinfs letter 
dated Zeila 23.3.1884.
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to control this south-easterly route to the coast.
Of all the campaigns which Menelik conducted before he 
became Emperor in 1889 perhaps the most sustained and the 
most bloody were those against the Arussi Galla. It took 
six different campaigns conducted between January 1882 and 
January 1887 to conquer that vast region.^ On each of these 
campaigns Menelik*s soldiers met with determined resistance 
from tie enemy. The success of the Arussi resistance was due 
partly to the extensive nature of their country and partly to
p
their numerical strength. The fact that Menelik conducted 
more than one campaign at a time in different provinces and 
that armies were stationed more or less permanently in each 
province meant that the King's fighting strength against the 
Arussi was considerably reduced. Further, the Arussi adopted, 
with considerable success, the Galla fighting technique of making 
surprise attacks in the night while the "Amhara" enemy were at 
rest, inflicting some losses and then quickly malting off before
■* .('!■) January 1882 (lasted 3 weeks)
(ii) December 1883-January 1884.
(iii)March-April 1884
(iv) November 1885.
(v) May-^ June 1886
(vi) December 1886.
After the fifth campaign an army ms left behind in the region 
which completed the conquest. The sixth campaign thus appears 
to have been only engaged in the pacification of the covmtry.
(cont.)
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the enemy could organise a counter-attack. In one such nocturnal
attack during the campaign of May 1886 the Arussi killed about
1
seven hundred of Menelik1s soldiers. Nevertheless Arussi 
resistance broke down during the last campaign in November- 
December 1886 and the region then fell to the invaders. In 
the final analysis it was thefiLrearms of the invaders which won 
them the contest.
With the fall of the Arussi country to Menelik, the 
conquest of Harar, the focal point <f the south-easterly route 
could not long be delayed. In fact Harar was conquered in the 
first week of January 1887, soon after the breakdown of Arussi 
resistance. One gets the impression from the sources that for 
some time Menelik had had his eyes on Harar and took considerable 
pains to prepare the ground for the eventual conquest, early 
as June 1885 Menelik expresssd his intention to occupy Harar.
In a letter to the King of Italy dated 4th June 1885 in which 
this intention is expressed, Menelik explained that Harar had 
formed part of the Medieval Empire and that to conquer it would
$ellassie: Ohronique, Vol.'J. p.172, note 6. fhe editor refers 
to Paulltschke1 s estimate of the population cf the Arussi in the 
1880s at about one million, and to Martial de Salviacfs estimate 
that the Arussi could raise a combined army of more than 10QP90 men.
'''Sellassie: op.cit., Yol. I, p.254*
Traversi; "Yiaggi negli Arussi*’ in B.SUG-.I. cit., p.274*
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only mean his resuming possession of what hah once belonged 
to his ancestors.**- It is true that the reunification of 
the scattered provinces of the Medieval Empire was a general 
motive for all his conquests. Wavei'theless, Menelik had other 
reasons for wanting to conquer Hai’ar.
The commercial m0bive has already been suggested.
The Harar province had formed part of the Medieval Empire.
With the spread of Islam into the eastern half of the Empre 
in the last five centuries of the Middle Ages and the conse­
quent wars between the Christian Emperors and their Muslim 
subjects, Imperial control over the easterly provinces had 
become tenuous. Harar together with other south-easterly, 
southerly and south-westerly provinces had become completely 
lost to the Christian Empire as a resultcf the Calla invasions. 
Prom this period until it was conquered by Egypt in October 
1875 the city of Harar lived the life of an independent, city- 
state. Throughout this period, by virtue of its geographical 
position - half way between the coast and the fertile south­
easterly regions of the Empire - Harar was a commercial centre 
of no small importance. The ports of Zeyla, Tadjura and Berbera
^Ljbro Yerde Ho. XV. Etiopia: Doc. 95> p.202. Menelik to 
Umberto I. Entotto 4.6.1885. (28 ghenbot l'anno 20 del nostro
regno)
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on which Aden depended for her provisions, in their turn were
dependent on Harar for these supplies. With the Egyptian
occupation, European merchants began to enter and trade
1directly in the city and by the early 1880s a French and
p
an Italian Commercial House had been opened in the city.
There were also quite a few Greek and Armenian merchants
established there. Harar1s trade with the coast was until
the 1880s clearly more important than Shoa1 s trade with the
coast; even in the 1880s when Shoa's direct trade with the
coast became increasingly important, that of Harar did not
diminish in importance.
For Menelik it was not merely a question of getting
control over the south-easterly route which led through Guraghe
and Arussi to Harar. Indeed, Menelik intended to extend his 
r
control of the trade routes to as far as the coast and possibly 
secure a port for Shoa. Already he controlled, rather in­
effectively, the routes which led from Zeyla, Oboek and Assab
1Until the Egyptian occupation the city was closed to Europeans 
and its trade with the coast was in the hands of Somali tribes 
and Arab merchants. The English traveller Richard F. Burton 
who reached the citv in 1854 succeeded only because h£ disguised 
himself as an (Arab; Muslim merchant.
2The French House, a branch of the commercial establishment of 
Bardey in Aden, was opened in December 1880 and was until 1885 
under the charge of Arthur Rimbaud. See Enid Starkie: Arthur 
Rimbaud in Abyssinia Oxford 1957. The Italian House, also a 
branch of the Bienenfeld establishment in Aden was in the charge 
first of Pietro Sacconi, then (after 1883) of Gaetano Sacconi and 
after 1887 of Ottorino Sacconi.
to the eastern frontier of Shoa. He even claimed control
over the salt lake at Aussa only a few hours journey from
the coast, and levied taxes on any of the Afar tribes who
1
took salt from the lake; it was for this reason that Menelik 
had to approve of the treaty which Antonelli signed in 183,2 with 
the sultan <£ Aussa, Mohamad Anfari (or Hanfari) to secure the 
route from Assab through Aussa to Shoa. But he did not yet 
have any control over a port on the coast. The ne&d for a 
port to which Shoa could have unimpeded access was brought 
home to Menelik by the Egyptian occupation of the Somali coast 
and the resulting blockade. Thus in May 1887, exactly four 
months after the conquest of Harar, Menelik wrote as follows 
to the King of Italy:
"My occupation of Harar is (notizia) good news for 
the commercial relations between Italy and Shoa, 
but more important than this ... is the (question 
of) Zeila. If your Majesty will see to its cession 
to me the route will be opened to trade not only 
from (i.e. with) Shoa but also from the countries
J. Borelli; Ethiopie Meridionale, pp. 42, 176.
L.V. No. XV. Etiopia: Doc. Ill, p. 246-7. Antonelli to M.A.E. 
Entotto 15.11*1886. Doc. tit (Annesso) Menelik to Umberto I, 
14.10.1886.
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of Arussi, ICambata, Gamma and ICaffa. Products
1
from all these countries would be sent to Zeila...."
There was also a question of the security of Shoa involved 
in the conquest of Harar. Menelik feared an occupation of Harar 
by a foreign power which might possibly lead to an attack on 
Shoa hershlf. Egypt had tried to dose in on the Empire as a 
whole from the north, the Soma'li coast as well as from Harar, 
and had failed partly as a result of defeats sustained at the 
hands of the Emperor in the north and partly as a result of her 
own domestic difficulties. Menelik had had great fears of the 
Egyptian "iron ring"; an occupation of Harar by a European 
power more powerful than Egypt would threaten the security of 
Shoa. Prance and Italy were both interested in occupying Harar 
on the withdrawal of the Egyptians, and were engaged in diplo­
matic and other preparations for this purpose. The object and 
the aeport of a French mission entrusted to the French vice- 
consulat Khartoum, M. Gaston Lemay, to the Somali coast and 
Harar in May-June 1885 and the activities of M. Henry, a French 
Engineer resident in Harar about this time might not be known to 
Menelilc. Nor would he have known about the diplomatic activities 
that went on between Hancini and ^ord Granville between March
A^SMA.1 56/4-4-0. Menelik to Umberto I, Antotto 7*5*1887.
and June 1885. But Menelik had at least one reason to fear 
Italian occupation of Harar. In April 1886, on the orders of 
the restored Emir, an Italian Commercial and Scientific mission 
to Harar led by Count Perro was killed to a man. Menelik 
feared that Italy might retaliate by invading Harar. With the 
Italians in Massawah and already pushing towards Tigrian frontier, 
yet protesting their pacific intentions, an Italian occupation 
of Harar would embarras Menelilc. The King who had been worried 
about the possibility of Italian occupation and had sought a 
clarification of their intentions regarding Harar from Antonelli 
in 1885 must have become even more worried. It would appear 
therefore that one of the reasons for the conquest of Harar was 
to anticipate its occupation by a European power and avert the 
dangerous implications which such an occupation would entail 
for the security of Shoa. It was probably for this reason that 
two days after the battle in which the Shoan soldiers routed 
the Harari soldiers, Menelilc sent news of his conquest of the 
city to the Italian commissioner at Assab.
^L.V. No. XV. Stiopia,, Doc. 91, p. 196. Antonelli to Direttore 
generale degli affari politici al M.A.E, dated Anlcober 25.6.1885.
2ASMAI 56/4-59* Menelik to Luigi de Simone 8.1.1887.
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As part of the preparations for the conquest Menelik
appears to have employed spies in the city whose task it was
to report to him on the developments there regarding the
withdrawal of the Egyptian forces and the movement of Euro-
peans. In October 1885, while the conquest of the Arussi
was still in progress Menelik sent one of his generals to
occupy the Ittu Galla country to prepare the ground for the
2
conquest of Harar. The sort of ground work that was to be 
done must have been clear to the general, Walda Gabriel: con­
quest of the Ittu country and gradual advance towards the 
frontiers of Harar. This is exactly what Walda Gabriel and 
his army did. By October the general had advanced pretty well 
towards the Harar frontier, to have repulsed an attack made 
on him by the Harari soldiers, the news of which he quickly 
sent to the King in Entotto. Preparations were immediately 
started towards a campaign. Although it was usual with the
1In the letter to King Umberto in June 1885 quoted above there 
are these sentences “My men (or Messengers) (i Miei”) who have 
been in Harar for seven months write to me that the country 
has now fallen into the hands of the Galla .... In the latest
letter they say that (nell* ultima lettera giuntami, mi si dice 
che) the Turks (i.e. Egyptians) have withdrawn all their troops 
('*... han finito coll1 andarsene via”). ....”
In Hovember 1884 when evacuation began, the Egyptian population 
at Harar was said to be 3,411 regular soldiers, 160 civil 
officials and 5*000 women and children. Paulitsclike; “he Harrar 
soug 1!administration egyptienne 1875-85u B.S.K.G., Vol. 10, 
1887, p.583* But the official report on the Evacuation pre­
pared by Major Heath who was connected with the operation said
(cont.)
King not to disclose the destination <f a campaign, it was
widely believed in Shoa at this time that Harar was the
destination of the impending campaign.1 Accompanied by Dr.
Ragazsi and Dr. Alfieri the e:xqedition left Entotto on 12th
November and marched by way of Arussi where Has Dargue joined
the forces, and the Ittu country and together with the governor
of Ittu the other troops made for Harar. At a place called
Chalanko (Giallancio) probably in the district occupied by
the Meta or Oborra tribe of the Ala group the Emir's men
a/fc tacked the invaders on January 6, 1887. The battle lasted
only half an hour; the Harari were routed; only the Emir
managed to escape on horseback. Menelik then entered the defence-
2
less city and occupied it. The government of this important
(cont.) that "The garrison and followers, to the number of 
8,359, were marched down to the coast in eleven detachments 
and embarked for Egypt.”
P.O. 78/3971 “Report by Major Heath on the Evacuation of 
Harrar” dated 14th May 1885.
H. Audon, "Voyage au Choa”, Le Tour du Monde 2e Semestre 1889, 
p. 144, para XII.
^Borelli: Ethiopie Heridionale, Paris 1890, p.158, Antotto 29.10.1886. 
ASMAI 36/3-25, Antonelli to Sig. Commissario Civile in Assab,
Antotto 12.12.1886.m S.R.nei Congressi Vol. 10. Taurin Cahagne 
to Cardinal Simeoni, Eeyla 11.11.1886.
1Audon. op.cit., p.154, para. XVI. Borelli; op.cit., ibid.
2ASMAI 8/1-2: V. Ragazzi to R° Commissario Civile in Assab, Harar
13.1.1887. G
Also Ragazzi to S.G.I. same date in ASSG1, Oartoni VI . It is this
(cont.)
province was given to the King* s o m  faithful cousin Ded.jatch
Makonen.*1* It was from Harar that campaigns were organised for
the conquest of Ogaden in 1891.
By 1889 when Menelik became Emperor, the area of the
Shoa which he inherited had been increased several times as a
result of his conquests. In the 1840s the area of Shoa was
estimated at one hundred and fifty miles in length by ninety
miles in breadth and its total population at two and a half 
2million people. About 1881 the area of ’the kingdom was put 
at 73956 square kilometres (about 46220sq. miles), while in 1878 
its population was reckoned "at about five million inhabitants, 
Christians, Mohammedans and heathens". It was these conquests 
which paved the way for those made in the 1890s which more or less 
fixed the present day frontiers of the Empire. From time to time 
there were revolts in one or the other of the conquered provinces 
but these were successfully put downjthe control of Shoa asserted,
(cont.) which was published in the B.S.G.I. Serie II - Vol. XII, 
1887, pp. 195-6.
ASMAI 36/4-39: 0. Sacconi to Bienenfeld, Harrar15.1.1^87.
G. Sellassie: Ohronique I, 242-9* Ihe chronicler^ account is very 
close to that of lagazzi.
Appointed Dedjazmatch abnut this time.
^I.O.L.: B.S.P. LG 204, Mo, 1216 Graham. Harris: Ihe Highlands,
III, p.28.
■^ Cecchi: Da Zeila, I, p.i^.F.O. Confidential Print (4082):
Messrs. Mayer and Greiner to Lord Salisbury 17.12.1878.
The conquered regions were organised on a hierarchical basis 
modelled on that which obtained in the central provinces 
of the Kingdom for purposes of administration. It is not clear 
how far the conquered Galla and Sidama peoples were assimilated. 
Although Amhara priests and monies followed each campaign it 
does not appear that much was done beyond establishing churches 
in provinces. This explains why several decades after the con­
quest Christians continued to be in the minorityjin these provinces. 
One thing, however, was certain, and it is that despite the 
periodic revolts, a measure of peace and security was brought to
i
the conquered provinces by the conquerors. It was this which 
made possible the exploration of those provinces. It is true 
that before the Shoan conquest of the south-westerly region, 
d'Abbadie and the Catholic Missionaries had visited those pro­
vinces; but the difficulties which they encountered were far 
greater than those experienced by the travellers who visited that 
region after the Shoan conquest. The "Pax Shoana" may be said to 
have been truly extended to the conquered regions.
A^. Aubry; "Une Mission au Choa et dims les pays Galla" in 
Bulletin de la Societe de geographig^de Paris, 7e serie, Vol.
VIII, 1887, pp. 467-8, Borellii or?.cit., pp. 168, 398.
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Chapter 1Y 
GOVEHMEHT MX) ADMINISTRATION
The Portuguese Manuel de Almeida, in his history of
Ethiopia summed up the administrative structure thus: -
"... At the same time it should he know that
none of these Kingdoms had Kings of their ovm
when the Emperor controlled them nor have they
today. He governed them all throughviceroys
or governors placed there hy his own hand, though
in some of them he used not to put strangers but
natives of the same Kingdom, descendants of their
1
o m  former Kings."
To what extent this is an accurate picture of ihe way in which 
the Medieval Empire was governed can only be established by 
a detailed study of the administrative system before the de- 
cline of the Empire. Almeida's picture, however, fits the 
governmental structure of Shoa.
Manuel de Almeida: "History of Ethiopia" in Some Records of 
Ethiopia trans, & Edt. Beckingham and Huntingford. Hakluyt 
Society 1954. Bk. I, Ch. 3* p.19.
2
R. Pankhurst in his introduction to the Economic History of 
Ethiopia has a chapter on government, but this deals mainly with 
the central Imperial structure and has vsry little on the de­
tails of pi'ovincial administration.
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Shoa developed a strongly monarchical administrative 
system which worked through a hierarchy of officials. Like 
the Imperial crown, the crown of Shoa was the most important 
unifying factor in the ever-expanding Kingdom. The Church 
played an important role in the life cf the Kingdom. It pre­
served tradition and thereby kept a link with the past. Its 
influence over the monarchs was considerable. The expulsion of 
the protestant missionary Krapf in 1842 was largely the work 
of the priesthood. Propagation of Amhara culture in the con­
quered Galla provinces was mainly the responsibility of the 
Church. In 1887 when Menelik offered to mediate between the 
Emperor Yohannes and the Italians in Mass aim, it was Abuna 
Mateos of Shoa who led a delegation to discuss the suggestion 
with the Emperor.'1' But as a unifying factor the Church's role 
was limited. This'had to be so in a rising kingdom whose popu­
lation was composed of diverse religious groups and whose Christian 
element was always heavily outnumbered. If Almeida's summary 
is accurate (evidence from other sources strengthens its accuracy) 
then there are indications which tend to suggest that the ad-
^Borelli; iSthiopie Meriodinale, Paris 1890, p.258. Antoto 18.10.1887. 
ASMAI 36/4-42: Antonelli to M.A.E. Addis Abeba, 9.10.1887*
Ljbro Verde No. XV Etiopia, Doc. 133, p.310 (Annesso). Menelik: 
to Umberto I. Antoto, 1.12.1887.
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ministrative structure of Shoa was, broadly speaking, a 
miniature but improved reflection of the system which ex­
isted in the Medieval Umpire. In the old Empire, the Emperors 
ruled the outlying provinces mainly through governors, some­
times local princes, whose main obligations to the central 
authority appear to have been the payment of tribute and the 
provision of soldiers, in times of need, for the defence of 
the Empire as a whole. As long as those obligations were 
faithfully met, the Emperors were content to leave the governors 
in charge of their various provinces. While this was a practical 
way of governing an empire as vast and heterogenous as pre- 
17th century Ethiopia was, it had serious inherent weaknesses.
Among otherthings it did not eliminate the danger of the growth 
of princely families with strong local interests; on the con­
trary it made possible such a development. Ihese princely families 
could make trouble for the central authority by exploiting their 
local influence to create petty, semi-independent states within 
the Empire. Indeed this is what appears to have happened, and 
its emulative effect was to contribute to the decline of the 
Imperial authority.
In Shoai.L although the system was somewhat similar to Almeida’s 
account, the Kings employed methods to ensure that provincial
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governors did not become a danger to the central authority. So 
central was the crown of Shoa in the government of the Kingdom 
that it will be best to start an examination of the admini­
strative structure with an analysis of the p artplayed by the King 
By the 1840s the administrative experiments of the previous 
rulers had developed to such a point that the King was absolute 
master of the Kingdom. He controlled not only the property but 
also the lives of his subjects, and was the fountain of honour 
and the source of bothpower and property. Although, among the 
Christian provinces of Ethiopia, Shoa was perhaps unique in 
this respect, the development of monarchical absolutism was by 
no means peculiar to Shoa. In other parts cf Africa absolute 
monarchies of varying strength had already developed or were 
developing almost contemporaneously with Shoa. In many re­
spects parallels could be found between Shoa and these other 
states. These parallels appear to be particularly close in the 
interlacustrine kingdoms, and in the discussion which follows 
references will be made especially to the contemporary Kingdom 
of Buganda. Ho inhabitant of Shoa could possess or 0™  anything
except what the king, out of his bounty, granted him. The whole
1
land of the Kingdom was the personal property of the King. It
^Charles Johnston: Travels II, p.185. Rochet d'Hericourt: 
Second Voyage, pp. 247—8. I.O.L.: BSP LG- 206 Ho. 1600, paras
12 & 13.
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was (to some extent it still is) a general African conception 
that the land of a particular state ultimately belonged to 
the Icing or supreme ruler. The king was the supreme symbol 
of the state and indeed often personified the stale. On the 
strength of this conception the land of Shoa would belong not 
to the king of Shoa but to the Emperor of Ethiopia who, as his 
title made clear, was the supreme ruler of the whole of Ethiopia. 
This was not an empty claim even with regards to Shoa. Although 
Salila Selassie had been completely independent of the Imperial 
power, Shoa had been conquered by the Emperor Theodros, and 
despite the re-establishment of its independence, Menelik ms  
in effect a vassal of the Emperor Yohannes and paid him tribute, 
nevertheless, to consider the Emperor of Ethiopia as the ’owner" 
of the land of Shoa is to over-simplify the issue. The fact 
was that Menelik1s position in Shoa was more than that of an 
ordinary ruler of a province within a state. In Shoa the symbol 
of supreme authority was not Yohannes but Menelik, and this made 
a world of difference on a continent where the symbol of the 
state was often identified with the state itself. By the treaty 
of 1878 the king of the kings of Ethiopia had acknowledged M£ne~ 
lilc as the hereditary king of Shoa. In so doing he had in fact 
acknowledged Menelilc* s rights to all the powers, rights and
218.
privileges which had been enjoyed by the letter’s ancestors 
as the supreme authorities in Shoa. One of these privileges 
was their right to the "ownership" of the land over which they 
were kings* It has been seen that the development of Shoa was 
made possible largely because of the relative weakness of the 
Imperial authority. The right of the Shoan kings to the owner­
ship of the land of the kingdom may therefore be said to'have 
had its strongest basis eoqquest. It has been shown in the 
previous chapters that the whole of the territory comprising 
our Shoa was conquered by a succession of rulers from one 
Amhara family. The kings of ourperiod were heirs to the earlier 
conquests to which they continued to add new territories. Thus 
in Shoa all the conquests were made not merely in the name of, 
but in fact for, the King. The King could therefore do what­
ever he liked with the conquered land. He could reserve each 
new conquest as crown land, or dispose of it to the Church or 
to individuals, or leave it for the use of its conquered in­
habitants. In practice, however, the King left as much land
as possible for the unrestricted use of the subjects, and
1contented himself with extracting tribute from them. The royal
^The system of land .tenure in Ethiopia is very complicated and 
differs from one province to another. For Introduction to the 
subject iii English see Ullendorff: The Ethiopians, Lond. I960, 
pp. 187-9. H. Perham; The Government of Ethiopia, Oxford 1947, 
pp. 277-92. The Ethiopian Observer: Vol. V, Ho. 4? 1962, pp. 302-339* 
R. Pankhurst: An Introduction.... 1961, Ch.10.
claim to all land was demonstrated in practice by Sahla 
Selassie's policy of resuming possession of the land he had 
granted to any individual on the death of that individual.
There is no specific mention of Menelik doing thisbut the 
indications are that he adopted a similar policy. In an agri­
cultural country where the land was the source of all property, 
the King's exclusive right to the land meant that the dnly way 
by which a subject could acquire not only property and wealth 
but even a living was to support the monarchy. Thus the sever­
est punishment in the Kingdom, with the possible exception of
p
mutlation and the death penalty, was deprivation of property.
The effect of the Crown's claim to all the land, therefore, was 
to attach the subjects to the Crown.
The administration of Shoa, like that of other African king­
doms, was highly centralised. All important appointments were 
made by the King and each official in the hierarchy was directly 
responsible to him. Officials continued at their posts for as 
long as they retained the royal fhvour, which they endeavoured to 
cultivate by acts calculated to impress the King with their devotion
•**0. Johnston; op. cit., Vol. 11, pp. 184-6, 210.
B.S.F. LG- 189 No. 206QG. Harris 5.1.1842. Para 2.
p  \
"Property" here ismeant to have wide connotation and covers 
the office held by a person and the lands, rights and privileges 
attached to such an Office.
and fidelity. Generally, these acts took the form of faithfully
discharging the duties attached to their offices; military
service in the campaigns of expansion, payment of annual tribute,
defence and maintenance of law and order in the provinces under
their individual control. An official who failed in any of his
duties was duly deprived of his post and the office given to
another person. Thus late in 1841 Ato Gfcfczbru, governor of Mind jar
province ms deprived of his post for inability to check the re-
1peated rebellions of the Galla tribes under his government.
In January 1842, Ato Tinta, the Amhara governor of the important 
market town of Aliu Amba was dismissed and imprisoned for em- 
bezzlement, and the post given to a Muslim . Menelik imprisoned 
Abba Uatto for rebellion. He also dismissed and restored to his 
post prince Mashasha Seifou according to whether or not he could 
rely on the fidelity of Seifou.
Besides faithfully discharging his duties, an official 
raised his position in royal favour if, from time to time, he 
offered presents to the King. This practice, it should be em- 
phasised, was not peculiar to Shoa. Thus on the occasion of the
***B.S.P. LG 189 Ho. 2034 Harris, 12.12.1841, para. 3-
2B.S.P. LG 185, Ho. 1440, Barker, 7.1.1842, para. 9.
See for example the practice in the kingdom of Kongo, in Doc.^ 
18, esp. pp. 132-5 of Cuvelier and JadinsL'ancien Congo d'apres 
les archives Romaines 1518-1640 (Louvain, 1954).
marriage of princess Zauditu of Shoa to Ras Areya Selassie 
of Tigre, in 1882, Ras Gobana offered Menelik presents con­
sisting of 1300 horses, five hundred mules, gold, ivory and 
1and musk. Dedjaz Ghermami as well as other officials, from 
time to time, gave feabts in honour of the King and his en- 
tourage. In fairness to the Kings it must be emphasized 
that they were not easily swayed by such presents. They ex­
pected their subjects to be faithful, and lavishly rewarded 
devoted services with honours, posts and lands.
The monarchs did not neglect to interest themselves 
in the improvement of the Kingdom. Sahla Selassie personally 
supervised the building of a bridge across the Beresa river
in 184-2, as well as the erection of barricades at the frontiers
■5
to improve frontier defences. Menelik1s personal attention 
to the building of bridges, frontier defences and new towns 
surpassed that of his grandfather. The Kingfs personal attention 
to the building of a new palace at Antoto in 1883 is described
1P. Soleillet: Voyages en Ethiopie, Rouen 1886, p.97.
%3ee for example: Guebre Sellassie: Chronique du regne de 
Menlikc II... ed. M. de Goppet, Paris 1930-2, Tome I, p.294.
3L.G. 189 No. 2060 X, Harris 31.1.1842. LG 196 No. 3489,
Harris 4-.7.1842, para. 18.
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by an eyewitness thus:
uHe (Menelik) personally supervises the workers;
without arty hesitation (he) puts his hand to the
work, taking measurements, designing the plans
1and the elevations of the building himself.*'
The crown was also the head of the army in the Kingdom. 
This ims not merely titular, for the Kings of Shoa always 
took practical part in the campaigns of conquest and ex­
pansion. The early rulers gave active military leadership, 
which sustained the early phase of the rise of the Kingdom, 
and their example was faithfully followed by the later rulers.
By the 1840s Sahla Selassie had created a contingent of some 
six hundred soldiers of which he ms the direct commander.
This contingent was the only standing army in the Kingdom, 
and was composed entirely of the personal servants in the royal 
household. Under Menelik the strength of this contingent 
was estimated at between 10,000 and 12,000 and was said to 
provide the finest soldiers in the Kingdom. Most of these were 
servants in various capacities at the Court, but some were re™ 
cruited from outside the Court. Again at this period this con­
tingent was the only part of the army which could be said to 
have been permanently under arms, and during campaigns was under
imiT i iiiiibi i r ~ 'iT~ if i in 1i ii i i i iiiTnm—n 1 T r> ' n mi   n  n ■ i iir .mi minniiii in *  n .fm i ■ m i 1 —i~~ ~n—wirrwmii—r~   rr. i in .i ■mini n i iw |it f »i i» nquiiLtir. i
1A. Aubry; ,fUne Mission au Oho a et dans le pays Oalla" in 
Bull, de la societe de geographie de Paris, 7e Seria Vol. VIII 
1887, p.471. See also Massaia: I.Miei... Yol. X passim.
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Ibhe personal command of the King. The supplies of the royal 
troops came directly from the royal arsenal.^ *
Sahla Selassie personally led many of the campaigns 
of conquest which were undertaken during his reign. On these 
campaigns he often killed a number of the enemy with his own 
hand, and displayed skill and bravery which iron the admiration 
cftie warriors. Menelik also led some of the expeditions of 
conquest in person and exhibited military talent by no means 
inferior to that of his ancestors. Among campaigns which were 
led by Menelik personally were those which conquered the ¥allo 
covin try between 1868 and 1876, that of 1879 to lake Zeway in 
Curaghe, those of the 1880s in Arussi country, and that of 
1887 which conquered Harar, It was the policy of Sahla Selassie 
and his successors to keep to themselves the destination of an 
expedition. In those campaigns which were notied by the King 
personally, only the commander-in-chief was entrusted with the 
destination and tactics to be employed. The conduct of a cam­
paign ms, therefore, the personal responsibility of the crown.
The dynamic example given by the monarchs during the 
campaigns contributed not a little to that display of daring 
on the part of Shoan warriors on which European travellers com-
LG 189 Mo. 206QD. Harris 27.11*1841, paras. 41, 42. Ch. Johnson 
(op.cit. Vol. II, p.75) estimates the strength of the royal 
contingent in 1842 at **at least a thousand11.
(cont.)
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mented with admiration* It must also have contributed 
to boosting up tie morale of the warriors in difficult 
circumstances* Such, for example, was the case during the 
campaigns against the Apussi Galla*^
The judicial functions of the Grom were as important 
as its administrative and military duties. Plowden paints a 
depressing picture of justice and judicial administration 
in the Empire in the 1850s. He says, among others, that:
"The office of a judge is rather to settle and 
profit by disputes brought before him than to 
punish offences against the law. In case of 
murder, for instance, unless the victim has some 
relative, who acting as accuser seizes the homi­
cide himself, proves the crime and is ready to 
slay him with his own hand, the culprit will be
untouched, justice furnishing neither accuser
2
nor executioner.  Having no prisons, the
(cont.) ASMAI 36./4-41. Antonelli to M.A.E., Entotto 19.9.1887. 
ASMAI 36/5-43. Same to Same, Addis Abeba 23.11.1887.
Borelll: Bthiopie Meridionale, Paris 1890, p.180* See also below, 
Chapter on Ar^ iy.
2 *Hochet d*Hericourt; Voyage sur la c§te orientals de la Mer Rouge 
etc. Paris 1841* pp. 168-72, 240-9 and passim. LG 189 Ho* 2060B 
Harris 29.10.1842, para 10. LG 189 Ho. 2060 K Harris 28.2.1842, 
para 3. _______ _
1See Chapter II pp. £e2-2<>3
2Correspondece Respecting Abyssinia 1846-68, p.117.
Howdm' T(J''The^arr of Clarendon,- July 9, 1854, enclosure.
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right hand of the prisoner is chained by the wrist
to the left hand of some other person, by a chain
of some two to four feet.......Thus an innocent
person must always suffer with the guilty......
Mutilation is practised, in general, 011 one hand
or foot or both,  A thief is mutilated on the
third or fourth conviction....... The ears and nose
are cut off for some other offences such as spying,
1
being taken in adultery etc...... H
Plowden!s account, it must be emphasized, inferred to the 
northern provinces of the Empire, It contrasts strongly with 
what we are told by travellers of justice and judicial admini­
stration in Shoa in the nineteenth century, and puts into 
perspective the peaceful and orderly nature of Shoan society 
during this period. In Shoa every facility existed for airing 
grievances and securing redress for wrongs done, and offenders 
hardly ever got away with their offences. Harris descries 
capital punishment inflicted in June 1842: "The malefactor, a 
Christian who had in cold blood murdered an Arnhara in his bed 
a few days previously, being arraigned before the royal tribunal
1
Plowden* Travels in Abyssinia.... London. 1868, pp. 94-7.
226*
received sentence of death, and was immediately led forth for 
execution.*•••. The culprit standing in an open spot...... was
suddenly knocked down from behind by a violent blow with a 
club on the nape of the neck when.... two of the Klng*s exe­
cutioners rushing in, transfixed the prostrate body with their 
spears.^ There isjno mention of offenders mutilated for tieir 
offences, although, in theory, mutilation was a form of punish­
ment; nor is there mention of culprits chained to innocent 
persons. Chaining, indeed, is mentioned as being employed 
in Shoa, but the sources positively say that only the culprit
was chained, and that both hands or legs were chained; often
o
he was imprisoned as well. Far fi*om there being no prisons, 
there was a security prison at G-uncho where the cells were 
said to be vaults from which escape was impossible. Here were 
to be found offenders of all kinds including political prisoners. 
The jailor was usually the governor of the province in which 
Guncho was situated. TJnder Sahla Selassie the governor was the
^LG 195 Ho. 2919* Harris 10.6.1842, para 35.
2LG 196 Ho. 3489. Harris 4.7.1842, para 10.
■^ LG 204 Ho. 1172. Haris, 31.10.1842, para 1.
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Muslim, Walasma Mohamed, whose son, usually referred to as 
Abogaz Walasma, was the governor under Menelik. When the 
Abogaz died in 1884, his duties as state jailor, together with 
his other duties, were transferred to Azaj Walde Tsadek, governor 
of Ankober where there was another prison. Besides, the fort­
resses of Tamo (Tammo), Afqara and 3?ekerie Chemb served as 
places of security for political prisoners. The existence of 
a machinery for settling disputes and securing justice in Shoa 
earned for the kingdom the reputation of being the most orderly 
and peaceful kingdom in the Empire.^
The judicial machinery was linked up with the admini­
strative and military structure, and was, ther<£ore, hierarchical. 
Each official constituted nan appeal court” for those immediately 
below him; the King was at the apex of the whole structure and 
constituted the final court of appeal in the kingdom.
There is mention in the sources of a special court of 
Wimberoch at the palace. These were "judges of an inferior kind 
who (relieved) the King of all first hearings of cases except in 
the most important ones, and who (sat) in judgment in one of the
^M. & D. (Afrique) Vol. 13. Itochet d^ericourt: "Considerations 
politiques et commerciales sur le royaume du Choa", p.279.
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courts of the palace".** In the early 1840s their number was
2estimated at seventeen, nineteen, or twenty-one. There is no 
indication as to which persons constituted this court, but we
3
are told that the 1court* always travelled with the King.
It would appear from the absence of information about its 
members that the court of Wimberoch was not institutionalised 
and that it was an ad hoc council called to deal with cases as 
tiey came. Its members would include any important dignitary 
who happened to be within reach at any particular time when the 
* court' was to be convened; its composition at any time would 
include dignitaries at the royal household, such as leaders of 
the royal troops, the Afa Megus^ the Malafia Agafari, the King's 
father confessor. The fact that the total membership of the 
'court' is estimated at an odd figure suggests that in its 
hearings the decision of the majority was accepted as the verdict. 
Appeals from the royal judges lay with the King himself.
Both Sahla Selassie and Menelik took their judicial duties 
seriously and spent many hours a day dispensing justice. Every
1Johnstons Travels... Vol. II p.160, also Borelli: op.cit., p.156 
Antoto 24.-27*10.1886. A, Cecchi; Da Zeila, Yol* I, p.359.
Rochet d'Heri court; Second Yoyage, p.251.
\ s M I  36/5-43. Antonelli to M.A.E. Addis Abeba, 23.11.1887.
^Literally the "mouth of the King", his duties were roughly 
similar to the linguist in the Alcan kingship system.
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inhabitant in the kingdom, rich or poor, master or servant,
had the right to present his grievances before the King* Appeals
were made in a curious manner; the party who intended to appeai
would go to the royal palace or tent and cry repeatedly for
“justice" in the King's hearing. She King's serious attitude to
his judicial duties was reflected in the fact that cases were
heard not only in the palace but wherever possible, even during
1military campaigns. The King sat alone as a "one-man court”; 
court sittings always took place in the open and could be attended 
by anybody interested* Open court and other procedure employed by 
the ICing were reflected in the "lower courts". The judge sat on 
a raised platform, while the plaintiff, the defendant and the 
public sat in a semi-circle at the foot of the platform. The 
plaintiff and the defendant were introduced by the agafari.
One party explained his case freely without interruption, after 
which the other party recounted his version of the story. There 
is no mention of witnesses, and one would suppose that they were 
not employed. ¥hile theparties spoke, the King listened atten­
tively. After both the plaintiff and the defendant had spoken the 
King would cross-examine them and then give M s  verdict. Gener­
ally the "judges of the royal court" would be present to explain
^LG 189 ho. 2060. Harris, 14*10.184-2, para 8. Rochet d'Hericourt-: 
Voyage sur la cdte orientals de la Mer Rouge ..etc* Paris 1841, 
pp. 191, 169* Borelli: op.cit., p.197* ASM! 96/9-43 Antonelli, 
Report cit.
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x
how they came to their decision. If the King considered the
verdict of his judges fair, he endorsed it^otherwise he gave
what he considered to be the correct verdict. The Kings of our
period had areputation for fairness. The ease and precision
with which they disentangled complicated issues won the admiration
2of European eye-witnesses.
In dispensing justice, the King and his judges undoubtedly 
consulted the Fetha Nagast, the legal code which was used 
throughout the Empire. They must also have taken into account 
lo&al. customs, as was the case in other provinces of the Empire. 
Punishments for various offences are prescribed by the Fetha 
Hagast. .'It was in the infliction of punishments that local 
customs and the sympathetic disposition of the Shoan kings pro­
vided a moderating effect. In Shoa mutilation, although pre­
scribed by the law code for certain offences, appears to have 
been hardLy ever inflicted. Our sources do not mention people 
mutilated for offences. Commenting on mutilation as a form of 
punishment, Harris wrote that in Shoa nno criminal everjsuffers
i
under the barbarous mutilation11. This is confirmed by Borelli
-'•Borelli; op.cit.. p.94. 22.6.1886.
2
LG 19b Ho. 54-89* Harris 4*7.1842. Rochet dfHericourt: Second 
Voyage... p.253. ASMAI 36/5-43* Antonelli Report clt.
3LG 193. No. 2919. Harris 10.6.1842, para. 8.
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who visited the Kingdom in the 1880s. Discussing forms of 
punishment he mentioned that mutilation ecists in the law 
code for stealing and many other offences; he commented, 
however, that in practice, "toutefois, ce ch&timent, qui ne 
tient aucun compte des degres de culpabilite, tend a 
disx>araitre,f and in its place chains and imprisonment sub­
stituted.1 In fact according to the same traveller, muti­
lation even of an enemy killed in war was punishable by 
death. Also executions must have been limited in number, 
for executions recorded in the sources are few indeed. This 
is significant because European travellers in non-European 
countries have always been quick to record and comment on 
executions, mutilations and other practices which they con­
sider to be barbarous. On the other hand, recorded examples 
of deprivation and imprisonment are many and suggest that 
these were the commonest forms of punishment inflicted in Shoa. 
Ihis is not to imply that Shoan society was devoid of criminals. 
What is being suggested is twofold; partly that crimes which 
warranted execution or mutilation appear to have been committed 
far less often in Shoa than was the case elsewhere in the Empire
1Borelli: op.cit., p.95. 22.6.1886. 
^Ibid., p.176. Antoto 1.12.1886.
and partly that the Kangs of Shoa, enlightened as they were, 
substituted less severe forms of punishment for mutilation 
and, to a limited extent, for execution. By establishing a 
strong and efficient monarchical administration the Shoan 
rulers succeeded in removing many of the factors which gave 
cause to animosity and crime. An orderly society was thus 
built up in Shoa, one of whose attributes was respect for 
law and authority.1 It was the existence of a strong central 
government in Shoa which made possible the peaceful develop­
ment of a society whose component aLements - Christian, Muslim 
and pagan - were such as could well have impeded an orderly 
development. The bane of the northern provinces of the Empire, 
in contrast to Shoa, was the absence of a strong central 
government which could instil into the society respect for 
order and love of peace,
For purposes of administration the Kingdom was divided 
into provinces. It must be emphasised that the system of pro­
vincial government evolved very gradually and became better 
defined as Shoa expanded territorially. Under Asfa Uassen, 
there were said to be four provinces but the number increased
1LG 216 No, 1600. Craham para 65.
%. L. Morie; Histoire de l!Ethiopie (Nubie et Abyssinie) depuis 
les plus reclues .jusqp^ a nos jours. Paris 1904, Tome II, pp. 
411-412. Cecchi: Da Zella... vol. I, p. 248-9*
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as the Kingdom expanded. In tlie early 1840s one could dis­
tinguish about fourteen more or less defined provinces with 
a couple of ill-defined ones beyond the effective frontiers 
of the Kingdom. These provinces fell into three blocks. The 
eastern block facing the Adal (Afar) country compiilsed, from 
north to south, the provinces of Argoba, Efrata, Ghedem, Ifat. 
The population of these provinces was mostly Muslim and in­
cluded Adals as well as Galla. The central block was made up 
of the provinces of Geshe, Mans, Tegulet, Ankober, and con­
tained nearly the whole of the Amhara element in the Kingdom 
but there were some Galla as well. The western block consisted 
of the provinces of Morabiete^Shoa-meder and Morat. The popu­
lation of the western block was largely pagan Galla. Stretching 
across the south of all three blocks were, from east^ to west, 
the provinces of Bulga, Mind jar and Angolala, whose populations
i/\were wholly Gallh. Beyond these, in the south and west, were 
a number of Galla tribes, tributary to the kingdom but over 
whom the King's control was rather tenuous. These included some 
Abitchu in the west and south-west, the Soddo in the south, 
and beyond the Soddo across the Hawash river Aimelele, the 
northernmost province of Gurage. During the reign of Menelik, 
the number of provinces more than doubled as a result of vast
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territories conquered in the south, south-east and south-west.
There is no indication in the sources as to the bases or 
criteria for the division into provinces. Indeed the divisions 
might not have been the result of a conscious effort. They 
tended, however, to correspond to the units which were conquered, 
and one would suppose that geographical and physical features 
and probably kinship groupings might of themselves have been 
the dividing factors. Thus, in the 1840s, the limited tract of 
the AfcjLtchu country conquered by Sahla Selassie constituted 
one province (Aagolala) while the large and mainly Amhara 
occupied nuclear province of Mans also made up a single pro­
vince. When the MaXa country was conquered in the early years 
of the 1880s the whole of it was constituted into one ad­
ministrative province until 1886?when the administration of 
this region m s  re-organised. Similarly, the Soddo country on 
both sides of the Hawash formed one province, so did the Xttu
Galla country, the large Arussi country and the city of Harar
r
together with the territory immediately surrounding it,
A governor was appointed by the king to administer each 
province, and invested with a silver sword as a badge of office.
"^ Harris: The Highlands, III, p.30.
For reasons which will become clear later this official might 
be considered as a governor-general for the whole province*
In Shoa, as in other centralised states in Hast Africa and 
indeed Africa in general, the provincial governor was in many 
respects the "king*1 of the province. His powers were limited 
but his duties were a miniature reflection of those of the King, 
both civil and military* A provii cial governor owed a duty to 
the King* on the one hand, and to the inhabitants of the pro­
vince on the other hand. lo the King he had Id pay tribute an­
nually; this represented tribute paid by the whole province 
and not by the governor as an individual. It was his duty to 
collect the tribute and see to it that it was regularly paid* 
Theialue and nature of the tribute paid by each province is 
not known. However, the Information available on tribute reach­
ing the King from some of the provinces suggests that much of 
the tribute took the form of local products. In the 1840s tri­
bute paid by the province of Mans was said to consist princi­
pally in Selcdat* a coarse black cloth manufactured from the fleece
2
of the sheep bred in that province* Ihe ICaraya district of the
. Vansina; UA Comparison of African Kingdoms” in Africa, 
Yol. 32, 1952, pp. 324-8*
2
Journal of Isenberg and Krapf..* etc. London, 1843, pp. 298-9. 
W. C, Harris: The Highlands... Yol. Ill p.287.
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province of Mindjar had to contribute “an anhual tribute of
twenty oxen, and the left tooth of evexy elephant slain or
found dead".'*' Tribute brought to Antoto from the province
of Goma in 1885 was described as consisting of fifty elephant
tuslcs, about two hundred horns filled with musk, and a bag
of thalers. In addition, the King was offered, as a gift and
not part of the tribute, about ten small ingots of gold, of
2
the size of a hazel-nut. Tribute brought from Jimma Abba Gifar 
in 1886 consisted of long elephant tusks, trunks of bamboo 
filled with civet, jars of honey, local tissues,lances, shields 
embo ssed with silver, and other local manufactures. When
in 1887 Hararrwas conquered, a total annual tribute of 50,000
4thalers was imposed on the city by Menelik."
In addition to paying tribute^  the governor owed the King 
military duty. He was expected to join the Kang with a contingent 
of soldiers from the province under his control whenever summoned, 
either to take paid; in the campaigns of conquest or to help in 
the defence of the Kingdom against external danger. Thus in 1855
^LG 193 Ho. 2917. Harris 17.4.1842, para 39. Also Harris: 
The Highlands... Vol. Ill, p.25j>-**4*
H^. Audon:''Voyage au Choa" in Le Tour du Monde, 2e Semestre 
1889, p.147.
J. Borelli: op.cit., p.159.
4iMa., p.214.
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on the approach of the Emperor Theodros, the provincial governors 
rallied round the King with their forces. This was repeated at 
least three times during the reignof Menelik when the Emperor 
Yohannes projected invasions against the Kingdom. While on a 
campaign each provincial governor commanded the inhabitants of 
his province, though on occasions the King furnished on® or more 
provincial governors with additional soldiers from the royal 
contingent. This happened mostly in the reign of Menelik, 
and was especially so when a governor was sent out to conquer 
a new territory. further, the provincial governor was responsible 
to the King for the defence of his province against external 
threats, and for the maintenance of law and order within the 
province* This was an important duty and inabiliti  ^to m e t  it 
was punished with deprivation and in a few instances with trans­
fer. for example, in!841 the governor of Mindjar was deprived 
of his post for inability to maintain order in the province;
a year later the governor of Geshe was transferred for a similar 
1
reason. The governors took this particular aspect of their 
duties very seriously and promptly put down any rebellion or 
signs of unrest which broke out in their provinces, furthermore,
^LG 189 Mo. 2034* Harris 12.12.1841, para 3.
the governor was responsible for the safety and maintenance 
of any strangers who travelled through his province with the 
permission of the King. For this reason, a foreigner who 
wished to visit any part of the country needed to have guides 
provided by either the King or the provincial governors of 
the provinces through which the route would pass.
To the inhabitants of the province, the governor owed the 
duty to defend them against outside foes and to provide the con­
ditions in which they could pursue their various professions in 
peace. He had also judicial duties to perform. It was his duty 
to settle disputes and provide justice for an injured party.
Ras Gobana, one of the most successful governors, was on sev­
eral occasions seen by European travellers, sitting in judgment 
over cases brought before him. Within the province the governor 
was the highest ”court of appeal” and appeals from his court lay 
with the King. In times of disaster such as famine, or when
^LG 206 No. 1600. Graham, para 66. A. Cecchi; Pa geila, Vol. I, 
pp. 416-7, 557* Soleiilet: Voyages en Sthiopie. Rouen 1886, 
pp. 123-4, 200. Borelli: op.cit., p.99*
o
See, for example, Soleiileti Voyages... pp. 142-3. A. Aubry: 
nUhe mission au Ohoa et dans les pays Galla” in Bulletin la Societe 
de geographie de Paris 7e Serie Vol. VIII, 1887, pp. 471*
^Aubry: art. cit. t p.471. Borelli: op.cit., pp. 157, 164.
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individuals fell out of royal favour, the inhabitants looked
up to the provincial governor for help. The governors clearly
understood their obligations towards the subjects and fi'om time
-(o time offered alms and gifts to the poor. It was not unusual
for the governors, especially on festival days, to feast by
1
turns, the inhabitants of their provinces.
Onerous though his duties were the provincial governor en­
joyed rights and privileges which were commensurate with his 
obligations. In Shoa as in Buganda and other centralised king­
doms in East Africa, a governor, on appointment, was granted 
lands situated within the province to which he was to be posted. 
These lands together with the inhabitants were set apart for 
the personal benefit of the governor and were at his disposal 
for as long as he held the post. He enjoyed both the produce 
from the land and the labour of its inhabitants who worked the
land largely not for themselves but for the benefit of the governor.
In compensation they received from thegvernor a portion of the
2land for their subsistence and expenses. The relationship be­
tween the governor and the men living on his official estate has 
often been described as feudal. It was feudal only in the sense
See, for example, Aubry: art. cit., p.466. Borelli: op.cit. 
pp. 167-S for a feast given by Ras Gobana to his soldiers.
^LG 204 Ho. 1216 Graham paras. 21 & 22.
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that each provincial command had a territorial basis and that
the inhabitants of the territory constituted the governors
immediate military following. It must, however, be emphasized
that the governor's official estate was not his fief. As will
be seen later in this chapter, the governorships were, almost
without exception, not hereditary. Indeed the holders of these
posts had not even a semblance of security of tenure during
their lifetime. It has been said that in Buganda the primary
1loyalty of the subject was to his immediate governor. In 
Shoa the situation was different. The subject obeyed and re­
spected the authority of his immediate governor as far as it 
was possible, but his primary loyalty was to the state as per­
sonified by the king. This is what the system of transfers 
(which will be discussed below) was intended to achieve. The 
fact that theprimary loyalty of the subject was not to the "feudal’' 
chief but to the king meant that ambitious governors could hardly 
muster enough support to challenge the authority of the king.
This explains why Ato Medako in his rebellion of 1838 had to
2rely on the support of the "conquered b&t disaffected Galla".
i
0. C. ¥rigley; "The Changing Economic Structure of Buganda", 
in The King’s Men Edt. L. A. Eallers (bond., New York, Nairobi
196TJ7p 2^0*
2See Chapter I, p.kf?-(?
It is thus one of the factors which explains the absence of 
internal challenges to the kings of Shoa; the troubled poli­
tical life of contemporary Buganda was due in part to the 
fact that the feudal chiefs enjoyed such support and loyalty 
of the subjects as the Kabaka could not always enjoy. The 
great loyalty which the ICing of Shoa, as opposed t ^
vincial governors, enjoyed from the subjects partly explains
the relatively smooth development of both the monarchy and
the Kingdom. It also helps to explain why the Kings of Shoa
could afford to be benevolent although wielding absolute
powers. Good kings were, of course, not unknown to Buganda but
here, unlike in Shoa, cruelty of kings and summary executions
for small offences were a common feature of life not only at
the court but in the kingdom as a whole.
Besides the occupants of the official estates, the governor
could also call on all the inhabitants of the province under
1his control, shumant by shumant _ to work on his lands. Gener­
ally when they worked on the governor's lands they were given
grain in return but it is unlikely that this was adequate com-
o
pensation for their labour. It was from these official estates 
"hsee below
2LG 204 No. 1216, Graham, para 22.
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that much of the wealth of the governor was derived. Model­
ling their life on that of the king, each governor maintained 
a court of officials and personal servants whose size de­
pended on the means of the governor. Successful governors, 
enjoying royal confidence, were liberally provided with lands 
and other forms of property by the king and therefore kept 
larger courts than less successful governors. In the 1880s 
the residences of Has Gobana ofcLAman end PallQ, that of Has 
Dargue at Eitche, and those of jDedjaz Ghermami and of Azaj
¥alde Tsadek impressed the European visitoi's by their com-
1
paratiye grandeurs. Erom time to time a governor received 
from the King, as gifts or rewards for faithful service, 
mules, sheep, horses and prisoners captured during campaigns. 
Prisoners so received constituted the governorfs household 
servants and the core of his army.
Bach province was divided into a number of districts. Eor 
example, the province of Manz comprised among others, the dis­
tricts of Lalo-Medei’, Mama-meder and Gera-meder, Argobba included 
the districts of Antsiokia and Dawe; Ghedem counted among its
vinces of Guraghe, upon the conquest of that coLintry' were con
' - ’ 1 C* f ■ ,
districts, ICulla-Daa, Ighem and ICaot (Caot)j the variuus pro
S n  . > r "  '■
pp. 471-2, 461, 466. Oecchi: op, 
Ghronique, I, p.294. Soleiilet
1
See description by Audon: art cit., p.1^8. Aubry; art cit., 
p.cit., I, p.165. G. ^ellassie;
^ p.126.
sidered as districts. Similarly the various Galla groups in 
each province mist have constituted a separate district within 
the province, Thus the Abu, the Gidda, the Jiben, Gallan, 
Karaya etc. must all have formed separate districts. In 
the 1840s it was estimated that there were between fifty 
and fifty-one districts; these, like the provinces, must 
have increased in number with the expansion of the Kingdom. 
About the same period the area of one district in Mindjar 
province was estimated at forty miles in length by thirty 
miles in breadth. This is clearly exaggerated. When it 
is considered that, at this time, the area of the whole king­
dom was estimated at one hundred and fifty miles in length 
by ninety miles in breadth the estimate for the district 
quoted might be too large for even one province.
A governor was appointed to administer each of the dis­
tricts within the provinces. The district governor, like the 
provincial governoxv was appointed by the King. Although im­
mediately subject to the "governor general" of the province 
in which his district was situated, the district governor was
1
Harris: The Highlands... Vol. Ill, p.29. Journal of Xsenberg
and ICrapf: p.90*
^Harris: The Highlands, Vol. Ill, p. 254.
^LG 204 Ho. 1216 Graham Para. 19.
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directly responsble to the ICing. This must he explained.
Tribute paid by a district governor reached the King through 
the governor general of his province; during military cam­
paigns the district governor was under the immediate command 
of his provincial governor general, and his army formed a 
unit ha the contingent from the province as a whole. Never­
theless, the district governor could not be dismissed or 
transferred by the Provincial governor but only by the King; 
and all M s  rewards for bravery or faithful service came directly 
from the King. The significance of this situation will become 
clear later. Often referred to in the sources as "guardian(s) 
of the frontier", the duty of the district governor was "to 
inform the King of the arrival of strangers. (He was) obliged, 
in general, to secure the boundaries against inroads or other 
casualties".^ Informing the King of the arrival of strangers
was an important duty which the governors had to perform. On
2
arrival at a frontier tom of Shoa a foreigner had to wait
until he was met by the "watchmen of the frontier", that is
luggage was searched and taxed. The 
the Provincial governor and his subordinate governors. His /
^Journal of Xsemberg and Krapf; p.90. Also Krapf in J.R.G.S.,Vol. \0. 
p.479. Harris: The Highlands, Vol. Ill, pp. 29-30.
2The word is meant to cover all persons not habitual inhabitants 
of the kingdom and would include Afar, Harari, Galla notyet 
subjugated, Godjamese, Tigrians, Gondaris, etc.
luggage was then taken from him and sent on to Ankober by- 
special carriers, unaccompanied by the owner. « The visitor 
himself was conducted by the officials to the city where 
all his luggage was then restored to him. Europeans who 
visited Shoa in our period remarked with disgust on this 
procedure. They were exasperated by the delay and the rigorous 
search to which their luggage was subjected by people whom 
they considered less civilized than themselves. Exasperating 
though it might have been, what took place at the frontier was 
Shoa!s way of doing what is done by present day customs offi­
cials at points of entry into any country.
It must be noted that only governors whose districts were 
frontier districts could correctly be called watchmen or guard­
ians of the frontiers. frontier governors they shared their 
responsibilities with the provincial governor. In short, all 
the duties and obligations, rights and privileges of the dis­
trict governor were the same as those of the governor general, 
but only within the limits of a particular district.
The districts were in turn divided into smaller units 
whose "governors" were called Shums. A shumant was the smallest 
administrative unit in the kingdom. It consisted of one large 
village or a group of small villages in the same neighbourhood.
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In 1842, it was estimated that there we re four hundred shumants 
1in Shoa, hut this figure must have at least quintupled by the
1880s. Shums were generally headmen nominated by the villagers
and formally appointedby the district governor to whom they
2paid twenty smoles on appointment. Shums of important villages, 
especially market towns, were appointed by the King, and, being 
directly responsible to him, held office at his pleasure. Shums 
nominated by the villagers and appointed by the district governor 
held office for one year only. During his term of office the 
Shum was exempt from payment of tribute. This exemption was 
extended to cover the first year after the end of hi s term of 
office. His duties, like those of everyone in the administrative 
hierarchy, were both civil and military. In times of war the 
Shum assembled all the able-bodied men in the village capable 
of wielding a lance and led them to the camp of the district 
governor who was their iimediate commander. In times of peace the 
Shum it was who collected the tribute which the village had to 
pay to the royal treasury. When collected, this was sent to the 
district governor who in turn gave it to the Provincial governor 
general. He organised the villagers to do public works such as
^Harris: The Highlands, Yol. Ill, p.29.
2 1 An Amole was a piece of block salt valued at 2 /2d. Twenty
amoles - 1 Maria Theresa dollar (thaler) i.e. 4/2d.
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building roads or churches, or working on the land of the 
governors. It was also the duty of the shum to settle dis­
putes and provide justice between individuals or two parties 
in his shumant. Appeals from his 'court1 lay with the district 
governor. The Shum also had to provide accommodation and the 
daily needs of any stranger accompanied by a messenger from
p
the King or the governor who quartered in the village.
It is clear from the preceeding paragraphs that the 
ordinary citizen was perhaps the most important element in the 
provincial administration. It was he who paid the tribute, 
did public work and cultivated the land on which the prosperity 
of the Kingdom depended. It was also largely on his military 
ability that the reputation of the hierarchy and the fame of 
the kingdom hinged. It was important therefore that he should 
be protected against abuses and exploitation by officials, and 
encouraged in hisjpublic spiritedness as well as devotion to 
the regime. The rulers of Shoa appreciated this necessity and 
provided for it accordingly. One way by which the ordinary citizlen
^M.A.E. (jaris^ ) M. & D. (Afrique) Vol. 105* p.13* Soleillet's 
letter dated 2.9.1883* According to Soleillet two out of every 
five working days were spent on the lands of the governor.
p
Journal of Isenberg and ICrapf, pp. 281- Borelli: op.cit.,
pp. 94* 399-400. A. Aubry: art. cit., pp. 471* 472, 473*
A. Oecchi: Da Zella... Vol. I, pp. 485-9 & Vol. II passim.
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was protected against exaction and abuse on the part of officials 
was the imposition of severe punishment for officials accused 
of exaction. Eor example in 1842 the governor of Aliu Amba was 
deprived and imprisoned for exactinn and embezzlement. In Dec­
ember of the same year the governor of the south-western?district
1of Ghedem was ’’removed on charges of oppression”. Early in 1888
Dedjatch Waldi^ governor-general of Guraghe, vras deprived for
2
extortion and other abuses.
/ The nature of Shoan society also offered, in a somewhat
l curious way, protection for the individual against exploitation. 
It has been seen that in Shoa an official owned whatever he had 
not by right but through the confidence of the King which he 
happened to have. The corollary of this statement was also true 
and the loss of the confidence of the King meant destitution 
and complete ruin. Awareness of this fact was great on the part 
of officials, and nrcsfc have induced them to exercise caution 
and moderation. The belief which has been general among students 
of Ethiopian studies that the gabbar, the ordinary peasant work­
ing on the land, was a fraction better than a serf, and laboured
■4,0 185 Ho. 1440. Barker 7.1.1842s LG 189 Ho. 2060B. Harris, 
29.10.1842. LG 189 Ho. 2034. Harris 12.12.1842, para. 15, 39.
^Borelli: op.cit., p.300. Djiren 9.1.1888.
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only for the advantage of others1 could lardly he a true re­
flection of the situation in Shoa during our period. Indeed 
this conception may have to he re-examined as a result of de­
tailed study of the evolution of the system of land tenure 
in the various provinces of the Empire. In this connection it 
is necessary to point out that the gabbar system as it existed 
in the Empire before the 1931 Constitution was a late 19th and 
early 20th century development. It was the direct result of 
the creation of a large army which was for the most part unpaid 
but which was gradually becoming divorced from the land. The 
gabbar system was thus the solution found for the problem of 
how to reconcile the need to provide for such an army with the 
iidigenous systems of land tenure in the conquered provinces.
As a system therefore it developed mainly in the conquered non- 
Amhara occupied provinces. In the Amhara provinces the system 
of r^st (family or kinship ownership) was more widespread.2 In 
Shoa, during our period, the condition of the peasant was not 
as deplorable as has generally been believed. As has been seen,
^ee p.'2!8note i.
2The evolution of the system of land tenure in Shoa has been 
studied in a Ph. D. thesis presented in Paris in 1965 by 
Mr. Berhanou Abbeba* "Evolution de Propriete Fonciere du Choa 
(Ethiopia) du regne de Menelik a la Constitutinn de 1931."
These de Doctorat en Ethnologic,Paris (Sorbonne) 1965 Polycopie. 
The present writer’s attention was drawn to this study by Pro­
fessor Tubiana but has been unable to consult it before writing 
this chapter.
the peasant .in effect held his land not from a complex hier­
archy of landlords but direct from the king who was the sole 
proprietor of all land in the kingdom. It is not clear from 
the sources how the land of the peasant was inherited. The 
Indications are that it required the sanction of the king for 
we are told that the kings resumed possession of the land of 
any of the subjects who died, not only governors and other 
state officials but also ordinary citizens, and that no "man
(could) part with his field to any individual without the ex-
jLpressed consent of the (king)....1 Thus the peasant paid, not 
a multiplicity of land tax to various officials;but a single 
unified tax to the king only. It is true that this tax reached 
the royal treasury through a hierarchy of officials, but that did 
not alter the true situation. It was merely a form of protocol. 
It 'has also been seen that the different officials derived their 
wealth not by exacting and bleeding the peasant dry}but from the 
lands and the labour of those who inhabited those lands which 
were invariably attached to their offices. The Shum who had no 
lands attached to his office enjoyed the privilege of exemption 
from taxation for two years. The peasant indeed worked for the
*i
LG 204 ho. 1216 Graham, para. 20. See also p.'li^ -jabove♦
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governor on his lands, but this obligation could hardly have 
been exploited by the governors in view of the severe punish­
ments which were inflicted by the ICing on officials who abused 
their rights and privileges. Captain Graham put this point 
nicely thus;
n... should he /x.e. a governor/ tax his people 
too roughly.... complaints invariably (reached ) 
the royal ear, which (were) certain to sbrip the 
offender of government and remaining property....”
Hor did the King himself exploit the labour or services 
of the ordinary citizen. It is true that the peasant fought 
in the King's campaigns of expansion, but as soon as a cam­
paign was over he was disbanded andssnt back to wbrk on his 
own land. In theory the King could employ the citizens on 
various works; while there is evidence that the ordinary 
citizens were employed on public works such as building of 
roads, bridges and churches, thex’e is no evidence that they 
were employed to work on the King's private domains. The King 
reserved a good deal of the cultivable land, usually the most 
fertile, as crown land; much of this was always under culti­
vation, but not with the labour of theordinary peasant. There
I^jG 204 Ho. 1216 Graham, para. 25.
p
See Chapter on the Army.
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were hundreds of servants in the royal household in each of 
the palaces in the various towns. These servants were mostly 
prisoners of war captured in the campaigns of conquest. It 
was the habit of the Shoan rulers to maintain residences in 
various parts of the Kingdom. In the 1840s the household 
servants in the royal palace at Ankober, the capital, ms 
estimated to have "(exceeded) by far one thousand..... The 
number of slaves (i.e. servants) at each of the three other 
residences (Angolala, Debra Berhan, and ICundi) (was) not 
quite so large as that of Ankober; but there (were) many 
hundreds at each'1. Menelik also maintained hundreds of ser­
vants at each of his residences at Litche, Ankober, Warra llu,
2
Debra Berhan, and some thousands at Antoto. It was these 
househo Id servants who cultivated the ci’own lands and did most 
I of the work which would otherwise have been done by the ordinary 
1 citizen.
Besides offering protection for the citizen, the nature 
of society in Shoa also provided encouragement to the individual 
in his public duties and in his attachment to the regime. There y1 
^  were no castes in Shoa. In the 1840s a few families in the recently
1
Journal of Isenberg and ICrapf, p. 120. Oh. Johnston: Travels,
Yol. II, p.75.
2ASMAI 36/5-43. Antonelli to M.A.E., Addis Abeba, 23.11.1887.
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recently conquered Oalla provinces were allowed to retain 
the government of the provinces* Under Menelik, the ruling 
family of Jimma Kaka was allowed to retain the government of 
that country after the Shoan conquest* This policy of retaining 
a few ruling families in power might have been a reflection 
not so much of a feeling of insecurity in those provinces as 
ankndication of the King’s confidence in the fidelity of the
I
Ibcal rulers. However, both Sahla Selassie and Menelik were 
not unaware of the dangers inherent in the practice, and they 
both sought to cuunteract that potential danger. On several, 
occasions Sahla Selassie dismissed and as often restored,
Walasma Mohamed the governor-general of the province of If at.
In 1841 the King abrogated the h ereditary system in 'the province 
of Morat and it was speculated that he was only waiting for an 
opportune moment to abolish the few remaining hereditary govern-
p
ments in the Kingdom. On the death of Abogaz Walasmajthe 
governor general of Ifat, in 1884, Menelik discontinued the 
practice of hereditary succession in that province and appointed 
Azaj Ualde Tsadek to that office. The absence of castes and 
the fact that promotion depended on merit; though not without a
^See for example, LO 204 Ho. 144. Harris 30.1.1843. 
^Journal of Isenberg and Krapf, p.300.
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touch, of favouritism, meant that there was, for the subjects, 
a semblance of equality of opportunity for advancement. It 
therefore became the ardent desire of every inhabitant of the 
Kingdom to attract royal attention by some act of bravery or 
devotion. Ihe opportunity for such a courageous display of 
one's worth often came in military campaigns. fhe Kangs of 
Shoa actively encouraged this phenomenon by rewarding those 
who distinguished themselves with medals, horses, offices, 
lands, servants, and occasionally the hand of an illegitimate 
princess. For example, Ato Berri, who was described in 1842 
as "quarter master general of the army1 was "formerly a Mohamedan 
pedlar ..." He entered the service of Sahla Selassie and 
proved such an able warrior and a faithful servant that "h?.. 
received from the King a large grant of land (in the province 
of Mndjar) and (by 1842 enjoyed) the honour of conducting 
every military campaign in person.Again Abba Mualle, a Galla 
by birth, won Sahla Selassie's favour by his courageous display 
in the conquiest of the province of Angolala; he was rewarded 
with the governor-generalship of that province and won the 
King's confidence by his determined resistance to the neighbouring
■^LGr 189 No. 2060. Harris 14.10.1842, para. 40.
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Grail a. He was then rewarded with the hand of one of the
1illegitimate daughters of the King. Ato Aboye^who ms said
to be a servant at the royal household during the reign of
Sahla Selassie?rose to the position of Dedjaz in the reign
of Menelik. Indeed in this reign* the policy of encouraging
faithful service with rewards was followed very seriously
and is best illustrated by the career of Ras Gobana.
Gobana was born, according to Soleillet, in 1817 of
Abichu Galla parentage and was in the service of both Sahla
2Selassie and Haile Malakot. He does not appear to have 
distinguished himself at this period;for there is no mention 
of him in the reign of either Sahla Selassie or Haile Malakot.
He is first mentioned about 1864 as an o rdinary but an able 
soldier in the service of Bezabu, one of the administrators 
appointed by Emperor Theodros in 1859 to govern Shoa.^ On 
Menelik*s return to Shoa in 1865 Gobana joined forces with 
the prince. Gobana must have impressed Menelik with his military 
skill during the reconquest and the early years of the cam-
^LG 189 Ho. 2060^. Harris 29*10.1842, para 7.
2Soleillet: Voyages..., p.114.
A^. Cecchi: Da Zeila..., Vol. I, p.260.
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paigns in the ¥allo country, for about 1870 he was appointed 
a Ded,i Agafari and soon afterwards he was made governor of a 
province.^ Henceforth, Gobana was to become the leading figure 
in the military history of Shoa. By the end of 1882 he had con­
quered for Menelik the whole of the Moca country and had even 
penetrated into Kaffa t0 exact tribute from its ruler,^ Gobana 
continued to be an intrepid conqueror and a faithful servant 
of Menelik* s until his death in June 1889. Gobana*s services 
were not unappreciated or unrewarded by the grateful King. By 
1875 Gobana had been promoted a Ded.jagmatch^ and three years 
later was made a Ras, one of the only two appointed by Menelik 
before he became Emperor in 1889.^ Gobana*s promotion as a Has, 
the highest military rank in the Kingdom, reflects to what ex­
tent he was in royal favour. Linked with his promotion Gobana
was made governor-general first of the whole of the Maca country 
but in 1886 was transferred to Wallaga which he had conquered
earlier in that year. Attached to his offices were lands, servants
15
and an army estimated at 50,000 soldi ex^ s. By the 1880s Gobana
^Qecchi: op.cit.,VoLI, p.267, 268.
^See Chapter III, p.
*y
■^ M.A.E. Paxis; M. & D. (Afrqqne) Vol. 62. Amoux's Journal, Entry 
for 15th May 1875. p. 558. 0
'^The other was Dargue, Menelik*s xmternal uncle.
^Audon: art. cit., p.158. Gecchi: op.cit., Vol. X, p.4-17.
ABMAI W ^ j A n t o n e l l i  to M.A. E. Iddis Abeba 25.11.1887.
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had become one of the richest men and probably the most powerful
warrior in the Kingdom. Such was the extent of his wealth that
in 1882 he was able to offer Menelik presents consisting of one
thousand three hundred horses, five hundred mules, gold, ivory 
1and musk. ind so great was the King*s confidence in him that
on a number of occasions when the King was away from the capital
or the Kingdom, Gobana was made regent. For example, in the
first half of 1888 when Menelik went up to meet the Emperor in
¥allo country Gobana governed the Kingdom in his absence.
Again in February 1889 when Menelik left Antoto with a large
army on his way to help the Emperor against the Dervishes Gobana
2
was left in Shoa as a regent.
The career of Gobana illustrates an important principle c 
which was basic to the structure of the administration: that,
in Shoa, race, birth or religion was in itself neither a passport 
nor a barrier to a position of importance and confidence. The 
absence of castes meant that every individual inhabitant could 
rise to an eminent position in the society. The policy of drawing 
officials from all groups in the population regardless of their 
birth, religion or race was introduced by Wagsen Saggad, the sixth
^Soleillet: Voyages..., p.97.
^Borelli; Ethiopie Meridionale, p.401. Antoto 16.6.1888.
ASMAI: 507 -^55." "iaitonell.T^ t0 Crispi (M.A.E.) dated Ghedem 26.3.1889. 
It was about this time (March 9 or 10) that Yohannes was wounded 
by the Dervishes and died on March 11. His death brought Menelik 
to the Imperial throne.
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ruler of our Shoa. Until his reign only the sons of the
Haredazmatch and a couple of Amliara devotees were made governors
in the provinces. The assumption behind this, no doubt, was
that the princes would feel themselves bound to the interests
of their father in the government of the provinces. This
assumption did not prove altogether correct. On the contrary
the princes tended to exhibit a sense of importance and a
liking for power; the result was that instead of proving to
be unquestionably faithful the governors tended to hs rebellious.
An example of this was Uassen Saggad's rebellion against his
1father Asfa Wassen. Taking a lesson from his own previous 
activities, Wassen Sagged introduced the criteria of merit and 
jability into the administrative and military systems, and he 
began to recruit governors from among everybody who proved to 
be loyal to the cause for which the Maredazmatch stood. His 
successors were quick to realise the advantage in the innovation; 
they appointed loyal Amhara, pagan Galla and Muslim Adal as 
officials both in the royal household and in the provinces. The 
new policy had one big advantage; it avoided the feeling of dis­
crimination which might otherwise have developed among that
1See Chapter I, pp.^y
section (or sections) of the society from which governors were
not dram. Put in a different way, it developed in all
sections of the society the feeling as well as the awareness
that they belonged to the Kingdom and shared in, or contributed
to, its development. In this way all sections of the society
became bound to the interests of the ruling family. They came
to believe that their welfare was closely bound up with that
of the royal family. This sense of belonging and of oneness
was an important factor In sustaining the cause of the ruling
family and in preserving the unity of the kingdom during the
period of the conquest by Theodros, when the royal family,
the greatest symbol of unity, was temporarily brought to an end.
The Shoan rulers were tactful in the distributinn of
governors. The eastern block of the kingdom where the Muslim
subjects were concentrated was, as far as possible, given
Muslim governors. During the reign of Sahla Selassie, two of
the Muslim governors in this region were Abogaz Hussain of
Argobba, and Walasma Mohamed, of the province of Ifat. Under
Menelik the governor of Ifat was the son of Walasma Mohamed
1called Abogaz Walasma. A careful scrutiny of the governors and■<i ui1 p V
slums of the eastern block of the Kingdom reveals that nearly
i
Walasma Mohamed and his son Abogaz Walasma claimed to be the 
descendants of the Walasma dynasty which established the Muslim 
sultanate of Ifat in the 13th.century.
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all of them were Muslims. The purpose of this, as has been 
mentioned already, was to create in the Muslim subjects of
the Kingdom a sense of belonging and of partakingjin every
!
aspect of the life of the Kingdom. In this case, however, there 
was another objective. The eastern block of provinces was the 
on®'" directly in contact with the ^uslim peoples inhabiting 
the lowlands between the eastern plateau of Shoa and the sea.
The shortest and most direct route from Shoa to the sea passed 
through the lowland country. It was therefore important for 
the Shoan rulers to give the rulers of the lowlands the feeling 
that their subjects and co-religionists who traded to Shoa ran 
no risk to their persons or goods. Shoan rulers realised that 
this feeling could best be created andsustained if, the lowland 
peoples, in their dealings with Shoa, negotiated through governors 
whose religion, if not race, was the same as theirs. The truth 
of this belief was borne out in 1884“5 when on the death of 
Abogaz Walasma in April 1884, Azaj Itfalde Tsadek, a Christian 
of Curaghe origin, was given control over the provinces formerly 
governed by the Abogaz. The confidence of the lowland peoples 
was shaken and for a time Shoa’s relations with the Muslim rulers 
of the lowland were strained.*^  Thus, far from compromising
^ASMAI 36/2-17. "Estratto dal Ciornale di Viaggio Antonelli 
18S4.n As a result of this, Antonelli 011 arriving at the 
coast in August 1834 on his way to Shoa, found to his dismay thefc 
the sultan of AiJssa, for example, was no longer enthusiastic 
about the route from Assab through Aussa to Shoa which had been 
opened by the Italian in 1882. For this reason, Antonelli had 
considerable difxiculty In organising his caravan for the journey.
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their position, the appointment of Muslim governors for the 
eastern provinces ensured the Shoan Kings not only the faith­
ful support of their Muslim subjects but also friendly re- 
latinns with the Muslim people inhabiting the lowland country.
The governors in the provinces were basically military 
men,each commanding an army during military campaigns. The 
army which they commanded had, in each case, a core of men who were 
mostly household servants of the governor and always at his 
disposal. Like the servants in the royal household, these 
men were mosfy war captives. In the case of governors who 
were high in royal favour, such as Ras Dargue or Ras Gobana, 
this core of household servants was very considerable. There 
was therefore the danger that successful governors might turn 
against the central authority and set themselves up as petty 
independent princes in the province under their control. This 
danger was particularly great in the provinces which were 
remote from the centre of powey, especially because communi­
cations were extremely poor. The Kings of our period were aware 
of this danger; they did not content themselves with relying 
merely on the fidelity or devotion of the governors but took 
definite measures to counteract the danger. One of the methods 
by which the crown exercised effective control over its offi­
cials was by keeping all important appointments in its own
hand and making each official directly responsible to the
Crown. Although, for the most part, staying in the capital
of the Kingdom, the Kings followed closely the attitudes
and movements of the governors in the provinces through a
network of spies. A governor, on his appointment, received
not only a sword of office but also servants for his household
duties. These servants were in reality the spies of the King
who informed him about the actions of the officials. T.'he
spy s^ sbem was not limited to the officials and subjects of
the Kingdom; it was extended to cover foreigners, especially
Europeans, as well. European visitors to the Kingdom were
given a couple of servants from the Palace, one of whose duties
was to make known to the appropriate authority the daily needs
of the foreigner. The servants had a special duty to spy on
their foreign masters and report anythig of interest to the
2
King or his officials.
Linked with the direct royal control over officials and 
the spy networkin the administration, was the sense of in­
security which, in theory at least, was implied in the govern­
mental system. Each of the officials understood that security
Krapf: Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours during an 
Eighteen years1 residence in Eastern Africa. Lond. 1860, p.91. 
Libro Verde No. XV Etiopia. Doc. 95, p.202. Menelik to Umberto 
1, Entoto 4*6.1885* ”{2*8 ghenbot I1 anno 20 del nostro regno)
2See for example, LG 189 Ho. 2060^. Harris 31.12.1841. papa 27 
where he writes: l,I had long seen reason to be dissatisfied with
(cOnt.)
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of tenure was dependent upon continuing to retain the King's 
confidence, and knew the consequences of loss of royal con­
fidence* The fear of these consequences might well have kept 
the officials in che ck and restrained any ambitions they 
mi^ it have lad. This is not to imply that abuses were completely 
eliminated from the administration. On the contrary abuses 
were not unknown and examples have already been cited of 
officials known to have been punished for abuses or inefficiency. 
Nevertheless,the various methods of control must have con- 
siderably reduced the incidence of abuses.
By far the most effective method by which the danger of 
governors becoming rebellious was avoided was the system'of 
transfers which was adopted by the Crown. Vivid accounts are 
given of these transfers in the sources. Writing on the sub­
ject of transfers Captain Harris continued as follows;
"At noon (on 25th February 1842) several new appoint­
ments were proclaimed by the Herald outside the palace 
gate. Habta Michael, governor of Mans, transferred to 
the government of Geshe. Habta Mariam, governor of 
Kitama-Woira, transferred to Machfoot. Gadeloo trans-
(cont.)the proceedings of the head Afero (messenger) on the 
establishment of the Embassy who... has proved a most active 
spy, never failing to report to the royal notice the most 
minute occurrences in the Residency. His system of espionage 
extended to the personal property of every individual...."
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ferred to Semama in Hans. Ato LenohcH, governor 
of Geshe transferred to Kembibit. Ato Dori Gembi, 
governor of Kembibit, to Katama-Woira. Fodach 
Kallide was also after an imprisonment of two 
years, restored to the government of the Derra 
Galla."1
Ill 1882, for example, Has I)argue was governor-general 
of Harabiete province but was transferred to Arussi ini 1885.
Ras Gobana governed the vast Maca country until early in 
1886 when he was transferred to Fallaga. Similarly Dedjaz 
Faldie who governed the Yeju province in the 1870s became 
governor of the Soddo province in the 1880s in succession to 
Mashasha Seifou. lhese changes were designed to prevent an 
official staying in one province for a period long enough to 
develop personal interest and acquire local influence. In 
this way the crown sought to counteract collusion and rebellion 
on the part of its officials in the provinces. The extent to 
which royal control over its officials was effective is shown 
by the fact that, apart from a few isolated instances of re­
bellion, the provincial administrators were, by and large,
1LG 189 Ho. 2060IC. Harris, 28.2.1842, para. 29.
o
Soleillet; Voyages, passim. Borelli: Bthiopie H^eridlonale , 
p.150 and passim. Cecchi: Da Zeila, Vol. I, p.421 and passim, 
ASMAI 36/5~43, Antonelli to M.A.E. Addis Abeba, 23.11.1887.
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loyal to the central government. It was the loyal service 
rendered by these officials which made possible the peaceful 
development <f the Kingdom.
In the sources there are references to either '‘counsellors1 
or the “Council3?or example in December 1841 occurred the 
death of "Ato Bainor who was the nurse to the King ininfancy
i
and has been his principal adviser through life.. . On the
approach of the Emperor Theodros to Shoa late in 1855? King
Haile Malakot was said to have summoned a council of his chiefs
2to decide that course of action to take. These references 
become more frequent during the reign of Menelik. On May 15, 
1875? a council met at Karra Ilu to discuss, among other 
things, Arnoux‘s project. Those present with the King were 
Eitaurari Kaldie, ffitaurari Mangasha, Ded.jaz Dargue, Ded,jag 
Mannaje, Mehmer Guebre-Sellassie, Alaka Rename, Grasmatch 
Kalde Yes, Ded.jaz Walda-Michael? and Dedjaz Gobana. The King*s 
cousin, Mashasha Seifou was not at the meeting because he was 
said to be on military expedition to the south. A meeting of 
the “council1* which took place at Litche on 1st June 1876
189 Mo. 2060^. Harris 51.12.1841, para 25.
^Cocchi: op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 251-2.
^M.A.E. \Paris^ ) M. & D. (iVfrique) Vol. 62, p.558. Arnoux*s 
Journal entry for 15.5*1875*
discussed the attitude of Egypt towards Ethiopia and her
offer of alliance to Shoa. Those present besides the King
were Mgr. Massaia, Mgr. Taurin Cahagne, Dedjaz Dargue and
1Azaj Walde Tsadelc. Late in 1877 there were a number of
meetings of the "council" to discuss the terms of reconciliation
between Menelik and his cousin Mashasha Seifou. Again, on
12th February 1878 when the invading armies of the Emperor
Tohannes were already in Shoa, Menelik was said to have called
a council of the military chiefs to discuss whether or not to
3resist the Emperor. These references give the impression that 
consul tat ins with "a council'1 of officials were not discounted 
by the Shoan Kings. One would have liked to identify the in­
dividuals present at each meeting of "the council" in crder to 
det^  ermine if there were permanent or regular membership. Apart 
from those cited here, there is harder any indication about 
membership of the "council" when references are made to its 
meetings in the 1880s. As regards the role of the "council" in
^M.A.E. Paris? M. & L. (Afrique) Yol. 62, p.382. 
Same Journal entry for 1st June 1876.
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matters of policy the information available indicates that the 
"council” was advisory whose advice the ICing was in no way 
bound to accept."** It would seem therefore that what is referred 
to in the sources as the "council" was not institutionalised 
but an ad hoc body composed of whatever officials happened to 
be near at hand and whose duty was merely advisory. Menelik, 
in particular, must have found advice obtained from such meetings 
useful for he appears to have made fairly regular use of these 
meetings throughout his reign. The Kings of our period are some™ 
times described in the sources as selfish despots. This is far 
from fair, since the same sources recognised that they were 
just and good men interested in the progress of their kingdom and 
the welfare of their subjects. It is true ihat they were absolute 
rulers, but they should be thought of as kings, enlightened for 
their period and country, who wielded absolute powers but who.V 
nevertheless, did not decide on anything out of the ordinary without 
first taking advice from their officials.
The administrative machinery of Shoa was probably the most 
efficient in the whole of the Empire. It was a monarchical ab­
solutism which worked through a hierarchy of officials.
Oecchi; op.cit., Yol. 1, pp. 430-1. Massaia; op.cit., Yol. X, 
pp. 203-6.
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smooth running and therefore efficiency, especially in the 
provinces, depended on faithful and devoted officials. The 
devotion of officials as well as the co-operation of the 
ordinary citizen were both readily forthcoming because the 
subjects of the kingdom had so much to benefit from the regime.
After March 1889 the Shoan systemwas extended to cover the
i ,
whole Empire and the efficiency of the systemwas onejof the
most potent factors which made possible the "Shoctnisation of
the Empire".
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Chapter Y 
AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY AMP TRADE
The economy of Shoa,like that of the rest of Ethiopia, 
was agricultural. There were small scale Industries producing 
simple goods to meet local needs, as for example cotton cloth 
and baskets, and internal as well as external trade Increased 
with the years. Nevertheless work on the land remained the 
main pre-occupation of the people. Neither Shoa nor Indeed 
Ethiopia : as a whole was peculiar in .this respect. For, although 
minor industries and flourishing foreign trade have for cen­
turies been known to various parts of the continent, the 
economy of Africa in general was, and has remained to this 
day, primarily agricultural.
No writer on Ethiopia has failed to mention its con­
genial climate and fertile soil, and Shoa need not be singled 
out in this respect, since she shared with the rest of the Empire 
both the advantages and the disadvantages of the Ethiopian 
climate. The physical nature of the country is such that it 
enjoys the best of both temperate and tropical climates.
Three zones are distinguished by the Ethiopians themselves; 
the Lega or highland - 7.,000 feet and above - the Woyna Dega 
or the intermediate zone, and the go11a, the lowland. The 
eastern half of the kingdom is generally low lying and is said
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to be hot and arid. The Woyna Dega and the Dega with numerous 
rivers flowing down to irrigate the slopes and the valleys 
have a climate which is reminiscent of northern Italy.
Owing to the different altitude a variety of vegetation 
associated with both cold and temperate climates is to be 
found within the boundaries of the Empire. With the natural 
advantages of a hospitable climate and a fertile soil all that 
was needed to induce the inhabitants to a large scale agri­
cultural activity was an atmosphere of peace and security.
This is what the rulers of Shoa provided for their subjects. 
Travellers often remarked that Shoa was the best cultivated 
"province" of the Empire. This was not because the inhabitants 
of Shoa were by nature more industrious than those in other 
parts of the Empire. It was rather because the almost in­
cessant inter-provincial and inter-district wars in which the 
other provinces were engaged made agricultural pursuits 
difficult in those provinces.
In the 1840s the extent of cultivation in Shoa was said 
to be "very considerable throughout the Kingdom", although
it was estimated in the 1870s that less than ten percent of
1the cultivable land was actually under cultivation. Part of
LG- 204 No. 1216 Enclosure Graham, paisas. 3 and 4.
ASHAI» 36/1-4. SGI to M.A.E.s Roma, 31-10.1879. The estimate 
by the SGI was based on the reports of thekembers of the 
Antinori Mission. See Chapter 3-
the explanation for the apparent contradiction in these 
estimates is that by the 1870s the success of the campaigns 
of expansion led to a considerable increase in the area of
although in fact land under cultivation had increased. More­
over, since most people were still primarily farmers and, 
since, with the exception of providing for the needs of their 
pastoral Afar neighbours, agricultural produce was mainly for 
home consumption, it was prudent not to cultivate more land 
than was needed to meet the demand.
Farming methods in Shoa were similar to those in vogue 
elsewhere in contemporary Africa - paring, burning, fallowing 
and shifting cultivation being in general practice. Neverthe­
less considerable industry was evidenced in collecting and dis­
tributing water from the rivers by means of trenches to 
irrigate the land and rotation of crops was practised, although 
perhaps without much deliberate or conscious premeditation on 
its advantages. It may be that there was hardly any scientific 
basis for the practice of crop rotation and that this system 
was merely the natural response of an agricultural people to 
the advantages of a fertile soil and a hospitable climate. It
the kingdom land left uncultivated
1LG 204 No. 1216 Snclosure Graham, paras, 3 arid 4*
272.
is also to be noted that, instead of the hoe which was in 
use in many parts of Africa, a plough, albeit rude, was in 
general use in Shoa and in other parts of Ethiopia, 'l’his 
machine,(called mar ash a in Amharic^was of a very simple con­
struction. The ploughshare was made of wood, reinforced with 
a small amount of iron, and the instrument had only one handle 
for the guiding hand of the driver. Owing to its simple con­
struction, it was said that a clean furrow could not be cut
up and turned over, so that the soil could be broken only
1by frequent crossing and re-crossing.
In farming communities, the planting and harvesting 
seasons are more or less dictated by the incidence of the rain. 
Ethiopia enjoys two rainy seasons a year. The heavy rains are 
from June to about the middle of September, and the light rains 
fall for not more than two months any time between the end of 
January and May. The fairly even distribution of rainfall and 
sunshine would seem to make possible sowing aid reaping all the 
year round. This in fact appears to be the case from a register 
of work andweather compiled for the year 1841 by a member of 
the Harris Mission to Shoa. Although the register gives the
1LG 204 ho. 121b Enclosure Graham’, paras 38-9* See University 
College of Addis Ababa Ethnological Society Bulletin No. 4 
Dec. 1955 p*23 for a diagram of the traditional plough with 
a description of the component parts.
2 Graham, ibid.» para. 17.
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impression of a faint attempt at a division of employment 
for the various months there is little doubt that the planting 
and harvesting seasons constituted the periods<f the greatest 
exertion. After the ICeremt (heavy rainy season) cotton was 
s,hown to talc© advantage of the sunshine and the light rains 
which follow and came to fruition in the spring when it was 
harvested about April. At the same time, between October and 
December, the land was ploughed in readiness for the sowing 
season which began about January. Prom that month until the 
end of May sowing of barley on the highlands, peas, wheat, 
beans, chick-peas in the Vfoyna Dega, oilseed^ teff and cotton 
in the valleys and the lowlands constituted the main agri­
cultural activity. These would come to fruition during and 
after the ICeremt when they would be harvested and the land 
ploughed and prepared for the sowing season which followed the 
heavy rains. One must not get the impression that farming in 
Shoa consisted solely of crop production. Pastoral farming 
was also important and provided not only meat but also the 
baggage animals which were so central to whatever trade the 
Kingdom had. In the province of Mans, for example, sheep were
bred in large numbers and the animal was probably the most
1
important single agricultural product from that province. 
^Journal of Isenberg and ICrapf, p. 304 •
According to the latest study, the average farm in Mans 
today has a herd of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty 
sheep. In other parts of the Kingdom oxen, cows, donkeys, 
mules and torses were reared.
Although the peasant’s ownership of the land which he 
farmed was never absolute, it is important to emphasise that 
economically the land was his property. In other words, 
the peasant had rights of usufruct to the land which he culti­
vated. The hierarchical nature of the administration, the 
military and territorial basis of the Provincial administra­
tion, and the consequent subordinate status of the peasant
has led European observers to remark that the peasant was
2
practically a serf of his overlord. This misrepresents the 
true situation. In the institution of serfdom as existed in, 
for example, contemporary Russia, the peasant was in effect 
the chattel of his master and was treated like any other pro­
perty, He could be disposed of at the will of the master 
without anybody raising a finger. He could not change from a 
bad master to a better one and had hardly any rights even to
*4). N. Levine; Wax and Gold (Chicago & Lond. 1965), p.29.
%ee for example Rochet d'Hericourt: Voyage sur les Deux 
rives de la Mer Rouge.... Paris 1841 p.288. Also M. Abir, 
Trade end Politics in the Ethiopian Region 1850-1855. Lond. 
Ph.D. thesis 1964 p.375 Note 3, where he writes; "According 
to the feudal system of Shoa each subject was not only the 
serf of his master working the land but a part-time soldier 
as well.’1
the fruits of his own labour on the land. In Shoa no such 
relationship existed between, the peasant and his overlord.
Even in contemporary Buganda or Kongo in the seventeenth 
century or Dahomey in the eighteenth century where the rulers 
were not averse to selling their subjects into slavery, the 
peasant could not correctly be considered as a serf. For in 
those kingdoms as in Shoa the peasant could, and probably 
not infrequently did, move from one province and overlord 
to another province within the kingdom, a thing which was 
impossible in serfdom. In Shoa as well as in other African 
states, the peasant was indeed subordinate to the Chief of his 
district or province as the case might be, but it must be 
emphasised that the chief’s territory was not his estate 
or manor but only an administrative domain. The relatins 
between the peasant and the chief were therefore more political 
than economic, and the duties and obligations of the one to­
wards the other were accordingly political rather than eco­
nomic. On thep art of the peasant those obligations consisted 
in military service and payment of tribute either in kind or
in labour. Even this tribute had very little economic signifi­
cance; its real significance was political}and was in this 
respect in no way dissimilar to the tribute which each official
in the administrative hierarchy paid to his superior, the 
type of tribute which Professor Vansina has called the "tribute 
of allegiance".’*' It may be said to hawe been part of the price 
which the peasant had to pay for the protection which he enjoyed 
from the state whose official and representative the local 
chief, after all, was. Beyond this tribute of allegiance 
the peasant had no other obligation towards the chief, and 
he enjoyed the fruits of his labour on the land which he farmed, 
so that he could use the products from his land as best he would. 
These products provided the commodities which were sold on the 
local markets. In certain cases, such as cotton or sheep farm­
ing, the products from the land provided the raw materials 
which went to feed the local industries.
Of the industries which were in production in Shoa perhaps 
the most important from the point of view of utility was the 
manufacture of cloth. Cloth making had existed as a home in­
dustry not only in Shoa but also in other parts of Africa long 
before our perid, though the raw materials employed probably 
differed from one region to another. In Buganda and the other 
interlacustrine states, for example, bark was the raw material
I
while in somdparts of Central Africa raphia fibres were used.
■*\J. Vansina: *'A Comparison of African Kingdoms" in Africa 
Vol. 32, 1962 p.326.
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In Shoa, as in north Africa where the climate was suitable
for the cultivation of the ppiant, cloth was made with cotton.
Besides cotton, some cloth was made in Shoa from the wool of
sheep. Cloth made from this latter stuff was the monopoly
of the province of Manz. Owing to the high mountains and the
cold winds, cotton cannot be grown in Manz. On the other hand
the Manzian climate was suited to the breeding of sheep with
long dark fleece. The banna» that is cloth (or blanket), made
from the fleece is called sekdat in the sources. It is said
to be thick and warm and therefore particularly suited for
iise in the cold highlands. Specialising as it did ( and still
does) in the production of thio type of cloth^it was to be
expected that tribute paid by Manz to the Monarch would take
the form of Sekdat. The King, we are told, used this black
1cloth for his tents or for charity to the poor. In Shoa the 
cloth-mmiufac'turing industry was not integrated. The evidence 
indicate^ that the farming of the plant, spinning of the thread 
and the weaving of the cloth were sex3arate industries which 
were hardly ever combined in the same hands. It Is nevertheless 
conceivable that the first two processes could have been combined,
1Journal of Isenberg and Krapf, p.209.
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spinning being done by the women in the farmer’s household.
The weaver would thus appear to have been one of the f ew
people who were more or less detached from the land and who
must have depended to a large extent on their skill and
industry for a living. His industry would have thriven,
initially at least, on the custom which still exists in
some parts of Africa, of weaving on request. And since the
finished cloth was in great demand the looias could not have
been idle for any length of time. Also the practice existed
of a customer handing over to the weaver a certain quantity
of the raw material for fabrication, a scale being fixed
for the remuneration of his labour. Ten arnole of cotton
was said to produce a thick cloth thirty cubits in length
and one and a half cubits in breadth. The fee for weaving to
1these measurements is given as seven amole. Fees must 
have been correspondingly high when coloured and worsted 
stripes were introduced into the manufacture, for not only 
did this entail extra labour but also the coloured stripes 
were not local produce ^but items of import from the coast.
In this way a weaver amassed enough money to enable him to
189 Ho. 2060G "Report on the Present State of Trade in 
the Kingdom of Shoa”. Harris 5*1.1842, para. 36. An mole 
was a piece of block salt used as currency aftjvalued at 
See below.
make cloths for sale 011 the markets. Weaving was generally
carried on in the open air. The loom has been described as
coi sisting of a few rough uprights planted in the ground for
the day to support the cotton twist and a simple shuttle for
1throwing the crossing thread. Considering the simple nature 
of his tools, one cannot help admiring the skill displayed 
by the weaver in the making of the cloth which impressed 
Ikiropean travellers with its clo s o b s s , warmth and durability.^ 
There can be little doubt that it took the weaver much time 
and labour to produce anything of the nise which could con™ 
veniently be used as cloth. It must be mentioned that cloth 
making was widespread as an industry and that at least one 
weaver was to be found in each town and probably also in most 
of the villages. The King, it must be emphasised, had weavers 
specially employed to make cloth for the royal household.
In the 1840s it was estimated that six hundred women were on- 
ployed in the Palace to spin cotton to provide thread for the 
looms of the royal weavers. At first sight this figure
^Harris, Ibid.
^Rochet; Voyage, £>*298-9* LG 204 Uo. 1453 Medical Report 
Kirk 17.4.1843 para 34.
would appear too huge to he believed, but it should be re­
membered that those six hundred women were probably not all 
employed for the sole purpose of spinning cotton. It is 
possible that only a few of them were full time cotton 
spinners and that the rest combined spinning with their other 
duties as employees in the Palace. But even If all of them 
were full time cotton spinners we should hesitate before 
dismissing the estimate quoted as exaggerated, tfe need to 
remeber that the weavers for whom the women had to spin cotton 
manufactured cloth for Hie use not only of the rojral family, 
but also of a host of others who were employed in the Palace 
and who as a rule derived their keep from the King. This
group included the royal troops who were, at this period,
1
estimated to number 11 at least one thousand'*; it also included 
the hundred^ of men and women employed in various capacities 
In the Palace and who constituted the palace establishment: 
water carriers, wood carriers, cooks, those who prepared the 
hydromel, to mention only a few. If we consider the fact that 
those spinning women did not know of the spinning Jenny and the 
other Improved tools then in use in contemporary Britain, and
Charles Johnston: Travels, Vol. II p.75.
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that they employed simple time-consuming methods in their 
industry we can better appreciate the need for a large number 
of spinners. Although we have no estimate of the weavers 
themselves, there is little doubt that they also numbered 
some hundreds. And the number for both spinners and weavers 
must have increased considerably in the reign of Menelik 
when, as we have already seen, both the Palace establishment 
and the royal troops increased In sise. The fact was that 
given the simple, slow methods and the heavycbmand which had 
to be met there was created a problem which could be solved 
only by employing more hands.
Although the manufacture of cloth was probably the 
most profitable local industry, it was by no means the only 
industry in Shoa. Indeed it would have been inconceivable 
if, until regular foreign trade brought into the kingdom im­
ported alternatives, the Inhabitants had not had the means of 
providing for their material needs however simple or imperfect 
the finished products might have seemed to the European 
travellers. As a kingdom built on military conquest, two of 
the most treasured possessions of the inhabitants were the 
lance and the shield. The manufacture of military weapons was 
the province of the blacksmith and the associated professions,
the joiner, the iron caster, the skin tanner and many others.
The importance of these industries in the military life of 
the kingdom was clearly appreciated “by the kings who, 
therefore, did everything they could to encourage the workers 
to improve their skills and step up production. The interest 
which the monarchs showed in improving the skills of the 
local handicraftsmen and artisans was reflectedjin the efforts 
they made to recruit foreign artisans with better skills 
to come to Shoa and train the local craftsmen. European 
missionaries who worked in the kingdom in our period found 
to their dismay that the rulers would have liked them better 
as instructors in various skills. Nor were they alone ±l this 
experience. The Emperor Theodros of Ethiopia and the Kabaka 
Mutesa I of Buganda (1857-1884)ta contemporary partly of 
Theodros and partly of Menelik of Shoa, no doubt like many 
other contemporary African rulers, made similar demands on 
the missionaries who visited their states. All the rulers of 
Shoa in their letters to the European rulers with whom they 
were in contact stressed their need for skilled artisans.
And, as has been explained elsewhere, it was this desii'e for 
European artisans that induced the kings of Shoa to welcome 
into the kingdom missionaries and travellers of all Ascriptions.
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The efforts of Sahle Selassie to recruit skilled tof^ign 
craftsmen met with very little success. An Armenian called 
Demetrius worked on various projects, including the con­
struction of a corn mill, which never started production 
because it was condemned by the priesthood as a work of the 
devil. Gorn mills were however established by the Frenchman 
Rochet d'Hericourt and by the English mission which was led
by Major Harris as part of the presents from their respective 
1governments. Although Major Harris observed that the King
was "greatly gratified at the comparative facility with which
2
wheat was converted into flour" it is very doubtful if pro­
duction continued after the departure of the Europeans in 1843. 
Apart from the establishment of these mills, there is no evi­
dence that the Europeans taught any skills to the local 
craftsmen. Menelik1 s efforts to recruit skilled Europeans met 
with better success than those of his predecessors. One of 
Arnoux's companions established a powder millfat Malha tfanz 
near Ankober in 1875; another Frenchman, Pottier, iried un­
successfully to train a group of Shoan youths in European
1LG 193 Wo. 2919. Harris 10.6.1842 para.39.
Ttarris Ibid.
'’l . L. Lande: "Un Voyageur Frangais..." in Rev, dss Deux Mondes. 
Vol. 30, 15th Dec. 1878 p.888.
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1military techniques; Swiss engineers were employed in road
2making and in the construction of "bridges; two Italian 
doctors, Alfieri and Traversi, put their professional skills 
at the disposal of the King and his subjects; ®&d an 
Italian armourer, Apriao, was for a short time in the Kingdom 
engaged in the manufacture of gunpowder.^ To make it easier 
for education and improvement of skills many of the local 
craftsmen were concentrated at Ankober. The choice of 
Ankober was probably because, until the foundation of Antoto 
in the 1880s, Ankober was the recognised capital of tie Kingdom, 
and both the kings and the artisans themselves must have seen 
some advantage in having the important industries concentrated 
in the capital. However, when Menelik made Antoto his official 
capital the manufacturing industries continued to be at Anko­
ber. ^ It is likely that not all the craftsmen were concen­
trated at Ankober and that some were scattered throughout the 
Kingdom. As was to be expected the craftsmen who, like the
1See Chapter Qj. % \22-Z's 
^See Chapter |jj.
'’See Chapter JljL.
‘^"ASBll 36/3-8. Antonelli to R° Commissario civile in Assab. 
Debra Berhan 27*9.1885. Traversi to Conte A. Bouturlin, 
Anlcober 23*9.1855.
Journal of Xsenberg and Krapf, p.62. A. Cecchi; Da Zeila,
Vol. 1, lip. 292-4.
^Cecchi% ibid.
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royal weavers, worked exclusively for the king, had their
1
workshops within the palace enclosure. They constituted 
one of the numerous groups of employees 011 the Palace estab­
lishment; one could therefore assume that with the transfer 
of the official capital from Ankober to Antoto this group 
of manufacturers would also have been transferred to the 
new capital. The chief of the blacksmiths was the head of all 
the handicraftsmen throughout the Kingdom, and might, in 
modern terminology be called the Minister for Industries.
p
In the early 1840s this important post was held by Ato Habti.
The holder of this Office was probably the most important 
Palace cfficial in the Kingdom in the 1840s and 1850s, although 
by the 1880s his importance had diminished considerably. There 
are at least three reasons to explain why hems so important. 
First, as the head of the craftsmen who manufactured the local 
fighting weapons, he was responsible for equipping the royal 
troops, who as we have seen elsewhere, constituted the only 
standing army in the Kingdom. One would suspect that this aspect 
of his duties diminished in importance as more and more European 
firearms were imported to equip the troops in the 1880s. It is
“^Krapf in Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. 10 
1840, p. 4V;0.
2Harris; The Highlands of Aethiopia (London 1844) Vol. XII, p.24.
also possible that it was this officer who was put in charge
of the storing and distribution of the imported firearms, and
that far from diminishing in important this aspect of his
duties acquired fresh dignity as Quarter~Master~General of
the royal troops. Secondly, he it was who fabricated the
heavy iron containers in which the treasures of the monarch
were kept and of which he was, in fact, said to be in charge.
As the state treasurer he xfas one of the few people who knew
1where those treasures were hidden. Thirdly, the chief smith
was traditionally the physician to the monarch and the roy*al 
2
family. This is easily understood when it is remembered that 
in African traditional beliefs the art of the smith has magical 
and supernatural associations. All these important functions, 
combined as they were in the office-of the chief of the smiths, 
greatly enhanced the importance of that office. With the ex™ 
ception of the royal troops who were supplied from the royal 
arsenal, all other subjects had to buy their weapons on the 
market. It was for this market that the local arms manufacturers 
provided.
LG 189 No. 20G0G. Harris 5-1.1842, para 54.
Harriss ibid. Also Harris: Ihe Highlands, Vol. Ill, p. 24.
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Besides the Blacksmith who was mainly devoted to the
manufacture of weapons, there were, as was to be expected,
other smiths who utilised gold, brass and silver to make
ornaments and trinkets. Unlike gold, silver and brass which
were items of import, iron was a local product the extraction
of which has been vividly described in the sources. Deposits
of the ore were said to abound in the kingdom especially in
the province of Bulg-a,” Prospecting for ii^ on deposits was
one cf the objects of a French mission which visited the King-
2
dom in the 1880s and of which Alphonse Aubry was a member.
Although Aubry, the chief mining engineer in the group, made 
a report which was by no means unfavourable, nothing further 
was done about it, and throughout our period the iron caster 
relied on his traditional methods to meet the regional demands 
for the metal. A small village in Bulga-province called Guriyo 
was said to be the centre of the industry and the process of 
smelting and refining the iron was described as follows. uThe 
ore having been broken into small fragments and coarsely pul- 
verized was mixed with a large portion of charcoal and placed
■^ LG 189 No, 2060G. Harris, 5.1.1842, para 28. Rochet d'Heriooirt, 
Voyage sur le Deux Rives de la Her Rouge, pp. 297-8.
Also see; Economic Progress of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa 1955, p.12. 
This is a publication by the Ethiopian Ministry of Commerce and
(cont.)
in a clay furnace resembling a smith's hearth, but furnished
with a sloping cavity sunk some depth below the level of the
blast-pipes. The non-metallic particles being then brought
to a state of fusion by the constant action of four pairs of
hand-worked bellows, the iron with the scoria sunk to the
bottom. This was again broken with the hammer andiksed a
second time when the dross flowing off, the pure metal was
discharged in pigs, which by a repetition of heating and
wilding were wrought into bars." It was estimated that about
two pounds weight of "excellent iron" were produced from each
1furnace after eight or ten hours labour. And Harris remarked 
that the process described above which ha,d been common in one 
form or another to every age and country from the ancient times 
was still in vogue at this period not only in Africa but also 
in Asia and Eastern Europe.
In addition to the industries already mentioned there 
were others such as basket weaving, leather making (skin tanning)
(cont.) Industry outlining some of the aspects of the Empire's 
development in the firsj 25 years of the present Emperor's 
reign.
2A. Aubiy, "Une Mission au Choa et dans les pays Galla," in 
Bulletin de la Soclete de geographie de Paris 7e Serie Vol.
VIII, p 1887.
ILG 195 No. 2919 Harris, 10.6.1842, para 22. Rochet; op.cit., 
p.297.
and pottery making, all of which were made by methods 
widely used throughout Africa, though not necessarily with 
the same raw materials. In the making of baskets, for ex­
ample, whereas in some parts of the content raphia or palm 
branches or cane were used, in Shoa baskets were made with 
the inner fibre of the onsete plant which is a species of 
plantain. This plant, the niusa ensete^ ensete edulis of the 
botanist) which grows in the southern regions from the Iiawash 
river almost as far as the northern banks of the Lake Stephanie 
was, and still is, of immense importance to the people among
whom it was found. It provided the fibres for making strings,
ropes and baskets. Its leaves, which are of gigantic dimensions
were used for roof ring houses and for making mats. More im­
portant still, its roots and stem, when fermented, served,
p
and still serve, as food.
It has been said in some of the sources that industries 
in Shoa produeed "almost exclusively for the King and the Queen"
See Y/t A. Shacks The gurages A people of the Ensete Culture, 
Lond. 1966, p.54, for a diagram of the plant; and p.5*
for a map showing the Ensete Culture Area.
2P. Soleillet; Voyages ,en_Jlifhtouie..Rouen. 1886, p. 188. 
tT.A,Shack: op.cit., passim. Also see Simmonds, N.H. in 
Tropical Agriculture Vol. 55, 1958? and Smeds, E., in Acta 
jQ-eographica Vol. XXII, No. 4, 1955, both cited by Shack.
•^ See for example H. Audon: "Voyage au Choa" in Le Tour du 
Monde, 2e sernestre 1889, p,158.
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This is far from the truth. It is clear from the same 
soiirces that outside the Palace there was a -wide* indeed 
an expanding, market in the kingdom for the output of the 
craftsmen, he have already seen this with respect to the 
manufacture of cloth and military weapons; it will not be 
wrong to say that it was the case with most, if not all, 
manufactures in the kingdom..:. Undoubtedly some of the 
manufactures, as for example, jewels and trinkets, were a 
royal monopoly; but it must be emphasised that the royal 
monopoly did not extend to every industryjin the kingdom.
As has been seen above, the King had his own group of in­
dustrial workers who produced for the domestic needs of the 
Palace establishment. Apart from this group of royal crafts­
men, all other artisans in the kingdom manufactured not for 
the benefit of the Palace but for sale on the markets. That
this was so was reflected by the variety of people and goods
1which were found on the markets in Shoa. In this connection 
it should be noted that the royal craftsmen worked for the 
needs of the Palace and not for sale on the markets. As 
commodities for immediate profitable trade to Europeans who
1See below.
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wanted to open up commerce between Shoa and the coast, the 
kingdom’s manufactured products were undoubtedly insignificant. 
But that was not because production was dictated by the ex­
clusive needs of the palace. It was rather because the 
general market for which the industries produced, although 
expanding over the years,ms still limited.
It would have been noticed that in reconstructing the 
agricultural and the industrial life in Shoa we have depended 
mostly on information from the first half of our period. This 
is not because the situation was any different in the second 
half of the period. Indeed the evidence from the lattei'1. half 
of the period generally corroborates that derived from the 
first half. If we have tended to lean too heavily on the 
evidence from the pre-Menelilc period it is because paradoxically 
that evidence is more exhaustive in its details whereas the 
evidence from Menelilc’s period tends to sketch only the out­
lines.
The trade of Shoa, both domestic and foreign, like the 
frontiers of the Kingdom, expanded with the years. And there 
was a direct relationship between her trade and her terri­
torial expansion. On the one hand, foreign trade brought into
the kingdom, among other things, European firearms. Armed 
with the improved weapons the Shoan soldiers met with greater 
successes in their campaigns of conquest and thereby ex­
tended the frontiers of the kingdom. On the other hand, the 
success of those campaigns and the resulting territorial ex­
pansion opened up new markets and fresh sources of raw material 
to the'farmer and craftsman alike, a factor which must have 
led to expansion of trade.
During the reign of Sahle Selassie^Shoa1s trade must 
have been limited. This would apply not only to trade with 
the neighbouring countries but even more so to trade within 
the kingdom itself. There was at least one good reason for this. 
As far as foreign trade ms concerned the greatest impediment 
to expansion was insecurity on the routes along which the tide 
of commerce fkwed. This point will be elaborated later, when 
we come to discuss foreign trade. Internally, however, in­
security could not have been a factor playing against expansion 
of trade because, as has been seen in Chapter I, Shoa was 
relatively secure and peaceful under Sahela Selassie. In­
security probably became a factor during the period of the 
inter-regnum (1855-65),when the absence of a strong government 
and the incessant wars against the imperial administration
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must have made conditions unfavourable to both commercial
and agricultural pursuits* ‘ It would seem that the factor
which inhibited a brisk internal trade was the ubiquity of
amateurism in the marketable enterprises. In other words
too many people were producing most of the things which they
needed on their farms or homes so that the market for the
2produce of the specialist was very limited. This problem, 
it would seem, wa^not peculiar to Shoa but was general in 
Africa at thisperiod. Indeed it is a general problem in un­
developed agricultural economies. In Shoa there was probably 
a good market for cotton cloth and local military weapons, 
but such commodities as baskets, skins and farm products 
must have had a limited market indeed. This is not to claim 
that each family in Shoa was selfBsufficing. All that is 
being emphasised is that the fact that many of the household 
requirements could be produced by the household must have 
limited purely domestic trade to only a few specialised products 
or manufactures. The situation altered, albeit almost, im­
perceptibly, during the reign of Menelilc. A number of factors 
accounted for this change. The development of that might be
1
See Chapter II.
See Ferret and CaHnier: Voyage en Abyssinie, Vol. II, p.393.
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1be called a standing army gradually divorced more and 
more people from the land and their erstwhile amateurish 
practices, thereby making it necessary for them to buy 
from others many of the things which they had until recently 
produced themselves. Moreover, the rapid expansion of the 
kingdom meant that more people lad to be taken into account, 
and what with Menelik's concern for roadmaking and the con­
struction of bridges across the rivers which could not be 
forded, districts which had hitherto been inaccessible now 
came within the reach of both farmer and craftsman alike. 
Furthermore, the territorial expansion and the consequent 
growth in foreign trade brought into Shoa an ever-increasing 
number of foreign traders who stayed hi the kingdom for con­
siderable lengths of time, and who, in the meanwhile, con- 
tributed not a little to internal trade.
Information on the internal trade of Shoa has tended to 
be concentrated on the big marketsj yet those big markets were 
more centres of foreign than of domestic trade. As a result 
our knowledge of the minor markets and the nature of purely
1See next chapter,
2
See below.
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domestic trade :is Scanty. Yet any account of Shoa's domestic 
mustsconsider the minor markets because they were the real 
centres of that trade, more eo than the markets which often 
drew the attention of the European traveller. It is clear 
from the accounts of the travellers that besides the big 
markets which they wrote about, there were minor ones in the 
towns, the larger villages and in some smaller and remote 
villages. Such , for example, were the markets at Litche,
Debra Berhan, Warra Ilu in ¥allo, folli, a small village in 
the Soddo country south of the Hawash river,and Sellalle 
a small village in the district of that name. It was in 
markets such as these that the local people obtained the com­
modities they needed. Goods exposed for sale on those markets 
were limited both in scale and in variety. In 1873 Cecchi 
and OMarini discovered that mules could not be obtained in
Ankober except at Debra Berhan?which was said to be a centre
1for transport animals. Again in 1887 Borelli found out that
he could not get certain commodities he wanted to buy on the
small market at Sellalle and had to travel to Djarso, one and
2
a half day!s journey, in orderto get them. Generally the goods
^Cecchi: Da Zella, I, 290, 292. Also Borelli, Ethiopie 
Meridionale, p.141. Krapf in Journal of the Royal Geographical 
Society, Vol. 10, 1840,p.430. I .. :; . ' h *
^Borelli, op.cit.. p.202. 15.2.1887.
displayed for sale in the minor markets reflected local 
specialisation and consisted of cotton cloth, baskets, 
military weapons, foodstuffs, transport animals and the 
like. Balt, important as it is in the household, could 
only very rarely be obtained on the smaller markets. The 
reason for this was that salt was not merely a kitchen 
commodity, but was also a medium of exchange in large scale 
transactions. For that reason the trade in salt was limited 
to the larger markets to which foreign merchants resorted.
On the medium szied markets, of course, a wider variety of 
goods could be obtained. These medium sized markets were 
generally larger than the village markets, though they were 
not centres of foreign trade. Usually situated In the toms 
or in lax^ ge villages, their importance derived from tie size 
of the population in the tom or the neighbourhood. An ex­
ample of medium sized market was that of Antoto or Litche.
At Antoto the maiket was held on Saturdays. Uhen Borelli visited 
it twice in August 1886, he found that it was well attended 
and that the goods on sale represented a cross-section of the 
local produce. He found too that imported articles such as 
mirrors and beads, which were normally only obtainable in
the larger markets were also on sale. Although we have 
said that articles were exposed for sale, it must he em­
phasised that in this part of the world at that time trade 
was carried on largely by barter. Money was indeed not un­
known and gradually more and more came into circulation, but 
transactions were made more through exchange of goods than 
through currency. According to Bianchi, merchandise was 
rarely weighed but was generally measured by sight. While 
it is true that measuring by sight was sometimes resorted 
to, there is also evidence that elaborate scales of weights 
and meaahres were employed in commercial transactions.
I
Throughout our/period Shoa carried on an increasing trade 
with her neighbours, the Galla and Sidama states to the south 
south-east and south-west, Harar, the Afar, and the other 
Christian provinces of the Empire. As Shoa expanded to incor­
porate more and more of these countries, her trade with them 
became domestic, but it should also be remembered that commercial
^Borelli, op.cit., p.123, 14.8.1886; p. 127 21.S.1886. 
C^t, Bianchi; Alla Terra del Galla, pp. 483-4°
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contact with the countries beyonl the expanding frontiers
remained essentially foreign trade. The part played by the
Amhara subject s of the Kingdom in the expanding foreign trade
1was very small indeed, for the Amhara, like the Baganda,* 
and unlike the Hande people of the Western Sudan or the Nyamwezi 
of West-Central Tanganyika, were not commercial^ inclined. 
Moreover, the Amhara of Shoa had; a morbid fear of the lowland 
regions through which the commercial routes to the coast lay. 
This fear was based largely on the inhospitable climate of 
these regions. As a result nearly the whole of the Kingdom's 
long distance trade was controlled by Muslims, mostly Afar, 
and by the G-alla. The Muslim control over trade in Ethiopia 
as a whole dated back some centuries. One reason for this 
was that the Church prohibited the Christian subjects from 
trading in certain commodities such as slaves, and also from 
cultivating others, such as tobacco. Thus the trade in these 
goods fell into the hands of the Muslims. Moreover, it was only 
Muslims who cohid trade successfully with the Muslim states 
which developed on the eastern, northern and north-western
See M. S. Kiwanuka: "The Traditional History of Buganda," 
London Ph. L. Thesis 1965, Vol. 2, p.452.
frontiers of Ethiopia in the Middle Ages. Furthermore,
with the object of stemming the tide of Islam which had
been winning increasing adherents, some of the restored
Emperor# had introduced anti-Muslim laws. The social
effect of those laws had been to deprive the Muslims of the
right to own land or practise agriculture. Thus restricted,
the Mujlim inhabitants had taken gradually to commerce and
soon became soproficient that they attracted into their
1hands the trade of the whole Ethiopian region.
Shoa* s foreign trade fell into three directions: 
with the southerly and south-westerly countries; with the 
coast (i.e. the easterly and south-easterly countries); 
and with thenortherly provinces. Trade with the south­
westerly countries formed the basis of the Kingdom1 s 
commercial network. It has been pointed out elsewhere that 
the south-westerly region was the richest part of Ethiopia; 
it was from there that all the marketable products, often 
referred to at the coast as Abyssinian products, came. Shoa 
as such, indeed Christian Ethiopia as a whole, had very few 
commodities of her own to offer to the coast; her trade was,
1 9J. S. Triminghamj Islam in Ethiopia, 1952, pp. 102-3.
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therefore, essentially a ‘transit trade of which the coast 
and the south-west constituted the opposite ends.
Before Menelilcfs reign, Shoafs trade with the south 
and the south-west must have been small. This was because 
Shoa was then only one of three possible routes which led 
from the south-westerly countries to the coast. One of 
the other two routes lay northwards through God j am; Gondar 
and Tigre to the Red Sea port of Hassawah. The other went 
eastwards through Arussi country to Harar and thence to 
the Gulf of Aden ports of 2eila, Tadjura or Berbera.
In the absence of adequate statistics it is impossible to 
determine the volume of trade which went by each of these 
routes. All that could be said is that Shoa^ share of 
the trade was probably small at that period. This statement 
is based on the fact that the d!Abbadie brothers, who visited 
the south-west in the 1840s and the Catholic Missionaries 
who followed in the 1850s, both give the impression that 
merchants who traded, to the north and to Harar were to be 
found more often than those who traded to Shoa. In the 1860s
1For the trade along these routes in the first half of the 
19th century see M. Abirs Trade and Politics in the Ethiopian 
Region, London Ph. D. Thesis 1964.
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and 1870s, however, the situation altered and Shoa’s share 
of the trade increased correspondingly. The reason for 
this change is not hard to seek. Before the 1860s Limmu- 
Enarea was the most powerful of the south-westerly states, 
and controlled the larger part of the trade of the area; 
the market of Sakka was then the centre of the south­
westerly trade. In the 1860s Jimma Abba Gifar gradually 
emerged as a rival to Limmu-Enarea and by the 1870s the 
balance had shifted in favour of Jimma Abba Gifar. In the 
contest the one great issue was who should control the trade 
of the region. Jimma Abba Gifar succeeded partly because 
her geographical position - situated between Limmu-Enarea in 
the north and the Sidama sources of supply in the north - 
enabled her to divert the bulk of the trade from the northern 
route through Limmu-Enarea to a north-easternly one via her 
north-eastern province to Shoa. By the 1880s, therefore, 
partly owing to the success of Jimma Abba Gifar and p artly 
owing to the expansion of Shoa, the bulk of the trade from 
this region was probably reaching the coast by way of Shoa.
For the beginnings of the struggle see M. Abir: "The 
Emergence and Consolidation of the Monarchies of Enareamd 
Jimma in the First Half of the nineteenth Century" in J.A.H., 
Vol. VI, Ho. 2, 1965, pp. 205-219. See also Abir: Thesis 
cited.
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In Shoa the markets of Roggie and Anduodi on the
opposite banks of the southern Awash were the centre* of
the Kingdom's trade with the south-west, There were, of
course, other markets in the area south of the Southern Awash
river and dotting the routes from Shoa to the south-west,
which were by no means unimportant centres of trade, but
the real emporium of the trade from the south and the south-
1
west was Roggie, with Anduodi as a depot* Of the three
routes which in the 1880s were said to lead from Shoa to
the south-westerly countries, the northern and the middle
ones started from Antoto and going by different provinces
converged near1 the Dendi mountains in the Maru Gall a country
and passing through the Nanno and Agalo plains led to the
north-north-eastern frontier of Jimma Abba Gifar. The
southern route led from Roggie through AndubdL and the Soddo
country and Cabiena to the north-eastern frontier of Jimma 
?
Abba Gifar. Situated in the Gallan Galla district, at 
the northern foot of the Jerer (xerrur) mountain, some six 
hours south of Antoto, the village of Roggie itself was very
*^CecchI; Da Zeila, vol. I, pp. 4-88-92. Vol. II, pp. 4 0, 35-60. 
ASSffil, Gartoni VlljP, Traversi al Presidente della SGI, 
dated Let-Marefia 10,4.188$ (B.N. Paris) NAP 21302 pp. 314-5
dTAbbadie.
2  TV
ASSGI, Carton! VIII11, Traversi Idem., d' ftbbadie NAD1 21302 
pp. 314-5; also pp. 175-6.
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small and owed its importance solely to the market which 
was held every Saturday* In 1878 the population of the 
neighbourhood was estimated at about 10,000 people, nearly 
all of whom were Muslims* Caravans from Jimma Abba Gdfar and 
other south-westerly countries conducted by pagan and Muslim 
Galla came to Roggie in large number carrying slaves, gold, 
coffee, ivory, civet, musk, skins, hides and other products 
from the region. It is not known how often these caravans 
arrived. Considering the distance and the insecurity on 
the route, it is not likely that the caravans were regular 
in the first half of our period. V/ith Menelik's conquest and 
pacification of the south westerly countries, both the 
numbers and frequency of the caravans arriving at Roggie must 
have increased. At Roggie the caravans from the south-west 
met others from Guraghe carrying slaves, coffee, tobacco, 
butter and other local products, Ifome caravans also came from 
the other large markets in Shoa as well as from GocLjam and 
the northern provinces. These caravans generally brought 
European goods from the coast; coloured silks, coloured cotton 
cloth, beads and other glass trinkets, knives, scissors, copper, 
sine, silver. The Galla tribes in the neighbourhood of Roggie 
provided foodstuffs, lances and shields, cattle, horses, sheep 
and mules.
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It has been mentioned already that trade in this part 
of the world in those days was carried on mainly by barter. 
Nevertheless, currency was used in some transactions. In 
the Ethiopian region as a whole, with the exception of Harar, 
the currency which was often used was the Maria Theresa dollar, 
also called thaler. All the nineteenth century travellers 
remarked that the thaler had to be of certain specifications, 
otherwise it passed only at a discount. In this connection 
it should be noted that the Maria Theresa thaler first minted 
in 1751 continu&d to be produce d with the queen's effigy even 
after her death in 1780, and that until 1866 production of 
the thaler was not limited to the Vienna mint but was done
1in other continental mints such as Venice, Prague and Milan,
They were even minted in Delhi during the Second World War for use 
by the British forces in the Ethiopian campaign. The thaler which 
passed abnormal rate had to be of the year 1780 and to bear 
distinctly visible 011 it the three distinguishing marks of 
seven points in the diadem, a brooch surrounded with points on 
the shoulder, and the letters S.P. below the head,
1R, Pankhurst, "The Maria Theresa Dollar in Pre-War Ethiopia" 
in Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. I, No, 1, pp. 8-10.
o
Oh, Beke; Letters 011 the Commerce and Politics of Abyssinia 
... addressed to the P.O. and the Board of T^ade, Lond.
1832 p.l/h LGr 189 No, 20600 Harris 5.1.1842, para, 47.
VcCUed at about four shillings and two pence, the thaler's 
subdivisions were reckoned in pieces of block salt called 
amole and valued at roughly two and a half pence.
There are no records of the relative prices of articles 
on the Hoggie market before the reign of Menelik. In the 
late 1870s and the 1880s a good horse sold for between twenty 
and twenty-five thalers, while a mule cost thirty to forty 
thalers. Barley, teff, and other grains were sold by volume, 
the unit for which was a cbulla, equivalent, according to 
Cecchi, to approximately 7331 cubic centimetres (about 4-47 
cub. ins.).'L Prices for grains varied between three and 
five aaiole a doulla. An excellent shield mad^of buffalo 
skin sold for two and a half to four thaler®. Coffee, gold- 
dust and ivory were sold by weight. The units for measuring 
weight were the thaler,the wakiet, the amole and the rotoli.
The weight of one thaler was equivalent to twenty-seven grams.
A waklet was equivalent to the weight of twelve thalers; a 
rotoli was of two kinds: one was equivalent to the weight of 
twelve thalers while the other was eighteen thalers. The rotoli
■^ Cecchi; Da Zeila Vol. I, p.306. Also 1 . & D. (Afrique) 
Vol. 62, pp. 309-70, Arnoux's Journal.
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of twelve thalers was in use in many parts of Ethiopia,
1
but in Shoa that of eighteen thalers was more common.
According to Cecchi there was a unit of weight called natter 
which was equivalent to a thaler and whose value when cal­
culated in thalers varied from place to place corresponding
to twelve thalers at Gondar, fifteen in other places and
2
eighteen in Shoa. Gecohi seems to have mixed up wakiet 
and rotoli here. It must be noted that Oecchi does not use 
the word rotoli although he uses wakiet; from his account, 
however, it is clear that what he calls natter was the same 
unit as the rotoli. It was estimated that 30,000 - 4-0,000 
kilograms of coffee entered Roggie annually, the price for 
which was one thaler for seventeen rotoli. The price for 
ivory was between thirty-one and thirty-five thalers a wakiet 
and the total annual volume of the ivory trade at Roggie 
was put at two hundred good teeth. Por purpose of selling 
gold dust, the wakiet was divided into either ten equal parts 
called derime or twenty equalparts called kemate or forty 
parts called kouara.^  It must be emphasised that Cecchi1s
1
Cecchis Da Zeila, Vol. I, p.306. G. Bianchis Alla Terra 
dei Galla, Milano 1884, p.483. A.N* (Paris) P.12.7210. 
Lefebvre, *'Le Commerce de 1’Abysslnie,t, Appendix A, 10.1.1846. 
LG 189 Mo. 2060G. Harris 5.1.1842 para 45. M. & D. (Afrique) 
Vol. 62 pp. 309-79 Arnoux’s Journal.
^Cecchi; lid .
3Cecchis op.cit., 1, 4-90; Bianchis op.cii.» 483-4.
4a.Iff.(Paris) P.12. 7210 Lefebvre. !,Le Commerce de 1* Abyssinie*1 
Appendix A. 10.1.1846.
estimate of the annual volume of the trade in ivory, and for 
that matter any estimate of the volume of the trade in gold- 
dust, civet, and music, must necessarily represent only a 
fraction of the actual volume of that trade. The I’eason is 
that the king had a monopoly over those articles, and their 
possession, except only as a reward from the King, was strictly 
forbidden to all the inhabitants of the kingdom. Thus the King 
appropriated the entire quantity of the open trade in those 
products and in other European manufactures* The royal mono- 
poly over these valuable products must have encouraged sur­
reptitious transactions in them. These would not have been too 
difficult, for we are told that at Roggie only the poor traders 
transacted openly and that thewealthier and more important
merchants preferred to trade in private homes where all trans-
2actions were in pr5.vate. Thus the proportion cf the trade which 
was done surreptitiously was likely to have been unknown to 
those who estimated the total volume of gold, ivory or civet 
which came annually to the Roggie market.
By far the most important commodities which were traded
LG 189 No. 2060 G. Harris 5.1.1842, paras. 16, 21 & 22.
2Cecchis op.cit., I, 490.
at Roggie were slaves. Unlike the trade in gold or ivory,
there was 110 secrecy about transactions in slaves, thousands
of whom were brought to the market annually from the Gall a
and the Sidama countries to the south and south-west. It
was estimated that between three and four thousand slaves
entered the market each year. This total consisted of
both sexes most of whom were aged from six to about sixteen
years. Prices tended to depend 011 age and for the age group
mentioned it varied between fifteen and forty thalers.
For obvious reasons the older slaves did not attract good
prices, which fell correspondingly with their age. Although
Roggie was an important slave market, the greatest mart in
Shoa for the trade in human be hags was Abdel-Rassul near
Aliu Ai^ ba. It will be profitable therefore to defer considering
the details of the slave trade until we come to discuss Shoa’s
eastern markets and her trade with the coast. Suffice to say
here that a tax of one thaler was imposed by the King on each
2slave brought into the Kingdom. It would seem that the tax 
^Cecchi; o^clt., Vol. I,p.490. Vol. II, p.538.
0
Cecchi; fip.cit.g Vol. 1, p.491.
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had increased over the years^for in the early 1840s only
fcair ainole were imposed as the tax on slaves per head,'
Besides Roggie, there were other markets for foreign
trade in other parts of Shoa. One of these was at Djar so in
the north-western province of Marabitie, and was about two
days journey from the Abay river. Like Roggie, Djarso was
the focal point of commercial routes from the south-westerly
countries and from the northern provinces of the Umpire by 
2way of Godjam. Merchants and merchandise on this market 
were of the same variety as were to be found at Roggie, 
but being nearer to Godjam there were probably more Godjarn- 
ese traders to be found at Djarso than at Roggie. In mid- 
April 1883 when Soleillet arrived on the bank of the Abay 
river he found encamped there about a hundred Godjamese (more 
likely northern) traders who had attended the market at Ljarso 
the day before and were returning to their country. It is 
regrettable that there is no information on the volume of 
trade which passed through Djarso to enable us to assess the
1LG 196 No. 3491, "The Slave Report" Harris. 20.7.1842.
paras 23, 39. Harris; The Highlands of Aethiopia. Lond. 1844 
Vol. Ill, pp. 300-1,
^d'Abbadie in Athenaeum 1847 Mo. 1042 p. 1078. LG 196 No, 3941 
"The Slave ReportHarris paras 22, 38.
Soleillets Voyages, p.295. See also Borelli; Ethiopie 
Meridionale, p.202.
relative importance of the market* Nevertheless, it is clear
from the available evidence that Djarsowas one of the large
markets in Shoa where foreign traders concoursed.
Of all the markets in Shoa the most important in every
respect was undoubtedly Aliu Amba* Indeed it was said to be
the third most important market in the whole of Christian 
1Ethiopia. Its importance derived from the fact that it was 
the centre of Shoa!s trade with the coast. It was purely a 
geogrjp hical accident which gave Aliu Amba its central 
position in the commercial network of the kingdom. It was 
situated five to six miles south-east of Ahkober on an amba
p /
which would fall into the zonal division of a Woyna Dega. ; ; ° 
The distance from the village to Shoa's effective eastern 
frontier was about thirteen miles, nearly two days journey 
by caravan. Situated as it was in a Woyna Dega, the tempera­
ture at Aliu Amba was congenial to not only the Afar who 
dreaded the bleak climate of the highlands but also the Galla 
as well as the Abyssinian who entertained a morbid fear of
^A.N. (Paris) P.12,7210. Ledean "Note sur les marches Abyssins 
2
See above, £ 209
lirk in J.R.G.S. Vol. 12, 1842, p.237.
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the scorching conditions in the lowlands, This explains why
Aliu Amba, unlike Roggie or Hjarso, was frequented by Afar,
Harari and Somali merchants besides the usual pagan and Muslim
Galla traders and the Abyssinian p easant, 'throughout our period
Aliu Amba consisted of three to four hundred huts with a
floating population of between two and four thousand, most
q
of whom were Harari, Afar and a few Somali merchants.' So 
important were these three peoples to Shoa's trade with the 
coast that they were treated with much deference by the Shoan 
kings. At Aliu Amba they lived in more or less organised 
"national11 groups under the immediate supervision of their 
own leaders, but subject to the general oversight of the 
Shoan governor of the town. The Harari were the best organised, 
and there were probably more Harari than Afar or Somali at 
Aliu Amba, for the route from Shoa to Harar was said to be 
the most frequented. This of course referred to the 1840s 
but one would assume that the frequency was maintained, if 
not in fact increased, during the reign of Menelik when the
1
LG 185 No. 1440 Barker 7.1,1842, para 7. Rochet d*Hericourt: 
^Second Voyage, pp. 259-60. Cecchi; Da geila, Vol. 1 , p.302.
(Afrique) Vol. 13* "Considerations Politiques et 
commerciales sur le royaume du Clio a11 Rochet d’Hericourt, p. 283 
Also, LG 189 No. 2060G. Harris, "Report on the Present state 
of Trade in the Kingdom of Shoa”, para II,
312.
expansion and pacification of the provinces brought security
to the roads. The chief of the Harari community at Aliu Amba
was appointed by the Emir of Harar probably with the approval
of the King of Shoa; his duty was to see to the gBneral welfare
of his countrymen. In 1842 the post was held by a certain 
1Abdul Sihi. As a representative of the Emir he combined the 
functions* of ambassador and a commercial agent. It should be 
noted that it was the policy of the Emirs of Harar to maintain 
representatives in all the places with which Harar had important 
commercial contact. Henry Salt speaks of such a representative 
at Moldia in the first decade of the nineteenth century, while
p
Burton mentions another at Berbera in the middle of the century. 
In the reign of Sahela Selassie relations between Shoa and 
Harar were friendly. In August 1841 it was reported that an 
embassy from the Emir of Harar arrived in Ankober with a letter 
to the King of Shoa requesting him to help j^ ep open the routes 
between the two states. The embassy left Shoa on September 6
*5
with what was believed to be a favourable reply. Again in
185 Ho. 1440 Barker, 7.1.1842, para 15.
Ch. Johnstons Travels, Vol. II, pp. 247-9.
p
H. Salt; Voyage to Abyssinia, Lond. 1814 pp. 131, 133*
Sir R. F. Burton; First Footsteps in East Africa, Memorial 
Edition, Bond. 1894, Vol. II, p.26.
^Barker in J.R.G-.S., Vol. 12. 1842, p.242.
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1842, when Captain Barker intended to return to the coast 
hy way of Harar, hems given a letter by Sahela Selassie 
which was to serve as his introduction to the Emir of Harar. 
The friendly relations between Shoa and Harar appear to have 
continued until at least 1886, for Menelik in one of his 
letters to the King of Italy made it clear that he had agents 
at Harar. By late 1886, however, Menelik*s determination 
to conquer Harar appears to have become known to the Emir 
and from that time relations between the two states gradually 
worsened until in January 1887 Menelik defeated the Emir’s 
soldiers in battle and annexed Harar to Shoa.^
The market of Aliu Amba was held on Fridays and was, 
as we have said, a truly varied gathering. The market place 
was a plain occupying the southern half of the amba (crest of 
an eminence) on which the village stood.4 Wares of every 
description were displayed for sale or barter. The inhabitants 
of the neighbourhood brought farm products and articles of
1LCr 185 No. 1440 Barker 7.1.1842. LG 189 No. 2060B, Harris 
29.10.1842, para. 6.
^LV Ho. Ky. Etfilonias Hoc. 95 Menelik to TJmberto X, Entotto 
4.6.1885*
^See C h . I I I .
'^Johnston; Travelsg Vol. II, p.229.
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local manufacture; foodstuffs, fowls, cattle, mules,
horses, lances and shields, "baskets, cotton cloth and others.
Traders from the south-westerly countries sold products from
those countries, principally coffee, tobacco, butter, ^arari,
Afar, Somali and merchants from Godjam, Gondar and Tigre were
the agents of European type of goods: sine, brass and copper
wix-es, beads, coloured silks, and other articles of European 
1manufacture. The Afar merchants were also dealers in s alt.
It has been mentioned that salt was one tf the commodities 
most sought after in Ethiopia as a whole, and that it was not 
jnereLy a kitchen item but also a currency. .All the salt that 
was used in the Empire came from the Afar country; it was for 
this reason that the rulers of Shoa were so anxious to maintain 
friendly relatinns with the chiefs of the Afar tribes living 
beyond the Eastern frontier of Shoa. Two types of salt were in 
circulation in Shoa and probably also in other parts of the 
Empire; the first was the piece of block salt which served as 
currency and was called amole, and the ordinary salt which was
w ■ n m m m  ■ * w
broken in thin, small pieces which ms of no use as currency and
2
was employed for culinary purposes. This latter type came from
189 ho. 2060G. Harris 5.1.1842, "Report on the Trade... of
Shoa", paras. 11-14. Rochet d!Hericourt; Second Voyage, pp. 
259-62. Cecchi; Da Zeila, Vol. I, pp. 301-3. Soleillet: 
Voyages, pp. 96-7.
2
Johnston: Travels , Vol. XX, p.257. Cecchi: op.oit.. Vol. 1,
P.305.
315.
the salt lake at Aussa, a couple of miles inland from Tad- 
jura, while the amole came from the mines in the northern 
Afar country on the eastern frontier of ligre. The shape 
and size of the amole has been compared to a mower1 s whet­
stone. Generally it was about eight inches long and cut 
thinner at the two ends than in the middle; the breadth 
across the centre was about two inches while at the ends it
scarcely measured one inch; the thickness was uniform and
2
was usually about one inch and a quarter. As currency, 
amole provided the sub-divisions for a thaler. The number of 
amole which made up one thaler depended partly on the distance 
from the market to the source of supply and partly on the 
season. During the rainy season, owing to dampness, the amole 
could not be preserved for long. For this reason the supply 
tended to be limited and the number of amole to a thaler was 
consequently small. Moreover, there was some difference in 
the rate of exchange between a new specimen and one that had 
been in circulation for some time. This was because salt, 
being soft and deliquescent, became denuded by use and so
Gecchis Ibid. A.M. (Paris) F.12V7210 Lejean '‘Mote sur les 
Marches Abyssins". Also Ibid Lefebvre uLe commerce de 
I'Abyssinie'1, IQ.; 1.184-6,
2Johnston: Travels, Vol. XX, p.232. M ?  21301, p.118, 
para. 346 d’Abbadie. Gecchi; op.cit., I, p.305- Soleillet: 
Voyages , p.96. See Pankhurst; An Introduction, pp. 262 
for a diagram of amole.
316.
there was considerable difference in weight between an 
old and a new amole. In the 1840s the exchange rate for a 
new amole was given as follows; In Tigre fifty to seventy 
amole to a thaler; in Gondar thirty to forty; at Basso in 
Godjam twenty- to twenty-five; at Saklca in Limmu-Enarea ten 
to twelve; in Wallo thirty to thirty-five; in tie Shoan pro­
vince of Giddem twenty-three to twenty-five; and at Aliu 
Amba eighteen to twenty.^ By the 1880s the exchange rate 
had fallen by almost half in Shoa and her dependencies, and 
was low fifteen at tfarra Ilu in If alio; ten to eleven ab 
Litche; nine to ten at Aliu Amba, Ankober, Abdel Rassul 
and Roggie; and five to seven in Jimma Abba Gifar and Itaffa.^
It is possible that the fallkn the rate of exchange noticeable
i
in Shoa in the 1880s was due to shortage in supply which was 
probably the result of the uneasy relationship that existed 
between Menelik and the Emperor Yoharmes. As we saw in Chapter 
III, this relation ship, for the most part took the form of cold 
war, but occasionally escalated into open hostility. This 
suggestion gains weight when one recalls that between December
1ilAE 10222,' p. 13, d’Abbadie. Beke; Letters on the Commerce 
and Politics of Abyssinia, p. 17. Journal of Isenberg and ICrapf, 
p. 443. LG 185 ho. 1440 Barker, para. 10.
’"Cecchi: Da Zeila, I, 305- Soleillet; Voyages, pp. 96, 196.
Bor ell i; op.clt., pp. 331™ 2.
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.1877 and April 1878, when the Emperor invaded Shoa, amole 
became very scarce and at Aliu Amba the exchange rate fell 
to seven and a half to a thaler. Thus it would seem that 
in his dealings with ShoaYohannes employed not only political 
but also economic weapons to keep Menelik and his kingdom 
weak.
At Aliu Amba, as well as at the other large markets in 
Shoa, a governor was always present at the market place when­
ever it was a market day. It was his duty to settle any 
disputes that might arise in the course of the market; 
he also collected the market dues which all traders had to 
pay for the convenience of selling or bartering their goods 
on the market. It should be pointed out that payment of market
I p
dues was a general Africanpractice. In Shoa the dues were
i
paid either in kind or in amole at the discretion <f the governor. 
The value of the toll was ten per cent the total value of the 
articles exposed for sale. However, the .tax on slaves was 
initially four amole per head, but this was later increased to 
one thaler. The severity of these taxes struck the Europeans
^Cecchi: Idem, 
o
See J. Vansina "A Comparison of African Kingdoms" in Africa,
Vol. 32, 1952, p.327.
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who wanted to open up large scale commerce with alio a, and in
the treaties which they signed with the Kings of Shoa to this
effect it was stipulated that the taxes had to he reduced to
1five per cent al* most. One wonders if the high taxes did not 
have the effect of discouraging trade with Shoa. Although the 
taxes were high, it should he remembered that Shoa was through­
out our period the most inviting part of the Empire for trading 
purposes, because there was in Shoa greater security to both 
the life and the property of 'Hie trader than there was anywhere 
in the Empire.
The lack of information on prices at the other Shoan 
markets before the reign of Menelik makes any attempt at com­
paring prices somewhat unrealistic. Nevertheless a careful 
anafcysis of the information available suggests that on the whole 
prices for local £>roduce were higher at Aliu Amba than else­
where, while articles of import from the coast where cheaper 
there. For example a doulla of grain which cost three to five 
amole at Roggie cost one thaler at Aliu Amba. This is not 
surprising. As the centre of trade with the coast, there was a
^See Chapter I, and Chapter III. Rochet (Second Voyage, p.577) 
stipulated a reduction to only 5°/°*
2Cecchi: Da Zeila, I, 505. Rochet; Second Voyage, p.262.
LC 189 No. 206QC. Harris, paras. 41 & 42.
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larger quantity and a greater variety of imported merchandise 
at Aliu Amba than elsewhere, so that the competition was 
greater and consequently prices of those goods were lower 
here. Moreover, it was largely from Aliu Amba that traders 
from Roggie, Ankoher, Djarso and other Shoan markets got their 
supply of European type of goods for retail; it was thus to 
be expected that prices of those goods would be higher else­
where than at Aliu Amba. On the other hand, the large number 
of foreign merchants who concoursed at Aliu Amba and the con­
sequent high demand for foodstuffs and other local products 
tended to keep prices for those goods high.
It will have beepnoticed that the trade in slaves has 
hardly entered into our discussion of the commodities sold at 
Aliu Amba. This is because slaves were not dealt in at Aliu 
Amba proper but at the village of Abdel Rassul, about three 
miles south of Aliu Amba. Abdel Rassul was the largest slave 
market in the kingdom; it was here that merchants from Harar, 
Ztyla and Tadjura collected their stock of the human merchandise. 
Roggie, as we have seen, was an imp at ant slave market, but it 
was so only as a point of entry and there is 110 evidence that 
the slave traders from Tadjura, Seyla went to Roggie to make 
purchaees. The whole pattern of Shoa’s trade was bound up with
the commerce in slaves. The Afar, Somali and especially Harari 
traders were the important dealers. With the proceeds from 
the goods which they brought from the coast they would purchase 
a small quantity of slaves and take them up to Shoe’s north­
eastern frontier markets in Giddem and Argobba and later Hallo 
provinces where the slaves were exchanged for amole. With 
the sboclc of amole so obtained the merchants would return to 
Abdel Rassul to buy a fresh stock of slaves for resale in 
the north-eastern provinces of Shoa. As has been seen, the 
number of amole to one thaler was larger in those provinces than 
at Abdel Rassul so tiat they made considerable profits fromthe 
transaction. Having made a few such profitable trips the mer­
chants were then able to purchase a large stock of slaves with
1which they would return to the coast.' While the foreign mer­
chants remained in Shoa they contributed considerably to trade 
in the smaller local markets, for they bought their foodstuffs 
aid other domestic necessities, and baggage animals from the 
variousp etty markets in the neighbourhood. They must have found 
it useful to purchase the domestic needs from the smaller markets 
because, as we have seen, the cost of those items was very high 
in and around Aliu Amba.
LG 185 Ho. 1440, Barker, 10* Johnston: Travels,
Vol. II, p.235o
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In Ethiopia as a whole the Christian population, in­
cluding the rulers, did not trade in slaves, This was ex­
pressly forbidden to them by law; in the same way the law 
protected the Christian subjects of the Empire against being 
sold into slavery. As a result, the slaves who reached the 
coast from the Ethiopian provinces consisted of pagan or Mus­
lim GallShankalla, Gurage, or Sidam a. Although forbidden 
to sell slaves, the Amhara could nevertheless own slaves, 
and there must have been a considerable number of slaves 
in the population of Shoa. The King and his governors possessed 
many slaves. It must be emphasised however that "these were 
not slaves in the sense in which that word was understood 
by contemporary Western world. They were mostly prisonersbf
I
war taken in the campaigns of expansion and retained in the 
service of their captors. Unlike the slave in the Americas 
before emancipation, the war captive retained as a domestic 
servant in Shoa or Christian Ethiopia had rights in the society. 
He cou Id be emancipated after seven years, and like his 
counterparts elsewhere in Africa he could rise to a position 
of honour and status not only in the master's household but even 
in the community as a whole. For example, Ato Besabu, one of 
the governors during the inter-regnum, was a "slave" in the
1
Palace In the reign of Sahela Selassie, And Azaj Walde
Tsadek for many years governor of Ankober and a leading
figure in Menelik’s reign was in origin a war capiive from 
2Crurage, Domestic slavery as it existed in Africa was 
different both in nature and in scale from the overseas 
slave trade.
Probably many of the slaves who were brought to Shoan 
markets were the product of ..1,int&Stjneand inter-state war, 
some were obtained through raiding expeditions specially organised 
for the purpose of capturing slaves. It appears that slaves 
from Gurage were obtained mostly through raiding, the tech­
niques of which have been vividly described in the sources. 
Children used to sleep by the side of their parents, but not­
withstanding this, kidnappers broke through the walls of the 
/■'
hut at night, put a large stick upon the neck of the parents, 
and quickly took their children away. If the children made 
an outcry a rag was put into their mouths. In many houses 
children slept on beams placed across, in the upper parts of 
the house, but kidnappers penetrated also to that place.
And the people were kidnapped in going from one village to 
another. So great was the danger of capture from marauding 
slave parties tht armed guards had to accompany women and children 
*4?. Soleillet: Voyages, p.273*
p
J. Borelli, op.cit., p.152.
^Krapf1s Journal for 26.12.1839 quoted in C.H.R. I84I. ^ The in­
formation was derived from a Cur age pri e sTTwhoYi s 1’ tfea Ankober 
in December 1839 to receive religious books.
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wherever they went. For this reason Traversi in his travels 
through Gurage found it extremely difficult to secure guides 
from one province to another. It is difficult to say whether 
this situation was the cause or the effect of the state of 
anarchy that was reported to exist in Guragej but there is 
no doubt that the one intensified the other. Raiding for 
slaves was by no means limited to Gurage. The account given 
to ICrapf by bilbo, a slave from Bnarea who was also interviewed 
by both Harris and Dr. Beke, mokes it clear that slave raiding
p
also existed in the south-westerly Galla states. Nor were 
large scale war and raiding the only methods by which slaves 
were obtained, for Borelli, speaking of a case of which he was 
an eye-witness, gives the impression that in Jimma Abba Gifar, 
offenders were sometimes sold as slaves.
From the sources of supply the slaves were carried in 
caravans of several hundreds and transported to the coast by 
onecf three routes; the south-eastern route through ICambatand 
Arussi to Harar and thence to the coast at Berbera Zeyla or
1'Traversi; "Viaggi negli Arussi etc.1 in B.S.G.X. Serie Ii, 
Vol. XII, 1887, p.284.
o
Journal of Isenberg and ICrapf, p. 50. LG 196 No. 349 
Harris; “The Slave Report" para. 21. Beke; "The Geography 
of Shwa” in J.R.G.S. Vol. 12. 1842 pp. 86-88. Harris;
The Highlands <£ Aethlopla, Vol. Ill, p.298-300.
'K  ^
Borelli; Bthiople Heriodjhiale, p.347, Djiren 3.3.1883.
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Tadjura; the eastern route through Shoa to the coast at Tadjura, 
Zeyla and later Assabjor Obock; and the northern route through 
G-odj am t Gondar and Tigre to the port of Mas so wall. All along the 
route transactions were made so that many of the slaves changed 
hands several times before reaching Shoa. And as they changed 
hands the prices on them increased until at Abdel Rassul a 
slave cost at least twice as much as in the south-west. For 
example in Kaffa prices were between two and four thalers; 
in Jimma Abba G-ifar, five to fifteen; at Roggie eight to 
thirty, and at Abdel Rassul ten to thirty. Young beautiful 
girls were generally more expensive, being destined for the 
harems of the South Arabian rulers, and their cost was always 
in the higher regions of the price range quoted."*'
Estimates of the number of slaves which reached Zeila 
and fadjura directly from Shoa vary between two thousand and
p
four thousand annually. It should be noted that this figure 
is lower than the actual number of slaves which entered the 
kingdom. As we have seen, Harari and Grondari (i.e. those from 
the north generally) merchants bought slaves in Shoa and transported
Harris : “The Slave Report", para. 25.) -n MT. 11Ah  ^ < For the 1840s.IjAF. 21^00, p.487 d’Abbadxe. )
Soleillet; Voyages, p.196 )
Cecchi: M  Zeila, Vol. X, p.490. ) For the 1870s and 1880s.
Borellij op^ciU, pp. 289, 331-2. )
2 ..
ICrapf: Travels Researches said Missionary Labour, etc. p.46)
Beke: Abyssinia: A S t a t S S i ^ t o  the
transactions with the la75TB^tTslTlEEs^ of ) ^ or G^10 1840s
Shoa. 1845, p.27. (c0nt.) )
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them partly via Harar to Berbers and Zeyla or Tadjura, and 
partly via Gondar and Tigre to Massawa. Although estimates 
exist for the number of slaves transacted at I-ias saw a or Harar 
and Berbera it is impossible to say what percentage was bought 
from Shoa or directly from the sources of supply. At first 
sight Harris’s estimate that eight to ten thousand slaves 
passed through Shoa annually' would seem too high to be be- 
lieved, but it 'might well represent the total annual figure 
that passed through Shoa to the coast either directly or in­
directly via Harar and Tigre.
Onewould have expected that the campaign by Britain 
to abolish the trade in slaves which had been going for some 
decades before the opening of our period would, over the years, 
have led to a significant diminution in the number of slaves 
reaching the coast from the Ethiopian provinces. This does 
not appear to have been so, for, as has just been mentioned, 
estimates remained the same for both the first and second halves 
of our period. Indeed the anti-slave trade campaign^/ was less 
successful in East Africa as a whole than in West Africa. It 
is beyond the scope of this Chapter to attempt a detailed ex­
planation for this; and only a few general points will be made
(cont.) Massaia: Vol. I, P-139 ) For the 1850s_1880S.
Oecchx: op.crt., Vol. I, pp. 490-1;
"I
Harris: "The Slave Report", para. 16-17. Harris: The Highlands,
Vol. Ill, p.303.
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here in this connection. IJhereas the Atlantic slave trade 
was in European hands, the East African slave trade was 
mostly in Muslim Arab hands and had for its markets Asian, 
especially South Arabian, centres. So that much of the initial 
prohibitions passed by Britain and other European nations was 
technically inapplicable to the Muslim Arab traders. Anti­
slave trade treaties were signed with local rulers in East 
Africa, the most effective of which were with the Sultan of 
Zanzibar, whose African dominions were important expox^ t centres 
for the slave traders. But the possessions of the Sultans of 
Zanzibar were limited to East Africa proper and did not ex­
tend to the Gulf of Aden ports which were the outlet for slaves 
from the Ethiopian region. Anti-slave trade treaties were also 
signed with local potentates in the Ethiopian region. The 
various treaties attempted with the different princes in North­
ern Ethiopia all had anti-slave trade clauses, but those 
treaties which were actually signed remained dead letters. And 
when, after 1868, Britain, the leader of the campaign, withdrew 
completely from the Ethiopian scene for some sixteen years, the 
canpaign suffered a setback in the Ethiopian region and this en­
abled the Muslim Arab traders to continue their nefarious acti­
vities with impunity. Moreover, restrictions on the slave trade
327.
in the territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar tended to drive 
some of the traders from the ports in the Indian Ocean to 
those in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, where restrictions were 
either ineffective or non-existent. The 3©suit, one would expect, 
was that instead of decreasing the slave trade, the campaign 
in fact led to its expansion in the Ethiopian region. Further, 
Menelik's efforts to abolish the trade were, to say the least, 
half-hearted and therefore ineffective. He pronounced the trade
o
in slaves illegal but did nothing to enforce the pronouncement.
The usual problem of economic interests tied his hands and 
restricted his actions. It is true that the King and Ills Christian 
subjects were not traders in slaves but Shoa derived substantial 
revenues from the trade in the form of taxes imposed 011 each 
slave that passed through the Kingdom. Furthermore, the trade 
in slaves was in Ethiopia closely bound up with other “Abyssinian" 
products such as coffee, ivory, gold and civet. It was the same 
caravans which carried both legitimate and “illegitimate" com­
modities. While this would seem to have facilitated the efforts 
of the advocates of legitimate trade, it complicated Menelik’s
^lOL: Aden Secret Letters Received (Various) Vol. 28. Cruttenden 
to Haines 31.10.1844> p. 245* Vol. 29, Same to same 20.4*1847, 
pp. 395-6.
p
L.L.Lande: ”Un Voyageur Fran^ais", in Rev, des Deux Mondes,
Vol. 30, 15.12.1878, p.888*
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problems. Apart from the tax on slaves, the legitimate com­
modities carried by a caravan which passed through Shoa paid 
a duty of ten per cent ad valorem. So that, in Menelik’s eyes, 
to suppress the trade in slaves, the most profitable portion 
of a caravan's load,was not to encourage legitimate trade but 
in fact to discourage it, and with it, to whittle away a valuabb 
source of his income. For, he believed that the slave traders 
faced with the prospect of decreasing profits arising out of 
the outlawing of the trade in slaves, would, instead of carry­
ing more legitimate commodities to make up the balance, in
T
fact reduce their visits to the sources of these commodities. 
Looking back now, over half a century after the abolition <f 
the trade in slaves and with a disinterested eye, we may be quick 
to detect how Menelik's reasoning was faulty but it was not so 
easy for him to realise the weakness in his line of thought. For 
these reasons Menelik could not seriously contemplate abolishing 
the trade in slaves outright, although he gave wide publicity 
to his ahti-slave trade declaration and presented himself to 
the European powers as devoted to the ideals of the abolitionists.
^A.S.S.Gr.I. Cartoni Antinori to President of S.G.I.
Let-Marefia 28.10.1880. Borelli: op.cit., p.346.
This was, of course, largely propaganda designed to obtain 
firearms from the Europeans to pursue his expansionist 
policy. That this was so is reflected by the fact that 
even after the "abolition" of the slave trade by Menelik, 
and his conquest of Gurage, Arussi and the south-westerly 
Galla states which were the sources of supply, the rate 
of flow of slaves remained the same as before the "abolition" 
and the conquest. For all these reasons the number of slaves 
which passed through Shoa and Ethiopia to the coast con­
tinued to be on the same scale, possibly even increased, 
during the reign of Menelik as before.
In Shoa as in other centralised kingdoms elsewhere 
in Africa, the King was a trading monarch and took an active 
part in the kingdom's long distance trade. In those days 
in Africa, the sort of commodities that came from the long 
distance trade, especially with the coast, were such that 
only the Court and the few rich subjects could buy them.
In Shoa only the Court was rich, for, as was explained in 
the previous chapter, the wealth of aLl the subjects including 
governors and the other state officials, ms strictly con-
^See Chapter III.
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trolled by the Crown. There was no indigenous merchant 
class in the kingdom, for the Muslims who handled the long 
distance trade were "foreigners11. All that the subjects of 
the kingdom could trade in were local, products and imports 
of basic nece ssities such as salt. Trade in precious or 
lucrative articles such as gold, ivory, and firearms, was 
prohibited to the sheets by law. This despotic restriction 
was part of the policy of the earlier rulers of Shoa to 
create on effective centralised government which controlled 
the most lucrative sources of patronage. So successful was 
this policy that by the opening of our period the Ras (later 
the King) had monopoly in the trade in precious and lucrative 
imported goods.^
The pattern of royal tx’ade with the south-westerly 
countries was simple. vJhen caravans arrived from tiose countries, 
they were met at the frontier by the ICin&^ s trading officials, 
who bfought all the gold dust, ivory, civet, musk, and settled 
with the merchants the pi'ice in cloths, mules, copper and brass 
wires. The goods were then carried to the Palace where some of ^
1L& 189 Ho. 2060G. Harris 5.1.1842, paras. 16, 21, 22, 29.
Soleillet: Voyages, pp. 225-7.
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gold dust was worked up by the smiths into bars and ornaments. 
Under Menelik more and more of the gold passed out of the royal 
treasury in tribute to the Emperor. The rest of the articles 
went to swell the wealth of the Grown amassed over the years 
from which the King rewarded his governors and distinguished 
soldiers as well as financed his trade with the coast.
Information <n the royal trade to the coast before the 
reigiof Menelik is fragmentary and does not enable one to 
describe the natureOf the trade with much confidence. It is 
knoTpi that caravans reaching the coast from Shoa carried, as 
part of their load, articles over which the King had a mono­
poly. For example, the caravan by which Rochet d*Hericourt 
travelled to the coast in March 1841 carried, among other 
commodities, civet and ivory.^ It is possible that these were 
obtained through clandestine commerce in Shoa, but it is more 
likely to have belonged to the King. Also the King had agents 
who frequented the ports in both the Red Sea and the Somali 
coast for trade purposes. In 1858 Krapf met one such agent 
at Mokhaj again, on tieir way to Shoa In 1839, Isenberg and 
Krapf met that same Ageh£, Haji Adam, who brought them a letter
'Rochet d’Hericourts Voyage .<2fir la c6te oriental? de la Mer 
Rouge, p.322.
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from the King and told them that he was going on a mission
3 Nto Mokha on behalf of the King. Since Shoa had no political 
or religious relations with the ^uslim rulers of Mokha, one 
could reasonably assume that Ha ji Adam's mission?were com­
mercial. Both Sahela Selassie and Haile Malakot were on 
friendly relations with the governors of Zeyla and Tadjura, 
and Haile Malakot appears to have had a commercial agent at 
Aden. Haji Ibrahim Shehem, often referred to as the messenger
of the King of Shoa was probably not just a messenger but
2in fact a commercial agent. Haji Ibrahim Shehem, it should
I
behoted, had been a successful trader in the reign of Sahela
Selassie and ms the leader of the caravan by which the Harris
Mission returned to the coast from Shoa in Kebruary-March
1843« Harris spoke of M m  as being "high in favour with Sahla 
3Selassie'1.
During Menelik's reign the king's trade with the coast 
became more regular and the volume increased. One reason for 
this was the opening of the Sues Canal? which made prospects of
*4<rapf and Isenberg in J.R.Cr.S. Vol. 10, 1840, pp. 466^7*
e‘I0L. Aden Secret Letters Received (Various) Vol. 32. Haines 
to Arthur Malet. Aden 22.3*1852, p.41. Sameletter in KOl/7.
205 Ho. 1341 Harris 25 .3.1843, paras. 9, 13, 18.
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trade la the Red Sea area easier and brighter than before.
Another reason was the impetus which Menelik gave to the royal 
policy of territorial expansion which necessitated large stocks 
of imported firearms. Menelik’s trading contact with the coast 
which may have started soon after his reconquest of Shoa took 
a serious turn with his appointment of Cesar Tian as his 
commercial agent in Aden in the Spring of 1871. The agent 
appears to have worked hard at his post, for when Arnoux arrived 
at Aden in February 1874 on his way to Shoa, he met two of 
Menelik’s men sent there to bring merchandise to Shoa. By 
1878 Tian had been replaced by Gabre Table as Menelik's com- 
mercial representative in Aden. Sabre Takle, it should be 
noted, was one of the two ’’Shoan” officials who on the orders 
of Menelik accompanied Arnoux on the Mission to Europe with whizh 
the Frenchman was entrusted by Menelik in 1876. The other offi­
cial was «Xose|ih Regoussie who was later to became Menelik's 
interpreter, secretary and roving commercial ambassador in the 
Somali and the Red Sea ports.^
1IQLs Abyssinia Original Correspondence, Vol. 3. Menelik to 
(British) Resident at Aden dated 29 Ma azia 1863) (May 1871); 
and Resident at Aden to Menelik 30.9.1871.
p
L.L.Lande: Art. Cit. in Rev, des Deux Hondes, Vol. 30.
Dec. 1878, p.880.
(Afrique) Vol. 62. Menelik to President of France 13.6.1878,p.260.
^ASMAI. 36/— 4-Sebastino Martini. "Promemoria” dated Cairo 22.3*1877.
(cont.)
It was seen in Chapters III and IV that Menelik strove 
hard to maintain friendly relations with the chiefs of the 
Afar tribes through whose territory the routes from Shoa to 
the coast passed; and that he encouraged the French and the 
Italians to open up ports at Obock and Assab as outlets 
for the irade of Slioa. It was also suggested that this en­
couragement had something to do with the Egyptian occupation 
of Tadjura and Zeila, the ports which had hitherto been used 
by Shoa, and the blockade which was instituted there. Hene- 
lik's desire to obtain a port free from Egyptian control for 
Shoa1s trade was sharpened by the humiliating treatment meted 
out to Arnoux by Abu Baker, the Egyptian governor of Seila , 
Menelik had furnished Arnoux with merchandise estimated by 
the Frenchman at about 200,000 Francs to take to Europe as an 
evidence of what Shoa could proyide for European markets.
When Arnoux arraVved at Zeila in August 1876 all the merchandise 
was confiscated and he himself Imprisoned for three months by 
Abu Baker, Persistent appeals from Menelik obtained only Arnoux’ 
release without restitution.~ There can be little doubt that
(cont.) The two Abyssinians did not continue to Europe but 
returned to Shoa from Cairo. Joseph Regoussie’s full name- 
was Joseph George Gabra Sellassie Regoussie.
& D. (Afrique) Vol. 62. Arnoux to President MacMahon,
Cairo 6.1*1877, pp. 274, 282-3. ASMAI 36/l~4? Arnoux to 
M.A.E. Homa 10.6.1878.
the fear of a repetition of this behaviour by Abu Baker 
induced Menelik to look for ports free from Egyptian control 
as outlets for his commerce.
From about 1879 caravans carrying merchandise belonging 
to the King arrived at the coast at least once a year. The 
organisation of the caravans was the duty of Azaj Kalde Tsadek 
who, in addition to being the governor of Ankober, could also 
be considered as the Minister for commerce. Azaj Walde Tsadek 
is often referred to in the sources as the Prime Minister of 
the Kingdom. Prime Minister is probably a misleading phrase^ 
but clearly he was an important official. It is not an ex­
aggeration to say that Azaj vfalde Tsadek was in the civil ad­
ministration what Ras Gabana was in the military sphere. As 
Asa;] to the King Valde Tsadek was the administrator general 
of the royal domains. As governor of the province of Ankober 
in which the important markets of Aliu Amba and Abdel Rassul 
were situated and after April 1884, also of the province of 
Ifat, he was responsible for customs dues and market taxes and 
had general oversight over commerce with the coast and foreign 
merchants In the Kingdom. In this 1ash capacity Walde Tsadek 
was responsible for the accommodation and dirge (daily mainten- 
ance) of Europeans who visited the Kingdom.’ The multifarious
“ Cecchi; op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 421-2 andjassim. Audon: art.cit.
Bo Tour du Monde, 2e semestre 1889, p.124, 128. Soleil3sfc; 
Voyages, p. 116 and passim. Aubry; art. cit. in B. de la S. de 
Geographie 7o Serie Vol. VIII, 1887, pp. 460-1. Borelli; 
op.cit. p.85 and passim.
nature of M s  responsibility became obvious during Cecchi's 
imprisonment in Grheia when every single instruction or step 
taken :h Shoa toward his liberation passed through tfal&e 
Tsadek,***
The organisation of a caravan was a big affair and took 
many weeks. The pattern and procedure were the same for in­
dividual traders as well as for the King's trading agents, 
first of all the merchandise had to be assembled, for the 
royal agents this was easy since much of the goods consisted 
of articles over which the King had a monopoly and came directly 
from the loyal stores. It should also be mentioned that gold, 
ivory, civet, musk and other articles were paid into the~ royal 
treasury as tribute by the conquered provinces. In addition 
the King had the right of pre-emption over all articles sold 
on markets in Shoa. After assembling thenerchandise, the 
baggage animals needed to transport them to the coast were 
found before food and water for both animals and caravan guides 
were collected. All this was more difficult and more ernpensive 
for the individual merchant than for the royal agents. On many 
occasions the royal caravan was led by the Danakil chief Sheik
Abdel Rheman who ms not always on friendly terms with the 
governor of Zeila. Menelik’s own reltionship with Abu 
Baker were at times uneasy. ITeither the King nor the governor 
could afford open hostilities because their commercial in-
*]
terests required that they should not come to an open breach."
In a number of cases merchandise carried by the King’s 
caravans were transported to Jedda, Mokha and Aden for sale.
On occasions, however, they were entrusted to a European to 
take to Europe jbr sale and to use the proceeds to purchase 
firearms for the King. Such was the case with the caravan en­
trusted to Arnoux in 1876. In September 1885 a french arms 
trader Labatut was furnished with a caravan by Menelik to
p
go to Europe in quest of firearms. Again in February 1886
another '^rench trader Leon Chefneux was given a caravan and a
3similar assignment by Menelik. In 1877 when Menelik cent the 
*
Italian Martin!~Bernardi back to Italy to look for arms, he did
1The commercial activities of the Abu Baker family, the attitude 
of this family towards the Egyptian conquest and the various 
Europeans on the coast, the relationship between this family 
and the other Afar chiefs near the coast, and the effect of 
all this*bn the course of the attempts to prohibit first the 
slave and then the arms trade will require a separate study.
2
Audon: Art. cit., pp. 139 > 146.
^ASMAI 36/3-38. Maggior-Generale Gene to M.A.E. Massaua 13*4*1886. 
Audon; art.cit., pp. 146, 148.
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not give him merchandise "but provided money to the tune
of7708 thalers towards the expenses of the journey. And
when Martini returned to 2eila in 1879? Menelik sent to
meet him a caravan of one himTred and forty to one hundred
1and fifty camels, of whom forty carried merchandise.
One gets an idea of the volume of the King's trade from 
an examination of the loads carried by some of the caravans* 
The sources make it dear that royal caravans were always 
large and heavily laden. The best information, however, comes 
from Arnoux. The caravan entrusted to him in 1876 was com­
posed of one hundred and sixty-five camels, whose load con­
sisted of 2100 kilog. of ivory, 1300kilog. of civet, 6900 
kilog. of coffee, 1958 hides, twelve kilograms of musk, one 
hundred and fifty kilog. of coal (for sampling) and other 
articles such as shields embossed with silver, horses and
p
samples of minerals." Horses and coal might not formpart 
of the load of all the caravans sent to the coast by the King, 
but at least, Arnoux1 s figures: indicate the diversity and
"^ ASSG-1, Cartoni VI1I^9 Antinori. Ibid. Oartoni VIXI^(b)
Carlo de Amesaga, Comando del R° Aveso MRapido,f, in 
Havigasione 30.5 •1879♦
& D. (Afrique) vol. 62. Arnoux to M.A.E. 23/7/1878, p.267. 
Also ASMAI. 36/l-4s Arnoux to M.A.M.X. Roma 10,6.1878.
the relative volume of merchandise carried by the King's 
caravans.
Although Menelik obtained some firearms in the manner 
described above, the bulk of his stock of imported weapons 
were traded to him partly by Antonelli and the Italian Govern­
ment and partly by individual French traders, for which he paid 
party in thalers but mostly in ivory and coffee in Shoa.
The details of the flow of firearms into Shoa will be discussed 
in the next chapter; suffice to say here that firearms con­
stituted the larged; single stock of import from Hie coast 
during Menelik’s reign. By 1889 when he became Emperor,
Menelik had at least 60,000 guns of all kinds, one million 
cartridges and about one million percussion caps, and many 
barrels of gunpowder.
One often comes across letters In the French and 
Italian archives purporting to have come from Menelik and 
asking to become the protectorate of Italy or France. The 
writers or translators of those letters must have misunder­
stood the intentions of the King. Indeed one suspects that 
the question of protectorates was an invention of the European 
travellers who either wrote or translated those letters:
The French , because they saw it as an inducement to goad their
Government to back up their commex’cial efforts; the Italians, 
because they wanted a pretext for acquiring a colony, Menelik 
himself regarded his relations with Europe as anything but 
political. He was too jealous of his position and had too 
ambitious an imperial plan to have sought to become a subject 
of a foreign power. That he did not intend to give away an 
inch of his territory or an iota of his independence was shown 
by the promptitude with which he denounced the treaty of 
Uccialli when he learnt that the Italians interpreted Article 
Seventeen as implying protectorateship. Menelik’s own attitude 
to his relations with Europe was clear from the numerous 
letters which he sent to the European nations, and from the 
treaties which he signed with Italy and France. He made it 
plain in those letters and treaties that he wanted friendship 
based on commerce, industry, the arts and technology, all of 
which he wanted to see introduced into his kingdom. If he 
agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives or to avail him­
self of the services of the Embassies of his European friends 
in countries with which he lad no contact, he did so not because 
he wanted to compromise his independence but because he be­
lieved that they would facilitate the realisation of lis basic 
aims. Menelik was a nationalist with imperial ambitions himself
and could therefore not co-operate with the foreign imperialists. 
He made this clear in his dealings with Egypt and Italy when 
both countries were involved in hostilities with the Emperor 
Yohannes with whom Menelik’s own relations were, for the most 
part, uneasy. And he again demonstrated it on becoming’ Emperor, 
when his determined policy not only of consolidation but also 
of territorial expansion brought home to the European imperial­
ists that they had to sign boundary treaties with Menelik 
in order to safeguard their own olonial acquisitions.
As the boundaries of Shoa were extended and her commerce 
expanded, the wealth of the Crown increased. As initiator of 
the campaigns of expansion the Crown more than any individual 
inhabitant of the Kingdom benefit ted from the wealth accruing 
from the conquest. The Crown derived revenue from four sources: 
from royal domains, from custms dues and market tolls, from 
direct taxatj-on of the subjects, and lastly from tribute paid 
by the conquered territories. The absence of statistics makes 
it impossible to give accurate picture of the erbent of revenue 
derived from each of these sources or of the total value of the 
Crown1s annual income. Customs dues and market tolls must have 
been a very valuable source of income. Europeans who visited 
Shoa during our period remarked that on arriving at the frontier
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tom of Farre the foreigner was met by royal officials who 
took an inventory of his luggage and imposed a tax of ten 
per cent on the total value of the goods, either in kind or
i
in currency. * If on entering the kingdom the visitor decided 
to sell his goods in Shoan markets rather than carry them 
to the countries beyond the frontiers of Shoa, he had. to pay 
another tax of ten par cent for theprivilege o f selling his
p
goods in the Kingdom. In effect therefore any imported goods, 
except slaves, said in Shoa, paid twenty per cent cf their 
value in taxes to the Crown. Slave dealers, as we saw above, 
paid four arnole on each slave brought in transit to the kingdom 
and another four if sold on markets in Shoa but by the 1880s both 
the transit duty and the market toll had risen to one thaler 
each. In the 1840s market dues collected on the Aliu Amba 
market alone was put at unot less than three thousand thalers 
annually"In 1888 the value of customs dues derived from 
Harar was estimated at 20,000 thalers.^ Considering the increase
^See Chapter IV, pp*2lM+—^
2
See above, p.3i7
185 Ho. 1440 BaJfer, para. 18. LG 189 Ho. 2060G Harris, 
para. 40.
^Audon; art. cit., p.154.
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in trade both in slaves and in other articles during the
reign of Menelik, the total annual income from taxes on trade
must have been at least 30,000 thalers,
Another valuable source of income far the Grown was
tribute from the conquered and the tributary states. Much
of this was paid in ivory, civet, musk, gold, and other local
products and its value is consequently difficult to assess
in thalers. In 1886 it was estimated that about 70,000 thalers
worth of tribute was paid in hard cash annually. This figure
must have soared greatly after the conquest of Ilarar for,
on its conquest, an annual tribute of 30,000 thalers was imposed 
1on the city. Probably all of it was not paid in thalers but 
it is conceivable that part of it would be paidii hard cash.
Although nearly all the gold that Menelik possessed was paid
out by him as tribute to the Emperor, revenue which came to
him as tribute from his dependent territories annually was
probably not less than 200,000 thalers in value. It is not
surprising therefore that Mdnelilcms able to pay for the large
stocks of firearms which he imported from the coast. It is
neither an exaggeration nor an over-simplification to say that
the greatest gains to Shoa during ourperiod were in the economic field.
1Borelli: op.cit., p.214. L. Robecchi-Brichetti, "In Viaggio 
per Harrar" in N.A., Vol. XXX, Seri© III, 16.11,1890.
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Chapter 71
the > m n
The territorial expansion which has been described in 
the foregoing chapters was largely the result ox military 
action- In a few cases diplomacy or marrisgp alliances were 
used either to win over the rulers of a new territory or to 
strengthen Shoa's hold over a recalcitrant tributary province, 
but the bulk of the territorial additions was made through 
military campaigns. It is necessary, therefore, that the 
nature of the army which was responsible for these acquisitions 
should be made clear.
Plowden divides the Ethiopian society as he saw it in
the 1850s into four distinct classes; the priest, the husband-
1man, the merchant and the soldier. This division, in so 
far as it was realistic, could only apply to the northern 
provinces of the Empire, where not only rulers but nearly 
every nobleman had troops of their own. Since, from about 
1750 to Plowden’s time, wars were almost a daily affair in 
one district or another in those provinces, the armed retainers 
kept by the noblemen were constantly engaged in fighting, 
thereby becoming almost professional soldiers. Thus a distinctly 
warrior group could be distinguished in the northern society.
1C.v/.Plowden; Travels in Abyssinia, Loud. 1868, pp. 45, §8.
545.
In Shoa, however,the situation, was different. Priests indeed
there were, but apart from the priestly group any attempt
at social classification along occupational lines would be
misleading. It was seen in the last chapter that there was
hardly any indigenous merchant class in Shoa. Similarly,
there was no distinctive warrior class. A standing army
developed omty very gradually and for the most part every
subject of Shoa was at once a farmer, a soldier and less so
a trader according to the times and the circumstances. At
the initial stages of Shoa!s history, those who fought for
the ruler were naturally his kinsmen and admirers; but the
number increased and became more varied in composition as
the sphere of the rulerfe influence widened until by the 1840s
the King could put to the field a force of thirty to forty 
1thousand menA In the 1880s it was estimated that a total 
force of at least 150,000 and anything ui3 to 196,000 mon could
p
be rallied for war by the King of Shoa. Also by the opening of
I^Crapf: Travels, Researches, etc., p.55. Kocliet gf'Hericourt:
Voyage sur la c6te orientale de la Her Rouge etc., p.255.
2ASMAI 56/5-43:. Antonelli to M.A.E. Addis Abeba, 23.11.1887.
The whole of this file deals with the military organization of 
Shoa. Same document is printed in LV Mo. XV Ethiopia, as 
Doc. 131 (Annesso). It must be noted that in the copy of the 
Green Book kept in the foreign Office Library in London this 
document is 128. The copy used by the present writer to cross­
check the AS ill I material is in the Library of the kuseo Africano 
in Home. Also ASMAI 36/5-40: Antonelli to Assab 31.8.1888.
ASMAI 36/6-53: Antonelli to Crispi (the M.A.E*)> Ghedem 26.3.1889.
This despatch reports on Menelik*s movements between 16th February 
and March 12, 1889 when the news of the Emperor's death reacl$him, 
and his subsequent manoeuvres.
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our period, commitment to war had become an essential con­
stituent of Shoa's strength and prosperity for in war lay 
territorial gains, slaves and livestock. A few of the wars, 
especial3.y in the early stages of her development# may be 
said to have been defensive, but right from the time ofthe 
earliest rulers, Shoa was on the offensive.
During our period, excepting the period of the inter­
regnum (1855-65)» military campaigns were conducted two or 
three times a year hi the spring and after the heavy rainy 
season (June to September). The timing of the campaigns, 
like working on the fields, ms generally dictated by the in­
cidence of the rains. Campaigns conducted after the Keremt 
(heavy rains) were often the most serious and tended to last 
longest. This was probably because the period from the end 
of September to the beginning of January is, in Ethiopia, the 
driest in the year so that the weather was favourable to sus­
tained campaigns.
Of the army that could be summoned to the field the 
most important section was undoubtedly that which constituted the 
royal troops. These were the warriors who were under the King’s
1IOL; LG 206 ho. 1600 Graham, parag, 46. ASMI 36/5-43• 
Antonelli, Addis Abeba 23*11.1887.
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personal command during campaigns. The strength of the royal 
troops in the 1840s cannot be accurately estimated; it 
must have numbered a couple of thousand/, since it consisted 
of all the male servants in the royal palaces not only at 
Ankober but also at Angolala, Debra Berhan and ICundi where 
there were other x^ alaces* Of the ro5>-al troops there was a 
core which was estimated at this time at about sis hundred 
to one thousand men who formed the King's bodyguard.'*' This 
was the only part of the army that could be said to have 
been a standing force; it was they who were under arms almost 
permanently. in the 1840s they were said to lmve been 
divided into three groups relieving each other in rotation 
after one week's attendance at the Palace, "While they were off 
duty they were expected to be in the neighbourhood of the 
Palace so tha/b they could be summoned at a moment's notice
p
if the need arose," In any case* all the royal servants lived 
in the immediate neighbourhood of the Palace and quite a few 
even lived within the Palace enclosures. By the 1880s the 
strength of the royal troops had increased to at least 19,000 
men of whom nine to twelve thousand constituted the royal body™
1Krap>fs Travels* p.3b. Johnstons Travels in Southern Abyssinia 
etc., Vol. II, p.75*
2
Johnstons op.clt., Vol. II, pp. 76-7.
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guard. The body guard was equipped directly from the royal 
arsenal and was, as a result, the best armed in the Kingdom.
Until the 1840s?while matchlocks were the most modgrn weapons 
possessed by the ruler, it was the bodyguard who handled them.
And in the early years of the 1840s when the King came to 
possess muskets, percussion caps, pistols and cannon it was 
they who had a monopoly of their use. There was at least one 
good reason to explain the special consideration which was 
given to the royal body guard in matters of armament. Kirst 
of all, it should be understood that the bodyguard were the men 
directly responsible for the safety of the King not just on 
ordinary days but more so during campaigns. It was to be ex~ 
pected therefore that they had to be brave and devoted as well 
as well armed. Since there wa««-not enough of the improved, weapons 
to enable every warrior in the kingdom to have one, it was 
natural that preference had to be given to those on whom the 
safety of the King depended. During the reign of Menelilc, 
when the King’s stock of firearms increased, many more people 
besides the bodyguard and the royal troops as a whole gradually 
became armed with the improved weapons. However, even at this
1&SMAT 36/5-4-3s Antonelli Addis Abeba, 23.11.1887.
ASMAl 36/4™41s Antonelli to Entoto 19.9*1887.
Borelli; Ethiopie Meridlonale, p. 214, Autoto 14.3.1887.
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time the most modern and the best weapons were given to the 
bodyguard. As a result, therefore, the bodyguard or rather
the royal troops became a corps d*elite who decided the issue 
of a battle. There is frequent mention in the sources to 
the effect that the King added soldiers to those already com­
manded by a particular general and sent the latter on a cam­
paign. It was from the royal troops that such soldiers were 
drawn. Their presence among the soldiers to whom they were 
added was intended to, and did, strengthen both the morale 
and the striking power of the ordinary warriors. It hardly 
needs to be pointed out that the development of a corps d1elite 
was not peculiar to Shoa nor indeed to Africa as a whole.
The military history of many other peoples elsewhere shows 
similar development. It would seem to be a process inherent 
in the development of states with absolute rulers. In Africa, 
the Zulu empire built up by Shaka in the first quarter of the
nineteenth century and the contemporary Kingdom of Buganda
2shovi strikingly similar developments. In Buganda it led to
q
AJ5MAI 36/5-43* Antonelli, ASMAI 36/4-41. Antonelli to H.A.E. 
iSnto to 19.9.1887 -
2See 3. Hitter: Shaka Zulu (1st edition bond. 1955) passim. 
b.A.Pallers (edt.) The King's Men (bond., Hew York, Nairobi 1964J 
pp. 25-6, 110-113 and Chapters 5 and 6. M. S, Kiwanuka: The
Traditional History of Buganda, London Ph. D. Thesis 1965? Ksp.
1^ol7™2.
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significant social and political chang J6S0 As the guardsmen 
distinguished themselvesm bravery and devotion they were pro­
moted as chiefs of districts and provinces; soon this new 
generation of chiefs, progressive and well armed, found them­
selves in conflict with the older and established chiefs. A 
delicate situation was thus created which flared up in 1888 
in an uprising of the guardsmen against the conservative forces 
who at this t.ime had found a strong ally in the Kabaka.
Shaka, whose bodyguard was not as well equipped as that of 
either Buganda or Shoa, escaped one assassination attempt
at the hands of a member of the royal troops and eventually
2met his death through the instrumentality of smother. In Shoa, 
however, the Kings enjoyed the advantages inherent in the de­
velopment of a corps d*elite but escaped its dangers, at least 
during our period. This was no mere accident and the explanation 
for it is to be found in the differences that existed between 
the nature of politics in Shoa on the one hand, and in Buganda 
or in Shaka1s empire on the other hand. One source of differ­
ence was in the characters and the personalities of the various
‘Faliens: op.cit. 
>
'Hi t ■t er; op. cit.
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rulers. The three Kings whose reigns span our period were
famous for their sympathy and benevolence and their courts
were completely free from the executions and other atrocities
that were so marked a feature of the court life in Buganda
and in Shaka fs Empii’e. The comparative effect of this differ-
fence was that whereas in Shoa an atmosphere of gaiety and
mutual confidence marked the relations which existed between
the ruler and his subjects, fear and anxiety pervaded every
section of the society in Buganda and in Shaka's Empire. A
similar contract could here be drawn between Shoa and the
rest of the Ethiopian Empire during the second half of the
reign of the Emperor Theodros II. Another and perhaps more
important source of difference was the nature of succession.
This was closely linked up with the character of the rulers.
In Shoa, as has been explained in Chapter I of this thesis,
succession was hereditary and by primogeniture, so that, all
things being equal, an orderly succession was always assured.
This was an important factor for it explains why in Shoa
succession disputes and the activities of rival claimants did
not play any part in politics. Even the potentially serious 
threat which Mashaslia Seifou's relations with the Emperor
Yohamies posed for Menelik never really got off the ground.1 
^See Chapter III.
In Buganda on ilie other hand, succession although here­
ditary in one clan was elective and. succession disputes mid 
the ambitions of rival claimants were the bane of the King­
dom and had no small effect on the xxKLides of the Kabaka.
An excellent illustration of this is to be found in the reign 
of the Kabaka Mutes a; I (1357“84) . ^ Shaka* s problem was not 
su much succession disputes and rival claimants as the fact 
that he was in origin an unwanted bastard. Although born 
of noble parentage he was an outcast and his later achievements 
had no basis in his noble ancestry. The circumstances of his 
birth and upbringing haunted him throughout his life and ac­
counted for his iron determination, like Joseph Conrad's hero 
Lord Jim, to redeem himself from his tainted past with some 
noble achievement. It was also responsible for his contemptuous 
attitude towards those he considered to be made of soft mettle 
and for the summary executions to which he put those who showed 
signs of weakness and cowardice during military campaigns.
In giving free phy to dais aspect of his nature Shaka bred fear 
and uneasiness among his subjects and not least among his body­
guard. One realises therefore that the tension which tended
See Kiwenuka; Thesis cited. Vol. 2
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to exist in the political life of Buganda or Shaka’s Zulu 
Empire and which found expression and leadership in the royal 
troops was non-existent in Shoa. And its absence goes far to 
explain why in Shoa the corps A*elite remained faithful to 
the monarchs.
The ICings of Shoa were anxious to keep the goodwill of
this important section of their army and treated them extremely
well by the standard of the time. While on duty at the Palace
hie royal troops were fed from the royal kitchens and in addition
they were given what European observers considered to be a
monthly salary. In the 1840s this was three to seven amole
according to their length of service.^ By the 1880s the basic
monthly pay had been increased to four amole and seven-' doulla .
of grain. An additional six doulla of grainwas added for each
of the dependents the soldier might have. Although the soldiers
themselves received their basic military outfit from the royal
stores, they were by this time paid five, ten, fifteen or twenty
2thalers clothing allowance a year. ' Since the *£oyal troops were
^Johnston; Travels, Vol. II, pp. 76-7. 
2ASMX, 36/5-43, Antonelli.
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for the most part under arms there is little doubt that the
clothing allowance was given in consideration dT the soldiers’
wives and children. Here one has an example of Menelik’s
progressive and liberal attitude towards his subjects. As
was to be expected, the leadership of the royal troops had
better remuneration than the rank and file, at least, in the
sense that they had prospects of promotion to governorships
outside the Palace, nevertheless, it must be remembered that
there was no particular class from which this leadership was
dram. Although Antonelli says that the leaders of the body-
1guard were drama from the children of Shoan nobility, a careful 
look at wlrcvb is known of the background of some of the prominent 
leaders indicates that this was an exception rather than the 
rule. For example, Ato Berri who in the early 1840s was de­
scribed as the Quarter-Master General of the royal troops was 
originally a Muslim pedlar. Again Ato Melko who was at the period 
the commander of the cavalry division of the body guard was the
son of a petty Galla chieftain who was for a long time a sworn
2
enemy of the Shoan ruler. Similarly, Ato Kakorie who was the
XASMAX, 36/4-41. Antonelli to M.A.H. Bntoto 19.9*1887.
^IOLs LG 189 Mo, 2060 Harris 14.10.1842, paras. 29 & 40.
Turk Pasha (Basha), that is, commander in chief of the royal
1
bodyguard, in 1887 was in origin not a nShoan" but a Tigrean."
The policy of the kings of Shoa of drawing their officials from 
all and sundry was not limited to the district and provincial 
governors but was also extended to the Palace officials. Thus 
any ordinary soldier in the divisions of the royal troops who 
distinguished himself by devotion and bravery soon found himself 
in the leadership of the royal army. And quite a few of this 
leadership got promoted to district or provincial governorships 
in the newly conquered provinces. One such example was Ato Makonen: 
the brave and devoted cousin of Menelik who in the 1870s was a 
member of the bodyguard and was said to be high in royal favour. 
Makonen so distinguished himself that by 1886 he had been pro­
moted to a district governorship in the Metta Calla country and
in 1887 became the governor of the very important province of 
2Harar.
During campaigns the body guard was commanded by the King 
personally but in the absence of the King it was commanded by the
^ASKAI, 36/5-43? Antonelli.
2-h. Louis-Lande: uUn Voyageur Fran§ais...." in Rev, des Deux Mondes, 
Vol. 30, Dec. 1878, p. 896, 897. Borelli; op.cit., p.109? 236-40. 
For an interesting though not always referenced biography of Makonen 
see S. Pierre Petridess Le Heros dfAdouas Ras Makonnea Prince 
d* hthioplo, Paris 1963.
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Turk Pasha. In Ethiopia as a whole, the title Turk Pasha 
was given to the commander of a body of soldiers equipped with 
firearms; in Shoa, on the other hand, since it was only the 
royal "bodyguard who, from the beginning, were so armed, the 
title came to be applied to only the commander of this cohort.
The title was believed to have derived from the fact that it was
i
the Turks who first introduced firearms 'to Ethiopia.
ill though they were the best aimed, the royal troops were 
only a fraction of the fighting force in the kingdom. The great 
majority of the soldiers who fought in the campaigns were ordinary 
peasants normally working on the land but enlisted whenever a 
campaign ms organised. The military organization ms very closely 
linked with that of the state. Each governor, as lias been seen, 
owed the King a military duty and was expected to organize the 
able-bodied men resident in his territory to take part in the 
military campaigns. Each subject too had a duty to follow his 
governor into war. Some of the campaigns were ordered by the king, 
but others were undertaken on the governors' own initiative, 
especially to quell any rebellions that might break out in their 
territories; for, as has been shown elsewhere, it was part of a 
governor's duty to maintain law and order in his territory. Unlike
i
' Borelli; op.cit., p.154. Soleillet: Voyages, p.98.
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the practice in Buganda and other African Kingdoms where prior 
consultations with chiefs were usual, in Shoa campaigns ordered 
by the King were usually decided upon by the King alone* Never­
theless, there is evidence in indicate that in certain cases 
the King consulted with some of his chiefs before undertaking 
a campaign. For example, in the autumn of 1855 when the 
Emperor Theodros invaded Shoa the King, Haile Malakot, consulted 
with his chiefs before declaring war against the invader.'
Similarly, on 12th February 1878 when the invading forces of 
the Emperor Yohannes were already in Shoa, Menelik called a 
council of his governors and generals before deciding on the 
course of action to follow. The council decided against fighting
and accordingly the King sent envoys to the Emperor to sue for 
2
peace. However, the occasions on which such consultations took 
place were few and exceptional. A campaign was ordered for one 
of several reasons. Failure on the part of a tributary province 
to pay the usual tribute - which in fact signified rebellion - 
was one of the commonest excuses; pillaging of the caravans which 
brought goods to Shoa was another excuse for a campaign; an 
attack by an independent Gallcfa tribe against a tribe which was
^Cecchi; Da Zeila, Vol. I, p.251. 
o
^Cecchis op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 415-21.
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either subject, tributary or friendly to Shoa was yet another 
excuse for a campaign against the offending people, thatever 
the immediate pretext, each of the campaigns must be con­
sidered as part of a wider scheme of expansion, the more so 
since nearly every campaign led to annexation of new territory.
Having decided on a campaign, the King announced his in­
tentions to his subjects by causing a nagarit (kettle or war 
drum) to be beaten. The sound of a nagarlt drew large crowds
to the palace gates, since the drum was used both for pro-
1
claiming wars and for announcing appointments. The news was
then given in one of many well known formulae, as for example:
"Hear oh, he aid Tour sovereign hath enemies and
would trample them in the dust two and twenty days
from this date. Let every soldier present himself
accoutred for an expedition for one month on pain
2of forfeiting his property for seven years."
Generally this proclamation would be made at the place where 
the King happened to be, but since each gover^r in the kingdom
hoi.: LG 189 Ho. 2060 Harris 14.10.1842, parag. 36.
ASHA1: 36/5-43? Antonelli.
^I0L: LG 193 No. 2919? Harris, 10.6.1842, parag, 21.
Also LG 189 No. 2060, Harris, 14-10.1842, parag. 36.
Rochet d11lericourt: Second Voyage, p.250. ASMAI 36/5-43, Antonelli.
was expected to join the expedition, one would suppose that 
messengers were sent to give the news to the governors in the 
province. It is clear from the proclamation that soldiers 
were responsible for providing themselves with equipment and 
provisions for a campaign. Unlike the practice in the northern 
Christian provinces of the Umpire where soldiers depended on 
indiscriminate pillaging for their support during campaigns, 
soldiers in Shoa were prohibited to touch the property of 
subject or tributary peoples although they could pillage an 
enemy tribe. The provisions and weapons needed to last a cam­
paign were therefore carried by women and boys who followed 
their masters into the battlefi&ld and constituted the
j
numerous body of camp followers which was so'conspicuous a
1feature of an Ethiopian army in general. And any firearms which
might have been furnished by the governors to any of their 
followers had to be returned to tie governor as soon as the 
campaign was over.
One would have thought that the campaigns would be a bother 
to the peasant soldier, for not only did he have to provide 
himself with provisions and weapons, but he was also taken away 
from his peaceful work on the land and exposed to dhe danger of
“Arilauld d * Abbadie: Douze ans de sejour dans la haute Ethiopia, 
Paris 1S68, pp. 252-3* Cecchi; Pa Leila, Voi. I, p.357. 
ASMAI, 36/5-43* Albert Hans: UL*arme<T de Meniiki': in R. des
deux Mondes, 15*6.1896, p.871*
death no matter how slight the danger might have been. On 
the contrary, the ordinary "Shoan" found the campaigns very 
welcome since they offered him the opportunity to show lx*s 
prowess and devotion to the state. The hierarchical and comp­
etitive nature of Shoan society had this effect that each 
individual strove to excel others in valour during the cam­
paigns. This was because the greatest and most general rewards 
came as a result of courageous display in wars. This aspect 
of the military system of Shoa will be elaborated later in 
this chapter.
When a campaign was announced a rendeavous was given where
all the troops had to meet. Prom here the whole group followed
the king without any knowledge of where they were being led to,
for the Icings generally kept the destination of a campaign a
guarded secret. If the king did not himself accompany any
particular expedition, then Qiv\y the governor general or commander-
in-chief was entrusted with the secret of the destination and the
strategy of the expedition. This, it should be noted, was also
1the practice followed by Shaka. The purpose was to prevent 
any news of the impending expedition leaking out to the enemy,
b. A. Ri c ber: op * oijh. (Panther 1961 Edition) p.154.
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for the element of surprise' was one of the powerful weapons 
by which the "Shoans11, like Shaka1 s subjects, achieved mili­
tary success.
It is clear from the sources that there was not much
order or discipline during the march or when camping. At the
camp only the King and the governors slept in tents; the
rank and file as well as the camp followers had no tents and
1found shelter as best they could. This probably was the 
reason why the dry season was considered the best time for 
making campaigns; it also explains, in part at least, why 
campaigns were generally short lived, for the soldiers could 
not be so exposed to the rigours of the Ethiopian climate for 
any length of time. These two suggestions are strengthened 
by the fact that the fifth campaign organised to the Arussi 
country in May 1886 which In effect, lasted throughout the
2
rainy season, took the heaviest toll of the Shoan soldiers.
Although the campaigns were usually short lived they 
were, nevertheless, generally a great success. The explanation
1XOL: LG 189 No. 2060B Harris 29.10.1841, parag. 49.
ASMAI: 36/5-43 antonelli.
£"G-uebre Sellassie; Chronlque, Vol. I, pp. 234-7. Borelli; 
. 2 »  P-135. Traversi: MVIaggi negli Arussi1 in BSGI 
(Serie II- Vol. All), Anno XII Vol. XXIV 1887, pp. 274-6, 
See also: Ch. 3? {p. 2,o7r3above.
*7' r. O_jO tZ, 0
for tills Is to be found in two related factors. The possession
of firearms by the 1,Slioansn was undoubtedly a factor, but it
could not have been decisive until about 1880 when the supply
began to increase. Until that date matchlocks were in use,
but even this stock was limited to the royal troops who were
after all only a small part of the total fighting strength of
the Kingdom. Although Sahela Sellassie possessed pistols,
1a detonating double barrelled gun and a couple of cannon, he 
d,id not, as Rochet d'Hericourt has remarked, use them as in­
struments of war. Instead, he only put them on display during 
feast days when their frightening detonation gave the cere­
monies an atmosphere of solemnity and raised his deputation in
p
the eyes of his subjectsThe success of the Shoan campaigns 
before about 1880 must therefore be sought in factors other 
than firearms. One of the factors was the weakness of the Galla 
tribes themselves. It was remarked in Chapter I that by the 
beginning of the Shoan expansion the Calla had lost whatever unity 
they had had and had degenerated into numerous petty tribes 
mutually hostile. The effect of this was that when one of these
^See below
R^ocliet d'Herioourt: Second Voyage, p,128,
tribes was invaded by the "Shoan" soldiers it found itself 
caught between either submitting timidly to the invaders or 
offering resistance knowing full well that the odds were 
heavily in favour ox the invaders. Galling on her neighbours 
for help was usually out of the question. Even if the neigh­
bouring tribes happened to be friendly to the invaded tribes 
the former must have been generally reluctant to help for fear 
that by so doing they would themselves incur the enmity of 
the Shoan king. The result of the mutual hostility between 
the various Galla tribes was that often they found security 
and peace either as subjects, tributaries or allies of Shoa 
and were only too willing to fight for Shoa against other Galla 
tribes. By the opening of our period therefore, Shoa could put 
into the battlefield a force vastly superior to what any of 
the surrounding Galla tribes could muster.And this was the 
second factor which made for the success of the campaigns of 
Shoa. In Africa at that period when the shield and the lance 
were a common factor to both the invader and the invaded, 
numerical superiority was the determining factor on the battle 
field. And wliat with Shoa* s strategy of surprise attacks the 
a^'lla enemy was often a helpless loser. In most of the campaign 
therefore, the Shoan warriors met with virtually 110 resistance
and they massacred and pillaged their way through the enemy
territory burning down whole villages and leaving nothing of 
1worth behind.
Nevertheless, not all the campaigns were a walkover for
Shoa, for there are examples of expeditions which met with
a fierce and determined resistance. The campaign conducted to
the Kgtta Galla country in January 1840 which was accompanied
by Rochet d'Hericourt was one such example. The Galla, although
they knew that they were overmatched, fought gallantly, killing
thirty and wounding ninety of the invaders before finally ad- 
2mitting defeat. And quite a few of the campaigns conducted
in the first half of Menelik's reign met with only partial
success. This was partly because by that time Shoan frontiers 
wei'e approaching the best organised of the Galla tribes; it 
was also partly because by then campaigns were conducted on 
different fronts at the same time so that the number of soldiers 
that could be put to the field against a particular Gal'la province 
was limited. Even hi the 1830s when increasing stocks of firearms 
hod strengthened the striking power of ShoCt, it sometimes took 
more than one campaign to a particular province before the desired
^I0L. LG 189 No. 2060B Harris, 29*10, 1841, parags. 22-23.
nCi 185 No. 1440 Barker,-15.12.1841. Rochet; Sfieond Yoyage, pp. 165
174-18Q. B. N. (Paris) NAF. 10222; Massaia’s letter dated 13.2.1S79
ASMAI 36/5-43; Antonelli.
^Rochet d'Hericourt; Yoyage sur la c6te Orientate de la Her Rouge, 
etc. pp. 242, 233-255.
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success was achieved. But when it came to serious military 
manoeuvres the "Shoans" rose to the occasion and proved that 
they were not only adept in surprise attacks hut could success­
fully live up to a sustained and determined resistance, 'this 
was reflected in the battle against GrOdjam in June 1882.^
It was even better reflected in the campaigns to the Arussi 
country where the "Shoans" met with what was probably thelnost 
determined resistance in the hi stony of their kingdom. 'The 
first four campaigns conducted between January 1881 and December
188|3 met with very little success but Shoan casualties were 
2
heavy. ‘ The fifth expedition achieved success only after four
months of continuous campaigning during which the Arussi killed
r
over seven hundred "Shoans" in a single attack. And it needed
a strong garrison under lias Dargue to defeat the Arussi to a 
final submission. The success of Arussi resistance was due to 
the fact that the two factors which made for Shoa’s victories 
elsewhere were here both conspicuously absent. Unlike many of
1 f ^
Sellassie; Ghi°onique, Vol. 1, pp. 176-180,
%ellassies op.cit. ? Vol. I, pp. 171-25 209. Audon: "Voyage au 
Ohoa" in Le Tour du Honde 2e Semestre 1889, p. 146.
Sellassie; Ohronlque , Vol. I, pp. 235-6. Ti’aversi: Art Cit.. 
pp. 274-6, -------
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of the Galla tribes surrounding Shoa, the Arussi were fairly 
well organised, so that the invaders were fealing not with a 
petty tribe surrounded by hostile neighbours but with a com­
paratively united people* Moreover, since the Arussi were 
somewhat organised they were able to put to the field a force 
numerically superior to that of the invaders.^ The breakdown 
of Arussi resistance was in the final analysis due to the 
superior armament of the invaders.
It is often said in the sources that the object of the 
campaigns was to plunder the enemy1 s land of cattle, women and 
children (and to induce him to pay regular tribute) and that 
the object of a campaign was achieved if large booty in live­
stock and 11 slaves” was brought back home. Further, the rulers 
are criticised for failure to annex aad garrison the subdued
Galla tribes, and to this failure was attributed the occasional
2revolts which broke out in the peripheral provinces. This 
criticism does not stand a closer examination of the facts. As 
to the object of the campaigns, it must be noted that the em­
phasis is here misplaced* It is true that thousands of cattle 
and war captives were brought back from the campaigns; for example, 
an expedition conducted in September 1841 to the Finfinni district
*^ See Chapter III, pp. 212-3.
%ee for example: IOL LG 189 Ho. 2060B Harris, 29.10.1841, parag. 34, 
Traver$i: art. cit. in BSGI, Anno XXI - Vol. XXIV, 1887, p.272.
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(phere Antoto or Addis Ababa was later to be founded)
1
returned with 14?042 heard of cattle. Another expedition 
which was made to the Soddo Galla country in ^arch-April 1843 
returned with what must have been an exaggereated figure of 
87,000 head of cattle.2 In October 1876 when the Antinori 
Mission arrived in Shoa, the King was on a campaign but he 
returned a few days later with 17,000 to 18,000 head of 
cattle. Similarly a campaign conducted by Mashasha Seifou, 
governor of the Soddo province in 1878 to quell a rebellion 
captured six to seven thousands head of cattle, some ivory 
and three to four thousand "slaves" of both sexes.^ However, 
these must be considered as the outcome rather than the object 
of the campaigns. The real object of the campaigns, as was 
seen in chapters one and three, was many sided but did not 
include the capture of booty, although admittedly this was 
an inducement to the ordinary subject of the kingdom to take 
part in the wars.
^XOL* LG 189 Ho. 2060D. Harris 27.11*1841? parag. 1.
^Rochet d'Hericourts Second Voyage p.210.
"A
^Cecchi: Da Zella, Vol. I, p.174.
^Cecchi: op.cit., pp. 491? 497? 506.
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As regards annexation and garrison in the conquered 
provinces examples ae many. Before the reign of Menelik an 
army of occupation in the conquered provinces was rare "but 
not unknown. It was rare because the Kings did not have 
neaivLy enough soldiers at their disposal to be able to spare 
some to garrison the various provinces which had been con­
quered. Nevertheless, a new Katama (town) was built in each 
newly conquered district and given to nShoan1 subjects for 
occupation. There are numerous examples of this in the 
sources. These new toms must be seen as frontier posts whose 
inhabitants, under the shums or the governors, served as 
garrisons. This, for example, was how Harr Amba,Kundi and 
Ankober itself had originated in the eighteenth century; 
similarly this was how Angolala and Cholie,in the Soddo 
country, grew up in the reign of Sahela Sellassie, and Litche 
and ,^dis Ababa in the reign of Menelik. During the reign 
of Menelik when the number of soldiers that could be brought 
to the field had increased, garrison forces in conquered dis­
tricts became an essential element in the process of expansion. 
These forces, together with their dependants, occupied the
1
See Chapter 1.
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frontier towns and served as 021 army of occupation. The
frontier towns were usually built on an elevated spot.
There were two advantages to be drived from such a location.
First, from its higher location the town commanded a panoramic
view of the surrounding area so that any suspicious movements
of the conquered inhabitants could be detected in time and
forestalled. Secondly, the elevation gave the town an element
of impregnability against any sudden attack by the conquered
people. And as if the elevation was not enough for its defence,
the torn was surrounded by a strong palisade. . When the Metta
Galla district was enqueued in the 1870s Dandy was built as
a frontier town and was occupied by a garrison under Fitaurari
Garrado, a- chief who commanded Ras Gobanal& advance guard.
The palisade around Dandy was said to be high and entry into
]
the town was by two gates only. ‘ Galamso, the katama of
Pedjas Halda Gabriel in the Tsialsiar country, Boroma that
of Ras Dargue in the Arussi region, and Sayo, that of Fitaurari
Odadjou in hallaga were all said to have been similarly gard-- 
2risoned. Arnotix gives a lucid acoount of the location and 
1Aubry: "Due Mission au Choa et dans les pays Galla'1 in 
Bull, de la Societe de Geographic 7e serie Vol. VIII, 1887, 
pp. 472-3.
p
^Aubry: Ibid. Borelli: op.cit.s pp. 130, 229-30.
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garrison at Vi'&rra Ilu which was bu'j.lr by Menelik to safeguard 
his conquests in the hallo region. Built off an elevated spot 
and admirably fortified on all sides by high strong palisades, 
Warra Ilu was, in the middle of the 1870s, occupied by an army 
of about 40,000 men. And when Harar was conquered xn 
1887 a well equipped army of four thousand men was left behind 
under hed_^ as Makonen as a garrison. Indeed, it is clear from 
the sources that in the reign of Menelik armies of occupation 
were stationed in all the conquered provinces. A careful 
analysis of the estimates provided by Antonelli indicates 
that in the 1880s a total of, at least, fifty thousand soldiers
O
were scattered Ai the various provinces as garrison.^ It is 
inaccurate therefore to say that the conquered provinces were 
left without any garrison. The revolts which used to break 
out were not due to the absence of garrisons;,. It is certain 
that but for the armies of ofAoccupation there would have 
been more revolts than actually occurred. Incidentally, it 
was the existence of those garrisons which created the problem 
for which an answer was found in the gabbar system.
Lande: "TJn Voyageur I'rangals" in Rev, das Deux Mondeg. Dec. 1378
pp. $89-90. See also Soleillet; Voyages,'p.92.
ASI’i-Xl pS/ 5“4y Antonelli, See also Bcrelli; op. cit ♦ passing
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The general question which needs to he examined is 
what happened to the inhabitants of the conquered provinces.
The problem of the gabbar is only one aspect of this question.
No simple answer can, however, be given to the question. Nor 
military was well as political reasons it was unsafe for the 
conquering state toLeave the conquered people in peaceful 
occupation of their lands. Yet there was a limit to the number 
that could be absorbed into the society of the conquering state.
In some parts cf Africa., the solution to this problem was found 
in the disposal of the conquered peoples as marketable commodities 
to the slave traders. Such, for example, was the practice in 
Dahomey. In Shoa,on the other hand, selling into slavery xms 
not adopted as a solution to the problem since, as has been seen, 
the King and his (fficialdom did not trade in slaves and the 
slave trade was in the hands of those who had nothing to do 
with the expansion of the Kingdom. It has also been ‘seen;:that 
the Christian population of Shoa could not, by law, be sold 
into slavery. It is not inconceivable, although there is no 
specific mentinn of it in the sources, that some people adopted 
Christianity if only to escape being sold into slavery. This 
would be particularly so with the people lived near the 
frontiers of Shoa. further, it is clear from the sources that
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generally speaking peace and order was brought into the con­
quered regions as a result of Shoan expansion. It could be in­
ferred from this that as the frontiers of Shoa expanded to in­
corporate more of the regions imu which slaves were taken, the 
area of supply receded and became more and more limited. Thus,
/
j it may be concluded that, far from contributing to the expansion 
I of the trade in slaves as was the case elsewhere in Africa, 
the territorial aggrandisement of Shoa in fact helped to limit 
that trade. If the diminution was not as significant as it could 
have been it was because the indirect economic interest which 
the king's of Shoa had in the trade restricted their actions and 
induced them to condone the trade when possible.
In Shoa, the solution to the problem mentioned above was 
found in two ways, the first was, of course, that a considerable 
number of the enemy was killed off during the campaigns. It has 
been seen that it was usual for the kSlioans" to burn down whole 
villages. One suspects that quite a few of these villages 
must have had their entire population killed off. In the campaign 
conducted to the Finfinni district in 1841 which has been cited 
already the invaders were said to have killed four thousand and six 
hundred of the invaded Grail a. During the Arussi campaign of
^ICL LG 189 Ho. 2060D Harris 27.11.1841, parag. 1.
1886, a single battle fought on September 6 terminated with
six thousand and more of the Arrusi left dead on the battlefield.
Considering the fact that, with the exception of the period
1855-65, campaigns were conducted two or three times annually
it is not improbable that at least one quarter of the total
original population of the conquered provinces was killed in
the course of the conquest.
The second solution had to do with those who survived
the campaigns. Of these some were taken captives to Shoa where
they were recruited to swell the royal troops and also the troops
of the various governors. Thus there must have been considerable
population movement. The law required that war captives should be
liberated after seven years. It is known that Sahla Selassie
did liberate some of his captives. In the letter which Menelik
sent to the European powers in 1878 he mentioned that he had
liberated a number of his captives, five thousand on one occasion
and twenty thousand on another, and had sent them all back to
2
their original homes. By the time the war captives were menu-
Sellassie; Chronlque, Vol. I, pp. 236-7. Martial de Salviac; 
he QalIa, pp. 333-5- According to information given to M. de Salviac 
by the Arussi some years after the battle their losses were not six 
thousand but twelve thousand (probably must be accented only as an 
indication of how bloody the battle was).
2I0h: LG- 194 Ho. 3073 Harris to Willoughby, 20.8.1S42, parag. 1 1.
See for sample: IjLHiLo, aV. Etiopia hoc. 37? Menelik to S.M.
Umberto I, Litche 28.11.1878.
10 L: LG 204 Ho. 1144 Harris to Willoughby 30.11.1843 parag. 28.
mitted they would have begun to feel at home in their new homes. 
Those who happened to show exceptional military prowess during 
the King’s campaigns would have at least started winning royal 
favours. In such circumstances it is conceivable that some of 
the liberated cap) fives would prefer to remain in the comparative 
prosperity of the master's home to going back to settle in the 
province from which they had been uprooted for at least seven 
years.
Those who survived the campaigns but escaped capture re­
mained on the land to pay tribute to the conquerors and to form 
the peasant-soldier division of Shoa’s army. It would seem that 
it was these people who became attached to the governors and 
their soldiers as gabbars. In view of what has been said above, 
one would susp)ect, however, that much of the governor’s official 
estate consisted of unoccupied lands, that is, land whose original 
inhabitants had either been killed o;ff or taken captives to Shoa.
In any case, in Africa in those days, some unoccupied land was alway 
to be found, though it was not without an "owner” as some of the 
European imperialists were inclined to think. The conquered people 
whose villages happened to be situated in a governor’s official 
estate became his tenants and paid him tribute both in le.bour 
and in kind. Similarly if any liberated war captives returned to
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settle 011 their original lands they now became tenants of the
uShoanM governor of the district. It was by means of the pro-
ducts of these official estates that the governors maintained
their garrisons. Presumably the estate was worked partly by
the soldiers and partly by the gabbar. The gabbar system then
was a form of a compromise device by which the state catered
for the increasing number of soldiers who were gradually becoming
divorced from the land without interfering unduly with the
]
agricultural pattern and prosperity of the kingdom."
flie subjects of the kingdom joined in the campaigns not 
so pnuch for fear of the punishment, which was invariably men­
tioned in the reclamation, as for the prospects of booty and 
promotion which the campaigns offered. Two-thirds of the booty 
brought hack from the campa ign were reserved for the kirgand
2
the remainder was given to rhe governors and the irnik and file.
But it was not the booty alone which attracted the ordinary 
soldier for his share of it could not have amounted to much.
What was more attractive to the soldier was the opportunity it 
offered to show personal prowess. In &hoa, as in other African
kingdoms, the triumph which attended the return of a warrior from 
battle was dependent on the number of trophies that he brought
\dee Chapter IV p. Qltft 
2ASMX, 36/5-43. Antonelli.
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back with him. For each enemy killed in battle he was entitled 
to some conspicuous personal badge, a ring, a feather, or a 
bracelet, and with these he rose accordingly in the estimation 
of his relatives and fellow warriors. A signal success frequently 
paved the way to a royal preferment and a governorship in a
l
province. This was what the subjects aspired to and the 
opportunity to prove one’s merit came during the military campaigns.
On return from a successful campaign it was usual for the 
King to feast the whole army, probably each province a t a time.
The account given hi the sources of these feasts makes it clear 
that they were big affairs and took the best part of a day. Thou­
sands of livestock, barrels of te.j.j (beer) and numerous basket- 
fulls of injera (a kind of pancake) were consumed at each feast. 
These feasts, together with the system of rewards for meritorinus 
display on expeditions, were devices calculated to win the sup­
port of the subjects for the campaigns of expansion. The extent 
to which they achieved the desired effect was reflected in the en­
thusiasm with which the subjects welcomed the campaigns and the 
devotion with which they fought to win the battles,
I0L: LG 189 2060B. Harris 29.10.1841, parag. 34-5*
ASI-IA1: 36/5-43 • Antonelli.
2 +
Rochet d’Hericourt: Voyage sur la cote orlentale de la Her Rouge . 
pp. 153-5 (for feast held in 1840jT™*^oLeillet: Voyages pp. 104-5 
(for feast held on 26.10,1882). Aubrey: art cited pp. 463-9 (for 
feast held in Sept. I8S3). Borelli; op.clt. pp. 152-4 (for feast 
held on 17.10.1886); pp. 255-6 (for feast held early in Oct. 1887).
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There is frequent mention in the sources, especially 
during the reign of Menelik, of Gondare (or Gondaris) and 
Tigreans in the service of the King of Shoa. These ’'northerners1’ 
were said to have had both political mad military significance. 
Politically, they were believed to have been spies for, or at 
least sympathetic to, the Emperor's policy towards Shoa.
It was said that under the giise of volunteers in the Shoan 
army, they constituted a powerful pressure group both in and 
out of the Court, and that their pro-imperial sympathies con­
siderably weakened Menelik's freedom of aetin in his relations 
with the Emperor. It was believed that Menelik*s wife, Wayaero 
Taitu, herself a northerner, was the unofficial head of this 
party. The marriage between Taitu and Menelik which took place 
in April 1883 was initiated by the Emperor, with the intention,
so it was believed, of planting a person sympathetic to him
]
at the very centre of Menelik's court. *
That "northerners” held posts in the Court and in the 
provinces cannot be denied. Menelik*s principal interpreter and 
"secretary” Joseph Negoussie was by origin a Tigrean churchman
36/p™p8 An ton ell i to M.il.E. Entoto 11.5-1886.
Land©: art. cit., in Rev, des Deux Mondes, Dec. 1878, up. 890-1, 
893-
who had been associated with the Lazarites there, had later
given up religious life and had come to Shoa where his know-
1ledge of French made him an invaluable asset to the King. 
Makorie who held the post of Turk Pasha (Commander-in™
Chief of the royal bodyguard) in 1887 was also a ligrean.^ 
Similarly, Mashasha 'darkle who in 1887 was governor of the 
district of Derra and commanded a force of two thousand 
soldiers was a Tigrean.Mashasha darkie, it will be remem­
bered, was the man who, together with the Abuna Mateos, was 
sent on a mission by Menelik to the Emperor in 188?. There 
were many others including Mangasha Atikem from Agaumeder, two 
of the sons of Has Ali, the former ruler of Amhara province, 
Mashasha, son of the Emperor ThQsSjros, Dedjas Sejum and Dedj 
G-uangual, to mention only a few.^ It is, however, difficult 
to prove that they were spies for the Emperor, or even that 
they were, on the whole, more sympathetic to the Emperor than 
to Menelik. For one thing, many of them are merely mentioned 
by name without any information being given about them. And 
the information we have about some of the better known ones
Borellzi: op^rt. p. 105 An to to 19-7.1886. Propaganda Archives 
(Rome): S.R.nel C. Vol. 10 Taurin to Cardinal Massaia, TTara^  
18.7.1889-
‘-AS MAI 36/ 5-45 Anton ell i.
Ibid, An ton ell i. ASMAI, 36/4-42, Antonelli to M.A.S.,
Addis Abeba 9.10.1887. Borelli: op.cit., p.258, An to to 18.10.1887
%!assalas I.Miel , Vol. XI, p.204; Vol. XX, p.26. ASMAI, 36/5-49,
(cont.)
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is not nearly enough to enable one to say anything conclusive.
Of the pi’ominent ones named here, V/aisero Taitu was represented
1as being miti-European. If this wore true, it would probably
be the sentiment or factor which could be found to link her
to the Emperor, Tohamies ? who was also opposed to the presence
of the kuropeansin Shoa partly on religious grounds and partly
because he believed that they were Menelik’s political advisers.
Beyond this there is little else that could be said since there
is no information to indicate that Taitu was an informant for
the Smperor. Mashasha liarkie according to Massaia, was on friendly
2terms with the Smperor. If it was time, it probably explains 
why he was chosen as one of the two men sent on the mission to 
the Smperor in October 1887. And according to iylde he even 
entered the Emperor's service in 1884. The indications are
that of the prominent ones named here only Mashasha ¥arkie could 
be pointed at with some justification as having been sympathetic 
to the Emperor's attitude to Shoa. Apart from Mashasha Warkie, 
the evidence available suggests that, with the exception of
 —   , , • . .. , r : - ... . . r     —  --
-(cont.) An&onelli. Landes art.cit. in Rev, des Deux Monies, Dec. 1878 
pp. 878-9, 890-1. Sellassies Chronique, Vol. I, p.129, 18^
^See Footnote 2, p.376 above.
O  tj
Massaia;’ op.cit., Vol, XI, p.2b.
A^. B, v/ylde, '83 to '87.in the Soudan, Lond. 1888, Vol. 1, p.268.
Waisseru Taitu, all the "northerners1 named here (and possibly 
most of the northerners in Shoa) were either deserters or fugi­
tives who, for one reason or another, had fled their original 
homes to seek safety in Shoa. Besides those who fled the terri­
tories which were under the Draper or’s direct rule for their own 
offences, as for example, Joseph Negoussie and Alaka Birru, 
there were others who thought it unsafe to live there because 
of their relations with former rulers of those provinces. Among 
these would be the two sons of Has Ali and the son of the Emjjeror 
Tbeodros. Indeed, such ware Menelik’s relations with the Emperor 
Yoliannes that Shoa at this time offered the greatest security 
to deserters and refugees of all kinds from the northern provinces. 
It will be misleading, therefore, to suggest that the northerners 
who were in Menelik’s service in Shoa were political agents 
for the Emperor.
Militarily, the northerners were a great asset to Shoa, 
especially during the earlj?* years of Menelik’s reign when his 
’’Shoan” forces were not well organised. At that time the northerner 
appear to have been enlisted mainly in the royal troops and. were 
equipped with firearms. This is not surprising, because the 
northern provinces of the Empire were always better supplied with 
firearms^ so that Menelik must have found the northerners better at
handling guns than the "Shoans". In this connection it 
should be noted that enlisting people from the northern 
provinces as soldiers in Shoa had been practised long before 
the reign of Menelik. The earlier rulers of Shoa : had em­
ployed matchlockmen from the north, and Sahele Sellassie had
\ 1 
even enlisted some hallo gunmenin his service. In 1875
the northerners in Menelik's service were described as the
finest warriors in Shoa. And when speaking of them to Arnoux,
Menelik proudly remarked thus: "If I had 10,000 of those men
o
I would become the master of the whole Ethiopia". As Menelikfs
stock of firearms increased and as more of M s  own subjects
became proficient in their use, themilitary importance of
the northerners as a group diminished correspondingly* By
the 1880s the royal troops were composed almost entire^ of
war captives and fresher recruits and the backbone of the
%
provincial garrisons were mostly Galla. It should also be
noted that not all the northerners in Shoa were offenders or 
refugees. Some were men who had voluntarily come to Shoa to 
enlist in the Ming's army. This group of northerners was attrac
lOL; LG 19j Ho. 2919 Harris 10.6.1842. See also Chapter I.
2
M.A.S. M.&D (Afrique) Vol. .62 Arnoux' 3 Journal, entry for 
25-2.1875, po53.
-’Ceochis DaJfeUa, Vol. I, p.417. A3HAI, 35/4-41 Antonelli to 
M.A.M. Mntoto 19-9.1887.
to Shoa by the prospects of .rich booty that they believed 
could be obtained as a result of the campaigns of <£Cpansion.^
All the northerners, refugees, deserters and volunteers appear 
to have been constituted into one cohort, probably in order 
to prevent them from infecting the bang's Galla troops with 
ideas of sedition and rebellion..
Mention has been made of the part played by firearms in 
the Shoan con quests, be must non consider the rate at which
firearms were importedanto the Kingdom, and the effect, if any,
i
uhich their introduction had on Shoan society.
In Chapter I we saw that the early rulers of Shoa im­
ported matchlocks from the n>r:\>.$qern provinces of the Empire,
There must have been a considerable stock of these weapons in 
Shoa by the accession of Sail la Selassie although the exact 
quantity is difficult to estimate. During the reign of Sahla 
Selassie the inflow of matchlocks increased considerably. This 
was partly because by this time the eastern route from Shoa 
to the coast at Tadjura and Zeila had become frequented and it
1
Borelli; op.cit., p.175, Antoto 29*11.1386. A8KA.1, 56/5-45 Antonelli.
2
Borelli: Ibid. Antonelli; Ibid.
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is almost certain that some matchlocks were imported into
Shoa directly from the coast* It was also jpartly due to the
advent of the Europeans into the kingdom in the 1830s and early
1840s. Individual travellers made gifts of guns and other
articles to the King. But the largest single source of supply
‘was the stock brought by the Harris mission oi behalf of the
Bombay Government and that brought by Rochet d’Hericourt on
behalf of the Hrench Ministry of Mar. The former consisted
of three hundred muskets, one hundred pistols, two cannon,
fifty pounds of gun powder, five thousand percussion caps and
1one detonating double barrelled gun. 'the latter consisted, of
two cannon of four mountains each, fifty cannonballs, one
hundred shot guns, fifty pistols, one hundred broadswords,
three cuirasses, two carbines for light infantry, five muskets,
2together with their accessories.
Attempts by HaileMalalcot and the governors of the Inter­
regnum to secure supplies of firearms from the Europeans on
3the coast appear to have met with no success. Similarly,
110L. LG 195 Mo. 3197 Harris 1.8.1842. ICrapf: Journal of 
Isenberg and ICrapf, p.344. Rochet d'llericourt: Second Voyage, p.344.
-,-1 ’ ■ ■■ 1 ~ ., * . . 1 . ^
M. & D. (Afrique) Vol. 13, p.298. Rochet d'Hericourt:
op.cit., pp. 127“8.
3See Chapter II.
Menelik*s early efforts to get firearms from the coast met
1with a dismal failure. It was not until about 1875 that 
the flow of arms into Shoa re-started. It has been assumed 
that Menelik derived some arms from the Khedive of Egypt. 
Pankhurst has even refeinred to the mission of Has or Alaka 
Birru (Bourru) and that of a certain Boghos fronkenelik to
i
the Khedive with the purpose, at least in part, of getting 
firearms. And, quoting from Douin, the official historian 
of the khedive*s reign, he has pointed out that the first batch 
of arms to Hen el die was despatched from Egypt on September 19.,
p
1875. That Menelik sent missions or messengers to Egypt 
cannot be denied; but, while Douin*s statement about the 
despatch of the firearms may well be true, it should neverthe­
less be pointed out tint the arms in question do not appear to 
have reached Menelik. It should be noted that Ras Birru on 
his return journey from Egypt to Shoa travelled with the 
Hgytian expedition intended against the Smperor of 'Ethiopia, 
which was led by Munsinger Pasha and which was killed almost to 
a man by some Afar tribesmen; Munsinger and Ras Birru were among 
those who died. Moreover, Arnoux^who recorded the arrival in
cl
1 ~See Chapter ILu
2..
xt. Pankhurst-: •'•lPirearras in Ethiopian History (1800- 1935) 11 
■in Ethlopian Observer, Vol. VI, No. 1962 p.150.
: M. &D« (Afrique) Vol. 62, p.375? Arnoux* s journal 
for 26.12.1875. Also see Chapter II^
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Shoa of messengers from the Khedive with letters to Menelik 
in January 1876^does not say anything to indicate that they 
brought firearms with them. Yet the circumstances were 
such that Arnoux could not have omitted to mention them, if 
arms had been brought.
It will be boring to record every single occasion on 
which guns, pistols or rifles were brought to Menelik, and only 
the important stocks will be mentioned in the account which 
follows, fhe purpose behind this enumeration of figures is not 
to try and calculate precisely how many rifles or pistols or 
other kinds of firearms Menelik possessed. Indeed it will be 
Impossible to cjo this since not all the stocks which came to Shoa 
are known; even,of those that are known the exact quantity 
of some are not known. The reason for' recording the stocks known 
to have reached Shoa is partly to give an :dea cf the rate of in­
flow of firearms cud partly to bring out some of the sources and 
the methods by way these firearms came into the kingdom.
Between the autumn of 1876 when the Italian Geographical 
Expedition led by Antinori reached Shoa and November, when Martini 
and Antonelli arrived in the kingdom, Menelik received a total of
M. & D. (Afrique) Vol. 62, p. 376 Arnoux1s Journal, entry 
for 13,1.1876. Also Lande, 2nd Art. in Rev. deS Deux Monies, 
Vol. 31, 15.1.1879, p.380.
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four hundred and forty seven shot guns, rifles, pistols, cannon,
1
and at least twelve thousand cartridges from the Italian sources, 
With the entry of Antonelli into the scene the flow of 
arms into Shoa assumed marked proportions. It was seen in Chapter 
III how he contracted privately to supply Menelik with two thou­
sand Remington rifles and how this was fulfilled on his return 
to Shoa late in 1882 as an emissaiyof the Italian government. On 
this visit Antonelli is believed to have signed another private 
contract with the ICing to furnish him with fifty thousand Reining-
p
tons, but how much of this was actually supplied is not clear.
For Antonelli!s secondofficial mission to Shoa on behalf of the 
Italian government in 1884 three hundred and ninety sis pounds*
worth of firearms were brought from a London firm of gun manu-*
facturers and sent on direct by the manufacturers to Aden from 
where they were forwarded on April 21, en route to Shoa. The
stock consisted of a totaLof twenty one rifles and revolvers and
3seven thousand cartridges.
^C. Giglio; L1Italia in Africa (Roma 1956), Vol. I, pp. 138, 144-5» 
ASSGrI: Cartoni VIE (c) Cabinet to Particolare di S.H. il Re
d*Italia ai Presidente della SCI. 27.2,1877; Cartoni VIIB 
Antinori to President of SCI, Let-Marefia 9.6,1880. Antonelli 
to his family Let-Marefia, 29.5*1880 in BSC!» Serie II, Vol. V,
1 8 8 0  p . 4 5 8 .
‘“Giglio; op .eft., Vol. T, p.273-4.
/ASMAI; 36/2-21; Cuunt ITigra (Italian Ambassador in London) to 
Hancini dated ^ondon 12.4*1884. Ibid. Bienenfeld (Consul in 
Aden) to Hancini, Aden 16.4,1884-
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The number of firearms sent from Italy to Shoa between
1883 end 1888 is difficult to pin down. A list of "gifts" drawn
up In February 1888 and intended to be laken to Shoa by Ragazzi
who was then back in Italy included six million percussion caps,
1
one and a half million car* bridges, and two machine guns.
Four days earlier the Ministry of War had reported to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that one thousand Remington rifles 
and 150,000 cartridgesknfended for Menelik had been packed 
into eighty cases and were at Naples awaiting embarkation for
p
Aden. " It is not known to the present writer whether or not 
this stock and the proposed list were in fact sent to Shoa.
The Indications are that they were not dispatched, for when 
Ragazzi finally left Assab for Shoa in September he carried 
with him only sixty-two Remington rifles and six thousand cart­
ridges which were sent to him by the Commander1 at Massawa on 
the orders of the Ministry of War. Ragazzi's request for 80,000 
cartridges for Menelik was turned down by the Ministry of War 
on the grounds that, since Menelik had refused to attack the 
Smperorj itwas prudent to wait a little and see what his real 
intentions might be. The refusal and the explanation for it 
were both subsequently approved by the Ministry of Foreign
^ASHAJ.; p6/5”45o Kinistero della R. Casa. Elenco dated 7*2.1888.
2ASHAI; 36/5-45. H. della Gtierra to 3.2.1888.
Affairs.^
About July 1888 when Ras Areya Selassie, the son and 
heir of the Emperor Xohannes, died, Menelik1 s chances of
p
succeeding to the Imperial throne became very great. In view 
of this Antonelli left Shoa in August for consultations in 
Italy. He returned to Addis Ababa on January 22, 1889 with 
instructions to sign an immediate treaty of friendship with 
Menelik should the latter become Emperor, and brought with him 
four thousand seven hundred Remington rifles and 220,GCO cart­
ridges. In addition he carried as gifts to Menelik, Ras Dargue, 
Ras G-obana, Dedjas Makonen, Azaj v/alda Tsadek and two other 
nobles a total of two hundred and sixty-eight guns of various 
descriptions and about two thousand cartridges.''*
Although the word "doni" (gifts) was often used in the 
Italian official circles in relation to the firearms sent to 
Shoa, it should be noted that with a few exceptions, which were 
comparatively insignificant in number, all the stocks were paid
1ASMAI. 14/1-6. M. della Guerra to M.A.E. 21.2.1388. K.A.S. to 
della Guerra (ufficio d1Africa) 27.7.1888.
2See Chapter III, P P . ^ - l W o
/ASIhll, 36/5-46; Telegramma (Antonelli) to Governor of Assab 
dated Roma 29.9.1888  ^ Ibid, Antonelli: nNota dei doni per 
8.M. Menelik II, Re di Scioa", same date. Also Sellassie: 
Chronic; ue Vol. I, p. 256, footnote 15.
1for by Menelik in ivory and other "Abyssinian productsuh
The use of the word "doni" was only a diplomatic subtlety
intended to get the better of the attempts which were then
being made by Britain to get the European powers concerned
to put a ban on the arms trade into the interior of Africa*
These attempts will be discussed later*
Apart from the Italians, Menelik had other sources from
which he derived firearms. As had been the case in the reign
of his grandfather, the King obtained gifts of arms from
the European travellers who visited the Kingdom. For example,
a little over four teeks after his arrival in Shoa, Borelli
noted that he had given the King thirty-five of his p ersonal
2firearms as gifts. Admittedly arms received from this source 
could not have been much, nevertheless, considering the number 
of Europeans who visited Shoa during Menelik*s reign, the 
stock must have been considerable. Also when Menelik conquered
-1
See for example ASMAI 36/2-17: Menelik to Antonelli, Entoto 
8*5*1884 where he wrote: "J*enverrais le prix entier de
fusils avec la seconde caravan©• Je feral de maniere de pouvoir 
contenter et vous et le Gouvernement Italien." Same doc. in 
LV XV Etjopia as Doc. 74 (Annesso l).
ASMAI 56/5-2.8; Antonelli to R. Oommlssario Civile in Assab 
dated Hoff(sfrata) 19*1.1886. "Prima di lasciare lo Scioa 
incaricai il sig. Cesare Yiscaroli di condurre In Assab una 
carovana di avorio di" S.M* il Re che mi fu data come parte 
del denaro che deve a me e ad altri. 1 denti erano 966 del 
peso di 5599 rotoli.5* Antonelli left Entoto on Dec, 1C. 1885 
with Menelik for Borumeda where the king was to meet the Smperor 
Yohannes.
See also: Chapter Y, pp. 3 3 ,^
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Harar, lie took possession of the firearms vrhich had been
left to the Emir by Major Hunter who had supervised the
evacuation of the Egyptian forces. The exact quantity of
these arms is not known for certain. Borelli put the number
at 6003000 cartridges, three thousand shrapnels and four
Krupp Cannon, adding that the Cannon were left behind for
1
the use of the Shoan governor of Harar.
./mother valuable source of supply of firearms to I-lenelik 
besides the Italian Government was the individual arms traders, 
mostly Fx'ench. Most of the Frenchmen who visited Shoa during 
Menelik's reign traded in arms, but the most important of them, 
were Chefneux, Soleillet, Bremond, Labatut and Savoure. Between 
thorn these five Frenchmen sold several thousand guns, pistols 
and rifles to Menelik between about 1882 and 1889. Soleillet 
and Labatut both died in 1886 but the rest continued their 
activities into the 1890s. It is, however, impossible to give 
the exact figures of the firearms which reached Shoa. The figures 
available were taken either in Aden or in one of the Somali 
coast ports. Though it is probable that all the stocks mentioned 
at the.coast reached Shoa intact, the known hazards of the 
journey from the Somali coast to Shoa make one hesitate before
Borelli; op.cit., p.214 Antoto 14.3.1887, p.266. Bienenfeld,
(cont.)
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admitting this probability. Oil the other hand, there is no 
otfegr way of arriving at a near satisfactory estimate since 
very few figures are given from Shoa itself. In the account 
which follows, therefore, it will be assumed, unless otherwise 
indicated, that the figures given at the coast all did reach 
Shoa.
On his first journey to Shoa (1882-4) Soleillet was 
reported by the British Consul in the Somali coast to have 
sold Menelik two hundred breach-loaders and two thousand muskets 
In February 1886 a consignment of military material belonging 
to Soleillet became the subject of correspondence between the 
British andthe French Residents in Aden. The British Agent, to 
whom an application for trans~sh:ipment permission was made, 
insisted on refusal while the FrenchVice Consul continued to 
plead for Soleillet. Eventually, however, the stock, consisting 
of two thousand one hundred rifles, 300,000 Remingtn cartridges
(cont.) probably basing his account on information from 
Sacconi, liis agent in Harar, reported that Menelik took with 
him to Slioa two excellent Krupp cannon, two mountain cannon and 
an unspecified quantity of ammunition. ASMAI; 8/l-2. Bienenfeld 
to General Gene, Aden 12.2.1887. According to the Editor of 
Sellassie's chronicle, (Chronique I, p.248 footnotes 10 and 11) 
Menelik took away two million cartridges but left behind two 
krupp cannon for the use of his governor of harar.
^F.G. 78/3497: Major Hunter to Resident in Aden, 27.11.1882,
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twelve pistols and one case of gunpowder, was given the re-
]
quired licence and was accordingly trans-shipped. ' Soleillet 
died before the consignment could be taken to Shoa and it was 
not until 1887 that the stock was despatched from Ambadu for 
Shoa.
In February 1883? the British sources reported that war­
like material to the value of 36?000 francs had been'embarked 
at Marseille to the address of Jules Bremond in Aden. The 
consignment was landed at Oboclc in March and according to Bre­
mond himself consisted of six thousand rifles and their accessor­
ies ; for which he had already received an advanced payment of 
about 80?000 francs from Menelik. In May? Antonelli reported 
from Ankober that Bremond? who had written to the King to
announce his arrival? was expected there any time with the six
2 \ thousand rifles in question. Again? earlyin February 18S9
an Italian resident in Marseille reported that Bremond had em­
barked on the gunboat "Saghalien" on January 27? with two thousand 
and five hundred Remington rifles and a quantity of ammunition
F.0. 78/3972: Brigadier General gogg to M. Gaspary? Aden, 19.2.1836;
M. Gaspary to Brgadier General Hogg? Aden, 22.2.1886; Brigadier General 
Hogg to M. Gasparay? Aden. 23.2.1886. Mote that Stark!e mistakenly 
put these references in F.0.78/3971.
o
"F.0. 403/81: Friend of British Government to F.Q. Marseilles 6.2.1883. 
Bremond: "L1 Mxp edit ion Scientific et commercial© dl0bock,tin 
L* Exploration. 1883. ASMAI 36/2-11: Antonelli. Report dated 
Aiikober 22.5.1883.
intended for Shoa. This consignment, it was added, was only 
part of a large stock and that the rest had "been parked into 
sixty cases which were to be embarked for Obock on the '■Amazone1' 
due to leave Marseille on February 12. Upon the orders of 
the*Italian Foreign Ministry the Italian Consul in Marseille 
verified and later confirmed the report, but he pointed out 
two days later that the sixty cases were left behind when the 
uAmazone" sailed from Marseille on February 12. It is certain 
that by the time the two thousand and five hundred Remingtons 
arrived In Shoa Menelik had already become Smperor of Ethiopia 
as a whole.
Reports from Aden reveal that large stocks of military
material were transhipped from there to the Somali ports en
route to Shoa between Februaiy 14* 1885 and 1st February 1886
by various merchants. The list shows the following: On February
14, 1885 Capitain S. Pino secured a transhipment licence for
two thousand and one hundred and ninety seven rifles, six re-
volvers, one sword, 292,000 percussion caps, four hundred
pounds weight of lead, 40,000 cartridges balled, and one thousand
2
two hundred cartridges for the revolvers. The arrival of this
14/1-3: Anonymous to M.A.E., Mar sigh :L a 4.2.1889. 
Simondetti to Crispi, Marsig’lia 10.2.1889. Same to Same, 
Marsiglia 12.2.1889.
2
F.0. 78/3972: Brigadier-General Hogg to Secretary to the Bombay 
Government, Aden 22.2.1886. ’Statement showing the consignment
(cont.)
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1
consignment in Slioa was reported by Audon about September 1885.
Pino, it is interesting to know, was a regular officer in Has
Gobana's army. He had received an advanced payment of six
thousand thalers against firearms which he was unable to supply,
and being also unable to refund the money he had been detained
2
in the service of the Ras for indebtedness.
On February 17, 1885 a certain M. Loses transhipped 150,000 
percussion caps and six hundred carbines. Cn 27th June of the 
same year a transhipment linence was Issued to Savoure to cover 
a consignment of 30,000 cartirdges, 60QQ00 percussion caps, three 
thousand muskets, twenty four guns, three thousand safety 
cartridges, two hundred sword blades, two hundred pounds weight 
of lead and two hundred pounds of gunpowder. The arrival of 
this stock in Shoa was mentioned fry Antonelli in a letter to
A
the Italian Foreign I-linister In May of the following year.
On 21st January 1886 Labatut transhipped tiro thousand two hunclred 
and thirty fusils. Two days later he transhipped 194?000 cartridges
"Audon: Voyage au Choa" In Le Tour du Monde, 2e Sernestre I88S9, p. 139.
Also ASMAI: 36/5-46: Pino to De Simone, dated Falle (Ville Galla) 
30.12.1887.
A^SHAI 36/5-46; Pino to De Simone cited. ASMAI 14/1-4: Alfierihs 
letter to the newspaper "Oorriere di Hap oil" issue for lOth-llth 
February 1SS9.
^F.0. 78/3972; Hogg to Secretary to the Bombay Government Aden 
22,2.1886; "Statement...” cited. ASMAI 36/3-28; Antonelli to 
M.A.E. Entoto 11.5.1886.
(cont.) of Arms, ammunition, military stores etc. transhipped at 
Aden for Obockfrom 14th February 1885 to 1st February 1886,"
balled, and 80,000 percussion caps. Again on 1st February he 
transhipped another three hundred and fifty eight fusils,
1two hundredweights of lead, and four thousand cartridges balled.
Rimbaud on his journey to Shoa in 1886 carried for sale to the
2
King eight hundred rifles. In addition to all these, there 
were the stocks furnished by Chefneux for which there are no 
figures but which must have been as large as those supplied 
by either Savoure, Bremond or Labatut. By 1889 when Menelik 
became Smperor he had, according to figures cited in the foregoing 
pages, a total of six cannon, forty pistols, 11,692 guns of various 
kinds, 21,726 rifles, 972,000 percussion caps and 1,969,000 cart­
ridges. Considering the suggestion that all this was only a portion 
of what he must have had, Menelik had enough firearms to equip 
at least, half c£ the overall total fighting force which Shoa 
could put to the field.
It is clear from the foregoing paragraphs that throughout 
the 1880s firearms werepoured into Shoa by individual arms traders 
despite the efforts by Britain to prohibit the arms trade into 
Africa. The question of prohibiting the arms trade is beyond 
the scope of this chapter and only one or two of its relevant
L ’.O. 78/3972; Hogg "Statement..." cited.
2
~L. Starkie: Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia, Oxford 1997, p.80,
issues will be discussed here. The attempt first to limit and
then to prohibit completely the inrportantion of firearms into
Africa started, as far as it applied to the North-Eastern
part of the continent, about 1884. In this^as hi the anti-slave
trade campaign^the initiative was token by Britain ^ who ms
quick to realise the danger that unrestricted importation of
firearms into Africa entailed not only for individual European
travellers but also to the governments in their efforts to
acquire colonies. The important x^ oint to note about the two
agreements signed in December 1884 and November 1886 between
Britain and France was that it aimed, in effect, at preventing
the Somali and Afar tribes bordering on the jKiris controlled
by the Surox^ ean powers from getting firearms. It did not thus
refer to the index>endent ruler of the Ethiopian Empire or the 
1King of Shoa. This was a loophole which was cleverly exploited 
by the French arms traders to obtain transhipment licences.
This weakness in the Agreements was brought to a head in 1888 when 
the French authorities, in answer to British protests about the 
liberal issue of licences, argued that "the terms of the agreement 
(of 1886) appeared to (the French Foreign Minister) that they are
not prohibitive of the transport of arras and powder either to
Shoa or Abyssinia through territories under French or English
protection on the coast.1 M. Flourens agreed that it was
politic to prevent the acquisition of European arms of precision
by the neighbouring' chiefs of small and barbarous o countries
but pointed out that both the Emperor of’Ethiopia and King Kenelik
of Shoa were powerful independent princes possessing considerable
military forces which could practically not be prevented from
being equipped with European firearms. Ho observed further that
the troops of the Emperor were equipped with repeating rifles
which were not of French manufacture or obtained through French
agency, and remarked that if the Ethiopian princes did not obtain
war material from that portion of the coast which was under French
or English protection they would get it from Italian or other
Asources of supply." It was necessary, in view of the French
argument, that amendments had to be made in the existing agreement, 
or that a new agreement altogether was to be negotiated to meet 
as many contingencies as possible. While discussions were going 
on towards this end French traders, taking cover under the loop­
holes In the existing agreements, continued to pour military material
"F.O* 78/4161. Lord Lytton (British Ambassador in Paris) 
to Lord Salisbury, dated Paris 28.S.1888 (reporting the substance 
of on interview with the French Foreign Minister),
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into Shoa. In October 1888 it was estimated that Henelik had 
"at least 50,000 men equipped with European firearms of all kinds” 
and a good stock of ammunition and accessories.*^ *
The flow of arms into Shoa had important and advantageous 
political effects for the Crown. In the first place the possession 
of firearms strengthened the King’s hold over his subjects. As 
has been seen/' the royal troops were all to a man equipped with 
firearms and the military review which was held on feast days 
at least once a year, must have impressed the subjects with 
the formidable display of royal firearms. The possession of arms 
was a military advantage which the King was careful not to lose. 
Unlike the Itabakas of Buganda who were unable to prevent firearms 
from reaching their neighbouring states of Bunyoro and Ankole, 
Kenelik succeeded in keeping the arms out of the reach of his 
G-alla enemy. He did this by imposing a strict control over the 
movement of firearms into his tributary territories and into 
the lands beyond his frontiers, so that, as Traversi noted, 
travellers who wished to visit any part of Menelik’s kingdom had 
to have his permission in order to carry firearms even for their
p
own personal protection.
^ASMAI p6/5--50. Ant anelli to M. A. H. ? Assab pi • 10.1888.
AASSGIi Cartoni VIII D, Traversi’s letter dated Let-Karefia 10.4.1838.
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In many parts of Africa, the expansion of a nuclear group 
to create a strong centralised sta^e generally entailed the 
development of a new class of aristocrats who ^ traditionally 
had no rights to office or positions of influence and power. 
Members of this class depended on the ruler for their positions 
and in general tended to be devoted to his interests. This 
development often had far reaching social and political conse­
quences . In Buganda for example, as has already been mentioned, 
the new aristocracy, armed with the gun and progressive in 
outlook, came into conflict with the conservative forces as 
represented by the traditional aristocracy, the chiefs of the 
various clans. In Shoa, a new aristocracy indeed'developed 
but the social effects of its development was somewhat different 
and the introduction of the gun therefore did not have the re­
volutionary pDoliticftf effect which it had in Buganda. Apart from 
the royal family there was 110 other group of people with tradi­
tional rights to power. The church, of course, had traditional 
rights and privileges which were respected by the Kings of Shoa, 
but the Church as a group played no direct part in the political 
life of the kingdom. Early in the history of Shoa, one could 
distinguish, especially among the Amhara of Mans, families which 
could claim traditional rights to govern certain districts. But
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as has been seen, these traditional claims were gradually 
destroyed by the rulers of the rising kingdom until by the 
opening of our period there was hardly any Amhara family with 
traditional claims'to offices. Similarly, when a G-alla tribe 
was conquered,its traditional rulers were removed and the tribe 
was constituted into a district or a province of Shoa administered 
by a governor appointed by the Shoan ruler. As we have seen 
elsewhere, this governor's security of tenure depended on his 
retaining the confidence of his master; loss of the master's 
confidence entailed deprivation and often imprisonment for the 
governor. There was not even the guarantee that the personal 
property of a governor would descend to his children and family 
for, as has been seen already, the Kings of Shoa resumed possession 
of the wealth of any of their officials who either died or lost 
royal favour. This policy of centralisation was so successful 
that Shoa in our period ms, to all intents and. purposes, a- caste- 
less society. The success of this policy is to be explained by 
a number of related factors all of which have been discused in 
the course of this study, and may here only be briefly summarised. 
The weakness and the mutual hostility of the surrounding G-alla 
tribes meant that often they found security in linking themselves 
with Shoa, their stronger neighbour. The effect of this was that
401.
the Galla subject s, finding protection in Shoa, tended to he 
very devoted to the Grown and Its provincial officials. And 
the ruler's policy of encouraging such devotion with lavish re­
wards and of punishing lefruction severely had the effect of 
welding the subjects to the interests of the rulers.
An important result of the success of royal absolutism 
was that in the Shoa of our period the conflict between the 
social classes which occurred in some expanding kingdoms in 
Africa was avoided. It was avoided because .the whole aristocracy
x
in Shoa was the creationbf the Kings and could be ruined, all without
exception, at the will of the Crown, llo section of the aristocracy
had any basis in tradition and therefore as a group the aristocracy
had nothing in common to defend against the absolutist tendencies
of the Crown. Gn the other hand, the one thing they had in common
was to safeguard their individual selves by serving the Crown
faithfully. The effect of royal absolutism was not only political
but also economic. As a result of the Crown's iron control over
everything in the kingdom, it was only the crown that really grew
rich, both ii liquid and In real assets, from the economic effects
of the expansion of Shoa. Individual governors grew rich In 
lands and in livestock but their wealth died with them, and
even while alive, their wealth remained theirs only for as long
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as they retained royal confidence. It may he said, therefore, 
that in Shoa It was individuals mad not groups, either families 
or clans, that mattered in public life. Here, incidentally, is 
to be found one of the essential differences between Shoa and 
other contemporary African kingdoms with which, otherwise,
Shoa had much In common. In Bugauda or the Alcan societies, 
unlike in Shoa, individuals and clans were almost equally Important 
in public life, for the success of an individual redounded to the 
credit of his family or clan as a whole and Increased both the 
prestige and power of the family and clan In the state.
Politically as well as economically the nature of royal 
absolutism in Shoa was to have far-reaching effects on the 
Ethiopian Empire as a whole. When in 1389 King Menelik of Shoa 
became the Emperor of a milted Ethiopia, the system of admini­
stration, both military and political, which had teen so success­
fully applied in Shoa was gradually extended to cover the whole 
Empire, despite the formidable opposition which had to be met 
from the established nobilities In the northern Christian prov­
inces. And with this extension the social and economic pattern 
of the Empire gradually became "shoanised^. The Shoan system 
of administration, of course, had its disadvantages; among these 
was the fact that it tended, politically to stifle individual
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initiative, and economically to suppress free enterprise in 
the most profitable trading spheres. This would, in part at 
least, explain why the political and economic life of Ethiopia, 
which did not experience what present day African politicians 
would call the baneful effects of colonial rule, was what it 
was until the reign of the present Emperor.
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EPILOGUE
The development of Shoa which has been reconstructed 
in the foregoing chapters reached its climax in 1889 when 
Menelik, the king of Shoa, became the Emperor of the whole 
of Ethiopia, and Shoa, once again, became the centre of 
the Empire, The policy followed by Emperor Menelik and 
the methods by which that policy we£g put into execution are 
well known to students of Ethiopian history. What is not 
nearly so well known is that neither the policy nor the 
methods originated in or after 1889. Both had their origin 
in the years during which Menelik was king of Shoa.
The Kingdom of Shoa over which Menelik ruled from 1865 
to 1889 had been built up by eight generations of his an­
cestors, The military offensive of these rulers against 
their Galla neighbours was part of a general process, which 
went on all over the Christian provinces of Ethiopia, by which 
Amhara culture was saved from destruction during the period 
of the decline of the Imperial power. The first five rulers 
of Shoa set the stage for their successors. Taken together 
their period was marked more by conquest than by administrative 
organisation. However, the need to organise the conquered 
provinces into some form of administrative pattern did not 
escape the early rulers, and a rudimentary governmental structure
was established. Wassen Saggad (1808-12), the sixth ruler 
of Shoa, carried both conquest and administrative organisation 
a stage further. The achievements of Wassen Saggad's reign, 
which lasted only four and a half years, were surpassed in 
importance only by those of Sahla Selassie and of Menelik.
Among other things, by adopting the title of Has, Wassen 
Sagged took the first step towards breaking all the political 
ties which had subordinated Shoa to the decadent imperial 
authority at Gondar.
When our period opens in 1813 Shoa was independent of 
the Emperor in all but name. Sahla Selassie who succeeded 
Wassen Saggad as ruler completed the process of Shoan inde­
pendence by adopting the title of Hegus (iSag) without seeking 
the approval of the authorities at Gondar. It was during 
this reign that all that was noble in the aspirations of 
the Shoan dynasty came to light. The wars of Nagassi and 
Sebastiyos, the first two rulers of "Shoa", had been limited 
in aim to securing an influence over the few Amhara people 
who still lived in Manz and who were surrounded by Galla. Their 
successors initiated campaigns against the Galla and succeeded 
in conquering many Galla tribes. Sahla Selassie's control 
over the Amhara of Manz was almost complete and his influence
on the conquered Galla was great, so he sought to advance 
his conquests to Guraghe and the Galla country to the south-west 
of Shoa. His aim was to re-unite all the provinces which had 
£>rmed part of the medieval Christian empire of Abyssinia.
This was a stupendous task the achievement of which required 
great military and organisational abilities. Sahla Selassie 
possessed these qualities and many others equally admirable.
He was kind and benevolent and his concern for the welfare of 
his subjects impressed the Europeans who visited his kingdom.
For his time and country Sahla Selassie was, without doubt, an 
enlightened ruler. With all his qualities, however, Sahla 
Selassie could not achieve the difficult task of re-uniting 
the scattered provinces of the former Empire. His country, 
his manpower resources and armament were too limited to have 
enabled him to achieve his ambition. Nevertheless, his contri­
bution to the development of Shoa should not be under-estimated. 
Sahla Selassie built in Shoa a polity which was distinguished 
by justice, peace and security. Under these conditions his 
subjects were able to pursue their variuus occupations without 
fear for their security and safety. The effect of this was to 
make both agriculture and commerce expand and prosper. Ultimately 
it was the Grown which really benefited from the atmosphere of
peace, security and prosperity which, existed In Shoa. The 
subjects came to regard their welfare as linked with the 
interests of the Crown; for this reason they gave the Crown 
loyal support in its policy of conquest and expansion, and of
maintaining the independence of the kingdom. It was the loyal 
support which the "Crown” enjoyed from the subjects which en­
abled Sahla Selassie to severe the political ties which had 
made Shoa a dependency of the Empire. More important, it was 
the loyalty of the subjects and the community of interest which 
existed between the subjects and the Shoan crown, which urged 
the "Shoans" to resist and ultimately to overthrow the govern­
ment imposed on them byBiperor Theodros when the Emperor con­
quered Shoa in 1855-6.
From the point of view of the imperial authority the 
emergence of Theodros was a step towards revival; for Shoa 
(and the other provinces of the Empire) on the other hand^ the 
conquest of Theodros was a definite set back since it aimed at 
destroying her independence. In the history of modern Shoa, 
the period 1855-65 was an anti-climax. Not only were no new 
territories conquered and in fact there was a danger that the 
peripheral districts would actually break away. The strong 
leadership which the country had had under Sahla Selassie and
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his predecessor was no longer there. ¥ith the king dead and 
the heir apparent, Menelik, a prisoner at the headquarters 
of the Emperor, Shoa entered on a period of decline. Yet, 
it was at this critical period that the achievements of the 
previous reigns in general and of Sahla Selassie in particular 
come to light. The success of the reigns before 1865 had 
united both ruler and subjects in the conviction that their 
welfare lay in maintaining the independence of their kingdom. 
Thus although cut off from their king, the inhabitants of 
Shoa struggled on to overthrow the imperial administration, 
established by Theodros. The escape and return of Menelik 
to Shoa in the second half of 1865 sealed the success of 
"Shoan" resistance to imperial conquest. The restored 
king gave effective leadership in the country and once more 
Shoa became a peaceful prosperous and powerful kingdom. As 
it turned out the reign of Menelik marked the climax of Shoa's 
development.
The last phase of Shoa's development, like the preceding 
phases, was made possible partly by the co-operation of the 
subjects and partly by the qualities of the ruler. Menelik 
was probably the most capable of the Shoan rulers. He inherited 
both his policy and his qualities - military prowess, admini­
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strative ability, benevolence and intelligence - jfrbm his 
Shoan ancestors. But the bitter experiences of his youth 
and his early contact with Europeans sharpened his latent 
natural intelligence. He was quick to realize the advantage 
that his position as king of Shoa gave him in the Empire and 
he determined to make good use of this to win the imperial 
crown for his dynasty. And his astute mind enabled him to 
employ European nationals and to manipulate his relations 
with European powers in various ways to further his policy 
of conquest and expansion. Thus when in 1889 Menelik became 
Emperor of the whole of Ethiopia he had behind him over twenty 
years experience not only in the art of governing but also in 
dealing with European powers. It was the experience which 
Menelik gained as King of Shoa which made his imperial reign 
the success that it was.
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